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INTRODUCTION
Isidor Wallimann and
Michael N. Dobkowski
Millions have died from poverty, millions from war and, as will
become evident in this book, millions have been victims of genocide.
While the social sciences have long been concerned with poverty-its
effects, causes, and prevention-much less attention has been given to
the nature of social conflicts and their possible escalation into war and
the destruction of human lives. Attempts to increase our understanding
of the nature of social conflicts and ways to de-escalate them (e.g.,
Kriesberg 1973) are part of a relatively recent endeavor to use social
science insights for the prevention of war and the maintenance of peace.
Still, despite the growing number of individuals and research institutes
devoted to "peace research," efforts to successfully destroy life through
war far outweigh those to preserve it. When it comes to genocide, the
situation is even more precarious. Although genocide has been a recurring social phenomenon and has become ever more devastating in terms
of lost human life as we have moved into the twentieth century, little
effort has been spent in assessing its causes in the hope of better preventing it It is as if events of genocidal proportions have-for whatever
psychological or sociological reasons-been suppressed and excluded
from the researchers' agenda. Yet, it is our opinion that genocide, like
poverty, war, and all other events and processes destructive of human
life, should gain top attention from scholars. With this collection of
essays, we wish to enhance and facilitate this process in the hope that
knowledge and "scientific" effort will increasingly be directed toward
and serve the preservation of life.
If such scholarly efforts are to contribute to the improvement of the
human condition by preserving life, in the case of genocide we can no
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longer conceive of it as a random (although relatively rare) historic phenomenon. Instead, we are compelled to look for patterns which lead to
and are associated with these annihilations. Difficult as it may be to accept such a notion, we must also look upon the history and nature of societies giving rise to genocides as man-made and thereby influenceable.
Any other perspective would preclude the human agency necessary to act
preventively. Thus, postulating that the social and historic circumstances
making genocide possible are man-made, and that genocides, far from
being random events, may be associated with certain social patterns, we
must begin to penetrate the circumstances under which human beings
have been annihilated in the past so that we can establish criteria for the
prevention of similar destructions in the future.
This volume is divided into two parts. The first part contains contributions of a general nature. They are primarily concerned with definitions, typologies, and explanations of genocide. The essays in the second part focus more heavily on special aspects of the phenomenon. On
the one hand, they illuminate processes or special characteristics associated with a particular genocide. On the other hand, they attempt to test
specific hypotheses or to explain the emergence of a given event of
genocide. Ultimately, both the more general and the specific articles
complement and draw from each other. In no way can they be treated as
mutually exclusive. Both parts, we believe, bring us a step further in the
"scientific" analysis and understanding of genocide as a modem social
and historical phenomenon.
Any disciplined analysis of genocide requires that certain definitional
issues and problems be clarified. Even if such problems cannot immediately be resolved, they must nevertheless be articulated. This we have
attempted to do at the outset. Here the discussion centers around such
issues as the groups that should be subsumed under any discussion of
victims of genocide. In addition to racial groups, for example, should
the annihilation of ethnic, religious, economic, or political groups also be
included in a definition of genocide? Other points concern the question
of numbers killed, intent, and plan. How many or what percentage of
members of a group must be destroyed before an event should be called
genocidal? Must this destruction be intentional or should any comparable destruction, intentional or not, be categorized as genocide? The
important question also arises concerning when, if at all, war is genocide
and genocide is war.
Not unrelated to definitions of genocide is the attempt to classify
events of genocide. In fact, classifications and typologies are a necessary prerequisite if genocide is to be understood and explained at all.
Again, we have chosen to place contributions aiming to develop and
justify typologies of genocide in Part I, which investigates how genocides have varied throughout history and to what extent this variance
may have been "caused" by differences in modes of production; differ-
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ences in warfare; economic competition; the tendency to accumulate economic power and wealth; differences in state power; the need to maintain
political control; or bureaucratization, ideology, and technology.
In many ways, typologies imply explanation because events of genocide are grouped according to criteria which in themselves can serve as
explanation. Nevertheless, the first part of this volume also includes
contributions which focus, aside from any explanatory power inherent in
typologies, on more general explanations of genocide. Thus, it is discussed how genocide could be a technique of dealing with surplus populations, implying that if the rise of surplus populations could be prevented genocide might not occur. Other endeavors look for an explanation of genocide in the existence of severe social cleavages, and in the
outright support of (or lack of constraints placed on) totalitarian regimes
by other nations. Also, it is postulated that the inability to carry through
structural social and political readjustments induces genocide, particularly when drastic changes might be called for as a result of defeat in
war, national independence, revolution, and so on. Finally, it is suggested that we should begin to understand modern genocides not as
examples of a rather impersonal process of technological rationality, or
as the results of structurally induced crises, but rather as acts of societal
madness. The entire notion of purposeful intentionality is critically
explored.
More specific studies characterize Part II. By focusing on the corruption of the law as it preluded genocide, by examining the Jewish
Holocaust, and by looking at other instances of genocide such as the
Armenian case or the "genocide" perpetrated against the Aborigines in
connection with colonialism and imperialism, it is possible to improve
our understanding of mass death. In addition, the question of the
uniqueness or universality of genocide(s) can fruitfully be dealt with in
this manner. For should the Holocaust, for example, prove to be
unique, the criteria making it thus can be drawn upon as explanatory
variables for a better understanding not only of the Holocaust but also,
by inference, of other examples of mass death. Thus, it is postulated
that the Holocaust is unique because of its scope, its unprecedented
involvement of the legal and administrative apparatus, the horrible treatment meted out to the individuals to be annihilated, and the concerted
ideological campaign directed against the population targeted for destruction. Yet these destructions do not occur in a vacuum. In as much as it
is individuals who carry out these atrocities, it also is important to pose
certain questions on the social psychology level. For example, which
ideology, mind sets, and personalities must already exist or be created
for individuals or even major segments of a society to feel unashamed
and justified in being part of an extermination enterprise?
It has been suggested that middleman minorities, due to their peculiar
position, and to the cleavages and conflicts in which they partake or be-
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come involved, are particularly likely to be discriminated against. Could
it be that, since such discrimination has often assumed high levels of
intensity, middleman minorities are therefore likely to become victims of
genocide? Is there a connection between middleman minority status and
genocide? For, should such a connection exist, we may have come a
step closer to understanding the phenomenon and possibly being able to
devise ways of preventing it.
Given the issues and questions raised in this collection, where do we
go from here? What points need further clarification, and what problems
still are to be solved? Admittedly, they are many, and if we, as editors,
now enter the discussion by pointing out some of the issues we believe
need further attention, we are fully aware of the selective nature of our
attempt. Yet, we maintain that these issues are pressing and important.
They concern the connection between genocide, surplus population, economic gain, and middleman minorities, and the question of intentionality
as it pertains to genocide.
We believe that it is of great importance to further investigate the connection between genocide and the presence or absence of surplus populations, just as it has been important to investigate the evolution of societies, their stratification systems, and the corresponding existential conditions in a manner that includes population size in relation to available
resources (Lenski 1966). However, in studying the connection between
genocide and surplus population, we need not necessarily confine ourselves solely to the question of how so-called surplus populations have
been and are being eliminated. We can equally inquire how society has
"constructively" rather than "destructively" dealt with surplus populations throughout history. For instance, we can study, as Mizruchi
(1983) shows, how potentially troublesome surplus populations, far
from being annihilated, have been socially controlled and regulated.
Thus, by inference, ways might be found which preempt genocidal
strategies of surplus population management.
Whenever the notion of surplus population is being used, it is important to distinguish between absolute and relative surplus population,
something Lenski and Mizruchi fail to do. For a portion of the society
may appear to us as superfluous while in fact it is not. Appearances can
be misleading and superficial; our observation that some people can no
longer maintain themselves or lack sufficient integration into the economic system may tempt us to conclude that a surplus of people exists.
However, taking appearances for reality has more often than not been a
source of great error. If, as is the case in capitalist societies, for instance, millions go hungry, are unemployed, underemployed, or on
welfare while factories run at much lower than full capacity and land
remains uncultivated or inappropriately used, the problem is not one of
having too many people. The problem lies instead in the structure of the
economy and the entire mode of production and distribution. The ap-
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parent surplus population is, under these circumstances, only relative,
not absolute, and should not even be called a surplus population. This
term itself tends to blame the victims, i.e., those negatively affected by
the politics inherent in a given mode of production. It tends to single
them out as the problem's source, overlooking the real sources of the
apparent overpopulation located in the economic system as a whole. In
short, the problem of relative surplus population is one of political
economy, not one of individuals reproducing at a rate faster than economic means can be made available. Even if one were able to show that
a society or segments thereof reproduce in excess of what can be produced to maintain everyone, it must be kept in mind that fertility rates
themselves are influenced by existing economic conditions. This can be
observed in those cases in which some elements of the population who
are marginalized economically distribute their risks by increasing the
number of offsprings. All this goes to demonstrate that so-called surplus
populations are rarely absolute. Should the presence of a relative surplus
population, therefore, be connected with events of genocide, it follows
that in order to prevent the latter, structural economic changes preventing
the rise of relative surplus populations must be brought about.
The present tradition (see, for instance, Rubenstein 1983) of linking
relative surplus population with genocide postulates that this surplus
population consists of the chronically unproductive and generally unemployable who, in times of crisis, might be eliminated. Since large-scale
elimination has been witnessed under Joseph Stalin as well as under
Adolf Hitler, it is concluded that these genocides served as a means to reduce or eliminate the existing relative surplus population perceived to be
problematic. It is our opinion, however, that the population eliminated
in both cases should not be characterized as chronically unproductive and
generally unemployable, and when they showed such "traits," as in part
was the case in Germany, this was the result of a policy that systematically cut Jews off from economic activity. What we are confronted with
here, therefore, seems to be a problem involving the categories employed. This problem deserves further attention and scrutiny. The
following questions must be asked: Why were other groups not eliminated who readily appeared as superfluous, i.e., as chronically unproductive and generally unemployable? Why should the relative surplus
population be eradicated indirectly? What can be gained, and who benefits (politically and economically) from an elimination of middleman
minorities or otherwise situated economically integrated segments of a
population in order to "solve" the relative surplus population problem?
In a larger economic and political context, what could be the function of
generating "vacancies" by eliminating groups that would not usually be
called chronically unproductive or generally unemployable? Why is it
that programmed and planned annihilation, historically speaking, seems
to be directed more often against economically integrated non-wage labor
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groups (such as middleman minorities) while wage laborers, the marginalized, and the poor of all ages seem to perish without explicit effort and
intention on the part of the remaining society?
The related idea that only intentional or planned massive destruction
of human lives should be called genocide can also be a very difficult and,
in our opinion, an inadequate notion. As such it has the tendency to
gloss over structural violence which through various mechanisms can be
equally as destructive of human life as many an intentional and planned
program of annihilation. In addition, the presence of structural violence
promotes the use of planned violence. The problem here lies not in the
difficulty of demonstrating what intentionality means psychologically
speaking, but rather in the neglect of those processes of destruction
which, although massive, are so systematic and systemic, and that therefore appear so "normal" that most individuals involved at some level of
the process of destruction may never see the need to make an ethical
decision or even reflect upon the consequences of their actions. What
prevents people from stepping outside of their particular situations and
from reflecting upon the consequences of their actions or inactions? Has
society, a product of human activity, become so objectified, so alien to
its source, that its creators feel no part of its operation, feel no possibility
of affecting its course of movement? Why is it that individuals do not
seem to be able to reflect upon the processes that have made them
anonymous actors, cogs in the system, and that have nudged many of
them to participate in genocide?
In a world that historically has moved from domination based primarily on the will of given individuals (in the Middle Ages, for example)
to one in which individuals are dominated by anonymous forces such as
market mechanisms, bureaucracies, and distant decision making by committees and parliaments, the emphasis on intentionality almost appears
anachronistic. To be sure, we are not suggesting that the individual actor
qua actor, be it Eichmann, a Turkish nationalist, or a soldier sitting in a
missile silo, is not responsible and should not be held accountable for his
or her actions. Neither do we say that they would not be capable of
making existential decisions. People do have a choice. Neither are we
suggesting that a specific nation or group engaged in genocide is involved in a process that has a degree of inevitability about it, hence
mitigating the issue of accountability. Rather, we are pointing to the fact
that in the modern age, the issue of intentionality on the societal level is
harder to locate because of the anonymous and amorphous structural
forces that dictate the character of our world. Technically speaking,
individuals have a will and retain the capacity to use it, but how often is
their agency the product of their will and intentions? Where in these
market mechanisms and decision-making processes lies the origin of intent, and whose intentions are being carried out? If, as a result of worldwide market involvement and market pressures, slaves in the eighteenth

Introduction

xvii

century began to be worked to death within some seven or eight years,
down from a much longer life expectancy, where can the plan for this
large-scale destruction of members of the black race be located? And
why was there no serious reflection on the part of slaveholding society
concerning the long-run economic consequences for the slave system as
a whole, to say nothing of the humanitarian and moral considerations,
dictated by the waste of such a cruel and seemingly "irrational" system?
And where was the rest of the world? Ideology, racism, and the availability of surplus labor to exploit, be it in the American South or in the
Nazi slave labor camps, are certainly operative and important factors, but
they are only partial explanations.
These are important questions since they force us to probe more
deeply and fundamentally into the nature of social structures and systems. Aside from the presence or absence of intentions and plans, it
must be investigated which forms of social organization are more likely
to guarantee the preservation rather than the systematic destruction of
lives through structural violence. Which forms of social organization
also make it less likely for a massive genocide to occur? Along these
lines it can be hypothesized that the less a society is permeated by
structural violence, the lower will be the likelihood of genocide and mass
destruction, for societies with lower levels of structural violence are also
less likely to allow for planned large-scale genocide. The less individuals' lives are ruled by anonymous forces, i.e., the less they are subject
to structural violence of any kind, the less likely it is that they will
become involved as perpetrators in an event of genocide. Conversely, in
societies where all are perpetrated upon, all become perpetrators in one
way or another. Therefore, freedom from structural violence and the
anonymous forces that dominate modern man seems to be one precondition for overcoming our age of genocide. For, if in history we
have increasingly moved to more frequent and massive forms of
genocide as anonymous and impersonal domination increased, it follows
that, aside from personal domination and intentions, the structural domination -- that anonymous domination exerted by the character of an entire
social system-would have to be reversed. Not necessarily eliminating
genocide resulting from personal domination or the exercise of that
power (by dictator, tyrant, king, tribal chieftain, for example), this
reversal may contribute to the mitigation of the massive and frequent
genocides that have been part of the landscape of modern human intercourse. Making genocide by definition dependent on the existence of
any intention and plan to destroy lives, therefore, seems historically and
politically too limiting.
What is required, then, is a greater degree of reflection upon and
awareness of the anonymous societal forces that frame and propel our
existence so that we can begin the arduous task of eliminating the structural violence that leads to domination, inequality, and the possibility of
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genocide. Ultimately what seems to be needed is a society that can
provide an equal access to power and resources for all with a minimum
degree of personal or structural coercion. We are fully aware of the utopian nature of our suggestions and recognize that such a world order
may never be achieved. Nevertheless, we stress our conviction that efforts in this direction must begin. We believe that the clarification of this
predicament must be attempted so that the struggle to eliminate structural
violence and domination can be initiated. Correct action requires understanding. Whatever progress is made in this pursuit, be it modest or
radical, will contribute to diminishing the possibility that in the future we
will engage in genocide, this most pernicious of anti-life-affirming
behaviors.
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PART I

Conceptualizing,
Classifying, Defining, and
Explaining Genocide:
Some Macro Perspectives

1
A TYPOLOGY OF GENOCIDE
AND SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR
THE HUMAN RIGHTS AGENDA
Kurt Jonassohn and Frank Chalk

INTRODUCTION
To begin with, such a title requires an explanation. Why would anyone try to construct a typology of genocide? The great majority of
serious studies that deal with genocide deal with a single case, usually
the Holocaust, less often with the Armenians in Turkey, and very rarely
with other cases. In doing a study of a single case no typology is required, either because the case is treated as a unique event, or because
the argument involves the internal sequence of circumstances that led to
the genocide.
The need for some method of classification becomes apparent only
when one is trying to deal with a large number of cases comparatively.
In fact, in so doing one even becomes aware of the need for a rather
rigorous and unambiguous definition; how else will one decide which
cases belong in the study and which ones really represent a quite different phenomenon and thus should not be included? But even after this
first step has been taken, the question arises whether all of the cases that
do meet the criteria of the definition should be considered as falling into
one large group. This question tends to answer itself after some preliminary work on some of the cases has been done. It is quickly apparWe want to thank Norman Cohn, Helen Fein, Leo Kuper, and Anton
Zijderveld for discussing our work on genocide with us, though they are not
responsible for the contents of this chapter. An earlier version of this paper
was presented at the Seventeenth World Congress of Philosophy, August 2127, 1983, held in Montreal, Canada.
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ent that genocides occur in quite different societies, under vastly varying
circumstances, confronting quite different people, and resulting in dramatically different outcomes. Thus, treating all such cases as if they represented an undifferentiated phenomenon seems unlikely to lead to the
kinds of results that are the aim of scholarly research. What we need is
to group together those cases that appear to have some crucial characteristics in common. If we can fit all observed cases into one of several
such classes, then we can talk about a process of classification, the end
result of which will be a typology.
The textbooks on research methods tell us that the classes in a typology must be exhaustive and mutually exclusive. Such a requirement is
difficult enough to meet but is not sufficient. We are not interested in
imposing on our data some typology for the sake of order and neatness.
A typology is a tool of research; unless it can be used as a tool in the
analysis of the data, it is merely a frill that looks elegant but leads neither
to meaning nor to explanation. If our aim is to satisfy such requirements, then the question arises as to what to use as a basis of building a
typology. It soon appears that typologies could be built around several
criteria. Thus, one could look at minority-majority relations within a
society as well as power relations between societies; one might classify
genocides by the means employed as well as by the results achieved; or
one could consider causes as well as intentions. No doubt other bases
for developing a typology could be added. And good reasons for using
any of these could probably be developed. The choice will depend on
the kinds of questions we want to explore. But the answer is really
based on a hunch about the nature of the research to be undertaken. The
very word "research" tells us that we are entering the realm of the unknown; if we knew the answers beforehand, we would not be searching
for them. Thus, the adequacy of any particular typology can only be
assessed in terms of the research results it helps to produce.
The typology to be proposed here is based on the hunch that intent is
one such crucial criterion. If a definable group of people was almost or
wholly eliminated, but nobody intended this to occur, is this genocide?
Some definitions of genocide do not include the intent of the perpetrator.
However, the case made here is that such events, although equally
regrettable, are not genocides and therefore should be called something
else. This leaves us with the task of trying to classify the kinds of intentions of the perpetrators and leads directly to a major difficulty: how
does 9ne prove or infer intent?
One of the major reasons for engaging in the study of genocide from a
historical and comparative perspective is to find out whether some kinds
of societies are more likely to commit genocide than others. From this
perspective, it seems that a typology based on intent might have a great
deal of analytic utility. However, there are two problems with the criterion of intent: first, it is rarely easy to get good evidence on conscious
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intent and, second, intent may be either explicit or implicit. However,
the criterion of intent seems so important, and other criteria for constructing a typology seem to yield so little analytic gold, that these difficulties will simply have to be dealt with to the best of our ability. With
these remarks in mind, the present chapter will discuss the need to examine events within the context in which they occurred, examine the
reasons why genocidal events have been largely ignored in the literature
until the middle of the twentieth century, and propose a typology of
genocide.

THE BRUTISHNESS OF THE PAST
AND COLLECTIVE DENIAL
Our study of genocide has forced us on many occasions to confront
the brutishness of most human societies in the past and the changing
value placed on human life. It was not very long ago that many human
societies sacrificed human beings to propitiate the gods, to protect the
living against their displeasure, and to reassert the corporate unity of society. Human sacrifice existed throughout the ancient world, buttressed
by religions that promised a good life in the afterworld to the sacrificial
victim as well as the favor of the gods in this world for those who
carried out the ritual slayings. The most recent discovery by archeologists excavating at Carthage of the remains of 6,000 infants sealed in
individual sacrificial urns gives credence to the reports of commentators
in the ancient world that the Carthaginian aristocracy gave its youngest
sons to the priests for sacrifice to win the favor of the gods of war. In
many societies human sacrifice continued until the society embraced an
ethic that ennobled the individual in this world and adopted a code of behavior that placed this new ethic above the need to satisfy the grim appetite of the old gods for human blood.1 Nigel Davies, who traces this
change among the ancient Hebrews, credits them with transforming the
"concept of life-giving ... into that of self-giving." He contends that
once the ancient Hebrews came to see God as good and just, human
sacrifice ceased entirely.2
Yet even in those societies which abandoned human sacrifice, daily
life was coarse and brutal for all but the very few. The great French historian Fernand Braudel reminds us that famines and epidemics were so
common that "they were incorporated into man's biological regime and
built into his daily life."3 In Western Europe, which was favored by nature, "famine only disappeared at the close of the eighteenth century, or
even later. "4 Sixteenth-century European towns worked out elaborate
stratagems to divert armies of starving peasants from their gates. In the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, France and England developed new
institutions to control the poor displaced peasants who flocked to their
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cities and to harness their labor. The physically fit poor of Paris were
often chained together in pairs and forced to clean the drains, while the
poor of London were held in poorhouses under the new authority of the
Poor Laws and put to work at menial labor. Conditions for the mass of
the people were even worse, according to Braudel, in China and India,
where famines struck more frequently and with greater severity than in
Europe.
Peasants in Europe who reacted to their misery by stealing food or
property felt the full vengeance of the law. Death or maiming were the
usual penalties until the late Middle Ages. Medieval penalties for such
crimes were codified in the German Empire in the Constitutio Criminalis
Carolina of 1532, which was representative of European practice. After
specifying such penalties as hanging in chains, beheading or burial alive,
and impaling for the graver crimes, the Carolina takes up less serious
crimes such as theft. For these offenses it "prescribes afflictive punishments-flogging, pillorying, cutting off the ears, chopping off the fingers, cutting out the tongue-usually accompanied by a sentence of banishment. "5 In Western Europe, following the enormous population
losses of the Thirty Years' War and the start of the effort to populate
overseas colonies, human life came to be more highly valued. In the
mid-seventeenth century, England and France moderated their use of
capital punishment in cases of crimes against property. 6 As the number
of executions in England diminished, the English turned to the transportation of convicts to the colonies for terms of labor as indentured servants. 7 At the same time, France and other Mediterranean countries
found it increasingly useful to sentence physically fit convicted felons to
life sentences as oarsmen on naval galleys. (The argument in this paragraph follows Langbein, chapter 2.)
This coarseness and brutality of human existence throughout much of
history was a subject that hardly ever appeared in the curricula of our
schools. The good news was reported; the bad news was not. The
great massacres of the past lay beyond the range of the telescopes designed to focus upon evidence that justice always triumphed. In high
school and university-level textbooks, Athens flourished, but the massacre of the men of Melos was barely mentioned. The Romans destroyed
Carthage and Corinth, but the fate of their peoples was not discussed.
The authors of history textbooks hardly ever reported what the razing of
an ancient city meant for its inhabitants. In other words, the fate of
millions of human beings who died unnatural deaths as defenseless
civilians was invisible.
Our review of the history of mass extermination and its neglect has
led us to the conclusion that until very recently scholars participated in a
process of pervasive and self-imposed denial. Many factors entered into
the process of collective denial. Throughout most of recorded time, it
was the victors who wrote the history of their conquests, and even the
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victims of mass extermination accepted their fate as a natural outcome of
defeat. The idea of human rights is relatively new in Western society;
even today, many parts of the world still emphasize duties more than
rights. The Enlightenment tradition of viewing human beings as inherently good and rational also played a part in the denial, as did the rise
of nationalism. The slaughter of people of other races, religions, and
nationalities barely offended anyone's sensibilities.
It took the shocks of the twentieth century to reverse the process of
collective denial; the gap between practice and ideals simply became too
great to support the intellectual foundations of such denial. The Jews
who survived the Holocaust refused to accept meekly the Nazis' assault
on their right to exist. They recorded their experiences for posterity. At
the end of World War II, the victorious Allied powers tried and executed
top Nazi leaders judged guilty of crimes against humanity, an action
which created a new interest in the history of crimes against civilians.
Parochialism and nationalism were undermined by the spread of the
democratic ideal after the war and the increasing sophistication of the
mass of the people that resulted from greater access to higher education.
Increasingly, journalists in the West have cast themselves in the role of
adversaries to the holders of power and as spokesmen for the underdog
in national and international affairs. Emboldened by this freer, more
sympathetic atmosphere, other victims of past exterminatory campaigns
-the Ukrainians the Armenians, and the Gypsies-have begun to tell
their stories. Ultimately, even scholars awakened to the paucity of
studies examining and analyzing the phenomenon of mass extermination
in history.

A REVIEW

THE LITERATURE

When we began our work on genocide in 1978, we could count on
the fingers of one hand the number of scholars who had written
comparatively about genocide. A small group of writers, taking up the
challenge of Raphael Lemkin's work, contributed to this literature.s The
pioneering scholarly study of genocide published by Lemkin in 1944,
Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, established a definition of genocide
which laid out the approximate boundaries of the concept and identified a
number of specific historical events within its perimeter. Lemkin defined
genocide as the coordinated and planned destruction of a national, religious, racial, or ethnic group by different actions through the destruction of the essential foundations of the life of the group with the aim of
annihilating it physically or culturally. What we call ethnocide was a
form of genocide in Lemkin's all-inclusive definition. After the war, the
French coined the term ethnocide to deal with the extermination of a
culture that did not involve the physical extermination of its people. 9
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Writing as news of the Nazis' depredations flowed in from Europe,
Lemkin defined genocide to include attacks on political and social institutions, culture, language, national feelings, religion, and the economic
existence of the group. Acts directed against individuals because they
were also members of a group came within his definition of genocide.
These included killing the members of the group or the destruction of
their personal security, liberty, health, and dignity.
Lemkin incorporated a three-part typology of genocide based on the
intent of the perpetrator in The A.xis Rule in Occupied Europe. The aim
of the first genocides-which he situated in antiquity and the Middle
Ages-was a total or nearly total destruction of nations and groups. In
the modem era, Lemkin argued, a second type of genocide emerged,
involving the destruction of a culture without an attempt to physically
annihilate its bearers. Nazi genocide comprised the third type of genocide in Lemkin's analysis. It combined ancient and modem genocide in
a hybrid version characterized by the Nazi strategy of selecting some
peoples and groups for extermination in the gas chambers and others for
ethnocidal assimilation and Germanization. What Lemkin did not realize
was that twentieth-century genocide was increasingly becoming a case of
the state physically liquidating a group of its own citizens. Had he paid
more attention in his 1944 book to the case of the Armenian genocide of
1915 or the genocide of the German Jews, this facet of modem genocide
might have played a more prominent role in his analysis.
Until the early 1970s, there was almost no scholarly comparative
output on genocide. Since then, several authors have produced books
and articles renewing serious theoretical discourse on the subject. Hervé
Savon's typology, which appeared in his book Du Cannibalisme au
Genocide, consists of genocides of substitution, devastation, and elimination. These types of genocide take their meaning from the outcome of
genocidal killings. 10 While Savon's work revived interest in the problem of genocide, his typology based on outcomes fails to illuminate the
events leading up to the genocide and the possible methods of interrupting the process.
In 1976, Irving Louis Horowitz tackled the subject in a short volume
titled Genocide which he revised and reissued in 1980 under the title
Taking Lives: Genocide and State Power. As the new title suggests,
Horowitz views genocide as a fundamental policy employed by the state
to assure conformity to its ideology and to its model of society. His
discussion of the role of the state in genocide and his critique of the
failure of modem social science to tackle the most pressing social issues
of the day ring true.
Horowitz devises a continuum of modem societies in which the level
of state-induced repression of the right to dissent and to be different is
the key variable. 11 This continuum ranges from genocidal societies at
one extreme, through less repressive and more liberal societies, to per-
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missive societies at the other extreme. Horowitz' typology is based primarily on twentieth-century cases. His approach focuses on outcomes
and does little to explain the process whereby an authoritarian state
resorts to genocide, nor does it account for pre-twentieth-century
genocides. Moreover, as Horowitz himself admits, a typology based on
internal repression cannot explain by itself those genocides conducted in
foreign countries.
Vahakn Dadrian, who followed Lemkin in emphasizing the intent of
the perpetrator, published a somewhat confusing typology at about the
same time that Horowitz' book appeared. He posits five types of genocide: (1) cultural genocide, in which assimilation is the perpetrator's aim;
(2) latent genocide, which is the result of activities with unintended consequences, such as civilian deaths during bombing raids or the accidental
spread of disease during an invasion; (3) retributive genocide, designed
to punish a segment of a minority which challenges a dominant group;
(4) utilitarian genocide, using mass killing to obtain control of economic
resources; and (5) optimal genocide, characterized by the slaughter of
members of a group to achieve its total obliteration, as in the Armenian
and Jewish holocausts. Dadrian's lumping together of intended and
unintended genocide serves to weaken the rigor of his typology. It
seems to us that Dadrian has blended together the motives of the perpetrators, unintended outcomes, ethnocide, and non-genocidal massacres.12 We learned a great deal from his discussion of the importance of
perpetrator intent but have not been able to use his typology effectively in
our work.
Helen Fein included two thoughtful pages on types of genocide in her
1979 book on the Holocaust, Accounting for Genocide.13 Before the
rise of the nation-state, Fein argues, there were two types of genocide:
genocides intended to eliminate members of another faith and genocides
designed to exterminate other tribes because they could not be subdued
or assimilated. In her view, the nation-state has given birth to three new
types of genocide: in the first, the state commits mass extermination to
legitimate its existence as the vehicle for the destiny of the dominant
group; in the second, the state kills to eliminate an aboriginal group
blocking its expansion or development; and, in the third, the state reacts
spontaneously to rebellion by totally eliminating the rebels.
Understandably, there are omissions and gaps in Fein's typology,
which is only incidental to her major task. She does not provide a place
for mass exterminations intended to instill terror in others to facilitate
conquest, or for mass killings to further economic enrichment. These
are categories that we have found helpful in our work.
Leo Kuper has contributed more to the comparative study of the overall problem of genocide than any scholar since Raphael Lemkin. In his
1981 monograph on the subject, Kuper wrestles with the problems of
genocidal process and motivation. His discussion of past genocides
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clusters the motives of the perpetrator around three categories: (1) genocides designed to resolve religious, racial, and ethnic differences; (2)
genocides intended to terrorize a people conquered by a colonizing empire; and (3) genocides perpetrated to enforce or fulfill a political ideology.14 Kuper is especially concerned with the increasing frequency of
genocidal events in the modern period. Since modern genocides occur
within nation-states that have the character of plural societies, the
creation of new plural societies during the period of colonization and
decolonization becomes of particular significance for his analysis.
Under the heading of "related atrocities," Kuper discusses two groups
which are excluded under the U.N. definition of genocide. 15 These are
the victims of mass political slaughter and attempts to decimate an economic class. He examines three exterminations in this category: in
Stalin's Russia, the decimation of the peasants, the Party elite, and the
ethnic minorities; in Indonesia, the slaughter of Communists in 1965;
and in Cambodia, the mass murders of the Kampuchean government led
by the Khmer Rouge. Kuper concludes that each of these cases would
have been labeled genocide if political groups had been protected by the
U.N. Convention.
In examining a large number of cases, Kuper insists on the need to
refer to specific conditions in each case. He does not think that it is
possible to write in general terms about the genocidal process. "The
only valid approach would be to set up a typology of genocides" and to
analyze the genocidal process in each type and under specific conditions.16
Kuper's book is the most useful contribution to the literature on
genocide thus far, but we have two major problems with it. One,
because he does not have a rigorous definition of genocide, he includes a
number of cases in his discussion which have no salient characteristics in
common. This is a serious handicap in attempting a comparative study
of genocide. Although Kuper is aware of this problem, instead of
excluding certain cases of large-scale killing, he includes them under the
category of genocidal massacre and related atrocities. Two, in his analysis, he treats plural societies as particularly vulnerable to genocide. We
think that the plural character of a society is at best an intervening
variable. It is new states or new regimes attempting to impose conformity to a new ideology that are particularly likely to practice genocide.
When tensions between the traditional society and the new regime
escalate, it is the plural character of a society which is most likely to
provide the social cleavages that define the perpetrator and victim
groups.
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A DEFINITION AND TYPOLOGY OF GENOCIDE
In order to distinguish genocide from the various misfortunes that
befall people, it is important to include the criterion of planning and
intent to destroy in its definition. The most widely accepted definition of
genocide is that contained in the 1948 United Nations Convention on
Genocide:
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial
or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental hann to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.17

While this definition certainly does include the criterion of intent, it does
not cover the extermination of political and economic groups-an exclusion made necessary in order to assure the passage of the Convention.
In our own work, we have broadened the United Nations definition to
include political and economic groups.
We propose to use this amended United Nations definition in our
work although it has serious shortcomings: it does not adequately define
the victim groups; it includes acts which we would consider ethnocide
rather than genocide; and it obfuscates the distinction between genocides, massacres, and wartime casualties. However, since this definition
is the most widely known one and since no better definition has been
devised, we shall use it for the time being. But in our usage, we shall
exclude those killings which are not the deliberate physical extermination
of a defenseless group, in whole or in part.
In devising a typology of genocide, we had no difficulty in deciding
that it should be based on intent, but the actual categories posed a much
harder problem. We have tried a number of typologies only to discard
them later. When we examined actual cases, it turned out that almost all
of them could fit into more than one category and thus required decisions
as to what should be considered the dominant intent. The present
typology is offered as a heuristic device and not as a final product. It
may well be modified as a result of our own further research or in response to such critiques as interested readers are prepared to contribute.
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We have classified genocides in terms of those committed (1) to eliminate the threat of a rival; (2) to acquire economic wealth; (3) to create
terror and (4) to implement a belief, a theory, or an ideology. In looking at actual cases, the motives tend to be more complex than such a
relatively simple scheme allows for; therefore, we have assigned cases
to one of these types on the basis of what we consider to have been the
dominant intent of the perpetrator.
We do not know when the first genocide occurred. It seems unlikely
that early man engaged in genocide during the hunting and gathering
stage. While we have no direct evidence, this seems a reasonable assumption because men lived in quite small groups and overall population
densities were extremely low (1 per 10 km 2 of habitable terrain according to the estimates ofMcEvedy and Jones).18
After the discovery of agriculture, the world divided into nomads and
settlers. This marked the start of systematic conflict in the form of food
raiding by the nomads. The nomads quickly learned to raid their settled
neighbors at harvest time for their food stores; however, they had no
interest in exterminating them because they planned to repeat their raids
in subsequent years. The settlers may have had much better reason to do
away with the nomads, but they had neither the means nor the skills to
do so.
As the settlers improved their agricultural techniques and produced
significant surpluses, they were able to support cities, rulers, and armies. They accumulated wealth and engaged in significant trade. With
these developments, the scene changed dramatically. Conflicts arose
over wealth, trade, and trade routes. Wars were fought over the access
to wealth and over the control of transportation networks (to use a
modem term). At first, these conflicts were probably in the nature of
brigandage and robbery. Soon they escalated to wars between citystates. However, these warring peoples soon discovered that their victories were mostly temporary: the defeated peoples withdrew long
enough to rebuild their resources and their armies, and then tried to recoup their losses and to avenge their defeat. This pattern became so
common that it soon appeared that the only way to assure a stable future
was to eliminate the defeated enemy once and for all. People that were
not killed during or after the battle were sold into slavery and dispersed.
This elimination of a potential future threat appears to be the reason for
the first genocides in history.
Genocides of this first type seem to have been common throughout
antiquity, especially in the Middle East, where trade routes between
Asia, Africa, and Europe crossed. The Assyrians were expert practitioners; about a number of the peoples whom they vanquished we know
little more than their names.19 When the empire of the Hittites was
destroyed, it was done so efficiently that not even the location of their
capital was known until an inspired German archeologist unearthed it
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almost by accident in the nineteenth century.20 Perhaps the best-known
example of this type of genocide is the destruction of Carthage.21 The
so-called Punic Wars between Carthage and Rome lasted well over a
century (264-146 B.C.) and were fought mostly over the control of the
Mediterranean trade and economy. These wars were incredibly costly in
terms of material and lives, even by modern standards. After Rome just
barely won the Second Punic War (218-201 B.C.), it decided that
Carthage had to be eliminated once and for all. Those who were not
killed in the Third Punic War (149-146 B.C.) were sold into slavery, and
the city was destroyed. Looking at the available evidence from antiquity, one might even develop a hypothesis that most wars at that time
were genocidal in character.
The evidence from antiquity is often contradictory, ambiguous, or
missing. Such evidence as we have consists almost exclusively of
written materials that were produced either by the victims or by the perpetrators; in those rare cases where we have accounts from both sides,
they tend not to confirm each other's evidence. It may well be that as yet
undiscovered evidence will shed new light on how and why entire
peoples have disappeared. Such disappearances in themselves are not
evidence of genocide because they may have been due to a variety of
processes, from migration to assimilation. However, if we should ever
develop an archeology of genocide, we may acquire more conclusive
proof of what happened to the populations of cities that were destroyed
and to whole peoples that have disappeared. One case illustrating such
possibilities is the extermination, reported by Iranian historians, of
whole populations by the Mongols under Genghis Kahn; these reports
were thought to be exaggerated because they originated from the victims.
They gained renewed credibility, however, when archeologists unearthed the pyramids of skulls that Iranian historians had described. 22
The second type of genocide is one committed primarily to acquire
economic wealth. It probably also originated in antiquity. People looking for greater wealth than their own territory could provide found it in
the possession of others. When such wealth was in the form of fertile
land and other primary resources, it could not be carried off as loot, but
could only be acquired by occupying the land and enslaving and/or exterminating the indigenous population. This type of genocide has continued to occur throughout history up to the present day. It has often
been associated with colonial expansion and the discovery and settlement
of new parts of the world. The Tasmanians23 disappeared in the same
way that some of the peoples of the interior of Brazil are disappearing
today.24
The third type of genocide is a somewhat later invention and was
associated with the building and maintaining of empire. To conquer
others and to keep them subjugated requires large armies and a permanent investment in a large occupying force. Genghis Khan probably
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deserves credit for realizing that the creation of terror is far more efficient
as well as more effective.25 He offered his prospective conquests the
choice of submitting or of being exterminated. If they did not submit,
the threat was ruthlessly carried out. Although there were never more
than about 1 million Mongols, using these methods Genghis Khan was
able to establish an empire that comprised most of the then known world
from China to Central Europe.
These three types of genocide have largely disappeared from history
for the simple reason that modem states have become so large that it is
no longer possible for the victor to exterminate the defeated enemy.
They persist, particularly genocides committed for economic reasons,
only in cases where the victim population consists of a relatively small
tribe living in relative isolation. In the twentieth century, several such
cases have been reported in South America.
The fourth type of genocide is quite different from the first three and
is also of much more recent origin. It is based on the implementation of
a belief, a theory, or an ideology. When conformity is enforced by
church or state, deviation from the dominating belief system is, in extreme cases, punished by extermination. It is in this fourth type of
genocide that the definition of the group becomes problematic because
the victim group is defined by the perpetrator; since the perpetrator's
definition is derived from his belief, theory, or ideology, the group may
be a real one or it may be a pseudo-group that has no existence outside
the perpetrator's particular conceptual framework. Similarly, the deviation that the victim group is accused of may be real or it may be imaginary, taking the form of a pseudo-conspiracy or an imagined social pollution which threatens the survival of the regime, the state, or the church.
The combination of these two variables, the group and what it is
accused of, leads to the following four sub-types:
In the first sub-type, both the group and what it is accused of are real.
Thus, the victims of the Albigensian Crusade were a real group of
heretics who were accused by the Papacy of a real deviation-the Cathar
Heresy.
In the second sub-type, both the group and what it is accused of are
inventions of the perpetrator. The first occurrence of this phenomenon
was the Great Witch-Hunt of the Middle Ages. We consider this a case
of genocidal massacre rather than genocide; however, it is instructive
because today we would all agree that there were no covens of witches
flying to meetings with the Devil on the tops of mountains, that there
were no pacts with the Devil to overthrow Christendom, and that no
witch ever had intercourse with the Devil. Although neither the groups
nor the accusations of conspiracy had a basis in reality, their horrible
consequences were real enough. Accused witches were tortured to extract confessions on the basis of which they were then burned at the
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stake. (We are fortunate that in the twentieth century a nation-state's
belief in the Devil seems to decrease with the increase in its national
debt).26
In the third sub-type, a real group is falsely accused of conspiracy.
The Turkish genocide against the Armenians in 1915 illustrates this type.
In contrast to the demonic witches, the Armenian people were a real
group, based on a common language and religion many centuries old.
But the Turkish charges of conspiracy against the state were wildly exaggerated. While there certainly were Armenian separatist organizations
who cooperated with the Russians during World War I, their supporters
were few and their ability to influence events was small. Yet the Turkish
government attacked virtually the entire Armenian population when it
launched its deportation and killing operations.
In the fourth sub-type, a pseudo-group is accused of a real conspiracy. This would be the case where the state had evidence of a real
opposition without being able to identify its members. It might then
accuse a pseudo-group and victimize it because its members are already
unpopular with the regime. This is a form of scapegoating that is well
known in other contexts. Such a pseudo-group can then be identified
only through the definition imposed on it by the perpetrator. While such
victimization does occur frequently enough, we can think of no actual
case that has reached genocidal proportions.
Genocide associated with the implementation of a belief, a theory, or
an ideology-our fourth type-had its origins in the Middle Ages but
has become much more frequent in the twentieth century. The rising
importance of theories and ideologies has produced a revival of accusations of pseudo-conspiracies which has resulted in much more frequent
persecutions of real and pseudo-groups; some of these have resulted in
horrible genocides and genocidal massacres. We are only too familiar
with the horrors committed in Ottoman Turkey,27 in Stalin's Russia,28
and in Hitler's Germany.29 One of the things that is different about this
fourth type of genocide is its result for the perpetrator: For the first
three types, it can be argued that genocide produced tangible benefits for
the perpetrators; in the case of the fourth type, it seems clear that
genocide was carried out in spite of tremendous costs to the perpetrators,
costs that can be measured in economic, political, and developmental
terms.

A NOTE ON METHODS
The definition of concepts and the design of a typology are an
essential part of any research enterprise. However, they are essential
only in making sense of the data. In the study of genocide, the data
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present a set of particularly difficult problems. This is not the place for
exploring these problems in detail. However, four kinds of problems
should be mentioned that make such study especially difficult:
1. The evidence is by its very nature difficult to obtain because throughout
most of history relevant records either were not kept or did not survive;
2. Where records do exist, they either originate with the perpetrators or with
the victims, but rarely do we find records from both;
3. When we do have records from the perpetrators and the victims, they are
often so divergent that it is difficult to decide what actually did occur, and
the intentions of the perpetrator may be the most difficult evidence to
discover; and
4. The reliability of the records presents another problem, especially in the
premodem period. Thus, we have evidence for genocides that occurred
but were not reported; but we also have those that were reported but never
occurred.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE HUMAN RIGHTS AGENDA
In our century, the increasing prevalence of the conditions leading to
type four genocide is becoming a matter of serious concern to those of us
who care about human rights. If we look at societies from Horowitz'
perspective, then we must ask how they deal with deviance and nonconformity. It seems to us that the crucial dimension in a society's
handling of deviants is the way it defines and maintains their membership in the society itself. This is not a purely conceptual distinction,
because it has wide-ranging consequences not only for the victims but
also for the way the world responds to the victims and the perpetrators.
Insofar as a given society responds to its deviants and dissenters with
something other than tolerance and permissiveness, the first question to
be asked is whether such groups are defined as continuing members of
the society or whether they are deprived of such membership. Loss of
membership can be implemented in only two ways, that is, by deportation or by extermination. Any other form of repression or punishment
implicitly acknowledges the victim's continuing membership.
Torture and harassment are ways of physically punishing "deviant"
groups and individuals. But punishment is incidental to intimidating and
terrorizing the rest of society: when victims remain at large or eventually
rejoin their erstwhile groups, their membership in society remains
unquestioned precisely because they are intended to serve as a dire warning to other actual or potential "deviants." It is also precisely because
they have retained their membership and their citizenship that it is possible to take action on their behalf under various human rights legislations and conventions.
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Deportation and extermination pose a different problem. In the case
of deportation, the victims may be helped by being granted a new membership status and the associated civic rights in another society that is
willing to welcome them. However, in the case of extermination
assistance is, by definition, too late to help the victims. Thus, in these
cases any meaningful action would have to address the search for
methods of early warning and prevention. Such a search faces daunting
problems of theory and practice. Prediction and early warning of mass
exterminations and deportations have barely been raised as a theoretical
problem, and a great deal of work remains to be done before any such
prediction can be made with some assurance of correctness. But even
after such theoretical problems are solved, there still remains the practical
problem of the sovereignty of the perpetrator. The history of the United
Nations, with all of its conventions, stands as mute testimony to the
discouragement of those of us who still believe in the worth and dignity
of all human beings.
Against this background, it is understandable that human rights
activism addresses itself to torture and harassment much more than to
deportation and extermination. With respect to torture and harassment,
much more is known about help for the victims and the possibility of
prevention. Success, when achieved or seen as attainable, reinforces
further activism. No such encouragement seems to be available to those
concerned with genocide and deportation. While mass deportations
seem to be decreasing due to growing populations which are too large to
transport, the spread of the nation-state, and the disappearance of relatively empty territories, genocides in the twentieth century seem to have
been increasing in number and in scope. (To cite just one example,
while it was possible for England, France, Spain, and Portugal to expel
the Jews at different times, it was not possible for Hitler to expel the
millions of Jews living in Germany and its occupied territories.)
In discussing the persecution and extermination of individuals and
groups, it is important to remember the distinction between theory and
practice. Many countries have declared judicial torture to be illegal; an
even larger number of countries have signed the United Nations Convention on Genocide. Yet this has clearly not meant that either practice has
disappeared or even diminished. There is a huge gap between declarations of good intentions and their application and realization.
The twentieth century has seen a tremendous increase of new states,
the majority of which are ruled by one-party totalitarian or military regimes. Totalitarian or military regimes usually have to deal with dissenting groups, which leads inevitably to various forms of repression and
persecution, and, with increasing frequency, to genocidal massacres and
to outright genocide.30 Such states are particularly prone to engage in
what we have called type four genocides, that is, genocides based on the
implementation of a belief, a theory, or an ideology.
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Individual activists and protest groups, assisted by several international conventions on human rights, have learned a great deal about the
various ways of assisting the victims of persecution in different countries. Such help, while not always successful, is usually initiated by
specific reports of incarceration and torture while the victims are alive.
Similar reports of killings and genocides do not elicit the same kind of
action for the obvious reason that the victims are already beyond help.
Why are human rights efforts not more successful? The first reason
is that the very notion of human rights is foreign to most cultures of the
world. It is often seen as another Western export that is being imposed
on the rest of the world from outside. Implementation of human rights
legislation is possible only in a democratic regime based on the rule of
law. Where military and/or totalitarian regimes are in power, the whole
notion of human rights is a contradiction in terms. The second reason is
that the nation-state is both the guardian and the violator of human rights.
Therefore, action from within is either impossible or fruitless, and action
from without conflicts with the much too widely accepted definition of
sovereignty. A further consequence of military and authoritarian regimes
is that they can control access to and distribution of information, with the
result that violations may not even become known or that proof may not
be accessible. The third reason is that international bodies and international agreements, largely supported by the West, continue to exist
mostly for symbolic reasons. Their continued existence is dependent
upon the degree to which they serve the interests of all sides. However,
their efficacy will remain largely symbolic because no supra-national
body exists that can enforce their terms. The participants are sovereign
nations that will not accept any diminution of their sovereignty, especially when they are also the offenders.
For these reasons, human rights actions will have to continue to rely
on publicity and on shaming campaigns, where these are successful. In
addition, their mission should be to spread the ideology of human rights
and to encourage and support research into the conditions and situations
which seem to increase or decrease the probability of human rights
violations in various countries.
Any worthwhile activism with regard to genocide will have to be
radically different from other human rights efforts. In order to be of help
to the potential victims, it will have to focus solely on prevention. Theo
van Boven, the former Director of the United Nations Division of
Human Rights, has recently made a similar plea with regard to political
assassinations and extra-judicial executions. However, in order to prevent such lethal crimes, we would have to be able to predict their occurrence-something that our present state of knowledge does not yet
permit. Thus, any efforts at preventing future genocides will have to
start with the kind of research capable of yielding predictive indicators
that would then allow concerted efforts at prevention; in addition, re-
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search will be needed to uncover those conditions and techniques of
external pressure that are likely to be the most effective means of prevention.
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HUMAN DESTRUCTIVENESS
AND POLITICS:
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY AS
AN AGE OF GENOCIDE
Roger W. Smith

We can no longer choose our problems; they choose us.

Albert Camus

Genocide has existed in all periods of human history, but prior to the
contemporary period it was rare except as an aspect of war, or, in the
sixteenth and nineteenth centuries, as an aspect of development. To a
large extent genocide also appeared in a form specific to a given period
--conquest, religious persecution, colonial domination. In the twentieth
century, however, genocide has been a common occurrence; moreover,
the forms it has taken are diverse and spring from different motives:
there has been a convergence of destructive forces in our period.
Camus called the twentieth century an age of murder, but it is, more
precisely, an age of politically sanctioned mass murder, of collective,
premeditated death intended to serve the ends of the state. It is an age of
genocide in which 60 million men, women, and children, coming from
many different races, religions, ethnic groups, nationalities, and social
classes, and living in many different countries, on most of the continents
of the earth, have had their lives taken because the state thought this
desirable. Such an age should perhaps be condemned out of hand, but it
must also be understood: for we have to live as well as die in that world,
and, to be realistic, a great many persons alive today have contributed to
that genocide, mainly through passivity, but often through more active
involvement.
There have been other ages of genocide-Assyria engaged in genocide almost annually for several hundred years and turned deportation
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and forced labor into routine instruments of public policy, and millions
of lives were taken in the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries in the name
of progress. Yet there are unique aspects to genocide in the twentieth
century-the scale, the range of victims, the technology, the variety of
genocidal forms, even the motives-that set it apart from earlier ages of
human destructiveness. It is these that this chapter will explore, but
without neglecting elements of repetition and continuity in the politics of
death.
I

Genocidal precedents exert pressure, yet each occurrence of genocide
is separate: the specific victims, perpetrators, motives, methods, and
consequences differ. Nevertheless, each genocide is related to all others
in certain ways. Genocide must be legitimated by tradition, culture, or
ideology; sanctions for mass murder must be given by those in authority;
the forces of destruction have to be mobilized and directed; and the
whole process has to be rationalized so that it makes sense to the perpetrators and their accomplices.1 Victims, however else they may differ,
will be vulnerable to attack and will be perceived as lying outside the
universe of moral obligation. They will be dehumanized: "Cargo, cargo"
is the way Franz Stangl described his victims at Treblinka; "Guayaki," a
term meaning "rabid rat," is how the Paraguayans refer to the Aché
Indians. 2 They will be viewed not as individuals but only as members
of a despised group, blamed for their own destruction, and held accountable in terms of the ancient notion of collective and ineradicable guilt.
Then, too, there is the ever present cruelty; this must be discussed at
greater length, however, since it is often either ignored or misunderstood.
One is tempted to say that in the contemporary period genocide is a
crime of logic, whereas in earlier ages it was a crime of passion. But
this would distort both the present and the past: much gratuitous cruelty
accompanies genocide today, and most of the genocide from the twelfth
century B.C. forward has been premeditated, a rational instrument to
achieve an end. What is proper, though, is to recognize that because
much contemporary genocide aims at the total elimination of a group,
which even with modern means of destruction takes time, sheer passion
is not likely to sustain the participants beyond the initial destruction.3
Thus, the fabricators of genocide today have created the image of an
"ideal killer": the "dispassionate, efficient killer, engaged in systematic
slaughter, in the service of a higher cause. "4 Nevertheless, all genocide,
over and above the actual killing of persons, appears to contain a large
measure of cruelty. Not all of this is gratuitous, however. Some of it in
earlier society stemmed from the sheer exhilaration of power that accompanied destruction, or was calculated to create terror or to exact retribu-
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tion; more recently (though this also occurred in earlier societies), some
cruelty has been ritualistic, expressive of good triumphing over evil, as
in the slaying of the Indonesian Communists. 5 In many respects, then,
the brutality that accompanies genocide is culturally patterned. In more
modem, secular cultures, however, there is little or no support for torture, as opposed to the taking of lives, yet much sadistic behavior still
occurs. Here the cruelty can perhaps be understood as the dehumanization-loss of compassion, psychic numbing, detachment-that results
from the prolonged participation in mass slaughter. 6 But however one is
to explain it, cruelty is everywhere the twin-not the father--of
genocide.
There is another element that is found in many genocides, though
there are important exceptions in earlier ages: the refusal to accept responsibility for one's acts. The refrain is familiar: we knew nothing,
we only obeyed orders, it was God's will, we were defending ourselves, they had it coming. On the other hand, while most twentiethcentury genocide has been preceded by crisis or great frustration, this
seems not to be the case historically, except perhaps where religious
genocide has occurred. Indeed, the relationship between crisis and
genocide is almost the opposite of what some scholars have taken it to
be.7 And even in the twentieth century, crisis has not always existed:
the Indians of Paraguay, Brazil, and Peru, for example, have been
destroyed out of cold calculation of gain (and in some cases, sadistic
pleasure) rather than as the result of economic or political crisis. While
context and situation are. important, genocide is never an accidental
feature of society.
II

Genocide is almost always a premeditated act calculated to achieve the
ends of its perpetrators through mass murder. Sometimes, however,
genocidal consequences precede any conscious decision to destroy innocent groups to satisfy one's aims. This is most often the case in the early
phases of colonial domination, where through violence, disease, and
relentless pressure indigenous peoples are pushed toward extinction.
With the recognition of the consequences of one's acts, however, the
issue is changed: to persist is to intend the death of a people. This pattern of pressure, recognition, and persistence is typically what happened
in the nineteenth century. Today, however, when indigenous groups
come under pressure, the intention to destroy them is present from the
outset; there are few illusions about the likely outcome. The distinction,
then, between premeditated and unpremeditated genocide is not decisive,
for sooner or later the genocidal is transformed into genocide.
Rather than being simply an expression of passion, genocide is a
rational instrument to achieve an end. While these ends have varied from
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perpetrator to perpetrator and, to a large extent, by historical period, they
have typically included the following: revenge, conquest, gain, power,
and purification/salvation. From these we can construct a grammar of
motives which, in effect, asks the perpetrator: What are you trying to do
and why is it so important that you are willing to sacrifice thousands,
even millions of lives (including those of children) to achieve it? Formal, but nevertheless useful, answers to these questions are contained in
the different types of genocide, arranged in terms of the grammar of motives. Classified in this manner, the pure types of genocide are retributive, institutional, utilitarian, monopolistic, and ideological.s

Retributive Genocide
Retribution may play a role in all genocide, but it does so mainly as a
rationalization: it is a way of blaming the victim. Though it draws from
the vocabulary of justice and of judicially administered punishment,
genocide destroys persons most often for what they are rather than for
anything they have done. In this sense, retribution flows from the dehumanization that has been fastened to the victims before they are attacked. As a principal motive in genocide, retribution is rare, but it does
seem to figure prominently in accounts of conquerors like Chingis-khan
(Genghis Khan).9 Nevertheless, it is difficult to see how the "Conqueror of the World," as he called himself, differed in his actions when
inspired by revenge than he and others did when they engaged in the
institutional genocide associated with warfare until about the fifteenth
century.

Institutional Genocide
Institutional genocide was the major source of politically sanctioned
mass murder in the ancient and medieval worlds. The massacre of men,
the enslavement of women and children, and, often, the razing of towns
and the destruction of the surrounding countryside, were universal aspects of conquest: genocide was embedded in the very notion of warfare.10 As such, no explicit decision had to be made to commit genocide
-it had become routinized. In part, institutional genocide was motivated by the desire to create terror, to display one's power, and to
remove the possibility of future retaliation. But it was also due to a
failure of political imagination: genocide was a substitute for politics.
Instead of ruling a city or territory, extracting tribute from it, and perhaps
even incorporating it into one's own system of power and authority, the
society was devastated. By the late medieval period this practice had
largely ended in the West (indeed, it had begun to change with the
Romans, who understood that only through politics could one build an
empire), yet it became a prominent part of the Crusades and was made all
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the more deadly because of religious passion.11 In any case, institutional genocide continued in the East with figures like Timur Lenk until
the fifteenth century. For some 500 years thereafter, the genocide of
conquest disappeared. It is possible, however, that both guerrilla warfare and the use of nuclear weapons signify a revival of this early form
of genocide. If the means are different, the motives seem not that
dissimilar, and the consequences include both widespread devastation
and the massive taking of innocent life by those in authority.

Utilitarian Genocide
If utility played a role in institutional genocide, it became particularly
prominent in the genocide of the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries,
when colonial domination and exploitation of indigenous peoples in the
Americas, Australia, Tasmania, parts of Africa, and elsewhere became
pronounced. It has continued in the twentieth century, especially in
Latin America, where Indians have been subjected to genocidal attacks in
the name of progress and development. Apart from the more sadistic
aspects of this kind of destruction, the object has been Indian land-for
the timber it contains, the minerals that can be extracted, and the cattle it
can feed-and, at the turn of the century, Indian labor to harvest, under
conditions of forced labor, the sap of the rubber tree.12
Richard Rubenstein has recently argued that development leads to a
population "surplus," which in turn leads to programs to eliminate the
superfluous population.13 What is happening with the remaining indigenous population of Latin America, and what was the fate of millions in
various areas of the world earlier, has nothing, however, to do with a
surplus population (whatever that is, for Rubenstein never defines his
basic term). They are being killed, were killed, because of a combination of ethnocentrism and simple greed. The basic proposition contained
in utilitarian genocide is that some persons must die so that others can
live well. If that proposition no longer claims a large number of lives, it
is because the previous genocide was so effective and the remaining
tribes so small, with at most a few thousand members each. Yet precisely because of the tenacity of the assaults against them, and the small
size of the groups, utilitarian genocide, although somewhat rare in the
twentieth century, tends to be total.

Monopolistic Genocide
Most genocide prior to the twentieth century was external-it was
exacted of groups that lived outside one's territorial boundaries. There
are some important exceptions-most of which are connected with religious persecution-but for the most part genocide was directed outward:
its goals were conquest and colonial exploitation. Today almost all
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genocide is domestic-groups within one's borders are destroyed.
Again there are exceptions-Hitler committed both domestic and external
genocide-but most examples of genocide in the twentieth century have
been directed inward. Issues that were not at stake in external genocide
are central today: who belongs, who is to have a voice in the society,
what is to be the basic shape of the community, what should its purposes
be?
While these questions obviously lend themselves to ideological solutions, the genocide that has emerged as a means of shaping the basic
structure and design of the state and society has been more inclusive than
that. Examples of such attempts come from those that are ideologically
motivated (Cambodia), those that are not (Pakistan), and those that combine elements of both (Armenia). In fact, whatever the shape of the
regime, the most frequent source of genocide in the twentieth century has
been the struggle for the monopolization of power. While issues of
international dominance, of the distribution of power, of who rules can
be raised in any political system, they have been crucial to conflicts that
have emerged in Pakistan, Burundi, Nigeria, and other societies that
have pervasive cleavages between racial, religious, and ethnic groups.
These plural societies are in large part a legacy of nineteenth-century
colonialism, but their genocidal struggles take place today within the
framework of self-determination.14 Having been subjected to colonial
exploitation and genocide, these societies now butcher themselves.

Ideological Genocide
Most genocide in the twentieth century has not been ideological but,
where it has, the results have been catastrophic: ideology under modern
conditions tends toward holocaust.15 Most genocide in the past was also
not ideological: it was an instrument not for the restructuring of society
according to some blueprint of the mind, but for gaining, on the ideal
plane, revenge, and on the more tangible one, booty, women, territory,
public slaves, or the exploitation of "native" labor and resources.
Ideology, in the form of religion, did contribute to human destructiveness-it provided rationalization to the Spanish for conquering and
enslaving Indians, it formed the background for repeated attacks on
Jews, and was one, but only one, ingredient in the so-called wars of
religion in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. On the other hand,
the Inquisition, which is sometimes cited as an example of genocide,
was nothing of the kind: cruel as it was, the Inquisition took the form of
a judicial inquiry, with those suspected of either heresy or of insincere
belief receiving scrutiny; those convicted (and not all were) were burned
en masse, but they were tried as individuals.1 6 Nevertheless, some
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genocide before the twentieth century certainly was ideological: the
destruction of unholy cities in ancient Israel and of the Albigensians in
the thirteenth century. The Crusades also to some extent had a religious
basis, though many other elements (political ambition, desire for material
acquisitions) became entangled in it In all these cases, however, the aim
was essentially conservative: genocide was used to protect and defend a
particular religious faith, not as contemporary ideology is, to transform
society. With us the attempt has been to eradicate whole races, classes,
and ethnic groups-whatever the particular ideology specifies-in order
to produce a brave new world free of offensive human material.
At the heart of contemporary ideology is what Camus called a "metaphysical revolt" against the very conditions of human existence: plurality, mortality, finitude, and spontaneity.17 It is, as it were, an attempt to
re-establish the Creation, providing for an order, justice, and humanity
that are thought to be lacking. At the same time that it strives for a kind
of salvation, it is often motivated by a profound desire to eliminate all
that it perceives as being impure-be it race, class, or even, in the case
of the Khmer Rouge, cities. The revolt is metaphysical, but it is also
deeply moral in an ancient way: the rejection of the unclean, the fear of
contamination. How else explain the constant references in Nazism to
purification and the Cambodian references to the cleansing of the people?
When one attempts to bring about a "perfect" society, much of the human material must be jettisoned; and since humans are going to be killed
for what they are rather than for what they have done, the most primitive, but still basic, moral category surfaces, that of the unclean, the impure. Indeed, one contemporary philosopher suggests that the "dread of
the impure and rites of purification are in the background of all our feelings and all our behavior relating to fault. "18 When defilement is understood ideologically, it is literally true, as Paul Ricoeur notes in a different
context, that "we enter into the reign of Terror." 19 Yet it is possible to
substitute one symbol of evil for another; in the Soviet Union the idea of
guilt, especially the objective guilt of class origins, assumes the role
played elsewhere by defilement. At bottom, ideology turns politics into
a variety of the sacred. Yet holocausts are born, not in the name of God,
but of biology, history, and peasant simplicity.
Tendencies, however, are not necessarily results; holocaust is not a
matter of deduction. Ideology seldom exists in a pure form: its relationship to culture is of particular importance. Does the culture reinforce
the ideology, as in Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, or does it come
into conflict with it, as in Italy and Cuba? That culture can humanize and
restrain ideology gives hope; that it does not always succeed and may
even buttress ideology is part of the contemporary uncertainty about the
future of genocide in its most extreme form, holocaust.
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III
A recent study of genocide begins with this statement: "The word is
new, the crime ancient." This should read, "The word is new, the
phenomenon ancient," for while the slaughter of whole groups has
occurred throughout history, it is only within the past few centuries that
this has produced even a sense of moral horror, much less been thought
of as "criminal." Indeed, from ancient times to well into the sixteenth
century, genocide was not something that men were ashamed of, felt
guilt for, or tried to hide; it was open and acknowledged. Massacre,
deportation, forced labor, the transfer of children from one group to
another, torture-all are laid out in the Bible, in the official records and
monuments of empires, in epic and dramatic poetry, in histories and
memoirs. The early Hebrews, the Assyrians, Greeks, and Romans, the
Church with its heretics, the Crusaders, the Mongols, and the Spanish in
America-each went to great lengths to leave public records of their acts
of human destructiveness. Some went further-they boasted of the
number of persons killed, the amount of booty gained, the prisoners
deported for forced labor, the terror their attacks had inspired.20 In
Assyria public festivals were held in celebration of the destruction of yet
another people, with prisoners slaughtered as an offering to the gods.
Stelae, bas-reliefs, obelisks, monuments of every sort were then erected
by the king to commemorate his deeds.21 Like us, but for different
reasons, the kings thought that no act of genocide should be forgotten.
But one does not have to look only at the Assyrians: similar accounts of
revelling in destruction could be taken from the memoirs of the
Crusaders and others. 22
In the twentieth century, however, no country has acknowledged that
it engaged in genocide. Monuments have sometimes been raised for
victims, but not by perpetrators to commemorate their deeds. Turkey not
only did not acknowledge publicly that it killed over 300,000 Armenians
between 1895 and 1908 and over a million between 1915-1917, but even
sixty years later it still denies that genocide was committed: people were
relocated as a wartime security measure and some died in the war, but
that, it says, is all. Nazi Germany attempted to hide its own massive
destruction of the Jews, Gypsies, Slavs, and other groups, including
those Germans who were, for reasons of health, considered unfit to live.
The most noble chapter in German history, according to Heinrich
Himmler, would never be written.23 Civil war, the destruction of
terrorists, or the repulsion of external invasion are the terms used by
contemporary regimes to describe their genocidal activities. The United
Nations, moreover, has only once detected an instance of genocide
(despite the fact that its own trucks were used in Burundi to transport
victims to their death) and that was of Communist China before it was a
member of the United Nations.24 While the Khmer Rouge was destroy-
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ing the lives of 3 million of the inhabitants of Cambodia and turning
others into refugees, it consistently denied that it had engaged in genocide; rather, it accused other countries of major rights violations. Occasionally, the leaders of a country have admitted privately what was
talcing place, and years after the event some examples of genocide have
been lamented by a new leadership--for example, Nikita Khrushchev's
condemnation of Stalin's destruction of various nationality groups and,
especially, the members of the Party.25 Yet he also mentioned with
approval the destruction of the kulaks. So genocide in the twentieth century, while justified in the eyes of its perpetrators, is not open and is not
acknowledged except privately, or for reasons that reject some genocide
but fully endorse other examples of it.
In the twentieth century, we find genocide to be horrifying, morally
unjust, and criminal, yet we go on committing it. For us the formula
goes something like this: It never happened, and besides, they deserved
it. Prior to the sixteenth century, when the Spanish in America began to
have doubts about killing men whose souls they claimed they wanted to
save, the formula would have read: We did it, and they deserved it.26
Even so, responsibility could still be assigned to a god or, better yet, the
victim. But with us, as genocide has become more repugnant, as it has
come to seem unthinkable, it has actually become commonplace. Contemporary man deals in bad faith as well as death.
IV
The scale of genocide in the twentieth century is staggering and helps
to account in part for the sense of the incomprehensible and the unreal
that conditions contemporary responses to genocide. Although genocide
has claimed many victims throughout history, in terms of scale, there has
never before been a century like ours: in less than one hundred years
some 60 million persons have been murdered to meet the needs of the
state. And with the exception of the destruction of small groups of
indigenous peoples, or the admonitory genocide (a version of the
struggle for power) that claims the lives of several hundred persons,
genocide in the twentieth century almost never claims less than 100,000
victims-that is the minimum, and the scale quickly goes up from there.
Turkey destroyed the lives of a million or more Armenians; Nazi
Germany destroyed 6 million Jews, but it is often forgotten that it went
on to murder other groups as well, so that a reasonable estimate for the
total number of its victims, apart from war deaths, is 16 million; Palcistan
slaughtered 3 million Bengalis; Cambodia brought about the death of 3
million persons; and the Soviet Union first destroyed 20 million peasants
in the 1930s and then went on to take hundreds of thousands of other
lives in the 1940s with its assaults on various nationality groups
suspected of disloyalty.
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In some ways, of course, it is a mistake to discuss numbers of
victims. Every life and every group is unique, and deaths can thus never
be compared. Also, numbers have the effect of dissolving the solidarity
that victims might otherwise feel for each other; instead of sensing a
common plight, questions of who has suffered the most come to the
fore.27 And numbers lead us into thinking that genocide is defined by
some magic number of victims, whereas legally and morally that is not
what genocide means. Nevertheless, numbers do indicate the massiveness of the problem of genocide in the current period. They can also
help us to see some qualitative differences between genocide as it is practiced now and as it was until at least the nineteenth century, which in its
often total assault on indigenous peoples began to resemble the twentieth
century, with its attempts to annihilate groups as a whole.
Genocide for most of its history has been local-the conquered city,
the particular group of Muslims or Jews before one, the Indians within
easy reach of exploitation. It was also segmental-except for groups of
heretics or, occasionally, out of desire for revenge, there was no attempt
to destroy an entire group (all Jews, all Muslims, all members of a
particular race or class). The reason usually given for both the local and
segmental quality of genocide prior to the nineteenth century is that
dominant groups lacked the means: the instruments of violence were
limited and the means of communication and transportation difficult at
best. While this is true, it also misses an important point: genocide previously had afinite quality to it; there was no aspiration to eliminate a
group totally. In the nineteenth century, Alexis de Tocqueville, for example, still viewed genocide as rooted in a finite world: tied to appetite,
limited in its goals, a world without demand for totality or infinity.28
But contemporary theories of genocide (Hannah Arendt, Erich Fromm,
Albert Camus) characteristically present a radically different image of
genocide, coinciding with a changed set of experiences with human destructiveness. It remained for the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to
generate both the means and the desire to destroy entire groups.

v
Genocide of any magnitude requires a sizable number of participants,
but it does not necessarily follow that a large increase in victims requires
an equally large increase in perpetrators. This partly depends on the
technology of destruction that is employed (some forms are, so to speak,
labor-intensive, others less so); on whether the victims are concentrated
in one area or must be rounded up over a large territory; and on the
extent to which the victims are able to resist. It also depends on what
might be called the style of destruction. Some regimes, such as that of
Idi Amin, concentrate the task of destruction in the hands of specially
created units, with almost no participation by wider segments of society.
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Others, such as Turkey, deliberately involve the army, local officials,
selected tribal and ethnic groups, and in the case of both Turkey and
Indonesia, large numbers of peasants. The decision to involve a large
number of groups is not due primarily to the availability of technology,
but to certain political objectives. In acting as Turkey and Indonesia
have, the regime satisfies the passions and greed of elements of the
society, thus building support for its actions; destroys the victim group
in the most vicious way possible in order to emphasize the subhumanity
of the dominated; and, by plunging a large part of the population into
murder, binds them to the regime.29 In other cases still, such as that of
Nazi Germany, the intended magnitude of destruction is so great, and the
victims so scattered, that most social and political institutions are harnessed to one overriding aim-the taking of lives.30
The large-scale genocide of the twentieth century does require numerous participants, but the extent to which this is true varies from case to
case. The scale of genocide in the twentieth century is unprecedented
with regard to victims; with regard to the percentage of the population
that participates in the actual process of destruction, it would appear to be
no greater than in previous ages of genocide. But given the frequency of
genocide in this century, this means that an enormous number of our
contemporaries, with the support and permission of political authority,
have committed mass murder.

VI
At all times, genocide has claimed a wide range of victims, but in the
twentieth century it has become more extensive. Before our own period,
victims came from one or more of the following categories: those
subjected to conquest, those destroyed for religious reasons, and those
exploited in a colonial relationship. Only a small number of these were
killed because of who they were.
Until the early modern period, one was typically subjected to genocide simply because of where one was. Most of the victims of genocide
in the past became such because they were on a conqueror's line of
march. They died or were enslaved because they were there, not because of any special selection process that singled them out in terms of
race, religion, political convictions, or the like. They were victims of
institutional genocide. On the other hand, victims of religious genocide,
though few in number, were chosen because of who they were: their
views and practices were considered a threat to unity and truth. And
with the beginnings of colonial domination in the sixteenth century, a
much larger set of victims was killed because of who its members were
(they came from a different race and a less technologically advanced
culture) and what they had (land, gold, labor power). They became victims of utilitarian genocide.
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In the twentieth century the range of victims has greatly increased;
moreover, almost all of them have been selected for genocide because of
who they are, because in the eyes of the stronger group (whether
majority or minority) they do not deserve to live. The victims, otherwise
so different, have only three attributes in common: for historical, situational, or ideological reasons they have been defined as beyond the circle
of moral obligation and thus as inhuman; they are vulnerable to genocidal attacks, whether sporadic or sustained, selective or indiscriminate;
and if they do survive, they often carry a greater burden of guilt than the
victimizers do for attempting to take their lives.31 The diversity and
range of those who have fallen victim to genocide in this century can be
suggested by the simple device of naming names and listing categories:
Armenians, Gypsies, Jews, Slavs, Bengalis, Cambodians, Tibetans,
Hutus, lbos, Chinese, Achés; Buddhists, Hindus, Christians, Muslims;
Communists, non-Communists; kulaks, intellectuals, workers, stone age
hunters, national groups, homeless peoples; persons who are black,
brown, red, yellow, white; the sick and the well; those who resist and
those who are compliant; those who are killed because of their race,
religion, ethnicity, physical condition, political opinions, class origins,
or stage of historical development
Falling victim to genocide has been so widespread and varied in the
twentieth century that few groups can be reasonably sure that they will
not be next. Even the most powerful nations-those armed with nuclear
weapons-may end up in struggles that will lead (accidentally, intentionally, insanely) to the ultimate genocide in which they destroy not
only each other, but mankind itself, sealing the fate of the earth forever
with a final genocidal effort. Human history would assume this form
(though it would never be written): mankind would have moved from
the mortality of the individual (who could be murdered or, like Abraham,
"die old and sated with life") to the genocidal destruction of human
groups (large or small, completely or incompletely) to the extermination
of the species itself.32 The will to genocide, which began as the will to
power, revenge, wealth, salvation, would have become (what perhaps in
some deep sense it had been all along) the will to nothingness.

VII
All the elements of the technology of death that we associate with
twentieth-century genocide-bureaucracy, modern communications,
rapid transportation, even the concentration camp in a primitive formhad emerged by the late nineteenth century. But apparently the first to
perceive the possibilities of this new technology to eliminate a whole
group of persons numbering in the millions was the ruling clique in
Turkey, which in 1915 began the systematic extermination of the
Armenians, an extermination that is the prototype of genocide in the
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twentieth century. It was premeditated, centrally planned (though carried
out by local officials to a large extent), and intended to be total. It was
also, to the extent possible, to be carried out without the knowledge of
the outside world. As Michael Arlen notes, "The Armenian genocide
was based on the imperfectly utilized but definitely perceived capacities
of the modem state for politically restructuring itself, which were made
possible by the engines of technology." In fact, he suggests, "In virtually every modem instance of mass murder, beginning, it appears,
with the Armenians, the key element ... which has raised the numerical and psychic levels of the deed above the classic terms of massacre has been the alliance of technology and communications. "33
If modern forms of technology do not cause genocide, they facilitate
it, extend its range, sustain its actions, and make it possible to destroy
huge numbers of victims in a relatively short time. Yet it appears that
Hitler's gas chambers were developed not only for the sake of efficiency, but to reduce the moral and psychological burdens that his
soldiers had experienced in shooting large numbers of women and
children on the Eastern Front.34 The means that contemporary bureaucracy develops to destroy whole groups are calculated not only to kill,
but to neutralize any sense of guilt or responsibility for what is done.
Ideology can help overcome any feeling of revulsion or any sense of
guilt, but only a few of those who are part of the apparatus of destruction
may be ideologically motivated. More decisively, modern forms of
organization can distance most persons from the actual killing and can
routinize the work which supports the killing.35 Most bureaucrats in
Germany, for instance, "composed memoranda, drew up blueprints,
signed correspondence, talked on the telephone, and participated in
conferences." Yet, as Raul Hilberg indicates, they "could destroy a
whole people while sitting at their desks. "36 Routinization reduces the
occasions on which moral questions can arise and encourages the job
holder to focus on the technical details of his work rather than on its
meaning.37 Moreover, the sharp division of labor fragments the act of
destruction-those who decide to commit genocide, those who organize
it, and those who carry it out are not the same persons; no one,
therefore, accepts responsibility for the final result. Finally, because of
the hierarchical structure of the organization, everyone can insist, not
insincerely, that they were only obeying orders.38 If organization, communications, transportation, and various new implements of violence
(among them the gas chambers) have played central roles in the technology of genocide, their capacity to reduce moral awareness has also
been important.
Nevertheless, highly developed organization and sophisticated means
of destruction are not always employed in the twentieth century: often
there is a mixture of the primitive and the modern. Indian tribes are
hunted, like any other prey, in Latin America, but are also bombed from
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the air; they are given sugar laced with arsenic and blankets that contain
the bacilli of fatal diseases, but are also relocated to reservations that are
little more than concentration camps. In Turkey and Indonesia, socially
induced hate and dehumanization are substituted for the bureaucratic
neutralization of moral responsibility. In Cambodia, ideology allows the
cadres of the Khmer Rouge to destroy parents in front of their children,
to desecrate age-old religious institutions, and, in place of means of
destruction that distance the perpetrator from the victim, to resort to
direct and brutal means of disposing of the "impure" portions of the
population: beating persons to death with hoes, driving nails into their
heads, and carving them open with knives. And in Uganda, victims
would often be strangled slowly and then killed with a sledgehammer
blow to the chest; thereafter, they would be driven in trucks for hours to
a river where they were thrown to crocodiles.39
While the capacity for organization varies-the Young Turks were
more efficient than the Sultan, the Nazis more sophisticated in the production of mass deaths than either-the use of a low level of technology
to destroy hundreds of thousands of victims is done by choice in the
twentieth century. Cambodia did have bullets; peasants armed with ritual
knives was not the most efficient means of destruction available in
Indonesia. Rather, the technology chosen was a mirror of the purposes
of the perpetrators (to inflict as much suffering as possible, to gain
support for the regime by satisfying the appetites of groups long hostile
to the victims) and the culture of the particular society (to invoke the
symbolism of an autonomous peasant society, which when it kills uses
hoes, or, with Indonesia, emphasizes the ritual triumph of good over
evil).
The technology of genocide in the twentieth century thus offers the
perpetrator a choice of means that can be tailored to a specific situation.
This kind of choice in itself makes contemporary genocide unique, as
does its enormous capacity to destroy human life.
Prior to the twentieth century, however, there was little choice in the
technology of mass death. For several thousand years the technology of
genocide was relatively static. Weapons used were hand-held (clubs,
swords, bows) and could be used only in close contact with the victim.
The introduction of firearms increased the efficiency of killing and made
the work of destruction less physically tiring, but it still involved direct
contact. Yet if I am correct in thinking that there were few, if any, moral
barriers to genocide until the sixteenth century, this proximity to the
victim would not have generated the burdens it would for us. It is odd,
then, that those who stress the distancing from violence that is required
for contemporary man to destroy his fellows have not explored the more
direct, and bloody, genocides of the past.40 The work was slow and
tiring; it went on for days; and in the end, sometimes literally wading in
blood, one knew what one had done.41
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They were able to carry out these acts (which an Eichmann would not
have had the stomach for) because, like us, they tended to obey orders,
but mainly because-and here they are unlike us-they were not burdened with moral inhibitions against killing those outside the group. The
ancient Hebrews, for example, did not worry about killing those who
had betrayed the faith, but only about ritual defilement-whether, say, a
man had had sexual intercourse before going into the herem (a term
usually translated "holy war," but which means "a pact with the deity by
which everything animate was devoted for destruction").42
In addition to various weapons of the sort mentioned, fire was used to
destroy large groups. This was one of the favorite methods of the
Spanish in America, but was also used by the Crusaders. Another technique, later used by Stalin, was to induce starvation: prisoners were
locked up without food and left to die; crops were burned; and, not
uncommonly, the available crops were seized and used by the dominant
group, allowing the producers to die in a genocidally induced famine.
All of the techniques of destruction in use before the twentieth century
were relatively primitive compared to what is available to us. Yet, given
the finite goals of earlier genocide, smaller populations, and the absence
of moral restraints, it was sufficient unto the day.

VIII
In the end, though, it is the concentration camp that is the symbol of
the technology of evil in the twentieth century. It is here, in the world of
the dying, that the Nazis, Stalinists, and those like them pursue their
beliefs that everything is permitted and everything is possible, and thus
aim at the total domination of man, stripping him initially of everything
except his body, and finally of even that. Yet we know from Bruno
Bettelheim, Alexsander Solzhenitzyn, and Elie Wiesel, and thousands of
other survivors, that the attempt fails; under sustained assault and the
most grotesque conditions, human beings can still maintain decency, can
share with others, and can continue to respect life.43 One looks for
parallels to the concentration camps, but, as Hannah Arendt indicates,
there are none: "Forced labor in prisons and penal colonies, banishment,
slavery, all seem for a moment to offer helpful comparisons, but on
closer examination lead nowhere."44 Whether the camps serve as places
of detention, forced labor, or extermination (the usual classification, but
misleading since most inmates do, after all, die in the camps), they are
places in which "punishment is meted out without connection with
crime . . . exploitation is practiced without profit, and . . . work is
performed without product. "45 It is here that one confronts what Arendt
calls "radical evil": an absolute evil that cannot be punished, forgiven, or
comprehended in terms of any recognizably human motives. Not
surprisingly, therefore, the metaphor of pain and endless torment that
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most of us fall back on is one that secular society knows only at second
hand and abstractly, the image of Hell. In fact, it is through the medieval
depiction of Hell, where
The very weeping there forbids to weep,
And grief finding eyes blocked with tears
Tums inward to make agony greater

that the literary critic George Steiner believes we can begin to grasp the
horror and meaning of the concentration camp. 46 For it is here that we
find the "technology of pain without meaning, of bestiality without end,
of gratuitous terror.... In the camps the millenary pornography of
fear and vengeance cultivated in the Western mind by Christian doctrines
of damnation was realized. "47 Quite true, yet the comparison is
dangerously flawed: for Hell, as traditionally understood, was a place of
justice, and neither those readied for mass execution in Treblinka nor
those left to a Darwinian struggle against exhaustion and gradual
starvation in Kolyma deserved their fate.
The fact that the analogies fail is not without its own significance.
For the failure of imagination indicates that we are in the presence of a
unique form of human destructiveness, one that in itself separates the
twentieth century from all that has gone before.

IX
The twentieth century, then, is an age of genocide. Moreover, in
terms of the number and range of victims, the variety of forms that
genocide has taken, the urge toward total destruction of whole groups,
the elaborate technology that facilitates death and eases conscience, the
concentration camp, and the radical evil that is inseparable from it, it is a
unique age of genocide. But to speak of "uniqueness" in the context of
political death is, at bottom, to call attention to the acuteness of the
problem; it is, in human terms, to indicate the necessity of finding means
to prevent further genocide. The massiveness of genocide in this
century, however, makes us feel that the task of prevention is futile.
Despair stands in the way of action, knowledge leads to a sense of
hopelessness. Yet we know from Sören Kierkegaard that despair is a
sin, whether against God or man, and sin exists to be overcome. We
cannot bring back to life the dead of this century or those who have been
victims of political mass murder throughout the ages, but we can act. It
is not true, as some have thought, that "he who saves the life of one,
saves the world," but it is a good beginning.
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3
THE ETIOLOGY OF GENOCIDES
Barbara Harff

One of the most enduring and abhorrent problems of the world is
genocide, which is neither particular to a specific race, class, or nation,
nor rooted in any one ethnocentric view of the world. Genocide concerns and potentially affects all people. Some people have found refuge
in the idea that the Holocaust was particular to the inhuman Nazis.
Thus, all barbarous activities perpetrated by these subhumans had to be
judged by different standards. However, evidence suggests that the
many who participated in the extermination of a people were not sadistically inclined.1 Israel Chamy argues that in many societies "traditions
of humanitarian concerns for victims" coincide with "the role of killer
... or of accomplice to other more vicious genociders. "2 Often democratic institutions are cited as safeguards against mass excesses. In view
of the treatment of Amerindians by agents of the U.S. government, this
view is unwarranted. For example, the thousands of Cherokees who
died during the Trail of Tears (Cherokee Indians were forced to march in
1838-1839 from Appalachia to Oklahoma) testify that even a democratic
system may tum against its people.
It is tempting to exaggerate the role of individuals, to blame leaders
for leading their citizens to genocide. But is it not the case that citizens
and leaders are able to make choices? Although powerful elites in a
democratic society are able to inject their political preferences into the
democratic process, sometimes not consistent with the preferences endorsed by the majority, that likelihood is far greater in a totalitarian system. But the capabilities for implementing ruthless decisions are always
hampered or aided by the decisions made in countless bureaucracies.
Thus, all people associated with the decision-making process lend their

42

Barbara Harff

own motives, rationalization, and legitimation to the genocidal outcome.
Although most of these people are not directly involved in executing their
victims, their ability to halt the process makes them equally responsible
for the executions. Clearly, the decision to destroy a certain people is a
product of the many involved, and although some decisionmakers are
more important than others, the role of the "helpers" surely facilitates the
larger choice which delivers others to death.
Throughout the course of history genocides or massacres have been
directed against specific groups in the context of larger political aims.
Thus, the Nazis' aim of eliminating "foreign" elements from within by
targeting Jews, Gypsies, Communists, and the mentally handicapped for
annihilation was advanced by stressing mystical qualities of the dominant
group. Similarly, the Turkification efforts, aided by the cry for "holy
war" of the Young Turks, may have led to the destruction of the Armenians. A more recent example is Kampuchea, where under the leadership of Pol Pot all potential political adversaries were eliminated, which
included the children of those perceived as reactionary elements.
Though some massacres could be explained as acts of violence in the
course of widespread mass hysteria, most genocides are devoid of the
emotional climate which is conducive to a compulsion to murder those
who are perceived as enemies of the dominant interests. In contrast,
murderous leaders are voted into office, are allowed to propagate their
pathological ideas, and often have ample time to plan and meticulously
execute genocidal policies. What environment allows for organized officially sanctioned violence? What enables individuals to shed their responsibilities and become part of the murderous machine? In the
absence of that passion which sometimes kills, how do "normal" people
become vicious killers of children, old and infirm people, and the many
others who have died in the genocides of modern times?
The following analysis investigates the conditions under which some
genocides have taken place. The theoretical framework is provided by
the author's previous efforts to shed light on why states engage in
genocide.3

ASSUMPTIONS AND PROPOSITIONS
Scholarly persuasion has it that the state is the ultimate obstacle to a
just world order, while others see ideological identity or class solidarity
as the one true path to that envisioned order. Some attempts to overcome
these predominant modes of analysis in international relations, such as
the Club of Rome's "doom project," have met with criticism and sometimes ridicule. It is not my purpose to assess in detail the ecologists',
realists', or Marxists' contribution to the analysis of international relations. Instead, this modest effort attempts to incorporate various ele-

The Etiology of Genocides

43

ments of different modes of analysis into a framework which allows for
an assessment of why past genocides have occurred and why future ones
will occur. Ecological challenges and the international security dilemma
have greatly contributed to the erosion of the state as the central actor in
the world. In contrast, the durability of the state is demonstrated through
its expanding role in providing social services to its citizens. The often
conflicting roles of the state as provider and entrepreneur have sometimes led to increased elite domination internally or increased military/
economic adventurism abroad.4 Here elite domination refers to people
who hold the controlling positions in the state structure; in other words,
they are the political elite. Under exceptional circumstances this elite
domination may lead to genocide. The following identifies the conditions conducive to the occurrence of genocide in national societies.
National societies are those coincidental with the emergence of the modern state system during the early seventeenth century. This does not
mean that genocides are confined to modern times. But "historical"
genocides are of lesser importance to my argument, which claims that the
"legitimate" authority structure, i.e., the state, is the predominant culprit
in genocides (for an extended discussion on the subject, see Chapter 2).
One of the emphases of my theoretical argument is on structural
change as exemplified in the concept of national upheaval. National upheaval is an abrupt change in the political community, caused, for example, by the formation of a state through violent conflict, when national
boundaries are reformed, or after a war is lost. Thus, lost wars and the
resultant battered national pride sometimes lead to genocide against
groups perceived as enemies. Post-colonial and post-revolutionary regimes are prone to internal violence during times of national consolidation, when competing groups/tribes fight for leadership positions.
Structural change is a necessary but not sufficient condition to promote the likelihood of genocide. A second factor leading to the development of genocide is the existence of sharp internal cleavages combined
with a history of struggle between groups prior to the upheaval. The
stronger the identification within competing groups the more likely that
extreme measures will be taken to suppress the weaker groups. Polarization is usually intensified by such factors as the extent of differences in
religion, values, and traditions between contending groups, and their
ideological separation. There are numerous examples from past genocides in which group polarization provided the background to genocides.
Gentiles versus Jews, Muslims versus Hindus, Fascists versus Communists, Germans versus Gypsies, whites against blacks and Indianssuch are the genocides of Nazi Germany, Bangladesh, Uganda, German
Southwest Africa, and countless others.
A third factor triggering genocide against national groups is the lack
of external constraints on, or foreign support for, murderous regimes.
At present, lack of international sanctions and/or interventions against
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massive human rights violators is the norm rather than the exception.
Unless national interest combined with the ability to interfere dictates
intervention, few efforts are made to ameliorate the suffering of local
populations.
Who are the genociders? Here genocide is defined as public violence
-by some political actor-aimed at eliminating groups of private citizens. Sometimes genociders are state officials, e.g., soldiers, police, or
special Einsatzgruppen; sometimes genociders are less openly linked
with state power, e.g., death squads. Usually genocide is the conscious
choice of policymakers, one among other options for repressing (eliminating) opposition. However, the likelihood of genocide occurring is
rare compared to the likelihood that officials will use sporadic violence
and/or torture to repress opposition. Thus, we have to differentiate between sporadic violence used against opposition groups, i.e., state terrorism, and systematic, Draconian attempts to eliminate or annihilate
them. Additional incentives to settle scores through lesser means are the
avoidance of regime instability and/or sometimes the threat of regionaV
international sanctions or other forms of interference. Genocide is not
just another policy instrument of repression; genocide is the most extreme policy option available to policymakers.
International wars are not genocides, because victims have no specific
group identity and are often unintended, i.e., civilians. The crime of
fighting an aggressive war, though outlawed as an instrument of international policy, is sometimes used as a coercive means to bring about
structural changes in the target state, not to eliminate the total population.
More difficult is the distinction between civil strife (wars) and genocides -- civil wars are contributing factors to the possible occurrence of
genocides but are not genocides themselves. In civil wars the legitimate
authority structure is weak and is opposed by strong opposition forces.
Again, as in wars, though atrocities may become a pattern on both sides,
the intent to destroy the opposition in part or as a whole is the crucial
variable in determining the onset of genocide. Burundi is a good example, one in which civil war eventually turned into a genocide, given an
array of other contributing factors, such as previous tribal rivalries, and
lack of regional and international intervention.
In addition, my definition of genocide differs from the official definition (Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide/Declaration by the General Assembly of the United Nations,
Resolution 96, dated December 11, 1946, article 2) insofar as it broadens the scope of the victims and perpetrators. Thus, political opponents
are included in my definition, though they lack the formal legal protection of the Convention on Genocide. The official definition includes
those acts leading to the physical destruction of the group when "such
acts are committed with intent to destroy, in whole or part, a national,
ethnical, racial or religious group," but says nothing about political
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groups. The Kampuchean mass slaughter under Pol Pot (1975) testifies
to the need to include political opponents in the definition, thereby
allowing the Kampuchean tragedy to be properly called genocide and
thus to enjoy the unfortunately limited protection of the Convention.
Political victims are not political as in contrast to religious or ethnic
victims; rather, it is their political affiliation which singles them out as
victims, not their ethnic identity. Thus, a Jew in Stalin's Russia who
opposed Stalin would have been a likely victim during the murderous
campaigns of the 1930s because he opposed Stalin, not because he was a
Jew. Furthermore, in my conception the Holocaust is the ultimate
instance of genocide, rather than a unique event defying comparison.
Only through comparison with other similar or dissimilar cases of genocide can we begin to understand what triggered that monstrous episode.
This is not to deny Holocaust survivors and victims their place in the
conscience of humanity; rather, it is to remind us of our special responsibility to its millions of dead children, women, and men in finding ways
to anticipate and eliminate future holocausts.
What follows is an analysis of information about twentieth-century
governments which have engaged in genocidal activities. It describes the
systemic properties, external environment, and internal conditions of
states at the time of genocide. It is based on the cases listed in Table 3.1,
a list which is by no means complete. What is attempted here is only the
beginning of a systematic ordering of specific cases into categories. The
cases are selected because they are relatively recent and well known, and
because information is readily available about them; thus, their analysis
should foster the kind of international reaction envisioned in the United
Nations Charter. The cases may also make it possible to test the plausibility of my argument that national upheaval and prior internal struggle,
combined with lack of constraints in the international environment, are
conducive to genocide. It should be noted that the estimated numbers of
victims vary greatly, often because "statistics" were not kept (with the
exception of the Holocaust) or because population data were inadequate
or dated. However, I do not believe that the number of victims makes a
great difference: the important factor is that they were the victims of
genocidal policies.

TYPES OF NATIONAL UPHEAVAL
Genocide happens in different types of political society-what types
of society? The classification scheme follows from the theoretical framework and distinguishes between types of societies formed after major
national upheavals. The task of differentiating among societies with ongoing fundamental political change is difficult. Obviously a successful
revolution with clearly defined ideological goals is much more likely to

Table 3.1
Some Twentieth-Century Genocides
Country

Dates

Perpetrators

Victims'
Identity

Estimated
Numbers

German SW
Africa

1904

German troops

Herero

65,0001

Ottoman
Empire

1915

Young Turks/
Kurds

Armenians

800,0001.8 million2

Germany

1941-45

Germans

Jews
Gypsies

5-6 million3
48,000

Sudan

1955-72

Sudanese
army

Southern
Sudanese

500,0004

Indonesia

1965-67

Vigilantes

Supposed
Communists

200,000500,0005

Nigeria

1967-70

Other Nigerians

lbos

2-3 million6

Bangladesh

1971

East Pakistan
army

Bengalis

1,247,0003 million7

Burundi

1972

Tutsis

Hutus

100,000200,0008

Paraguay

1968-72

Paraguayans

1,0009
Guayaki
Aché (Indians)

EastTimor

1975

Indonesian
army

Timorese

Kampuchea

1975-79

Khmer Rouge

Kampucheans 740,8003 millionll

Uganda

1976-78

Sections of
Ugandan army

Ugandans

60,000100,00010

500,00012

1. For an extended discussion see Jon M. Bridgman, The Revolt of the Hereros
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981); Horst Drechsler, "Let Us Die

Fighting": The Struggle of the Herero andNama against German Imperialism (1884-

1915) (London: Zed Press, 1980); Arnold Valentin Wallenkampf, "The Herero Rebellion in South West Africa, 1904-1906: A Study in German Colonialism" (Ph.D.
dissertation, University of California, 1969).
2. For an extended discussion see Helen Fein, "A Formula for Genocide: Comparison of the Turkish Genocide (1915) and the German Holocaust (1939-1945),"
Comparative Studies in Sociology, 1 (1978); A. D. Sarkissian, Martyrdom and
Rebirth (Published by the Armenian Church of America; New York: Lydian Press,
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1965); Viscount Bryce, The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire 19151916 (prepared by Arnold Toynbee; London: H.M.S.O., 1916).
3. For an extended discussion see Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism
(New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1966); Helen Fein, Accounting for Genocide:
National Responses and Jewish Victimization During the Holocaust (New York: The
Free Press, 1979); Leo Kuper, Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981).
4. For an extended discussion see Mohammed Omer Beshir, The Southern
Sudan: From Conflict to Peace (London: C. Hurst and Co., 1975); Robert O.
Collins, The Southern Sudan in Historical Perspective (Tel Aviv: The Shiloah
Center, 1975); Cecil Eprile, War and Peace in the Sudan 1955-1972 (London: David
and Charles, 1974); Edgar O'Ballance, The Secret War in the Sudan: 1955-1972
(London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1977).
5. Brian May, The Indonesian Tragedy (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul,
1978).
6. For an extended discussion see John De St. Jorre, The Nigerian Civil War
(London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1972); Alexander A. Madiebo, The Nigerian
Revolution and the Biafran War (Enugu, Nigeria: Fourth Dimension Publishing Co.,
1980); Arthur Agwuncha Nwankwo and Samuel Udochukwu lfejika, The Making of a
Nation Biafra (London: C. Hurst and Company, 1969); Peter Schwab, ed., Biafra
(New York: Facts on File, 1971).
7. Kalyan Chaudhuri, Genocide in Bangladesh (Bombay: Orient Longman,
1972).
8. For an extended discussion see René Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi (New
York: Praeger, 1970); Norman Wingert, No Place to Stop Killing (Chicago: Moody
Press, 1974).
9. For an extended discussion see Richard Arens, Genocide in Paraguay (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1976).
10. For an extended discussion see Jill Joliffe, East Timor: Nationalism and
Colonialism (Australia: University of Queensland Press, 1978); Justus M. van der
Kroef, Patterns of Conflict in Eastern Indonesia (London: The Eastern Press, 1977).
11. For an extended discussion see François Ponchaud, Cambodia Year Zero
(Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1978); Michael Vickery, Cambodia 1975-1982
(Boston: South End Press, 1984).
12. Dan Wooding and Ray Barnett, Uganda Holocaust (Grand Rapids, Mich.:
Zondervan Publishing House, 1980).
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lead to a restructuring of society than anticolonial rebellions with "reformist" goals. In other words, the greater the changes affecting society
through new governments, the likelier it is that genocidal policies are
implemented to insure total obedience. Thus, the extent of structural
change is a major factor underlying my typology.5
Revolutions are a type of national upheaval. Revolutions always involve the overthrow of the ruling political elite and aim at bringing about
fundamental social change.
Anticolonial rebellions, which are similar to separatist conflicts, are a
type of national upheaval. Anticolonial rebellions are internal struggles
with mass participation, directed against the ruling foreign power, seeking autonomy. In the case of separatist conflicts, the major struggle
takes place between two movements, one trying to break away, the other
to prevent it.
Coups may constitute a type of national upheaval. Coups involve the
total or partial replacement of the ruling elite and lack mass participation.
Thus, coups which involve the total replacement of the ruling elite are
more likely to induce fundamental social change.
A special case is a takeover by duly elected or appointed political elites
who endorse extreme ideologies (right-wing or left-wing). There is no
abrupt structural change, but rather a move to exert total control. Such
changes may lead to the creation of a climate in which people are absolved from making personal judgments and are rewarded for their total
obedience to authority.
Another crucial factor in the development of genocide is the existence
of sharp internal cleavages. In some societies internal violence is a way
of life,6 and some societies are preconditioned to accept political violence
(coups, for example) because they frequently do occur (for example, in
Bolivia). However, genocide needs more than reinforcement through
societal acquiescence. Genocide is a product of state policy, with an involvement and commitment of massive resources, and is only marginally
beneficial to people involved in the process.
National upheaval always intensifies internal cleavages. Depending
on the preferences of policymakers, some groups may become targets of
genocidal policies. Groups which are most "different" from the dominant group are more likely to become targets than those which more
closely resemble the dominant group. Thus, groups different in religion,
culture, wealth, education, and/or ideology have a greater chance to be
singled out for genocide. Economic preponderance by some groups may
be enough to induce genocidal policies against them. These cleavages
usually pre-exist, but in some cases they are introduced by the new elite.
Thus, for example, the targeted group may involve all those opposed to
the new regime (Kampuchea), or rich peasants (Communist Russia). 7
The structural precondition of national upheaval combined with societal receptiveness for internal violence targeted against "most different"
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groups may pave the path to genocide, but a third condition may ultimately provide the final incentive for the occurrence of genocide. Here
we are talking about external support for either the genocider or the target
group. Sometimes the genociders are foreign powers, for example,
colonizers; sometimes genocidal elites enjoy support/protection from
powerful neighbors. In modern times the overt or covert support of one
of the superpowers is a warrant for the survival of regimes involved in
repression or genocide. In other cases, states may neither condemn nor
praise other states engaged in internal repression. The state in question
may be too unimportant to warrant international attention, thus enjoying
the kind of freedom which comes from lack of automatic sanctions in
cases of extreme human rights violations.
Support of a different kind may come for the genocidal target. Thus,
fellow religionists or ethnic groups may induce their governments to
intervene on behalf of the potential victims. A more limited kind of support may come from international organizations in the form of protests or
boycotts. In some cases irredentist movements elsewhere may lend
military support.

COMMON ELEMENTS IN DIFFERENT GENOCIDES
The merits of this theoretical argument can be demonstrated by analysis of the characteristics of cases of genocide categorized according to
their political circumstances.

Post-War, Post-Imperial Genocides
The Holocaust is undisputably the most abominable instance of modem genocide; however, it has many structural, societal, and external
similarities with lesser genocides. Hitler's rise to power, though by
constitutional means, came in the wake of a worldwide depression. The
post-war economic crises and the inability of the new democratic
government to cope with massive unemployment and extreme currency
inflation greatly strengthened the radical left and the extreme right. Fear
of a Communist takeover led to the bare victory of the National Socialist
Party, and the "Enabling Act" left Hitler with dictatorial powers, which
he used to bar any opposition. (See Chapter 10.)
The emergence of the nationalist movements of the "Young Turks"
came in the wake of a disintegrating Ottoman Empire. A prior rebellion
in 1908, which briefly restored a constitutional monarchy, led to a coup
in 1913 and the total takeover by the Young Turks under their leader,
Enver Pasha. During the Balkan wars (1912-1913) the Ottoman Empire
lost almost all its territory in Europe, which left the new nationalist
movement with little sympathy for the national aspirations of the
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remaining ethnic minorities in Turkey. (See Chapter 11.)
Both countries-Turkey and Germany-did experience a major restructuring of their respective governments following loss of territory in
war and a rapid succession of different versions of government. The
German Empire was replaced by a democratic government, which lacked
the strength to unite the warring factions of Communists and Monarchists. In Turkey the Sultan was briefly replaced by a constitutional Sultan, who, however, was in no position to halt the nationalist movement
of the Young Turks, who tried to propel Turkey into the twentieth century with sweeping reforms. The national upheavals following the
takeover by both nationalist movements had disastrous consequences for
some ethnic/religious minorities in both countries-Armenians in Turkey
and Jews and Gypsies in Germany.
The annihilation of Jews and Gypsies in Germany and the genocide
against Armenians in Turkey followed a similar pattern. In both countries domination of the state apparatus by a tightly controlled political
elite was complete. Both the Young Turks and the Nazi movement
introduced a kind of myth, exalting the likeness of the dominant group,
i.e., "Aryan"-Germans and Turks. Germanization and Turkification
both emphasized pureness of race and common culturaVethnic and
religious values. Thus, all "real" Germans were to be Christian, Aryan,
and non-Communist, as all Turks were to be Muslim, Turkoman, and
pro Young Turk. Both Jews and Armenians were easy targets, for they
were different in religion, "racial" heritage, and culture. The age-old
division between Christians and Muslims and Christians and Jews accelerated receptiveness for a renewal of a crusade against infidels and the
people of the book. The readiness to massacre Jews and Armenians was
not new to either society. Sporadic violence or planned massacres had
taken place prior to both genocides. But the Holocaust and the Genocide
of 1915 against the Armenians were exceptional, because they were premeditated acts by policymakers to eliminate a people. Why?
I have argued that once preconditions such as structural changes, lack
of external constraint, and internal cleavages combine, the stage is set for
genocide. In both cases external constraints were either nonexistent or
too late and too little to halt the slaughters of thousands of innocent
victims. Neither meager German protest in 1915 (Turkey's major ally)
nor an international boycott by World Jewry did much to stop impending
disaster. Russian threat of intervention against Turkey was superseded
by World War I, similar to Allied lack of intervention due to World War
II. International sympathy for Jews was virtually nonexistent, evidenced
by the refusal of other countries to grant entry permits to fleeing Jews.
Armenians fared little better in the wake of competing nationalist movements elsewhere in Europe and the impending Russian Revolution, and
the making of new alliances culminating in World War I.
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But neither structural change nor external conditions fully explain
why policymakers decide to eliminate or annihilate a people rather than
engage in sporadic violence, i.e., why they resort to genocide rather than
state terrorism to suppress opposition. Internal conditions may provide
the final clues to why states engage in genocide. Often the strength of a
new government greatly depends on its ability to mobilize mass support.
Often divisions within culturally heterogeneous societies are overcome
by declaring one group responsible for the other's misfortunes. Sometimes that is the case in socialist revolutions, where capitalists serve as
scapegoats for the misery of the workers. Turkification and Germanification both served to unite people in their pride of belonging to a people,
both inheritors of a long history, i.e., heirs of the Holy Roman Empire
and the Ottoman Empire. Armenians may have been a legitimate threat to
the Young Turks because they were collectively organized and demanded
limited autonomy within the new state. Jews, however, were no threat
to the Nazis; they were neither politically organized nor particularly
visible as a group-Germany boasted a more assimilated "enlightened"
(non-religious) Jewish population than most other European countries.
Yet Nazi propaganda had singled out the Jew from its beginning. If
Jews in Germany were at all special as a group they were so because of
achievements in the professions. A disproportionate number of them
were doctors, scientists, literary greats, and artists. Leading lights of
Marxism/Socialism included many Jews, e.g., Karl Marx, Rosa
Luxembourg, Ferdinand Lassalle, and Eduard Bernstein. Why did the
Nazis single out the Jews? Anti-Semitism has long been part of European history. It was probably the single most appealing prejudicial doctrine available to the Nazis, who were trying to consolidate their power.
Different groups in Germany may have had different animosities, but the
Jews offered more value as scapegoats than other groups such as
Gypsies or Communists. Communists were after all "genuine Germans," whereas Gypsies were too small in number and not a settled
people. The successful merchant image of the Jews spelled competition
for the average shopkeeper in Germany; the dominance of Jewish scientists may have caused envy among their colleagues; legendary Jewish
international finance connections added to the image resented by others.
The liberal image of artists residing in the capital did nothing to persuade
the provincial German that the Jew was part of their world. Hitler's
claim that Marxism/Communism was after all a Jewish invention thus
was easily absorbed into an ideology offering an escape for many. The
Jews had something for everyone, and those enlightened enough to
realize the demagoguery thought that Hitler could be controlled. Once
the Nazis realized the appeal of anti-Semitism, propaganda made full use
of it. Nazis, once in power, fulfilled their promises to put people to
work and "clean" the towns of Jews. Once the Nazis realized that the
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world was not eager to take "their" Jews, the "final solution" was to take
care of the Jewish "problem." Who was to stop the murderous engine?
In 1944 the Germans, their cities bombed, were losing the war, yet the
death camps were working to full capacity.
Killing the Jewish population of Europe may have been the rational
choice of the Nazis, yet the utility of doing so was utterly irrational. The
costs of keeping the camps going despite the war effort were immense.
Thousands of people were involved in killing Jews; trains transporting
Jews had priority over those aiding the war effort. 8 The fanatic pursuit
of "finishing the job" was part of the robot-like performance of those
selected to serve the "higher cause" of Nazi ideology.

Post-Colonial Genocides
The genocides of Southern Sudan Biafra, Bangladesh, Burundi, and
East Timor all took place following massive internal rebellions. Bangladesh, Biafra, East Timor, and the Southern Sudan sought to secede
-from Pakistan, Nigeria, Indonesia, and the Northern Sudan, respectively. Bangladesh was successful; Biafra, East Timor, and the Southern Sudan were not. In Burundi the Hutus tried unsuccessfully to throw
off the minority rule of the Tutsis. All five genocides happened in the
wake of colonial liberation. In each case euphoria over liberation soon
gave way to a reemphasis of existing cleavages.
The Northern Sudanese, Muslims who claim Arab descent, saw their
future tightly bound to the Arab world. For the Southern Sudanese,
mostly Negroid, animist (though including many Christians), and multiethnic, the traditional societies of East Africa seemed a more likely ally.
The racial division is somehow arbitrary, since many Northerners who
claim to be Arabs are Negroid in appearance and many Southerners
called Negroid have non-Negroid features.9 More important, Southern
economic development was grossly inferior to the North. It was no
surprise that the politically and economically powerful (and more
populous) North should dominate the South after independence in 1956.
Thus, domination by the British was replaced with domination by the
North. Even before independence came to the country the South revolted against the North, which resulted in the slaughter of many thousands of innocent people.
Nigeria after independence in 1960 was united under a federal system. But unity was fragile among the three dominant ethnic groups, the
Hausa-Fulani (about 15 million), the Yoruba (about 10 million), and the
Ibos (about 10 million). The three were different in language, religion,
and social organization. 10 The Ibos who became the targets of genocide,
were mostly Christians and animists, in contrast to the Hausa-Fulani,
who were Muslim and organized in the traditional Arab way under a
strong central authority. Adding to the problem was the Ibos' domi-
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nance in education and industrialization. The North, with a high illiteracy rate and a largely agrarian economy, nevertheless controlled the
federation by sheer weight of numbers (the total Northern region
numbered about 35 million people).11 The lbos who attempted to secede
in 1967 capitulated to the federal government of Nigeria in 1970. During
the years of warfare hundreds of thousands died either in battle, during
massacres, or by starvation.
The process of decolonization in India brought the division of India
and Pakistan, strongly fostered by religious cleavages. Pakistanis were
largely Muslims, and most Indians were Hindus; intermingling between
the two groups was prohibited because of the caste system of the Hindus. Caught between the two groups were the Sikhs, who were divided
between the emerging states of India and Pakistan. Before partition the
Sikhs were embroiled in a "holy war" against the Muslims. Communal
strife during this time took on mass proportions as an estimated 1 million
people lost their lives. Upon partition Pakistan was divided into West
and East Pakistan, separated by 1,000 miles of India. As in the Sudan,
one region, West Pakistan, was considerably more industrialized,
whereas the East was predominantly agricultural. In addition to economic domination, political domination was secured by a bureaucracy
consisting largely of West Pakistanis. Negotiations for greater autonomy for the East in 1971 ended in massive retaliations by the West
Pakistani government. During the following months genocidal policies
were implemented which resulted in the indiscriminate deaths of men,
women, and children numbering well over 1 million.
Burundi became independent in 1962 after years of extended rebellions against Belgian authorities. The country has a majority of Hutusabout 85 percent of the population-ruled by a minority government
composed of Tutsis, who make up about 15 percent of the population.
This domination by a minority was over 400 years old, established when
the warrior Tutsis invaded the country from Ethiopia. Three aborted
coups in 1965, 1969, and 1972 against the unwanted minority government led to severe reprisals by the Tutsis and in 1972 to genocide against
the Hutus which claimed about 200,000 lives.
East Timor was a Portuguese colony which was to become independent in 1978 but preempted that step in 1975 by unilaterally declaring
independence. The people are largely of Malay and Papuan stock, with a
majority of Christians and some Muslim minorities. Past rivalries were
confined to interparty conflicts. The most popular party, FRETILIN,
which enjoyed 60 percent of the popular vote, was anticolonial and antiIndonesian and was thought to be left-leaning. Two other parties,
APODETI and UDT, called for union with Indonesia. This division
erupted into violence during August 1975. Indonesia immediately reacted by initiating a blockade against East Timar and subsequently invaded the country in December 1975. With the help of UDT and
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APODETI forces, independence was exchanged for union with Indonesia; the invasion resulted in looting, torture, and slaughter, with the
result that nearly 10 percent of the population was killed.12
In all five cases foreign intervention significantly added to the success
or failure of the secessionist movement. The intervention by India in
December 1971 ended the genocidal massacres and also secured the independence of the new state of Bangladesh. Not so typical was the
international support given to Nigeria/Biafra. China, France, Portugal,
Israel, and South Africa supported Biafra, while Great Britain and the
Soviet Union supported Nigeria. The latter "alliance" was probably due
to Britain's effort to curtail growing Soviet influence in Nigeria. Biafran
support came in the midst of conflicting European and big-power politics
(e.g., France's oil interest in Biafra and China's tensions with Moscow),
while Israel mostly confined its support to humanitarian relief efforts.
The United States paid lip service to a united Nigeria. The Organization
for African Unity (OAU) also supported Nigeria.13 The Southern Sudanese enjoyed almost no support from outside sources, while Egypt,
Libya, Algeria, Kuwait, East Germany, and the Soviet Union were said
to have armed the North. In Burundi, no international action was taken
to halt the massacres, although protests through diplomatic channels
were plentiful. So, for example, the OAU supported the Burundi government, as did China, North Korea, and France. The greatest concern
was shown by the former colonial power, Belgium, which early on
protested against Burundi's genocidal policies. East Timor received
verbal support from Australia and Portugal, and Indonesia received military support from the United States, while others claimed ignorance
about accusations of genocide in East Timor. In all cases United Nations
actions were confined to humanitarian relief efforts.14

Post-Coup and

.ost-Revolutionary

Genocides

The genocides of Kampuchea, Uganda, and Indonesia took place
after a revolution in Kampuchea, after a coup in Uganda, and after an
attempted coup in Indonesia, each conflict causing massive internal
upheaval.
With the deposal of Prince Norodom Sihanouk in 1970 a relatively
tranquil period ended in Cambodia. Increased involvement in the Vietnam War led to increased turmoil in the Khmer Republic. Forces of the
Khmer Republic fought the Khmer Rouge in a civil war, which ended in
the takeover by the Khmer Rouge Communists in 1975 and the establishment of Democratic Kampuchea. From 1975 to 1979 the Khmer
Rouge expelled all foreigners and instituted one of the bloodiest regimes
known in the twentieth century. Under the leadership of Pol Pot the
urban population was sent to the countryside to become part of the
"new" productive forces. He designated as expendable all those unable
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to perform the task. Pol Pot's "Marxist" revolution was but a peasant
uprising against the feudal class represented by the townspeople.15
Though his fury was mainly directed against townspeople, former
collaborators including loyal peasants were also eliminated; thus, all
perceived as opposing the regime were targets of genocidal policies. The
failure of the regime was sealed with the invasion by Vietnamese forces
in 1979; Vietnam is still occupying the country.
In January 1971 ldi Amin overthrew Milton Obote of Uganda in a
coup, setting in motion a regime which ruled with unprecedented brutality. Amin, the dictator of Uganda who is often compared with Hitler,
during his first three months in office was responsible for the deaths of
10,000 civilians and 2,000 soldiers. Like Pol Pot, Amin immediately
chose to expel all foreigners from the country. His genocidal policies
extended to all perceived as opposing his regime. His henchmen were
members of his own tribe, the Kakwa, Nubians inside Uganda, and
mercenaries from the Southern Sudan. In the effort to consolidate his
power, Amin was responsible for the slaughter of an estimated 500,000
people. His regime ended with an invasion by Tanzanian forces in
1979, leaving behind a legacy of tyranny.16
On October 1, 1965, six Indonesian generals and a lieutenant were
murdered in an uprising against President Sukarno. Although the truth
may remain forever a secret, the events were thought to be Communist
inspired and/or initiated.17 In a predominantly Muslim society, the
Communist party was something of an enigma (membership estimated at
10 million or one-quarter of the adult population). The short-lived
uprising was crushed a few days later and led to the systematic slaughter
of hundreds of thousands of Communists over a period of two years.
Participating in the slaughter were soldiers and civilians trained for the
purpose. Some officials of the Suharto regime later explained the
slaughter as the "people's revenge," suggesting a spontaneous mass
reaction to avenge the death of some of their leaders-hardly convincing
in light of the fact that the slaughter continued over two years.
International support for the revolutionaries in Kampuchea came from
Vietnam and China, while the regime was supported by American arms
and aid. The faltering United States effort in Vietnam led to an abandonment of the pro-American Lon Nol regime, which enabled Pol Pot to
take over. The subsequent fall of the Pol Pot regime was in part due to
the growing antagonism between China and Vietnam, eventually leading
to the invasion by the latter, whereupon Pol Pot fled to China. Uganda's
Amin received full support from Libya but was criticized by the leaders
of Tanzania, Zaire, and Zambia. By and large, however, the OAU
remained silent about the indiscriminate killings of Ugandans. Only after
Uganda invaded Tanzania did Tanzania respond with a counterinvasion.
Supported by renegade Ugandan soldiers, the invasion successfully
removed the murderous regime, and Amin fled to Libya. In Indonesia
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the coup was thought to be inspired by Peking, though no direct link
with China could be detected. American sympathies went to the Suharto
regime. In all cases the United Nations did little other than express its
dismay and verbally condemn these flagrant violations of human rights.

Genocides of Conquest
During the imposition of German colonialism in what is today Namibia, the Hereros became the target of genocidal policies. In the early
1970s "the International League for the Rights of Man, joined by the
Inter-American Association for Democracy and Freedom, charged the
government of Paraguay with complicity in genocide against the Guayaki
Indians."18
In the short-lived colonial history of the German Empire (ending in
1918), early efforts of peaceful colonization in Southern Africa were
soon replaced by measures which reduced the indigenous people to
serfdom. The Hereros, a pastoral people noted for their large cattle
herds, saw themselves slowly stripped of their land by German settlers.
From 1903 to 1907 they revolted against the German colonizers-with
devastating results. Successful at first, the Hereros were eventually defeated by superior technology and firepower. Thousands lost their lives
in the actions following the uprising. The Germans "hunted them down
like wild beasts all during 1905."19 An estimated 65,000 Hereros lost
their lives.
The Guayaki (Aché) Indians, a hunting and gathering people, were
targets of genocide when "modern" Paraguayans encroached upon their
traditional lands. During 197 4 the Paraguayan government was blamed
for allowing the slaughter, torture, and enslavement of the Indians by
hunters and slavetraders.
International action was negligible in the first case. Wars against native Africans warranted no attention from other colonizers. There was
some international attention given to the Aché Indian case, and verbal
condemnation of Paraguayan policy eventually resulted in some response
by the government.

CONCLUSIONS
In all the cases considered here genocides were preceded by some
attempt to change the existing power structure. It should be obvious that
any attempt to change existing power relations carries a certain amount of
risk for the challenger. Though most potential revolutionaries accept the
calculus of losing some lives, genocide would be an unacceptable risk to
anyone.
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Successful rebellions (Kampuchea, for example) more often resulted
in massive internal upheavals than did failed attempts (Indonesia, for
example). Moreover, unsuccessful coups often resulted in the slaughter
of those affiliated with the rebelling faction, for example, in Indonesia
and East Timor. Evidently governments utilize genocidal policies to
eliminate the opposition in an attempt to maintain the existing power
structure. In some cases these processes may extend to include attempts
to annihilate a people, i.e., a holocaust. This does not mean that holocausts result in more deaths; it simply means that the pursuers seek the
total destruction of a people rather than their partial destruction. The difference is especially apparent in cases where the victims belong to the
political opposition-often the slaughter stops short offamily members.
The child of a Communist may not necessarily become one himself, but
the child of a Jew cannot escape his/her Jewishness, as a result often
becoming the victim of a holocaust. Utilizing genocide to eliminate
political opposition thus appears to be a more rational choice than the
attempt to annihilate a people. As such, policymakers sometimes make
the argument that political victims are legitimate targets of governmental
violence which aims to prevent further violence, e.g., future civil war.
In contrast, one may argue that ethnic/religious victims are illegitimate
targets of governmental violence because they have neither the means to
fight back, nor do they compete with government, and thus are truly
innocent of any wrongdoing. But what is at stake is not the characteristics of the victim group, but the motives of the perpetrators. The
killing of a people for attempting to change the existing government
structure cannot be based on the collective character of a group, simply
because not everybody is involved in the struggle. The only public
offense which warrants the execution of an individual is the murder of
another (in some societies even murder does not result in death). Excluded from this principle are killings done in the process of war, although many people view war and the resulting human carnage as an
unacceptable means of international interaction. In cases of no war and
where no individual crime has taken place, any killing either done by or
conspired in by public authorities against a group of people is a crime.
The theoretical argument advances the proposition that structural
challenges result in upheavals, polarize existing internal cleavages, and
-with external help or the lack of it to either the dominant group or the
rebelling faction-sometimes lead to genocide. In all cases cited above
the genocides were preceded by challenges to the dominant power strata.
In all cases genocidal processes were accelerated through the polarization
of internal cleavages. The most distinct cases are those of the Holocaust,
the Armenian genocide, and Burundi, where the groups were targets of
prior discrimination and/or random violence, and also were easily identified by differences in culture, religion, and ethnicity. The Southern
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Sudan, Biafra, and Bangladesh similarly saw incidences of random violence and/or repression against target groups who were culturally, ethnically, and/or religiously different. In East Timor, Kampuchea, and
Indonesia the victim groups shared similar ethnic characteristics with the
dominant group, but, though prior internal rivalries existed in all cases,
the victims were considered enemies mainly because of their political
affiliations. Uganda is something of a special case, because victims
were neither clearly political enemies nor did they belong to one specific
religious or ethnic group. The killings, although systematic, seemed to
be instituted to consolidate the despotic power of a tyrant, similar to the
"Enabling Act" which gave Hitler the license to kill. The genocides
against the Hereros and the Aché Indians were policies designed to extend the control of the dominant "civilization." In the case of the former,
the Germans encountered a new type of warfare in the guerrilla tactics of
the Hereros, which they responded to in kind. Thus, random incidents
of "savagery" by the Hereros led to their wholesale, systematic slaughter
by the Germans. The Achés, although part of the same racial stock as
their persecutors, were culturally separated from the dominant stratum of
Paraguay. Malign neglect by the government led to their genocide,
perpetrated by those acting on behalf of the dominant interest, in a march
toward their version of civilization.
In all cases external support for either the dominant group or a
rebellious faction added significantly to the success or failure of the
undertaking. The Herero genocide is the exception, probably because
the slaughter of "savages" in 1904 by the colonizers was more acceptable
then. Today, the "savages" of the past are replaced by either the
Untermenschen or enemies of the dominant group. Nowadays, the drive
toward civilization is replaced by the search for a better world, in which
those perceived as standing in the way of "progress" are liquidated.
If we are able to explain past genocides and thus to anticipate future
genocides, the next logical step is their prevention. International organizations such as the United Nations have failed to halt the use of genocidal policies by sovereign states. Internal bickering and competing interests have prevented the effective use of international diplomacy to
prevent or stop genocides. Yet, the emergence of numerous private
organizations, in combination with a few U.N. efforts, gives the
impression that something may yet be done.
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4
GENOCIDE AND THE
RECONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL
THEORY: OBSERVATIONS ON
THE EXCLUSIVITY OF
COLLECTIVE DEATH
Irving Louis Horowitz

The subject of genocide in general and the Holocaust in particular
threatens to become a growth industry in the Western cultural apparatus.
Books, plays, and television dramatizations on the subject pour forth relentlessly. Sometimes they are presented soberly, other times scandalously; but all are aimed at a mass market unfortunately more amazed
than disturbed by their implications. There is danger in this massification of Holocaust studies. Western culture is inclined to adopt fads; even
Holocaust studies may become a moment in commercial time-interest in
them may decline as well as grow, and even peak out, leaving in its
wake a void. The residual debris will probably be summarized in musical comedy; we have already seen examples of this in The Lieutenant
(Lieutenant Calley) and Evita (Eva Peron) on Broadway. Peter Weiss'
play The Investigation led one commentator to suggest that the major
character in the play, in order to elicit shock from the audience, read lines
"as if he were saying: 'Let's hear it for genocide."'1 This may be a sign
of things to come.
One of the least attractive features of post-Holocaust studies is the
effort of a few to monopolize the field. As a consequence, a linguistic
battle looms among survivors over which exterminations even deserve
the appellation "holocaust" (the total physical annihilation of a nation or a
people). Such a bizarre struggle over language remains a grim reminder
of how easy it is for victims to challenge each other and how difficult it
is to forge common links against victimizers. 2 I do not wish to deny
Jewish victims of the Nazi Holocaust the uniqueness of their experience.
But there are strong elements of continuity as well as discontinuity in the
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process of genocide, in the evolution of life-taking as an essential dimension by which state power can be measured in the twentieth century.
Writing with compelling insight, Elie Wiesel personifies the mystic
vision of the Holocaust. Those who lived through it "lack objectivity,"
he claims, while those who write on the subject but did not live through
it must "withdraw" from the analytic challenge "without daring to enter
into the heart of the matter."3 More recently, it has been suggested that
"for Jews, the Holocaust is a tragedy that cannot be shared" and "it may
be unrealistic or unreasonable or inappropriate to ask Jews to share the
term holocaust. But it is even more unreasonable and inappropriate not
to find a new name for what has taken place in Cambodia. "4 Since what
took place in both situations is a holocaust-from the demographic point
of view-we need not invent new terms to explain similar barbaric processes. Those who share a holocaust share a common experience of
being victim to the state's ruthless and complete pursuit of human lifetaking without regard to individual guilt or innocence. It is punishment
for identification with a particular group, not for personal demeanor or
performance. These are not theological, but empirical criteria. To seek
exclusivity in death has bizarre implications. The special Jewish triumph
is life. All too many peoples-Jews, Cambodians, Armenians, Paraguayans, Ugandans -- have shared a similar fate for victims to engage in
divisive squabbles about whose holocaust is real or whose genocide is
worse.
Those who take an exclusive position on the Holocaust are engaging
in moral bookkeeping, in which only those who suffer very large numbers of deaths qualify. Some argue that the 6 million deaths among
European Jews is far greater than the estimated 1 million deaths among
Armenians. However, the number of Armenian deaths as a percentage
of their total population (50 percent) is not much lower than the percentage of Jewish losses (60 percent). Others contend that the deaths of
Ugandans or Biafrans are too few to compare to the Holocaust; yet here,
too, tribal deaths in percentage terms rival the European pattern of
genocide. In certain instances high death rates (approximately 40 percent
of all Cambodians, or 3 million out of 7 million) are indisputable; then
one hears that such deaths were only random and a function of total
societal disintegration. Yet it has been firmly established that such
deaths were targeted against intellectuals, educators, the foreign-born,
and literate people-in short, the pattern was hardly random; anyone
who could potentially disrupt a system of agrarian slave labor flying
under Communist banners was singled out and eliminated. Even making
the definition a matter of percentages risks creating a morality based
solely on bookkeeping.
There is need to reaffirm the seriousness of the subject. The problem
of genocide must be rescued from mass culture. It must not be returned
to academic preserves, but it must be made part and parcel of a general
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theory of social systems and social structures. The positions which I
would like to discuss, examine, and criticize perhaps have been articulated best by theologian Emil L. Fackenheim5 and sociologist Leo
Kuper. 6 In some curious way they represent the extremes that must be
overcome if an integrated approach to the study of genocide is to become
a serious subject for scientific analysis. On the one hand Fackenheim
speaks with a thunderous theological certitude that approaches messianic
or at least prophetic assuredness. On the other hand is Kuper, who is
extremely modest in his approach, to the point where some fundamental
distinctions between severe strife and mass destruction are entirely obliterated. This is not to suggest that the truth lies somewhere in the middle
but rather that the need for a social scientific standpoint in the study of
genocide may convince all to move to a higher ground in this area-an
area of research that has truly replaced economics as the dismal science.
Fackenheim's propositions have come to represent the main trends in
the theological school of Holocaust studies. They carry tremendous
weight among mass culture figures for whom theological sanction provides legitimation to their endeavors and respite from critics.7 Fackenheim does not remotely intend his views to become part of mass culture.
Quite the contrary. His eight propositions distinguishing the Holocaust
in particular from genocide in general represent a tremendous effort to
transcend journalistic platitudes, to move beyond an articulation of the
banality of evil and into the evil of banality. This deep respect for
Fackenheim registered, it must also be said that an alternative perspective-a social science framework-is warranted.
Fackenheim presents his eight propositions with direction and force.
A general theory of genocide and state power, which accounts for the
specifics of the Holocaust, can have no better baseline.
One: The Holocaust was not a war. Like all wars, the Roman War against
the Jews was over conflicting interests-territorial, imperial, and religiouswaged between parties endowed, however unequally, with power. The victims of the Holocaust had no power. And they were a threat to the Third
Reich only in the Nazi mind.
The Holocaust was a war; but a modern rather than a medieval
variety. Earlier wars redistributed power by military means. Genocide
redistributes power by technological as well as military means. Robert
Lifton recently stated the issue succinctly.
The word holocaust, from Greek origin, means total consumption by fire.
That definition applies, with literal grotesqueness, to Auschwitz and
Buchenwald, and also to Nagasaki and Hiroshima. In Old Testament usage
there is the added meaning of the sacrifice of a burnt offering. That meaning
tends to be specifically retained for the deliberate, selective Nazi genocide of
six million Jews-retained with both bitterness and irony (sacrifice to whom

64

Irving Louis Horowitz

for what?). I will thus speak of the Holocaust and of holocausts-the first to
convey the uniqueness of the Nazi project of genocide, the second to suggest
certain general principles around the totality of destruction as it affects survivors. From this perspective, the holocaust means total disaster: the physical, social, and spiritual obliteration of a human community.s
The precedent for this war against the Jews was the Turkish decimation
of the Armenian population. Like the Nazis, the Ottoman Empire did not
simply need to win a war and redistribute power; it had an overwhelming
amount of power to begin with.9 A war of annihilation is a war. To
deny the warlike character of genocide is to deny its essence: the destruction of human beings for predetermined nationalist or statist goals.
The Holocaust is also modem in that it is an internal war, waged with
subterfuge and deception by a majority with power against an internal
minority with little power. Here too the Armenian and Jewish cases are
roughly comparable. Although one can talk of genocide in relation to the
bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, genocidal conflict involves internal rather than external populations. But this is an unambiguous point
on the nature of war rather than a denial of the warlike nature of the
Holocaust per se.
The victims of the Holocaust did have a certain power: they represented a threat to the Nazi Reich. The Jew as bourgeois and the Jew as
proletarian represented the forces of legitimacy and revolution in Weimar
Germany. They had modest positions in universities, in labor, and in
industry. Regarding state power itself, where there were scarcely any
Jews, they were powerless. Jews were locked out from the German
bureaucratic apparatus much as the Turkish Beys locked out Armenians
from the Ottoman administrative apparatus, except to use them in a Quisling-like manner. The Jews posed a threatening challenge to the legitimacy of the Nazi regime.
Two: The Holocaust was not part of a war, a war crime. War crimes belong
intrinsically to wars, whether they are calculated to further war goals, or are
the result of passions that wars unleash. The Holocaust hindered rather than
furthered German war aims in World War II. And it was directed, not by
passions, but rather by a plan devoid of passion, indeed, unable to afford this
luxury.
This argument rests on a peculiar and misanthropic rendition of the
Hilberg thesis. The Holocaust did hinder the Nazi war effort in the
limited sense that troop transportation took second priority to transporting Jews. But in the longer and larger perspective, there were
advantages. Slave labor was itself an advantage; unpaid labor time was
useful. The expropriation of goods and materials was an economic gain
for the Nazi Reich. People were liquidated at marginal cost to the
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system. The gold taken from extracted teeth became a proprietary transfer.10 Fackenheim questions whether war goals were furthered by the
Holocaust; this is not answered simply. As a mobilizing device linking
military and civil sectors of the population, war ends were enhanced by
the conduct of the Holocaust. The Nazi attempt to exterminate the Jews
was motivated by passion, as evidenced by the fact that troop movements to the Russian front took second priority.
Raul Hilberg makes clear the direct collusion of the German Wehrmacht and the German Reichsbahn with respect to the systematic deportation of Jews and the front-line servicing of the armed forces. The
management of the German railroad illustrates how irrationality can
become rationalized, how a "true system in the modern sense of the
term" was employed for the unrelenting destruction of human lives. As
Hilberg notes, to the extent that the technification of mass society was
exemplified by the transportation network, such human engineering
considerations cannot be viewed as ancillary.
It illuminates and defines the very concept of "totalitarianism." The Jews
could not be destroyed by one Fhreron one order. The unprecedented event
was a product of multiple initiatives, as well as lengthy negotiations and
repeated adjustments among separate power structures, which differed from
one another in their traditions and customs but which were united in their
unfathomable will to push the Nazi regime to the limits of its destructive
potentiaI.11
The question of passion is a moot point at best; undoubtedly there was a
collective passion undergirding the conduct of the Holocaust. It was not
simply a methodical event
Fackenheim and many other theologians overlooked parallels in the
pursuit of a genocidal state following defeat. After the Turkish defeat at
the hands of Bulgaria in 1912, the most massive genocide against
Armenians occurred. After the Nazi defeat at Stalingrad in 1943, the
most massive destruction of Jews ensued. Whatever the vocabulary of
motives-fear of discovery, of reprisal, or of judgment-the use of
state-sanctioned murder to snatch victory from the jaws of defeat is
evident.
The largest part of European Jewry was destroyed after Germany had
in effect lost the war. When the major object of the war, defeat of the
Allied powers, was no longer feasible, the more proximate aim, destruction of the Jewish people, became the paramount goal. War aims
have manifest and latent elements. The manifest aim was victory in the
war, but the latent aim was defeat of the internal "enemy," the Jews.
The near-total destruction of the Jewish population might be considered
the victory of the Third Reich in the face of the greater defeat they
confronted by the end of Stalingrad.
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Three: The Holocaust was not a case of racism, although, of course, the
Nazis were racists. But they were racists because they were anti-Semites, not
anti-Semites because they were racists. (The case of the Japanese as honorary
Aryans would suffice to bear this out.) Racism asserts that some human
groups are inferior to others, destined to slavery. The Holocaust enacted the
principle that the Jews are not of the human race at all but "vermin" to be
"extenninated."
Here Fackenheim represents a considerable body of thought But the
Holocaust was a case of racism. It is not a question of which comes
first, anti-Semitism or racism; that philosophical dilemma is secondary.
Assignment of special conditions of life and work to Jews implies what
racism is all about: the assumption of inferiority and superiority leading
to different forms of egalitarian outcomes. Ultimately racism is not
about institutionalizing inferiority or superiority, but about denial of the
humanity of those involved. Jewish vis-a-vis Aryan physical characteristics were studied by German anthropologists to prove that there was
such a thing as race involved. These stereotypes were the essence of
European racism, as George Mosse has fully documented in a recent
work.
Racism had taken the ideas about man and his world which we have attempted
to analyze and directed them toward the final solution. Such concepts as
middle-class virtue, heroic morality, honesty, truthfulness, and love of nation
had become involved as ever against the Jew: the organs of the efficient state
helped to bring about the final solution; and science itself continued its
corruption through racism. Above all, anthropology, which had been so
deeply involved in the rise of racism, now used racism for its own end
through the final solution. Anthropological studies were undertaken on the
helpless inmates of the camps. Just as previously non-racist scientists became
converted by the temptation to aid Nazi eugenic policies, so others could not
resist the temptation to use their power over life and death in order to further
their anthropological or ethnographic ambitions.12
The fact that American racism has a clear-cut criterion based on skin
color does not mean that the physical and emotional characteristics
attributed to Jews were less a matter of racism than the characteristics
attributed to American blacks. To deny the racial character of the
Holocaust is to reject the special bond that oppressed peoples share, the
special unity that can bind blacks and Armenians and Jews. To emphasize distinctions between peoples by arguing for the uniqueness of antiSemitism is a profound mistake; it reduces any possibility of a unified
political and human posture on the meaning of genocide or the Holocaust. The triumphalism in death implicit in this kind of sectarianism
comes close to defeating its own purpose.
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Four: The Holocaust was not a case of genocide although it was in response
to this crime that the world invented the term. Genocide is a modem phenomenon. For the most part in ancient times human beings were considered
valuable, and were carried off into slavery. The genocides of modem history
spring from motives, human, if evil, such as greed, hatred, or simply blind
xenophobic passion. This is true even when they masquerade under highflown ideologies. The Nazi genocide of the Jewish people did not masquerade under an ideology. The ideology was genuinely believed. This was
an "idealistic" genocide to which war aims were, therefore, sacrificed. The
ideal was to rid the world of Jews as one rids oneself of lice. It was also,
however, to "punish" the Jews for their "crimes," and the crime in question
was existence itself. Hitherto, such a charge had been directed only at devils;
Jews had now become devils as well as vermin. And there is but one thing
that devils and vermin have in common: neither is human.
Here Fackenheim has a problem of logical contradiction. First we are
told that the Holocaust is not a case of genocide, and then we are
reminded of the Nazi genocide of the Jewish people. But more significant is the contradiction within this framework, an inability to accept the
common fate of the victims. Whether they are Japanese, Ugandans,
Gypsies, Cambodians, Armenians, or Jews, their common humanity
makes possible a common intellectual understanding. Insistence upon
separatism, that the crime was Jewish existence and that this makes the
Jewish situation different from any other slaughter, whatever its roots,
contains a dangerous element of mystification. It represents a variation
of the belief in chosenness, converting it from living God's commandments into chosenness for destruction. This approach is dangerously
misanthropic. It misses the point that being chosen for life may be a
unique Jewish mission, but being selected for death is common to many
peoples and societies.
The description of Jews as devils was not the essence of Nazi antiSemitism; it was only the rhetoric of Nazism. The Ayatollah Khomeini
and other Iranian clerics constantly refer to Americans as devils. The
essence of the Jewish problem for Nazism was the Jew as a political
actor, and beyond that, the Jew as a cosmopolitan, universalistic figure
in contrast to Fascist concepts based on nationalism, statism, and
particularism. The Jewish tradition of social marginality, of reticence to
participate in nationalistic celebrations, makes anti-Semitism a universal
phenomenon, as characteristic of France as of the Soviet Union. The
special character of Jewish living cannot be easily converted into the
special nature of Jewish dying. Dying is a universal property of many
peoples, cultures, and nations.
Five: The Holocaust was not an episode within the Third Reich, a footnote
for historians. In all other societies, however brutal, people are punished for
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doing. In the Third Reich, "non-Aryans" were punished for being. In all
other societies-in pretended or actual principle, if assuredly not always in
practice-people are presumed innocent until proved guilty; the Nazi principle
presumed everyone guilty until he had proved his "Aryan" innocence. Hence,
anyone proving or even prepared to prove such innocence was implicated,
however slightly or unwittingly, in the process which led to Auschwitz. The
Holocaust is not an accidental by-product of the Reich but rather its inmost
essence.

Response to this proposition must acknowledge the basic truths of the
first part of the statement. The Holocaust was not merely a passing
moment within the Third Reich. It did not occur in other Fascist
countries, like Italy, for example, where death itself was alien to the
Italian culture, where not only the survival of Jews but the survival of
Communists was tolerated and even encouraged. Antonio Gramsci's
major works were written in a prison that had been converted into a
library by his jailers. The nature of national culture is a specific entity.
The Italian people, the Turkish people, the German people all had a
distinctive character. Social analysts do not discuss this kind of theme in
public. It is not fashionable; we have become even a bit frightened of the
concept of national character. Any notion of national character as that
advanced by Fackenheim carries within itself the danger of stereotypical
thought. But how else can we understand these phenomena? How can
we understand the character of reaction, rebellion, and revolution in
Turkey without understanding Turkish character, especially the continuity of that kind of character in the moral bookkeeping of development?
Ascribing guilt through proving innocence fits the framework of the
Nazi ideology. But to construct a general theory of historical guilt may
have pernicious consequences, in which the sins of the fathers are
bequeathed to the children and further offspring. That the Holocaust
was an "inmost essence" makes it difficult to get beyond phylogenic
memories, beyond a situation in which a society might be viewed as
having overcome its racism. When guilt is generalized, when it no
longer is historically specific to social systems and political regimes, then
a kind of irreducible psychologism takes intellectual command and it
becomes impossible to stipulate conditions for moving beyond a genocidal state. The Holocaust becomes part of a rooted psychic unconsciousness hovering above the permanently contaminated society. To be
sure, the Holocaust is the essence of the Third Reich. However, such an
observation is not necessarily the core question. Does the destruction of
the Jews follow automatically upon a nation that is swallowed up by the
totalitarian temptation? In which forms of totalitarianism does a
holocaust or genocide take place? Is anti-Semitism the essence of the
Soviet Union as is now claimed? Does the existence of anti-Semitism
prove a theory of totalitarian essence?
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The uncomfortable fact is that genocide is the consequence of certain
forms of unbridled state power. But whether anti-Semitism or other
forms of racism are employed depends on the specific history of
oppressor groups no less than oppressed peoples. States which demonstrate their power by exercising their capacity to take lives may be termed
totalitarian. Totalitarianism is the essence of the genocidal process. This
in itself provides an ample definition. If the Holocaust is unique to the
Third Reich, the question of genocide loses any potential for being a
general issue common to oppressive regimes. It is parochial to think that
the Third Reich somehow uniquely embodied the character of the Holocaust, when since then we have seen many other societies adopt similar
positions and policies toward other minorities and peoples.
Six: The Holocaust is not part of Gennan history alone. It includes such
figures as the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Jajj Amin al-Husseini, who
successfully urged the Nazi leaders to kill more Jews. It also includes all
countries whose niggardly immigration policies prior to World War II cannot
be explained in nonnal tenns alone, such as the pressure of the Great Depression or a xenophobic tradition. Hitler did not wish to export national
socialism but only anti-Semitism. He was widely successful. He succeeded
when the world thought that "the Jews" must have done something to arouse
the treatment given them by a Gennan government. He also succeeded when
the world categorized Jews needing a refuge as "useless people." (In this
category would have been Sigmund Freud, had he still been in Germany
rather than in America; Martin Buber, had he not already made his way to the
Yishuv [Palestine].) This was prior to the war. When the war had trapped
the Jews of Nazi Europe, the railways to Auschwitz were not bombed. The
Holocaust is not a parochial event. It is world-historical.
Curiously there is no mention of any other kind of history. Is, for
example, the genocide of the Armenian people part of world history or is
it simply part of Turkish history? This is a very complicated point; at the
risk of sounding impervious to moral claims, one has to be historyspecific if anything serious is to emerge. If one blames the whole world
for what took place at Van, one can construct such a theory. But it is
more pertinent, more appropriate, more pointed, to blame the Turks and
not the universe, and to blame the Germans and not the whole world,
including the Grand Mufti. The issue is implementation, not rhetoric.
The issue is neither the Grand Mufti nor the insecurities of Ambassador
Morgenthau.
Fackenheim's idea that Hitler neither exported national socialism nor
wished to do so represents a special reading of events. As Gideon
Hausner reminds us,13 as late as April 1945, when the Soviets were
penetrating Berlin for the final assault and Hitler was imprisoned in his
bunker, his last will and testament concluded by enjoining "the
government and the people to uphold the racial laws to the limit and to
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resist mercilessly the poisoner of all nations, international Jewry."
Hausner makes it plain that national socialism was an international movement whose linchpin was anti-Semitism. Fackenheim presumes that
World War II was all about anti-Semitism, but at a more prosaic level it
was about conquest. There was a Nazi government in Rumania; there
was a Nazi government in Yugoslavia-all these regimes were exported
The idea that Hitler was not interested in exporting national socialism is
curious. It would be more appropriate to note that wherever national
socialism was exported, so too did anti-Semitism follow. However, in
conditions where the Jewish population was not a factor, Nazism still
sought to establish a political foothold, either with or without direct
military aggression. The relation between national socialism as an
ideology and anti-Semitism as a passion is one that the Nazis themselves
were hard put to resolve. The linkage between the ideology and the
passion, which seems so close in retrospect, was far less articulated
policy than felt need in the earlier states of the Nazi regime.
Fackenheim slips in a subtle point that Jews were "trapped" in
Europe. But Jews were not trapped in Europe. They were of Europe
and had been of Europe for a thousand years. One of their dilemmas is
one rendered in almost every history where those who are to be exploited
or annihilated overidentify with their ruling masters. The Jews of
Europe were entirely Europeanized. Only a small fragment remained
outside the framework of Europeanization. The great divide of German
and Russian Jews was participation in European nationalism, identification with enlightenment. Fackenheim's idea that the Jews were
trapped in Europe is a clever misreading of the facts. The added horror
of the Holocaust is that it happened to a people who were endemic to that
part of the world.
Seven: The Jews were no mere scapegoat in the Holocaust. It is true that
they were used as such in the early stages of the movement. Thus Hitler was
able to unite the "left" and "right" wings of his party by distinguishing, on the
left between "Marxist" (i.e., Jewish) and "national socialism" (i.e., "Aryan")
and, on the right, between raffendes Kapital ("rapacious," i.e., "Jewish"
capital) and schaffendes Kapital ("creative," i.e., "Aryan" capital). It is also
true that, had the supply of Jewish victims given out, Hitler would have been
forced (as he once remarked to Hermann Rauschning) to "invent" new
"Jews." But it is not true that "The Jew [was] ... only a pretext for
something else." So long as there were actual Jews, it was these actual Jews
who were the systematic object of ferreting-out, torture, and murder. Once,
at Sinai, Jews had been singled out for life and a task. Now at Auschwitz,
they were singled out for torment and death.
The difficulty with this exclusivist formula is that while Jews were
singled out, so too were Gypsies, Poles, and Slavs. Hitler's appeal was
to state power, not to unite left and right; not to unite bourgeoisie and
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proletariat, but to make sure that the bourgeoisie and the proletariat of
Germany were purified of Jewish elements. If one considers the national aspects of the Third Reich rather than the mystical aspects of
Jewish destruction it becomes a lot easier to fathom. German Jewish
concentration points were the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, in leftist
socialist politics and in high bourgeois economics. Liquidation of the
Jews enabled the German bureaucratic state to manage the bourgeoisie
and the proletariat of Germany without opposition.14 The destruction of
socialism was attendant to the destruction of the Jews. Without socialist
opposition, the German proletariat was an easy mark for Third Reich
massification. The first two legislative acts of the Third Reich were bills
of labor, work, and management. The liquidation of the Jewish population, within both the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, permitted the Nazis
to consolidate state power. The Holocaust, from a Nazi standpoint, was
an entirely rational process, scarcely a singular act of mystical divination.
It was the essential feature of Nazi "domestic" policy in the final stages
of the Third Reich.
Eight: The Holocaust is not over and done with. Late in the war Goebbels
(who needless to say, knew all) said publicly and with every sign of conviction that, among the peoples of Europe, the Jews alone had neither
sacrificed nor suffered in the war but only profited from it. As this was
written, an American professor has written a book asserting that the Holocaust never happened, while other Nazis are preparing to march on Skokie in
an assault on Jewish survivors. Like the old Nazis, the new Nazis say two
things at once. The Holocaust never happened; and it is necessary to finish
the job.
On this point, Fackenheim is on sound ground. Still, the point that he
does not make and that requires emphasis is that the Holocaust did
happen and could happen again, but is now more likely to happen to
people other than Jews and Armenians. It was more likely to happen to
Ugandans, and it did; to Cambodians, and it did; to Paraguayans, and it
did; to Biafrans, and it did. It is correct to say that the Holocaust is not
over and done with. But it is not over and done with because there are
other peoples victimized by the very model created by the Turkish and
Nazi genocides.
It is important not to fit peoplehood into theories; theories must fit the
realities of people. If the restoration of human dignity is to become a
theme for social research, it becomes imperative to understand the unified character of genocide, the common characteristics of its victims, and
ultimately the need for alliances of victims and potential victims to resist
all kinds of genocide. To insist on universalism, triumphalism, or separatist orientations is self-defeating. If there is to be any political consequence of research into genocide, and if victim groups are to do more
than pay for annual memorials and remembrances, understanding of the
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unity needed to confront state oppression must be made paramount;
otherwise little will have been accomplished and nothing will have
changed.
Although my analysis has sharply demarcated theological from
sociological viewpoints, it should be appreciated that Jewish religious
thought is itself far from unanimous on the special nature of the Holocaust Orthodox segments in particular have cautioned against an overly
dramaturgical viewpoint, urging instead a position in which the Nazi
Holocaust is but the latest monumental assault on the Jewish peopleone that is neither to be ignored nor celebrated, but simply understood as
part of the martyrdom of a people. In a recent essay, William Helmreich
has finely caught the spirit of this "strictly orthodox" view-which may
be shared by larger numbers than either the mystifiers or the celebrationists may recognize.
He notes that this orthodox wing rejects paying special homage by
singling out the victims of the Holocaust on both philosophical and
practical grounds.
In their view, the Holocaust is not, in any fundamental way, a unique event in
Jewish history, but simply the latest in a long chain of anti-Jewish persecutions that began with the destruction of the Temple and which also included
the Crusades, the Spanish Inquisition, attacks on Jews led by Chmielnicki,
and the hundreds of pogroms to which the Jewish community has been
subjected to over the centuries. They do admit that the Holocaust was unique
in scale and proportion but this is not considered a distinction justifying its
elevation into a separate category.15
Helmreich goes on to note that the ethical problem, in view of orthodox
believers, is the same if one Jew is murdered or if 6 million meet such a
fate. Since Judaism is a Gemeinschaft ("a community of fate"), the
sheer volume killed, while awesome, does not in itself transform a
quantitative event into a unique qualitative phenomenon.
The significance of this minority theological report is to call attention
to the fact that in the problem of the Holocaust, while there are some
strong clerical-secular bifurcations, there are also cross-cutting patterns
across disciplinary boundaries. For example, certain sociological lessons can be drawn from the Holocaust: the breakdown in egalitarian
revolutions of the nineteenth century, the subtle abandonment of the
Palestinian mandate after the Balfour Declaration, the lofty assertion
followed by a total revocation of Jewish minority rights in the Soviet
Union. For orthodoxy the Holocaust is more a function of the breakdown of Jewish solidarity than of any special evils of the German nation
or the Nazi regime.
The sociological view attempts to transcend sectarian or parochial
concerns and develop a cross-cultural paradigm that would permit placing the Holocaust in a larger perspective of genocide in the twentieth
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century rather than seeing the former as entirely distinctive and the latter
as some weaker form of mass murder. For example, with the liquidation
of roughly 40 percent of the Cambodian population, even the quantitative
indicators of the Nazi Holocaust have been approached in at least one
other situation. In the past, it has been argued that genocide of other
peoples-Armenians, Ugandans, Paraguayans, Indians-has been too
random and sporadic to be termed a holocaust It has also been claimed
that the atomic attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were highly selective
and refined military targets and not efforts at the total destruction of a
people. Whatever the outcome of such contentions, the Cambodian case
would indicate the risks in vesting too much intellectual capital in the
sheer numbers involved-although it is clearly a factor to be contended
with.
Having argued thusly, let me note that qualitative differences do exist
which distinguish the Jewish Holocaust from any other forms of genocide. First, there is the systematic rather than random or sporadic nature
of the Holocaust: the technological and organizational refinement of the
tools of mass slaughter which ultimately reduced all morality to problems
of human engineering-development of the most effective methods for
destroying and disposing of large numbers of people by the fewest
cadres possible in the shortest amount of time. Second, there was an
ideological fervor unmatched by any other previous variety of genocide.
So intent were the Nazis in their policy of extermination of the Jews that
they dared contact other nations, especially Axis powers and neutral
countries, to repatriate Jews back to Germany to suffer the ultimate
degradation. Third, genocide against the Jewish people represented and
rested upon a national model of state power: the purification of the
apparatus of repression by a total concentration of the means of destruction in a narrow military police stratum unencumbered by considerations
of class, ethnicity, gender, or any other social factors affecting Nazi
response to non-Jewish groups. The liquidation of plural sources of
power and authority made easier, indeed presupposed, the total liquidation of the Jewish population.
With all these inner disputations and disagreements accounted for,
there are still those who--too guilt-ridden to face the monstrous consequences of the Holocaust against Jews in particular and victims of
genocide as a whole-have chosen the path of evading reality. An
isolated voice like that of Arthur R. Butzl6 is now joined in a quasiintellectual movement, with all the paraphernalia of historical scholarship, 17 denying this massive crime. Denials of gas chambers, rejection
of photographic evidence, equation of indemnification of the victims
with Zionist beneficiaries are all linked to the rejection of the Holocaust's
occurrence. The Nazi "revisionists" dare not speak of Nazism, but of
national socialism; not of Germany under Hitlerism, but of a Third
Reich. The Nazi epoch is even spoken of in remorseful terms: "Over-

74

Irving Louis Horowitz

whelming British, American, and Soviet forces finally succeeded in
crushing the military resistance of a Germany which they accorded not
even the minimum of mercy."18 Pity the poor victim!
Even the New Nazi "intelligentsia" does not deny mass murder, but
only the numbers murdered.19 If it is not 6 million, then what number is
it? No matter, those massacred were Zionists, Communists, or a
hyphenated variety of the two-Jewish-Bolsheviks-any euphemism for
Jews other than the admission of a special assassination of Jews as a
people. The need for exacting scholarship-the sort that has begun to
emerge-with respect to all peoples victimized for their existence is not
simply a matter of litanies and recitations, but of the very retention of the
historical memory itself. The scientific study of genocide is not a matter
of morbid fascination or mystic divination, but of the need to assert the
historical reality of collective crime. Only by such a confrontation can
we at least locate moral responsibility for state crimes even if we cannot
always prevent future genocides from taking place.
With all due weight given to the different traditions involved in the
theological and sociological arguments concerning genocide, they do
have a strong shared value commitment to the normative framework in
which greater emphasis is placed on the protection of life than on
economic systems or political regimes.20 Both traditions are committed,
insofar as their dogmas and doctrines permit, to the supreme place of life
in the hierarchy of values. This is no small matter. Nazism witnessed
the breakdown of religious and scientific institutions alike; and those that
could not be broken down were oftentimes simply corrupted, as in
decadent and exotic notions of a Teutonic Church and the equally
ludicrous belief in an Aryan Science. In the larger context of world
history and in the wider picture of centuries-old barbarisms, we bear
witness not to a warfare of science versus theology but rather to a shared
collapse of any sort of normative structure in which either could function
to enhance the quality or sanctity of life.
Leo Kuper, born and banned in South Africa, is professor emeritus at
the University of Southern California and the author of several excellent
monographs in social stratification and race relations in African contexts.
He is a good man writing about an awful subject who has produced,
unfortunately, a mediocre book. The author of Genocide: Its Political
Use in the Twentieth Century manages to skirt just about every major
issue which has arisen in the field of investigation: the relationship between the Holocaust and genocides in general; the relationship between
civil conflict and state destruction; and the reasons for the ineffectiveness
of international peace-keeping agencies in reducing genocide. The last
omission is particularly glaring since Kuper describes this as an essential
task.
On a different level, however, it is an excellent basic text, especially
for individuals who are not familiar with the subject of genocide.
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Definitions are invariably fairminded and essentially sound; the
appendices, especially on United Nations resolutions and areas of backsliding (such as its attitude toward the Turkish genocide against Armenians), are particularly revealing. The role of the United Nations, or its
lack thereof, has been discussed often but understood rarely. At such
descriptive levels the book provides a welcome contribution. The selected cases are for the most part helpful and demonstrate a keen sense of
the magnitude of the problems of genocide. When we talk in terms of
roughly 800,000 Armenians, 6 million Jews, and 3 million Cambodians,
we have clear-cut examples of an enormous portion of a national
population decimated by the authorities, giving a sober reminder that our
century hovers dangerously between creativity and destruction.
The book's problems are less those of sentiment than of method.
Equating such phenomena as civil strife between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland with the destruction of German Jewry or the
destruction of urban Cambodia just does not work. Even the author
acknowledges that in Northern Ireland, victims have been numbered in
the hundreds over a long stretch of time, whereas in most clear-cut cases
of genocide the numbers destroyed are in the millions. Then there is the
too simplistic equation of civil war and genocide. Equating the Nigerian
Civil War or even the struggle against apartheid in South Africa with
cases of undisputed genocide blurs and confuses rather than clarifies
what genocide is about-namely, the vast, near-total destruction of large
numbers of noncombatants innocent of any specific crime. Furthermore,
burdening the United Nations as the source of the failure to control genocide is unconvincing since, as Kuper explains at length, this organization
is primarily a composite of nations and not in itself a sovereign power.
Underneath the demand to strengthen the United Nations is an implicit
assumption that nationalism should be weakened-something that clearly
has not taken place, nor is likely to take place, certainly not under the
aegis of the United Nations.
In the balance of this critique, let me take up some of the thornier
issues. The problem of genocide is not a new one, and the need for a
scholarship to move beyond horrors and into analysis becomes increasingly critical. It is risky to equate genocide with arbitrary death. Two
examples which Leo Kuper has given illustrate a problem rather than
indicate a solution. He raises, for example, the case of India during the
partition. Hindus and Moslems constituted majorities in different parts
of the country, each with the capacity to engage freely in what he calls
reciprocal genocidal massacre. However terrible and tragic that mutual
destruction was, to speak of it as genocidal in the context of religious
competition and conflict risks diluting the notion of genocide and equating it with any conflict between national, religious, or racial groups.
This error also appears in his analysis of Northern Ireland, where
Protestants and Catholics engage in the meanest and most dangerous
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kinds of assaults on one another. If one were to tally the numbers of
deaths since 1920, they would total about 10,000, surely a terrible human loss and an indicator, according to Kuper, of the risks involved in
the removal of the British presence in Ulster before a political solution is
achieved. One might indicate, as have many leaders from both the
Catholic and Protestant camps, that the British presence is itself a source
of violence and that the removal of the occupying power would
overcome a major obstacle to resolution of the civil conflict. Whether
this belief is correct or not, we are dealing within the realm of political
tactics and international relations, but surely not with genocide-unless
we reduce the term to a fatuous notion of the cultural elimination of
certain groups and ideologies.
Kuper also confounds legal identification between apartheid and
genocide in South Africa with the empirical problem: the place and condition of the blacks within South Africa. As the author himself well
appreciates, there is a demographic restraint to annihilation. The black
African population in South Africa grew from roughly 8 million in 1945
to 19 million in 1980. The Asian population grew from 285,000 to
765,000; and the white population from 2.4 million to roughly 4.4 million. The demographics alone indicate that genocide simply has not occurred. What may have happened is the fragmentation of the African
population and the consequent denial of blacks' citizenship rights. South
Africa is also a classic case of exploitation of the majority by a racial
minority, in a very specialized context. But it does not benefit the
victims or anyone else to present South Africa as a case of genocide
-which implies the absolute destruction of a people, if not completely,
then in such large numbers as to affect their future survival potential.
Relativizing the issue of genocide particularly damages efforts to
understand the Nazi Holocaust against the Jews. The major problem in
such relativizing is that it completely fails to distinguish between the
systematic, total, scientific engineering of death, and the more random
occurrences that are characteristic of other events. If others were to
operate under a veil of anonymity such as the Nazis did, they might also
attempt a kind of "final solution." But whether that is so or not, the
notion of the final solution, the sources and consequences of the Nazi
destruction of the Jews, is absent in the work of Professor Kuper.
While I myself have argued against celebrating the exclusivity of death,
one must consider seriously differences between the almost total
destruction of a population, reducing it to a remnant, and the selective,
random elimination of political or religious opposition. The very concept
of the Holocaust as something unique fails to appear in Kuper's work
and is mentioned only in relation to a book title. It is as if the author
were consciously and deliberately attempting to relativize the Jewish case
as one of many, and consequently disregarding the specificity and peculiar characteristics involved in the Nazi Holocaust This undermines not
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only the moral basis of Kuper's work but also weakens his appreciation
of the full meaning of the Turkish assault on Armenians. The latter was
not merely an event that took place in the Ottoman Empire but is characteristic of the Kemalist democracy that followed. The genocide against
Armenians, like the Holocaust against Jews, was special in its totality as
well as in its movement beyond the boundaries of nationalism and rationalism. Both cases are not characteristic of any others-until we get to
Cambodian communism.
Underlying his failure to distinguish between genocide and civil strife
on the one hand, and genocide and total destruction such as the Holocaust on the other, is a peculiar inability to distinguish between theory
and action and, more specifically, an unwillingness to deal with German
and Turkish cultures. Kuper, along with others, has dedicated a great
deal of futile time to problems of ideology. There is sufficient confusion
within Marxism and Fascism to make one wary of this line of approach.
Perhaps Marxism, in its acceptance of a theory of class polarization,
yields to a Manichean vision of a world torn apart; but even a Marxism
predicated on guilt by social origin may or may not translate into
genocidal behavior. It certainly does in terms of the Gulag Archipelago
and the years of Stalinism; it certainly does not in such places as
Yugoslavia. Likewise, even with Fascism there seems to be no doubt
that the Nazis analogized European Jewry to a cancer which had to be
excised and identified Jews with world conspiracy. Fascism in Italy did
not have the same genocidal potential. When Jewish enclaves in Asia
came under Japanese dominion during World War II the genocidal
pattern did not follow. Any comprehensive analysis of genocide must
deal seriously with cultural canons which permit or forbid genocidal
behavior. This total absence of cultural analysis--of both those who
were and were not given to genocide-seriously weakens Kuper's book.
Ideology rather than culture is held responsible and accountable for
genocidal behavior. This is a difficult thesis to prove. The republican
developmentalism of Ataturk in Turkey is absolutely at odds with imperial notions derived from the Ottoman Empire, yet both republican and
anti-republican forces within Turkey carried on genocide against the
Armenians. The peasant egalitarianism of the Khmer Rouge did not
spare us a major genocide. Wherever one seeks an answer based on
ideology the same kind of confusion presents itself, issues which Kuper
unfortunately does not address.
Kuper charges the United Nations with having done much less than it
should have. He argues that its capacities to curtail genocide, much less
prevent or punish atrocities, have been blunted. He gives several reasons for this laxity: first, the punitive procedures of the United Nations
are weak; second, the United Nations is committed to the sanctity of state
sovereignty; and third, the United Nations has established commissions
to deal with complaints about human rights violations which are them-
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selves highly politicized and controlled by a clique of powerful nations
whose vested interests are in stilling the voices of opposition. One could
hardly argue with Kuper's analysis of the weaknesses of the United
Nations, but from an analytical point of view, it is an extremely thin reed
on which to hang an analysis of the problem of genocide. The sources
of genocide are certainly not in the United Nations. The limits of the
organization are well understood by most. Kuper might then have analyzed different kinds of national cultures as well as how punishment and
law emerge in various countries.
There is now a burgeoning literature on just these subjects. It might
be possible to develop an early warning signal, a concern about problems of law and democratic order, that might limit the possibility of
future genocides taking place. But if the genesis of the problem is not in
a world organization, then it is hard to believe that the solution will be
found there. As Kuper knows quite well, the United Nations is itself the
source of so much amoral self-righteousness that its very existence
strengthens nationalism and the national ideal.
The treatment of the Holocaust as a dialogue between God and
Golem, as ineffable and unspeakable, serves to return the matter of death
into the antinomic and Manichean tradition of original sin versus original
goodness, or, as it is more fashionably called, historical pessimism
versus historical optimism. On the other hand, the treatment of genocide
as a problem for the United Nations makes it a rather tepid organizational
affair, denying to this "dismal science" its full meaning and significance.
If social science is to make its own serious contribution to Holocaust
studies, it must get beyond the mystery of silence or the silence of
mysteries. However limited the clinical analysis of collective death may
be, we may at least be spared the repetition of some forms of genocide.
To incorporate in the Jewish psyche the phrase "never again" requires an
antecedent commitment to explain why genocide happened in the first
place. Theologians must not presume an exclusive monopoly on meaning by insisting upon the mystery and irrationality of taking lives. The
task of social science remains, in this area as in all others, a rationalization of irrationality. Only in this way can the victory be denied to
Golem and the struggle against evil be understood as a task God assigns
to humanity. This is far greater than standing in silent awe at the
tragedies that have befallen our tragic century.
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5
GENOCIDE, THE HOLOCAUST,
AND TRIAGE
JohnK. Roth

Since its historical entry into world history the German people has
always found itself in need of space.... Our people has never been
able to settle this need for space, except through conquest by the sword
or through a reduction of its own population.
AdolfHitler, 1928
In May 1984, the Associated Press wired to American newspapers the
recent findings of the Population Reference Bureau, a Washington-based
research group that studies population trends. I Beyond announcing that
nearly 4.8 billion human beings now inhabit the earth, the bureau indicated that our planet's population has doubled since World War Il. Not
only did the world's population increase by almost 85 million in the past
year, the report went on to say, but there will be 5 billion persons here
by 1987. That number will rise to 6 billion by the end of the twentieth
century. Within forty years, the world's population will double.
Strangely, however, the AP's story took no notice of forces that could
disrupt these trends. Such interruptions, hastened by exploding population growth, ought not to be taken lightly. Nuclear threats make that fact
obvious. So does the history of genocide. More people exist than anyone needs. That condition-more or less-has always held. It makes
history, as Hegel deftly said, a slaughter-bench.
Where more people exist than are wanted, man-made death is never
far behind. One of the most persuasive teachers of that lesson was Adolf
Hitler. Although not sufficient, his leadership was a necessary condition
for the Holocaust, the Nazi attempt to exterminate the Jews. As suggested by the quotation with which this essay begins, Hitler believed that

82

John K Roth

the world's population was too large, and that therefore space, entailing
opportunity as well as geography, was lacking for the German people.
His self-proclaimed mission was to lead them to their rightful increase
and dominion.
Significantly, Hitler's statement comes from his so-called Zweites
Buch.2 Drafted in 1928, this sequel to Mein Kampf was suppressed by
Hitler himself. It is not necessary to assess the various explanations that
have been offered to account for that fact-the work was identified in
1958 and published in German three years later-but the issue that provoked Hitler to write is noteworthy. As Telford Taylor tells the story,
"the question of the South Tyrol was an especially sharp thorn in the
Nazi flesh" (p. xvi). For more than a century preceding the end of
World War I, this Alpine region south of the Brenner Pass, much of it
German-speaking, lived under Austrian rule. Thanks to the Treaty of St.
Germain, Italy gained control of the area. Its policy toward the German
population was benign until Benito Mussolini's Fascist regime introduced a program of Italianization. By March 1928, for example, Italian
had become the language of religious instruction in South Tyrol, prompting strong criticism from the Austrian Chancellor, Ignaz Seipel. When
Mussolini returned the favor by recalling his ambassador from Vienna,
the anti-Italian reaction in Germany as well as in Austria was considerable.
Hitler, however, did not profit from this feeling. On the contrary,
having praised Mussolini in Mein Kampf, where he also asserted that
unrest in the South Tyrol was a Jewish-inspired scheme to discredit 11
Duce and to threaten German-Italian cooperation, Hitler found himself
"attacked from the 'folkish' and nationalist quarter as 'soft' on an issue
of German irredentism" (p. xvii). Ironic though the facts just mentioned
may be, Hitler's Zweites Buch concentrated on the status of South
Tyrol. If the passing of the crisis influenced him to withhold the book
when it became apparent that nothing could be gained by publishing a
work that would "belabor an issue on which he and his Party were on
the defensive," Hitler's Zweites Buch still shows that the problem of not
enough space and too many people, or at least not enough space for the
right kinds of people, was never far from his mind at the time (p. xx).
Nor would those issues dwindle in importance as Hitler came to power
and unleashed genocide in his quest for Lebensraum. After the Anschluss, Hitler may have been content to leave South Tyrol under Mussolini's jurisdiction, even though he was unsuccessful in urging its German population to emigrate to the Reich, but both outcomes drove home
the governing principles Hitler had written down in 1928:
Politics is history in the making. History itself is the presentation of a
people's struggle for existence. I deliberately use the phrase "struggle for
existence" here because in truth that struggle for daily bread, equally in peace
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and war, is an eternal battle against thousands upon thousands of resistances
just as life itself is an eternal struggle against death. (P. 5)
No people have ever been wanted less than the Jews were by Hitler.
His anti-Jewish campaign was so virulent that it reduced Jews to sub- or
non-human status, thus making their elimination easier. Under Hitler,
then, the Nazis unleashed their genocide on the Jews. The success of
this attack is corroborated by the fact that even now debate rages about
whether genocide is a category that is adequate to encompass the Holocaust. At issue in those debates is the Holocaust's uniqueness. Consider, therefore, the useful distinctions that Yehuda Bauer makes by
designating the Holocaust as "the extreme case" of genocide.3
To Bauer, genocide suggests a continuum, each instance aimed at destroying a people in one way or another. The Holocaust belongs at its
"farthest point" because, as Hitler's targets, "every Jew-man, woman,
and child-was to be killed" (pp. 331-32). Genocide includes a multitude of sins, but heretofore its instances have not aimed at the total annihilation Hitler eventually directed against the Jews.4 Hence, the Holocaust is unique. Yet, owing to the possibility that total annihilation might
in some time or place become the aim again, Bauer contends that the term
"Holocaust" can be "not only the name by which the planned murder of
the Jewish people is known," but also "a generic name for an ideologically motivated planned total murder of a whole people."5 Just as history contains a variety of Holocaust-related events, such as the Armenian
massacres, there may also be Holocausts in the offing, a possibility
made all the more real since the Holocaust occurred.
If genocide is a continuum with Holocaust at its farthest point, how
are genocide's victims to be understood? If there is not some universal
characteristic that they all share, do they at least have what the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein would have called a family resemblance? The
import of such questions is more than historical; it also directs us toward
the future. For if people become potential targets of genocidal campaigns for reasons that at least resemble one another, that knowledge can
alert the endangered and those who care about them.
Such concerns are among those that orient the scholarship of Richard
L. Rubenstein, whose writings are as far-ranging as they are controversial, as perceptive as they are discomforting. An authorship taking
him from After Auschwitz (1966) to The Cunning of History (1975) has
recently been enhanced by The Age of Triage (1983), his most disturbing and hence most important work to date. There will be more to say
about that book, but first The Cunning of History. It not only focused
on the Holocaust but did so by accenting motifs already noted in this
essay.
For example, while impressed by the unprecedented features of the
Holocaust, Rubenstein affirmed that more understanding is to be gained
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by regarding Auschwitz as part of a continuum of human action than by
putting it in a category entirely its own. Next, although The Cunning of
History makes no mention of Hitler's Zweites Buch, Rubenstein knew
the importance of Hitler's conviction that Germany "was always an
overpopulated area. "6 Rubenstein further understood that Hitler's
appraisal along those lines was not limited to quantitative considerations.
Overpopulation was a qualitative matter for Hitler as well. In fact, a
witches' brew of quantitative and qualitative concerns about population
was not only what drove Hitler to establish the death camp as one of the
twentieth century's fundamental realities. That melange could also reveal
the Holocaust's significance in light of the recognition that the world's
population is nearly 4.8 billion and escalating at a startling pace. With
the Holocaust as the precedent, mass murder-if not genocide or
Holocaust-might well be the remedy of choice to achieve a "final solution" to the problems created by hordes of people who are unwanted by
the powers that be.
Stressing that the power of a political state is essential for Holocaust,
if not for every form of genocide, The Cunning of History packs an
incisive array of views into little more than a hundred pages. But none
drew more vigorous response than Rubenstein's simplest and most
fundamental thesis: "The Nazi elite clearly understood that the Jews
were truly a surplus people whom nobody wanted and whom they could
dispose of as they pleased.... In terms of German ideology, the
Jews were a surplus population because of the kind of society the Germans wanted to create. "7 He would expand those claims in The Age of
Triage, but already Rubenstein's point was that established interests had
for centuries engaged in the riddance of redundant populations. The
Nazis' handling of the Jews implemented an extremely calculated procedure for dealing with an old problem. It also involved a host of particular features-typically involving the blending of ancient strands of
religious anti-Semitism with modern ideologies of nationalism and racism. But Rubenstein's major insight was that the category of "surplus
people" was a crucial one to employ in relation to the Holocaust because
it could help us understand not only how that event is unique but also
how it is symptomatic of features that may be endemically destructive in
our current ways of life.
Lest he be misunderstood, Rubenstein carefully stated that "the concept of a surplus population is not absolute. An underpopulated nation
can have a redundant population if it is so organized that a segment of its
able-bodied human resources cannot be utilized in any meaningful economic or social role" (p. 10). That qualification, however, did not
prevent criticism for introducing population redundancy into an interpretation of the Holocaust. Even going on to clarify that "a surplus or
redundant population is one that for any reason can find no viable role in
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the society in which it is domiciled," Rubenstein is still attacked for
holding that the Holocaust-though exceptional-is still one of many
instances of state-sponsored population elimination. 8
A theory is only as good as its ability to cope with the objections
brought against it. By indicating some typical challenges directed against
Rubenstein's view about the Holocaust and surplus populations, responding to each, and then elaborating other dimensions of his vision,
Rubenstein's contributions to an understanding of the age of genocide
can be appraised. As to the criticisms-some explicit, others impliedthe first of seven examples comes from Jacob Katz. Responding to
statements made by Rubenstein at a conference on "The Holocaust-A
Generation After," he asserted that Rubenstein was mistakenly trying to
analyze the Holocaust "in Darwinian terms."9 Specifically, contended
Katz, the hypothesis that the Jews were a surplus people was not
credible because the Nazis, even during the intensity of the Holocaust
itself, "used Jews very profitably in SS factories" (ibid.). Variants of
this argument have frequently been raised against Rubenstein from time
to time, but they are not telling. Katz, for instance, undermines his own
analysis by acknowledging that decisions to use Jews for slave labor
were often overturned and instead those workers were dispatched to the
gas chambers. Or, it could be added, many others were simply worked
to death, as The Cunning of History testifies. Coupling these notes with
Rubenstein's basic qualification that population redundancy is not simply
a matter of numbers, Katz' objection remains beside the point.
In the same forum, Alice A. Eckardt took a different approach. She
concurred with Rubenstein that the Nazi treatment of the Jews was not
adequately handled by calling it an irrational aberration. Instead there
was a kind of rationality in the Nazis' anti-Jewish campaign. But, she
insisted, that rationality was not to be located in any Nazi perception that
the Jews were superfluous. Rather, the Nazis looked on the Jews "as an
absolute hindrance, a virus, a cancer" (p. 260). They were, in short,
"the incarnation of evil" (ibid.). From the Nazi perspective, then, it
could have made good sense to be rid of the Jews. To suggest, however, that the Jews were targets simply because they were superfluous
will not do.
Not much more than Katz' remarks do Eckardt's undermine The
Cunning of History. Indeed, they reflect it, for her argument, ironically,
has the unintended consequence of supporting Rubenstein's analysis.
The concept of a surplus population is not absolute; instead it encompasses the factors that Eckardt rightly stresses. People-and the Nazi
outlook did not simply deny that Jews were people-do not become
classified as viruses and cancers unless those beings are already regarded
as unwanted in the extreme. Propaganda and ideology utilizing such
classifications do so to underscore the more effectively how radically
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these people are unneeded, how they have no viable role in the scheme
of things controlled by the powers that be in the region where they
happen to dwell.
A third criticism has been advanced by Shlomo Avineri. He takes
Rubenstein to task for being "a functional structuralist" (p. 262).
Rubenstein, claims Avineri, tries too hard to subsume particular events
under universal categories. Such attempts may be part of a noble tradition, but in the case of the Holocaust, avers Avineri, they will not enable
Rubenstein to do what he wants. For there simply is not evidence to
substantiate the claim that the Nazis regarded the Jews as surplus and
therefore decided to exterminate them. On the other hand, there is
abundant evidence that the Nazis were fundamentally anti-Semites. The
Jews became targets not because they were superfluous but because the
Nazis hated Jews so thoroughly. The full measure of that hatred was
taken at Auschwitz.
One ought not trifle with a scholar of Avineri's deserved stature.
Thus, it is welcome that Rubenstein can accept his points and find that
the surplus people hypothesis is not jeopardized but strengthened.
Rubenstein would be the first to agree with Avineri's observation that
"Nazi antisemitism was not instrumental to Nazi aims but basic and
immanent to them" (ibid.). Genocide, on the other hand, is instrumental. "Seldom elected by a government as an end in itself," Rubenstein has since pointed out, "genocide is always a means of eliminating a
target population that challenges an economic, political, cultural,
religious, or ideological value of the politically dominant group."10
Hence, Avineri's stress on Nazi anti-Semitism indicates why the Jews
were targeted, but in being targeted, the Jews also revealed themselves to
be a surplus people as far as the Nazis were concerned. Rubenstein's
point is rightly a functional one. Practically speaking, Nazi anti-Semitism meant Jewish superfluity. Already we have noted that Hitler had
much to say about overpopulation, but even if Nazi rhetoric did not
speak directly and consistently about the Jews as surplus people, actions
spoke louder than words. Moreover, since there is no genocide without
human redundancy of one kind or another, Nazi actions do support the
contention that the Holocaust belongs on Bauer's continuum of genocide, albeit at its extremity. In spite of Avineri's contention to the contrary, the perspective of a functional structuralist, if the term is apt, can
illumine the Holocaust's place in the larger scheme.
The previous objections find fault with Rubenstein's account because
its emphasis on surplus people seems to overlook certain economic considerations and features of Nazi ideology. If those objections are much
weaker than purported, the plot thickens when Berel Lang questions the
explanatory power of Rubenstein's appeal to "the superfluity of a certain
proportion of the population." 11 Lang does not elaborate his objection,
but it seems to entail the belief that the surplus people category is itself
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rather superfluous when it comes to telling us how or why mass murder
takes place in particular circumstances. If Lang's briefly stated position
were expanded, it might claim that Rubenstein's concept says both too
much and too little. We do not know what "surplus" means until we
look at particular cases where allegedly surplus people are to be found.
When we do such looking, moreover, we find that "surplus" is indeed
not an absolute idea but so extremely relative that its meaning incorporates any number of specific reasons why a particular people might be
targeted and killed. In the process, the concept covers so much as to
become nearly meaningless.
Lang's criticism, implicit as well as explicit, has not gone unnoticed
by Rubenstein. The best evidence for that claim is that the author of The
Cunning of History planned early on to produce the sequel, The Age of
Triage, that would buttress the propositions about surplus populations
that were offered only in germinal form in the earlier study. As will be
pointed out in more detail below, the latter book analyzes numerous
historical examples to show that man-made mass death is linked with
perceptions of population redundancy. That redundancy is not merely a
matter of semantics, either. Historically, people tend to be killed en
masse when dominant powers deem them unnecessary and unwanted.
The factors that can put people into that risk are myriad, and hence the
utility of Rubenstein's theory about surplus populations emerges. If one
focused only on the many and varied particulars that lead to man-made
mass death, the continuities among those events would be overlooked.
Genocide and even Holocaust are concepts that help us to see the links.
Rubenstein's contribution, vastly meaningful, is to show that the specific
reasons for genocide also involve a pattern, one to which his intentionally elastic concept of surplus population directs us. The explanatory
power of the concept may not be its primary hallmark-for explanation
one must go more to the details in particular cases. The concept's
strength is instead in its synthesizing capacity, which in turn enables us
to see before it is too late the diverse ways and places in which people
might find themselves functionally redundant and destined to be targets
for riddance.
Other interpreters have taken The Age of Triage into account and still
find Rubenstein vulnerable where his theories about surplus people are
concerned. John Patrick Diggins, for example, echoes Berel Lang by
wondering whether Rubenstein's appeal to the problem of surplus populations really tells us why genocide happens. "For all his admirable research," Diggins says of Rubenstein, he "cannot establish the precise
cause, or even causes, of genocide, and this is profoundly disturbing. "12
This critic reasons that a historian "must demonstrate that causes originated in man's conscious intentions and purposes" before claiming to
know why human consequences turned out as they did. On Diggins'
reading, then, population superfluity could only be a cause of genocide if
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awareness of such a superfluity existed and the superfluity yielded a
conscious motive that led people to kill accordingly. Such evidence, he
implies with Avineri, is hard to come by not only in the Holocaust but in
other genocidal scenarios as well.
Rubenstein, I believe, would be agreeable to Diggins' insistence on
documentation. One issue between them, however, is where such
documentation can or must be found Again, Rubenstein's methodology
places less emphasis on what people say than on what they do. People
do not have to be overtly labeled "surplus" in order to be redundant; nor
do the powers that be have to pronounce that there is a problem of
surplus population in order for them to document through their actions
that they do, in fact, think one exists. The ultimate documentation is
extermination. Diggins may wish to wait for more explicit documentation, but if he does so, it is not clear that his historical positivism will
show itself superior to Rubenstein's willingness to let practice document
belief.
Incidentally, Diggins' skepticism notwithstanding, Rubenstein has
boldly asserted that the Holocaust "can be fully comprehended in terms
of the normal categories of history, social science, demography, political
theory and economics." 13 The credibility of that claim, of course, will
depend on what is meant by ''fully comprehended," but at this juncture
Rubenstein's Hegelian reach may well exceed an existential grasp. For
if human experience cannot ultimately account for itself-and it cannot
-then it is hard to see how "the normal categories of historical and
socio-political analysis" can fully comprehend the Holocaust or anything
else, for that matter. Yet, even if Rubenstein's assertion on this particular issue is not well-founded, a major point in his favor remains. He
defends the Holocaust's comprehensibility to contest perspectives that
mystify the Holocaust by stressing that the event eludes rational comprehension. Probably the truth is closer to Rubenstein's side than not.
Admitting that we lack the requisite metaphysical certainty to comprehend fully any historical occurrence, the disciplines of history, social
science, demography, political theory, and economics nevertheless do
tell much about how and why Auschwitz appeared. The Holocaust's
"incomprehensibility" is more in the beholder's eye than in the facts
themselves.
Where the Holocaust is concerned, however, the nature of the facts
remains in question, and to some extent that will probably be true
forever. An example is found in the research of Steven T. Katz, who by
implication disagrees with some of Rubenstein's economic emphases in
interpreting how and why the Jews became a redundant population
destined for mass death.14 Particularly in The Age of Triage, Rubenstein has held that the West's modernization process tended to render
Jews surplus as it turned them away from being an economically complementary class, rendered them instead a source of instability and
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conflict, and thus set them up for the kill. Not so, says Katz. The decisive turning point on the road to Auschwitz was instead a specific kind
of anti-Semitic racism. Close to Alice Eckardt's perspective, Katz' suggests that this racism was "microbial" and "parasitological." Such
racism reflects and inculcates the belief that inferior races will destroy
superior ones in ways analogous to those that exist when deadly diseasecausing agents invade human life. Racism of this kind brooks no compromise. Be killed or kill-completely-is its imperative.
Once more, nothing in Rubenstein's theory would require him to
deny that Katz' analysis has much in its favor. But Rubenstein can also
reply that Katz' account itself would be more credible if it took
economics with greater seriousness. Katz stresses that the content of the
Nazis' anti-Semitic racism had very little relationship to any empirical
realities. Its irrationality was a major characteristic, one that gave this
ideology peculiar power because it was beyond disconfirmation.
Rubenstein, however, urges a second look. Perhaps this anti-Semitism
is not quite so irrational, not quite so much a thing unto itself, if we see it
more than Katz does as an effect of economic relationships gone sour.
Understanding that "no single cause can explain a historical phenomenon," Rubenstein invites us to consider that realities of all kinds are more
interrelated and continuous than they are discrete and disparate.15
Rubenstein's approach has the advantage of fitting that pattern better than
Katz'. It does so by illuminating the economic factors in Nazi antiSemitic racism, thus making the latter no less hideous but more intelligible than Katz' stress on its irrationality can do.
Although Richard Rubenstein's critics contest much that he says,
even they are likely to agree that he is on target in asserting that ours is
the age of triage. How we arrived there and what we might do about that
outcome are two of his main concerns as his book by that title assesses
the extent of fear and hope in an overcrowded world. Having explored
several major objections with which Rubenstein's Holocaust theories
have had to contend, plus some of the rejoinders that can appropriately
be made to them, it will be well to conclude with an overview of The
Age of Triage, drawing out of Rubenstein's total vision of our past and
future his accent on the importance of religious as well as social scientific
reflection.
A socioeconomic sorting that saves some ways of life by dispatching
others, triage testifies to the ascendancy of a powerfully practical form of
human rationality. Casting his point in economic terms, Rubenstein
stresses how decisive it has been that people discovered how to produce
a surplus. For thereby, he asserts, they also took "the first step in
making themselves superfluous."16
Already we have observed that current concerns about global population find the world containing many more people than anyone needs.
Rubenstein recognizes, in tum, that this perceived population redun-
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dancy exists partly because of sheer numbers but even more because the
dominant intentions that energize modem society tend to be governed by
the belief that money is the measure of all that is real. More than any
other, he claims, that belief drives the modernization process, which has
been under way and intensifying for centuries. One effect of this process is that the intrinsic worth of people diminishes. Their worth is evaluated functionally instead. Hence, if persons are targeted as nonuseful-they can be so regarded in any number of ways, depending on
how those in power define their terms-a community may find it
sensible to eliminate the surplus from its midst. In modem times, that
action has been facilitated, indeed instigated and promoted, by governmental power. Triage, then, entails state-sponsored programs of population elimination: through eviction, compulsory resettlement, expulsion,
mass warfare, and outright extermination-roughly in that order. This
winnowing process, more or less extreme in its violence, enables a
society to drive out what it does not want and to keep what it desires for
itself.
Persistently intrigued by history's continuity as well as by its cunning, Rubenstein links modernization and mass death in a study that
encompasses such apparently diverse events as the enclosure movement
in England during the Enlightenment, the nineteenth-century famine
years in Ireland, and a variety of twentieth-century events-a nonexhaustive list would include the Armenian genocide, the slaughter of
Soviet citizens under Stalin, the destruction of the European Jews under
Hitler, and the devastation of Cambodia. Taken alone, Rubenstein's
political interpretation is stunning enough, but The Age of Triage does
more because its author has not abandoned his grounding in religion and
theology to tum exclusively to socioeconomic analysis. On the contrary,
an age of triage makes the vitality of religion and theology more critical
than ever. It is within this perspective that Rubenstein should be
understood when he states that "no theological enterprise, that is, no
consideration of the ultimate values that move men and women, can be
adequate to its task if it ignores critical political and social theory, especially insofar as these modes of inquiry seek to comprehend the conditions under which men attempt to conduct their lives both individually
and collectively" (p. v).
Explicitly and implicitly, God is both absent and present in The Age
of Triage. Historically, for example, Rubenstein argues that Western
monotheism desacralized the world, leaving human power free to exploit
nature and to kill far too much with impunity. Ironically, the same God
found in the theologies that were instrumental in unleashing the modernizing process has also been its victim, eclipsed by an advancing civilization that has produced in tandem benefit and destruction, both in
unprecedented abundance. Yet, looking toward the future, Rubenstein
hints at-indeed he yearns for-a religious revival that might transmute
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humanity's propensity to move, as Benjamin Nelson put it, "from tribal
brotherhood to universal otherhood" (p. 7). Such a revival, hopes
Rubenstein, would convert us so that we are "born again as men and
women blessed with the capacity to care for each other here and now"
(p. 240). God's place in an age of triage ought not to be the least of our
concerns. Consider, then, four of Rubenstein's fundamental propositions. Each merits a governing role in late twentieth-century theology
and religious reflection.
1. "Modern civilization is largely the unintended consequence of a
religious revolution" (p. 230). Western monotheism, contends Rubenstein, replaced magic and belief in a spiritualized nature by insisting that
there is one and only one God who is the sovereign creator of heaven
and earth. The success of Judaism and Christianity inadvertently paved
the way for the secular outlooks that result in triage. True, these traditions affirmed that the earth is the Lord's. Men and women, moreover,
were to be obedient to God's will. That will, in tum, would make itself
known in history, and there not everything was to be permitted. Bonds
of moral obligation, underwritten by God's judging power, were
claimed to be in force. Human life, formed in God's image, appeared to
be even more sacred than it had been prior to monotheism's eminent
domain.
Neither in practice nor in theory, however, does history conform
entirely to conscious intention. In spite of and even because of monotheism's moral components, a course unfolded in which nature and even
human life itself came to be regarded as subject to the mastery of politics
and economics. Religions predicated on revelation within history unleashed reason in ways that transmuted the moral authority of revelation
itself. A biblical God inspired a secular consciousness, and at times God
disappeared in the process. Providence became Progress. Progress
meant the triumph of a calculating, functional rationality whose Golden
Rule was Efficiency.
My account, if not Rubenstein's, is overly simple. Still, the power of
its drift remains. Religions and theologies are loaded dice because they
always contain more options for development than the limitations of
immediate consciousness can comprehend. In an age of triage, we have
learned that lesson to our sorrow. Yet Rubenstein's point is that we can
be aware of it now. That awareness enjoins a warning, which takes us
to a second proposition deserving of attention.
2. "In a crisis, a secularized equivalent of the division of mankind
into the elect and the reprobate could easily become a controlling image"
(p. 216). Western monotheism's emphasis on a God of History has
typically included the idea that some groups or persons are specially
called. They are linked together and with God in relations of covenant.
At their best, these convictions have singled people out for service, but
nearly all of these doctrines of election and covenant have also been
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extremely volatile. Separating people, they have induced a host of
rivalries. Those rivalries and their offspring, Rubenstein avers, have
more than a little to do with triage.
Unintended consequences are no less real than those that are consciously desired. The former, in fact, may be the more devastating precisely because their full power remains hidden until the effects are felt.
In our religious context, the crucial link between theology, religious
reflection, and triage lurks in the fact that Western monotheism has much
to do with economic versions of divine election and covenant. Within
such perspectives, poverty and wealth are much more than economic
conditions. They entail divine judgment and just desert. Thus, their
driving force can be not one of ministering to the poor but rather of
eliminating them so that the position of the elect remains unthreatened.
The theology of election and covenant sketched here sounds perverse.
It is. But Rubenstein's point is that it is too simple, too convenient, only
to protest that a tradition has been distorted. No doubt distortion exists,
but perhaps the more important point is that what we say about God is
usually a two-edged sword. That fact holds with respect even to the best
examples of theology and religious reflection that we can cite. For the
seeds that sprouted into destructive versions of election and covenant
were not sowed first by the spiritually bankrupt or by the intellectually
corrupt. They are gifts from the giants of Western religion. The issue
that remains, then, is whether theology and religious reflection can speak
in ways to avert the crises that fuel forces bent on triage because they see
the world in terms of the elect and reprobate.
3. "We are by no means helpless in meeting the challenge confronting us" (p. 224). Economically, argues Rubenstein, the basic remedy for triage would be to create a social order that provides a decent job
for any person who is willing to work. His optimism is muted, however, because he knows that the implementation of his economic remedy
is anything but an economic matter alone. In fact, the forms of practical
rationality that govern modern economic thinking tend to mitigate against
policies of full employment. The challenge that confronts us, then, is
largely a spiritual one. Unless men and women are resensitized
religiously, the resources to avert triage are likely to be hopelessly
inadequate.
Rubenstein thinks that we need nothing less than "an inclusive vision
appropriate to a global civilization in which Moses and Mohammed,
Christ, Buddha, and Confucius all play a role" (p. 240). To call Rubenstein's vision demanding understates the case. For, their universalizing
tendencies notwithstanding, the major religious traditions have themselves been instrumental in "triaging" people "into the working and the
workless, the saved and the damned, the Occident and the Orient" (p.
240). Rubenstein, of course, hopes that a new religious consciousness
will build on the inclusive aspects of the major religious traditions,
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excluding the exclusive features in the process. Yet a further difficulty is
that, while the thinker and the theorist can point out the needed direction,
they cannot manage the achievement of such a vision.
If the so-called death of God theologies have had their moment in the
limelight and have now largely faded from view, the radical secularization of our time remains. Functionally, human reason in history tends
toward Godlessness, a pattern that theology and philosophy may check
but seem unlikely to reverse. It is Rubenstein's conviction that the
needed reversal, one that would substantially reduce the prospects of
triage, depends on "authentic religious inspiration" (p. 239). Such inspiration is not absent, but it cannot be called into being at will, least of all
by intellectuals. Nor are religion's presently dominant forms characterized chiefly by the inclusiveness that Rubenstein advocates. If the age
of triage is one in which God's best defense may be that God does not
exist, our religious situation is truly a season of advent, of expectant
waiting and seeking for the religious transformation we need.
4. "Theology seeks to foster dissonance-reduction where significant
items of information are perceived to be inconsistent with established
beliefs, values, and collectively sanctioned modes of behavior" (p. 132).
Every religious tradition has to cope with evidence that disconfirms it.
Triage itself is a case in point, for the experience of the death of God in
our time has everything to do with the mass wasting of human life.
Typically, theologians have apologized for God when the problem of
evil has taken center stage. Specifically, they attempt to reduce the dissonance that arises when traditional claims about God's power and
goodness collide with history.
The pertinent point here, however, is that Rubenstein's description of
theology's function, whatever its validity, is not propounded by him as
normative. On the contrary, his use of this description helps to identify
meaningful work that remains for thinkers and theorists to do, even if
they do not have the charisma to control the floodgates of religious
inspiration. Rubenstein's Age of Triage is a theological statement, but
his reflection does little to reduce dissonance. Its mood is instead quite
the opposite. By calling attention to the Holocaust, to triage, to the
reality that men and women too often kill with impunity, and by doing so
in a way that questions the functional status of God in the world,
Rubenstein's book is an exercise in dissonance production.
At least indirectly, Rubenstein suggests that an age of triage calls for
more, not less, theology and religious reflection in that vein. Yet a note
of caution should intrude. For the dissonance production that is needed
today, Rubenstein implies, is not the kind that will intensify individualism and isolation. Rather, it ought to shatter such barriers and extend
the boundaries of mutual social obligation. To move in that direction,
however, is a task that will tax the best brain power we can muster, for
powerful indeed are the drives and interests that find triage tempting
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because such sorting offers a solution as rational as it is final. Political
and economic sophistication will need to join hands with theological
acumen if religious thinkers are to do their dissonance-producing
responsibly.
God's fate, as well as that of humankind, hangs suspended in an age
of triage. Should God be real in any sense at all, God joins humankind
in responsibility for history's destruction. Yet realistic hope against fear
in an overcrowded world ought not to pronounce God dead. For history
itself may induce shame and sorrow in some quarters, but if the age of
triage is literally a Godless time altogether, the net effect of the defenseless victims will be to testify that the powers of death are irredeemably
victorious. Hence the pages of The Age of Triage, particularly those that
deal with the Holocaust, set an agenda for Western theology and
religious reflection. In sum, it consists of at least these four imperatives:
(1) Deconstruct the ties between Providence and Progress. (2) Destabilize distinctions between the elect and the damned. (3) Discern, as
far as thought permits, ways beyond the self-regarding individualism
that so often drives propensities toward triage. (4) Deploy the right
kinds of dissonance.
In his Zweites Buch, Adolf Hitler had a different vision. Proclaiming
himself a German nationalist, he announced a National Socialist foreign
policy predicated on "folkish, racial insights" and "determined by the
necessity to secure the space necessary to the life of our people."17
Knowing that vestiges and variants of that outlook are still very much a
part of our world long after Hitler's demise, Richard Rubenstein assays
genocide, the Holocaust, and triage to find ways beyond them. Admittedly there is little that is totally novel in that agenda, any more than
Richard Rubenstein's account originated with him alone. The pieces
have been lying there for some time. Yet, to Rubenstein's credit and for
our benefit, he has worked the puzzle in a way that shows with particular
urgency the vital tasks that must be attempted if catastrophe is to be forestalled in our overcrowded world.
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6
GENOCIDE AND TOTAL WAR: A
PRELIMINARY COMPARISON
Eric Markusen

INTRODUCTION
Of all the problems confronting humankind during the last quarter of
the twentieth century, none is more significant or urgent than the mass
killing of defenseless citizens by human beings acting as agents of, or
with the tolerance of, their governments.
This chapter seeks to contribute to greater understanding of this problem by comparatively analyzing two major types of state-sanctioned
mass killing-genocide and total war. Since several of the other chapters in this volume address definitions, causes, and examples of genocide, the focus here is on the phenomenon of total war. Then a preliminary analysis of differences and similarities between the two types of
mass killing is offered. The central thesis of this chapter is that there are
important similarities between the two types. Specifically, it is suggested that ideology, bureaucracy, and technology play comparable
facilitating roles in both genocide and total war. Finally, tentative lessons from this analysis of mass killing in the past and present are drawn
in order to shed light on the seemingly inexorable momentum toward
nuclear war.
Humankind has been afflicted by the problem of mass killing since
early prehistory. Archeologists have discovered indications that lethal
conflict among groups of human beings may have originated as early as
a million to a half-million years ago. 1 As an organized social institution,
however, warfare is a relatively recent development. According to
Arnold Toynbee, the institution of war did not emerge until approximately 5,000 years ago, in the lands of what are now Iraq and Egypt. 2
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Since that time, the human and material costs of war have tended to increase steadily, despite some temporary respites. In his survey of warfare from the end of the fifteenth century through the early 1960s,
Quincy Wright notes: "War has during the last four centuries tended to
involve a larger proportion of the belligerent states' population and
resources and, while less frequent, to be more intense, more extended,
and more costly. It has tended to be less functional, less intentional, less
directable, and less legal. "3
It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, that an unflinching review of
past centuries-with their mounting death tolls from wars, revolutions,
massacres, as well as famine and disease resulting from human
malevolence and negligence-led William James in his celebrated 1910
essay, "The Moral Equivalent of War," to conclude that "history is a bath
of blood."4
However, a number of analysts have concluded that the number of
human beings deliberately killed by other human beings during the twentieth century is far greater than for any other equivalent period of time in
history. The "bath of blood" that James discovered in his study of many
past centuries has become a veritable ocean of blood in just a few
decades.
For example, Pitirim Sorokin, in his study of wars from the twelfth to
the twentieth centuries (which was published in 1937, two years before
World War II began), calculated war casualties in relation to the populations of the combatant nations and concluded:
If we take the relative indicators of the casualties, probably the most important

criterion of war, they tell definitely and unequivocally that the curse or
privilege to be the most devastating or most bloody war century belongs to the
twentieth; in one quarter century, it imposed upon the population a "blood
tribute" far greater than that imposed by any of the whole centuries
compared.5

The most detailed and comprehensive attempt to identify those killed
by their fellow human beings during the twentieth century is British
sociologist Gil Elliot's Twentieth Century Book of the Dead, published
in 1972. On the basis of his carefully documented review of historical
sources, Elliot estimates that there have been approximately 100 million
"man-made" deaths during the first three-quarters of this century. Elliot
asserts: "It is possible-in my view certain-that in a future perspective
this explosion of human lives will be seen as the significant 'history' of
this period. "6
But even more ominously, the most powerful nations on the planet
are currently devoting prodigious resources to the preparations for the
ultimate mass killing project-nuclear holocaust. The United States and
the Soviet Union are each annually spending billions of dollars to
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maintain and expand their nuclear arsenals. At present, these arsenals
combined contain approximately fifty thousand nuclear warheads with a
collective explosive force equivalent to more than 3.5 tons of high
explosive for each of the 4.5 billion people on earth. 7 Current plans for
both nations call for adding thousands of new warheads to their arsenals
during the next decade. While the United States and the Soviet Union
are increasing their stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction, the other
nuclear-armed nations, like Great Britain, France, and China, are also
making additions and refinements in their nuclear arsenals, while several
nations without nuclear weapons are struggling to acquire them. 8
If even a small portion of current arsenals is actually used in a nuclear
war, the ensuing holocaust will dwarf the worst atrocities of history. A
recent World Health Organization study, for example, concluded that a
nuclear war fought with about one-half of present arsenals could result in
1 billion prompt deaths and an additional 1 billion serious injuries, most
of which would eventually result in death due to lack of medical care, the
effects of radiation exposure, shortages of food, and other lethal after
effects of the initial carnage and destruction.
To these findings must be added those from recent studies of the
possible climatic and long-term biological consequences of nuclear war.
Among the most shocking is the possibility that the detonation of even a
very small portion of existing arsenals (as few as 1,000 of the 50,000
warheads) could produce a so-called nuclear winter, which would entail
plunging temperatures and a pall of darkness resulting from smoke and
other atmospheric pollution generated by fires. This nuclear winter
could spread across the entire Northern Hemisphere and last for
months.9 So grave could these and other consequences of nuclear war
be that the researchers concluded:
Combined with the direct casualties of over 1 billion people, the combined
intennediate and long-tenn effects of nuclear war suggest that eventually there
might be no human survivors in the Northern Hemisphere.... In any
large-scale nuclear exchange between the superpowers, global environmental
changes sufficient to cause the extinction of a major fraction of plant and
animal species on Earth are likely.... In that event, the possibility of the
extinction of Homo Sapiens cannot be excluded. 10
In view of the terrible toll of human lives due to governmental mass
killing in the past, the present, and, very possibly, the future, one might
expect that a life-affirming species would have mounted a massive effort
to confront and reduce this problem. Unfortunately, such a massive
effort has not yet been made. Despite the vital contributions of a number
of individuals and organizations, the attention and energy devoted to
understanding and preventing state-sanctioned mass killing have been
negligible when compared with the scale and urgency of the problem.11
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Avoiding this disturbing topic may well assure peace of mind and
contentment with the status quo over the short term. On the other hand,
such avoidance may also serve to encourage the social forces favoring
continued reliance on mass killing as an acceptable tool of national
security and thus increase the risk that government leaders may resort to
mass killing in the future. If that mass killing takes the form of nuclear
war, then the final price of short-term peace of mind will be oblivion.
GENOCIDE
Although the wholesale destruction of groups of human beings has
been practiced for millennia, the concept of genocide, which depicts
certain forms of such destruction, has been in existence for less than fifty
years. The term was coined by Raphael Lemkin, a Polish emigre to
London who lost seventy members of his family to the Holocaust. In
1943, he wrote Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, one of the earliest and
most comprehensive accounts of Nazi persecutions of the Jews and other
citizens of occupied nations. It was in this book that he introduced the
term "genocide," which he derived from the Greek word genos, meaning
race or tribe, and the Latin word cide, meaning killing. According to
Lemkin, "By 'genocide' we mean the destruction of a nation or of an
ethnic group. "12
Thanks in large part to Lemkin's indefatigable lobbying efforts, on
December 9, 1948, the General Assembly of the United Nations unanimously adopted the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide. The Convention listed specific actions which constitute the crime of genocide. Article 2 states:
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or
religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions oflife calculated to bring
about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group.
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.1
More recent analysts of genocide have incorporated features of the
U.N. Convention in their own definition while at the same time criticizing its limitations. Leo Kuper, for example, states that "genocide
... is a crime against a collectivity, taking the form of massive
slaughter, and carried out with explicit intent. "14 He notes also that
"genocide is pre-eminently a government crime."15 However, Kuper
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also questions the Convention for its exclusion of political groups from
among those protected. Such an omission leaves out such cases as the
murder of tens of millions of Soviet citizens under the Stalinist regime
and the extermination of millions of their own citizens by the Khmer
Rouge forces in Cambodia during the 1970s.16
Likewise, Irving Louis Horowitz defines genocide as "a special form
of murder: state-sanctioned liquidation against a collective group, without regard to whether an individual has committed any specific and
punishable transgression."17 Horowitz goes beyond the "standard" type
of deliberate, intentional mass killing to include "one shadowy area of
genocide that permits the state to take lives by indirection, for example
by virtue of benign neglect, or death due to demographic causes. "18
A final contemporary definition is provided by V ahakn Dadrian, who
defines genocide as "the successful attempt by a dominant group, vested
with formal authority and/or with preponderant access to the overall
resources of power, to reduce by coercion or lethal violence the number
of a minority group whose ultimate extermination is held desirable and
useful and whose respective vulnerability is a major factor contributing
to the decision of genocide. "19 As will be discussed below, Dadrian
includes a wide range of actions within his definition, including military
activities that cause high casualty levels among civilians, even if the
targeting of the civilians is not deliberate. 20
Despite inconsistencies evident among these and other definitions of
genocide, and despite disagreements among analysts regarding whether
or not particular cases of mass killing constitute genocide, there does
appear to be a strong consensus on several crucial features of genocidal
acts.
First, genocide is undertaken by and for governments. The official
ruling elite of a sovereign state either undertakes a deliberate campaign of
intentional extermination; permits subnational groups to slaughter other
subnational groups; or implements (or tolerates) practices that result in
mass deaths among members of certain groups, even if such deaths are
not the explicit policy objective.21
Second, the individual identity of the victims is in general irrelevant,
as are distinctions among sex and age. What concerns the state is that
the individual belongs to the group targeted for destruction. A wide
range of groups has been targeted throughout history, including racial,
ethnic, and religious groups; the mentally handicapped; homosexuals;
citizens of enemy nations; and members of political groups. The vast
majority of victims of genocide have been civilians.
Third, while the methods employed vary considerably, direct mass
killing is the most characteristic form of genocidal destruction, although
many additional deaths have resulted from hunger, disease, and other
sequelae of direct killing and the destruction of resources necessary for
survival.
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TOTAL WAR
Like the concept of genocide, the concept of total war encompasses a
wide range of cases and subsumes a number of components.22 Two
features of total war-a high degree of societal mobilization for war and
an extremely high level of death and destruction-have been emphasized
in most definitions and analyses of this type of mass killing. In considering the destructiveness of total war, most commentators note the
tendency to deliberately attack noncombatant citizens of the enemy nation
or group. Moreover, the direct or indirect participation of the entire
nation in the war, combined with the targeting of civilians, tends to result
in wars in which the very survival of one or more of the belligerents is at
stake. Thus, strategist Edward Luttwak defines total war as "a war in
which at least one party perceives a threat to its survival and in which all
available weapons are used and the distinction between 'military' and
'civilian' targets is almost completely ignored."23
No recent war, even World Wars I and II, has been completely "total"
in the sense that literally all of the available resources of the combatant
nations have been devoted to the conflict or that the destruction of the
enemy has been complete. (However, as noted above, a nuclear war
could conceivably result in the latter condition, not only for the
belligerents, but for uninvolved nations as well.) In practice, the concept
of total war applies to conflicts in which either or both of these conditions-societal mobilization and destructiveness-exist to extreme degrees. As Frederick Sallagar notes, "What characterizes an all-out, or
total, war is that it is fought for such high stakes that the belligerents are
willing, or compelled, to employ, not all weapons they possess, but any
weapons they consider appropriate and advantageous to them. "24
Throughout human history, many wars have been characterized by
one or both of the features now associated with the concept of total war.
As J. F. C. Fuller notes in The Conduct of War, 1789-1961, "Primitive
tribes are armed hordes, in which every man is a warrior, and because
the entire tribe engages in war, warfare is total. "25 The price of defeat in
such conflicts was not simply the concession of territory to the victor,
but the mass slaughter of the vanquished, with the possible exception of
those dragged off into slavery. Religious wars have often been total
wars. Edwin Corwin, noting that most people think of total war in terms
of extreme degrees of ruthlessness, observes: "While the phrase itself is
of recent coinage, total war in this primary sense is at least as old as
recorded history and enjoys, at times, the most exalted sanction."26 To
illustrate his point, Corwin cites a passage from the Bible, in Deuteronomy 20: "Of the cities of these people, which the Lord thy God doth
give thee for an inheritance, thou shalt save nothing alive that breatheth:
But thou shalt utterly destroy them."27
Subsequent wars of religion, including the Crusades, involved the
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mass slaughter of noncombatants as a routine practice. Such total wars
culminated in the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648) in which as many as 8
million civilians (as compared with "only" 350,000 combatants) were
killed, and the destruction of property and crops was so pervasive that
many survivors were reduced to cannibalism.28
In the aftermath of the Thirty Years' War, a trend toward more civilized, limited warfare developed, although there were many relapses and
exceptions. For nearly 150 years, most European wars were fought
between relatively small mercenary armies sponsored by absolute
monarchs. Killing of noncombatants was significantly curtailed, and the
casualty levels among soldiers were reduced, in part to keep the financial
burden on the sponsoring monarchs as low as possible. Rather than
ending in the annihilation of the loser, wars tended to end in settlements
that left the structure of all societies largely intact29
This respite from total war began to end at the close of the eighteenth
century with the French Revolution, the rise of Napoleon, and the beginning of the era of wars waged between entire nations. Napoleon's chief
contribution to the revival of total war was his utilization of huge armies
of conscripted soldiers. However, while the scale and intensity of military conflicts increased precipitously with the advent of mass armies, the
other practice of total war, deliberate mass killing of noncombatants,
remained relatively constrained.
Following the final defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo in 1815, a warweary Europe entered another period of relative peacefulness. Indeed, in
his survey of warfare over the centuries, Sorokin found the overall intensity of war during the nineteenth century to have been exceptionally
low.30 Nations strove to prevent and limit wars through such efforts as
the Vienna Congresses which, beginning in 1815, attempted to facilitate
peaceful resolution of disputes, and the Rush-Bagot Agreement of 1817,
in which the United States and England agreed to limit warships on the
Great Lakes. Also, as Richard Preston and Sydney Wise note in their
history of warfare, the nineteenth century witnessed "the restoration of
the conservative military system of the eighteenth century in place of the
mass nationalistic armies of the Revolutionary era. "31
Unfortunately, however, such restraints on war began to weaken during the latter half of the nineteenth century, and the twentieth century was
to witness the resurgence of both aspects of total war to a degree that
would compress the carnage of the Thirty Years' War into little more
than a decade and multiply it severalfold.
In modern total wars, mobilization of the combatant nations is accomplished in several ways, including the conscription of citizens to serve in
mass armies, the widespread use of propaganda to maintain morale and
support for the war, and the calculated exploitation of the national
economy in the service of the war.
Conscription results in large numbers of citizens being obliged to
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leave their peacetime positions, often for the duration of the war. This
can have a disruptive effect on individuals and families, and on the
economy as well. In the case of the levee en masse imposed by the
French revolutionary government in 1793, it has been noted that "the
forced withdrawal of such great numbers from the normal pursuits of
daily life disturbed the social economy profoundly, while the task that
was put upon the depleted society of supplying and equipping such
numbers aggravated the disturbance. "32 Conscription by one belligerent
generally compels the others to adopt a similar system for building up
comparable forces. In the American Civil War, for example, both sides
initially relied on volunteers, but the high rates of attrition required first
the Confederacy and then the Union to resort to conscription.
Mass conscription has affected not only the degree to which the nation
is involved in war but also the nature of warfare itself. In the case of the
Napoleonic wars, casualties among combatants increased considerably in
comparison with the preceding 100 years. As Fuller observes, "Conscription changed the basis of warfare. Hitherto soldiers had been costly, now they were cheap; battles had been avoided; now they were
sought, and however heavy the losses, they could rapidly be made good
by the muster-roll. "33 The vastly increased size of the revolutionary
French army, which grew with conscription to include 750,000 soldiers,
rquired changes in administration and logistics. The army was broken
up into smaller, more mobile units, and long supply lines gave way to
"compulsory requisition" of shelter and food, which often entailed officially sanctioned plunder of the contested territory.34 Similar measures
were employed by the German military forces during World War II in
their campaigns against Poland and the Soviet Union.
To maintain the morale of the conscripted soldiers and the support of
the citizens, government propaganda tends to be widely utilized in total
wars. Such propaganda, which frequently takes the form of vilifying the
enemy nation, can raise passions to the point where it becomes difficult
to end wars on a basis that would promote a lasting peace. In his
analysis of the Napoleonic wars of the late 1700s, Fuller emphasizes
how difficult it was "for a conscripted nation-that is, a nation in arms
-a nation fed on violent propaganda, to make an enduring peace. The
peace treaties wrung from the vanquished were generally so unreasonable that they were no more than precarious armistices; the losers only
signed them through duress, and with the full intention of repudiating
them at the first opportunity. "35
During the same period that conscription was radically altering both
the impact of warfare on society and the nature of war itself, the Industrial Revolution was moving both European society and warfare in
the direction of ever greater mechanization. As Hans Speier notes, this
trend necessitated "a particularly close interdependency between the
armed forces and the productive forces of the nation."36 As the size of
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armies increased, and as armies became increasingly mechanized, the
number of noncombatants needed to keep the army provided with equipment and supplies increased as well. Under such conditions, much of
the adult population tends to be directly or indirectly involved in supporting the war effort. The coordination of the many sectors of the
economy requires greater centralization of governmental authority.
"Such a gearing-in," observes Wright, "of the agricultural, industrial,
and professional population to the armed forces requires a military organization of the entire society."37 Or, as stated by Raymond Aron in The
Century of Total War, "the army industrializes itself, industry militarizes
itself; the army absorbs the nation: the nation models itself on the
army."38
Such processes tend to blur the distinctions between democratic and
totalitarian forms of government. Noting the centralization of authority
among all the involved nations in World War II, Marjorie Farrar
suggests that "as a result institutional and ideological distinctions among
the belligerents were reduced and the democratic regimes increasingly
resembled their totalitarian counterparts. 39
Just as industrialization decisively affected the mobilization of the
society for total war, it has also had a profound impact on the second
basic component of total war-the extreme levels of destruction and
death affecting civilian and soldier alike. Such destructiveness reflects
two trends in the era of modern total war. First, the close interdependence of the military and the economic-industrial sectors of society
has created a steady expansion in the types of targets considered legitimate by military forces. Second, the long-range and highly destructive
nature of modern weapons has made it difficult, if not impossible, to
discriminate between noncombatants and combatants, thereby resulting
in high levels of civilian casualties even when traditional "military"
targets are attacked. When civilians are deliberately attacked, the death
tolls are of course far higher.
The dependency of the mechanized military forces on civilian industry
has meant that whole nations have become targets. As Gordon Wright
observes in his analysis of World War II, "the battlefield, no longer
limited or defined, was everywhere; it was occupied by civilians and
soldiers alike. "40
Some military policymakers, recognizing that total wars are fought
between entire societies, rather than between armies, have urged and engaged in deliberate attacks against enemy civilians. During the American
Civil War, for example, Union General W. T. Sherman conducted a
campaign of killing and destruction against the civilians of Georgia. In
World War I, although most of the fighting was confined to the battlefield, toward the end of the war the Germans began using submarines to
sink civilian ships. Bombing of cities, which had begun early in the
war, had steadily escalated during its course, although the armistice was
11
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signed before its full potentialities were realized. Still, the noncombatant
death tolls were relatively low. According to Gordon Wright, civilians
accounted for only one in twenty deaths during World War J.41 By
World War II, however, such practices as the scorched earth campaign
of the Nazis and the Nazi and Allied practice of firebombing population
centers contributed to far greater overall casualty rates, especially among
civilians, who, according to Elliot, accounted for two-thirds of the
approximately 60 million deaths.42
It should be noted that many commentators have deplored the practice
of deliberate attacks on civilians as a profound moral retrogression. In
his essay "The Morality of Obliteration Bombing," John Ford argues that
many, if not most, civilians killed in bombing raids were "innocent noncombatants," especially children and the elderly, who made no contribution to the war effort and therefore could not be regarded as legitimate
targets.43 The practice of targeting civilians for mass destruction, like
the total mobilization of the society for war, tends to narrow the gap
between democratic and totalitarian forms of government. Quincy
Wright observes that "the development of the airplane by the totalitarian
states in the twentieth century first extended their empires and then compelled the democracies to adopt their techniques. "44 Lewis Mumford, in
his essay "The Morals of Extermination," asserts:
By taking over this method [obliteration bombing] as a cheap substitute for
conventional warfare--cheap in soldiers' lives, costly in its expenditures of
other human lives and in the irreplaceable historic accumulations of countless
lifetimes-these democratic governments sanctioned the dehumanized techniques of fascism. This was Nazidom's firmest victory and democracy's
most servile surrender.45

GENOCIDE AND TOT AL WAR: A PRELIMINARY
COMPARISON
Genocide and total war have consumed many tens of millions of
human lives during the twentieth century and many hundreds of millions
of lives throughout history. The preparations are now being made for a
nuclear war that could destroy billions of lives and possibly extinguish
our species.
The following comparative analysis is offered in the hope of generating insights into mass killing in the past and in the hope of increasing
understanding of the momentum toward mass killing in the present and
future. It should be emphasized that this comparison is preliminary,
tentative, and necessarily brief; it attempts to discern important differences and similarities between two ostensibly distinct types of state-sanctioned mass killing. It is hoped that it will stimulate others-including
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those who disagree with its findings as well as those who find them
plausible--to undertake further study along these lines.
Perhaps many others share with Horowitz the assumption that "it is
operationally imperative to distinguish warfare from genocide. "46 One
of his reasons for advocating this distinction is his belief that genocide
involves mass killing in an intrastate, or domestic arena, whereas warfare involves lethal conflict between two nation-states. His decision to
emphasize the distinction, he states, is "warranted by the weight of
current empirical research that indicates that domestic destruction and international warring are separate dimensions of struggle." In further support, he cites political scientist R. J. Rummel: "There are no common
conditions or causes of domestic and foreign conflict behavior."47
Others differentiate between genocide and warfare on moral grounds.
Genocide is unequivocally evil, an entirely unjustifiable atrocity perpetrated against helpless and innocent victims by cowards who face little
personal risk. On the other hand, warfare can be seen as evil or heroic,
depending upon one's perspective. It has been noted above that some
commentators regard the practice of bombing cities as moral retrogression. Indeed, prior to their involvement in World War II, both Great
Britain and the United States issued statements condemning the practice
as immoral. They expressed righteous outrage when Germany bombed
such cities as Warsaw, Rotterdam, and, later, London. Both nations decried the bombing of cities as a reversion to barbarism and beneath the
dignity of a democratic nation. Yet, in the course of the war, both countries-first Great Britain in Europe and then the United States in Japanengaged in firebombing of crowded population centers on a scale far
greater than the Nazis. It is perhaps noteworthy that after the war, Great
Britain appeared to have second thoughts about its obliteration bombing
policy; the airmen who managed to survive their extremely hazardous
missions were never awarded a campaign medal, and the individual most
responsible for the policy, Sir Arthur Harris, slipped into an obscurity
that amounted to virtual exile.48 In contrast, Curtis LeMay, the individual most responsible for the decision to shift American bombing policy
in Japan from precision attacks on military targets to the deliberate creation of vast firestorms in the highly flammable, densely populated
Japanese cities, was widely touted as a hero after the war and was
rewarded with the command of the elite Strategic Air Command, the
nation's atomic-armed military unit.49
Another basis for distinguishing between genocide and total war is the
relation between goals and means. While both phenomena utilize similar
means-the production of very large numbers of dead bodies-the goals
are quite different. For example, Mumford suggests that, "in principle,
the extermination camps where the Nazis incinerated over six million
helpless Jews were no different from the urban crematoriums our air
force improvised in its attacks by napalm bombs on Tokyo.... Our
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aims were different, but our methods were those of mankind's worst
enemy. "50 The difference in aims is crucial. The Nazis, as Michael
Sherry points out in "The Slide to Total Air War," would not have
stopped mass killing Jews if they had won the war; in fact, they had
hopes and plans of intensifying their "Final Solution" to additional areas
they might have conquered. 51 Some scholars suggest that the ability to
exterminate the Jews was among the chief motives for Nazi aggression
that led to World War II.52 So vital was genocide as a primary goal
during the war that the Nazis carried on their extermination program even
at the expense of their military efforts against the Soviets and Allies. In
contrast, the Allies continued their mass bombing operations only until
the surrender of their enemies: as soon as their primary goal was
attained, they had no reason to continue employing the means.
While these and other differences between genocide and total war
support the assumption that they represent two distinct phenomena,
much of the literature on mass killing is more equivocal. Even Horowitz,
who was cited above as an advocate of maintaining the distinction, is
inconsistent. At a later point in his pioneering study, he appears to contradict himself by suggesting that "the end of an era when formal declarations of warfare were made signifies the beginning of a new era in
which the line between war and genocide becomes profoundly
blurred."53 As an example, he cites the U.S. war in Vietnam, an undeclared war which has been alleged by some critics to have had genocidal
dimensions, and by others as being a case of actual genocide. 54 After
citing arguments on both sides of the issue of whether or not the war
was genocidal, Horowitz states, "the distinction between internal and
foreign people who are being killed helps little, since it must be confessed that all genocidal practices involve a definition by the perpetrators
of mass violence of those destroyed as outsiders. "55 Thus, he appears
to be acknowledging the existence of an important process, depersonalization of victims, that occurs in state-sanctioned mass killing in both
domestic and foreign conflicts.
Likewise, Kuper, while emphasizing that the sovereign state is the
main arena for genocide, refers to both conventional and atomic bombings as genocidal when he notes that:
the changing nature of warfare, with a movement to total warfare, and the
technological means for instantaneous annihilation of large populations,
creates a situation conducive to genocidal conflict. This potential was realized
in the Second World War, when Germany employed genocide in its war for
domination; but I think the term must also be applied to the atomic bombing of
the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the U.S.A. and to the pattern bombing by the Allies of such cities as Hamburg and Dresden.56
Finally, it has been noted that Dadrian, in developing his conceptual
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schema of types of genocide, explicitly identifies strategic bombing as an
example of what he terms "latent genocide. "57
Just as careful analysts of genocide have implicitly or explicitly included certain operations of total warfare within their definitions of genocide, some definitions of war have included situations that have been
regarded as genocidal. For example, in "The Social Types of War,"
Hans Speier develops the concept of "absolute war," which has many of
the same characteristics as genocide. Absolute war, according to Speier,
"is not waged in order to conclude peace with the vanquished foe. Peace
terminating an absolute war is established without the enemy. The opponent is an existential enemy. Absolute war is waged in order to annihilate him."58 Such wars feature a lack of moral restraint; one or both of
the belligerents regard the other as subhuman or even as an animal. As
examples of absolute wars, Speier mentions the wars of the ancient
Greeks against the barbarians and the wars between Christians and Muslims during the Middle Ages. In the latter case, weapons and techniques
that were prohibited in conflicts with other Christians were freely employed against the Mohammedans. Speier also includes clashes between
heavily armed colonizers and poorly armed indigenous peoples in this
category, which would appear to move it within the realm of genocide.
Thus, there does appear to be some overlap between the definitions of
genocide and total war. In terms of actual practice, several common features are evident, three of which are particularly salient for this analysis.
First, both genocide and total war involve mass killing of human beings, the majority of whom are civilians. The mass nature of the killing
reflects the fact that large numbers of people are killed more or less simultaneously and as anonymous members of a targeted group or inhabitants of designated areas. Second, in both cases mass killing tends to be
done in a deliberate, planned, premeditated fashion. The goal of the perpetrators or implementors is clearly to kill large numbers of people,
either as an end in itself, or else as a means to a different end. Finally, in
both genocide and total war, mass killing is undertaken by the state as a
national security measure. Both are organized and administered, or at
least facilitated, by officials of the government for the ostensible purpose
of assuring the well-being and security of the majority of citizens.
Another approach to comparison involves examining the role of three
factors-ideology, bureaucracy, and technology-that have been cited
by several analysts as significant elements in both genocide and total
war.59
If ideology is defined as a system of psychological and political
rationalizations for adopting a particular policy or engaging in a particular
practice, then it is evident that the twentieth century has featured abundant ideological incentives to participate in mass killing projects. 60 In
this respect the twentieth is no different from past centuries: there have
always been ideological justifications for mass killing. One of the most
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potent of these has been religion, which has inspired some of the most
savage cases of organized mass slaughter.
In the modem world, however, religious ideologies have often been
replaced by political ideologies, particularly the "religion of nationalism,"
to use Toynbee's phrase. This powerful ideology has been used to
justify some of the most atrocious mass killing projects of the century.
"Intense nationalism," notes Horowitz, "is itself an essential characteristic of the genocidal society. It instills not only a sense of difference
between those who belong and those who do not, but also the inhumanity of those who do not belong, and thereby the rights of the social
order to purge itself of alien influence." 61 Nationalistic ideologies have
also inspired wars of increasing scale and intensity. Toynbee states that
"the increasing fanaticism of nationalism has exacted an increasing
oblation of military human sacrifice. "62
When the advocates of mass killing are able to justify their policies on
the basis of national security, they increase the likelihood of cooperation
by citizens, both in the role of direct perpetrator/implementor and in that
of compliant bystander. In some cases, the official claim of a threat to
national security is clearly specious, as has been the case with recent
genocides. For example, the Jews in Nazi Germany certainly did not
pose a real threat to the German state. But to the extent that Nazi propagandists were able to convince German citizens that the Jews were to
blame for Germany's many grave problems, they were able to secure active complicity and passive compliance with respect to the "Final Solution." In other cases, especially total wars like World War II, the threat
to national survival posed by the enemy is real. But in both cases, specious and real, the ideology of nationalism and the authority of government is used by leaders to promote citizen cooperation in state-sanctioned
mass killing projects.
When the authority of national government is invoked, many individuals are willing to subdue any moral reservations they might have about
a particular policy or practice in order to continue service to their nation.
This was the defense of many of the war criminals on trial at Nuremberg;
however, the Tribunal consistently refused to respect their claims of having had to obey "superior orders." As the infamous "Obedience to
Authority" experiments conducted by Stanley Milgram disclosed, normal
individuals are willing to inflict severe pain on other people when induced by a convincing authority figure. 63
If the government begins to fear waning support for its policies, it can
employ propaganda or outright deception. During World War II, there is
evidence to suggest that bomber crews were given briefings that intentionally exaggerated the military significance of such targets as Dresden. 64 The British government attempted to restrict information about
the Dresden raids from the general public to avoid "jeopardizing public
support for the war. "65
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In addition to capitalizing on the tendency of both civilians and
soldiers to defer personal scruples in favor of conforming to authority,
the invocation of national security can create a "kill or be killed" mentality. The targets of the government killing project, whether members
of a despised minority group or citizens of an enemy nation, must be
eliminated in order for the vitality of one's own group or nation to be
preserved. In his study of Nazi doctors, "Medicalized Killing in Auschwitz," Lifton notes that "killing was done in the name of healing. It is
not too much to say that every action an SS doctor took was connected to
some kind of perversion or reversal of healing and killing. For the SS
doctor, involvement in the killing process became equated with healing. "66 Likewise, Charny states, "Incredible as it may seem, virtually
every genocide is defined by its doers as being on behalf of the larger
purpose of bettering human life. "67 In his article, "American Military
Ethics in World War II: The Bombing of German Civilians," Ronald
Schaffer cites excerpts from a wartime memo by U.S. Army Air Forces
commander Henry H. Arnold in which Arnold stated that the bomber,
"when used with the proper degree of understanding ... becomes, in
effect, the most humane of all weapons. "68 Schaffer comments:
These sentiments appear to conflict with Arnold's willingness to burn down
cities, his desire to see robot bombers fall indiscriminately among the German
people.... Yet they are more than lip service or words for the historical
record. They represent a moral attitude inherent in air power theory, a position that goes back to World War I-the idea that the bomber is a way of
preserving lives by ending wars quickly and by providing a substitute for the
kind of ground warfare that had killed so many soldiers a quarter century
earlier. 69
Among the most important forms of ideological justification for mass
killing is the dehumanization of the victims. "Dehumanization," according to Kuper, "might be conceived as the relegation of the victims to the
level of animals or objects or to a purely instrumental role. "70 Herbert
Kelman suggests that dehumanization entails the removal of two fundamental qualities from the victims, identity and community; the individual
identity of each victim is submerged in the group to which he or she
belongs, and the group as a whole is considered as subhuman or nonhuman. 71 In Helen Fein's terms, the victims are placed "outside the
sanctified universe of obligation-that circle of people with reciprocal
obligations to protect each other whose bonds arose from their relation to
a deity or sacred source of authority."72 If the invocation of national
security and official authority provide initial inducement for both participants and bystanders to accept the necessity of harsh measures against a
targeted group, dehumanization of that group further erodes any moral or
empathic restraints on the willingness to perpetrate massive and indiscriminate violence. As Kelman notes: "Thus when a group of people is
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defined entirely in terms of a category to which they belong, and when
this category is excluded from the human family, then the moral restraints against killing them are more readily overcome. "73
Both total war and genocide are characterized by the dehumanization
of victims. When the victims are members of a different religion or race,
dehumanization is greatly facilitated. For example, when the United
States shifted its bombing policy in Japan from "precision" attacks
against military targets to deliberate efforts to create huge firestorms in
urban areas, accounts of the raids in the popular media were replete with
images suggesting that the Japanese were more similar to insects than
people and that the bombing campaign was closer to pest extermination
than a traditional military operation. The image of pest extermination
was also frequently used by Nazis who were involved in the attempt to
exterminate the Jews.
A final element in the ideological justification of mass killing to be
considered in this preliminary analysis is the role of the academic and
scientific communities. In the case of the Holocaust, the entire campaign
against the Jews-from the earliest official persecutions in 1933 through
the implementation of the "Final Solution"-was intellectually rationalized by members of the German academic and scientific community.
The medical profession, for example, as has been documented by Lifton,
played very important roles, both by contributing to such legal measures
against the Jews as the Nuremberg Laws of 1935, which made it illegal
for Jews and non-Jews to be married or have sexual relations (on the
assumption that interbreeding with Jews would pollute and weaken the
German-Aryan "blood"), and by direct participation in the mass killing
operations. 74 Scientific authority was also invoked to justify the shift
from precision to area bombing by the British during World War II. The
military and political leaders who favored such a shift in targeting policy
eagerly seized on the fact that certain prestigious scientists had purportedly found evidence indicating that such a policy would significantly
help the war effort. Other scientists, who reached a contradictory conclusion-that "de-housing" the German workers was less efficient than
continuing to attack specific industrial targets-found far less receptivity
among the policymakers.75
A second contributing factor emphasized by analysts of contemporary
mass killing is the pervasiveness of bureaucratic political and social organization. According to Richard Rubenstein in his study The Cunning of

History: The Holocaust and the American Future:

Usually the progress in death-dealing capacity in the twentieth century has
been described in tenns of technological advances in weaponry. Too little attention has been given to the advances in social organization that allowed for
the effective use of the new weapons. In order to understand how the moral
barrier was crossed that made massacre in the millions possible, it is neces-
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sary to consider the importance of bureaucracy in modem political organization. 76

Sociologist Randall Collins sees bureaucracy as a reason for the "ferocious" face to face cruelty of the past to have been replaced by a new
kind of cruelty: callousness, or "cruelty without passion." While he
notes that callous cruelty has existed throughout history, he suggests that
it is "especially characteristic of large-scale, bureaucratic organization,"
and that "the structural organization of bureaucracy seems uniquely
suited for the perpetration of callous violence. "77
Ongoing mass killing projects-like the operation of killing centers or
the undertaking of a sustained incendiary bombing campaign against
densely populated cities-require a complex and efficient organization.
For every individual who is directly involved with the mass killing (e.g.,
operating the gas chamber or serving as crew on the bomber), there are
many others who must decide and promulgate the policy; design, build,
and service the necessary machinery; coordinate the logistics of transport
and supply; generate, distribute, and file paperwork; monitor and evaluate.
Several features of bureaucratic organizations serve to promote the
overall efficiency of mass killing projects as well as to enable individual
participants to carry out their tasks with a minimum of questioning or
doubt. Insofar as the positions within a bureaucracy are arranged in a
formally hierarchical structure, individuals at the lower levels tend to
have a reduced sense of personal responsibility for either the policy they
are helping to implement or its final outcome. They are, after all, only
"following orders" that have descended through all the levels of the
organization above their own. This is particularly true of the military
with its strongly indoctrinated tradition of unquestioning loyalty to
authority. Another feature of bureaucracy, division of labor, breaks
down complex tasks into compartmentalized sub-tasks. "Microdivision
of labor," according to sociologist Don Martindale, "has made the goal
of activity invisible, depriving it of meaning for the individual. "78 For
example, the distinguished physicist and U.S. defense consultant Freeman Dyson, reflecting on his involvement as a scientific analyst in
Bomber Command, the organization responsible for British strategic
bombing during World War II, notes:
Bomber Command was an early example of the new evil that science and
technology have added to the old evils of soldiering. Technology has made
evil anonymous. Through science and technology, evil is organized bureaucratically so that no individual is responsible for what happens.79

A further diminishment of personal responsibility results from the formal
separation of the individual from the position which he or she occupies
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within the organization. According to Collins, this separation is "the
fundamental principle of bureaucracy."80 The assigned task is performed during working hours, after which the individual is free to pursue other activities and interests.
Bureaucracy facilitates the crossing of the "moral barrier" to which
Rubenstein referred by its deliberate effort to render humane considerations irrelevant with respect to the performance of the task at hand. As
Max Weber noted, a bureaucratic organization, "develops the more perfectly the more the bureaucracy is 'dehumanizep,' the more completely it
succeeds in eliminating from official business love, hatred, and all purely
personal, irrational, and emotional elements which escape calculation.
This is the specific nature of bureaucracy and it is appraised as its special
virtue."81
Such amoral rationality augments the effects of the other features to
help create technically proficient functionaries who perform their specialized assignments with a minimized tendency to concern themselves
with the fundamental nature of the overall project or its ultimate goals
and results. As Fein observes, "Bureaucracy is not itself a cause of the
choice of destructive ends, but it facilitates their accomplishment by
routinizing the obedience of many agents, each trained to perform his
role without questioning the ends of action. "82
Technology is the third factor that has contributed decisively to the
unprecedented death tolls of the twentieth century. It has made this contribution by providing killers with weapons of ever-increasing lethality
and by creating a physical and emotional distance between killers and
victims.
Throughout history, technology has always had a powerful impact on
warfare. In his analysis of the historical development of weaponry from
preliterate peoples through the 1950s, Francis Allen concludes that technology is "the clearcut, outstanding variable of importance" in determining the nature of war. 83 This conclusion is shared by Quincy
Wright, who states that "the outstanding characteristic in which modern
war has differed from all earlier forms of war has been in the degree of
mechanization. "84
The lethality of weapons has increased tremendously during the
modern era. In his classic study of the increasing rate of social change,
sociologist Hornell Hart has documented several dimensions of the
"accelerating power to kill and destroy." These include the range over
which weapons can be projected and, as a function of this range, their
"killing area." Hart notes that from 1 million B.C. until approximately
A.D. 1450, the maximum range of available weapons remained under
one-third of a mile and the killing area under one square mile. The only
weapons developed during this entire period capable of attaining these
results were the catapult and the ballista (a giant crossbow). Between
1453, with the invention of cannons, and 1912, with the development of
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coastal artillery, the range increased from 1 mile to 11.4 miles and the
killing area from 3 square miles to 408 square miles. However, between
1915, with the first Zeppelin raid on London during World War I, and
1954, with strategic bombers and in-flight refueling, the range grew
from 200 miles to 12,500 miles and the killing area from 126,000 square
miles to 200 million square miles. This killing area exceeded the total
surface area of the earth, approximately 10 million square miles.85
Hart also traced the increase in the killing power of the explosives that
can be delivered over the above ranges. One measure that he uses is
deaths per ton of explosive. During the German bombing raids on
London during World War I, for example, about 3 people were killed for
each ton of TNT bombs dropped. By World War II, the rate had risen
precipitously; in the American incendiary bombing raid on Tokyo on
March 9, 1945, deaths per ton was 50. By the end of the war, the
invention of the atomic bomb had raised the death toll per ton of explosive even higher, up to "about 10,000 persons killed per ton of normal
bomb load for the B-29 that made the raid. "86 Hart concludes his
analysis of increased killing power by noting that "the five centuries
from 1346 to 1875 saw several times as much increase in explosive
power as had been achieved in the previous million years. The 70 years
from 1875 to March, 1945, saw several times as much increase in explosive power as the previous five centuries. "87 With the development
during the war of atomic weapons, and after the war of thermonuclear
weapons, destructive capabilities have climbed even higher.
The combination of long-range delivery capability and high levels of
destructiveness has made modern weapons indiscriminate. During
World War II, even efforts to precisely target key industries frequently
created large death tolls among civilians living in the vicinity, as the result of either errant bombs or conflagrations that started in the designated
target areas and then spread to surrounding residential areas.
Warfare is not the only type of mass killing that has been vitally
affected by technological developments. As Horowitz notes, "What
makes genocide a particularly malevolent practice in this century, with
wide-ranging consequences, is the role of modern technology in the
systematic destruction of large numbers of innocents." 88 In the case of
the Holocaust, technology played a crucial role in at least two ways.
First, existing technology was utilized by the killers to facilitate their
tasks. For example, communications technology enabled them to coordinate a killing project that involved millions of intended victims scattered throughout Europe, and transportation technology was exploited to
ship the Jews and other victims from their far-flung homes to the killing
centers. Second, new technologies of killing and corpse disposal were
developed in order to increase the "output." This included gas chambers
with a capacity of 2,000 people at one time, huge ventilation systems
designed to evacuate the poisoned air from the gas chambers, and
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crematoria capable of disposing of thousands of corpses per day. While
none of this technology was particularly sophisticated or esoteric, its
efficient exploitation definitely helped the perpetrators to attain higher
"body counts" than would have been the case had they continued to resort to more "primitive" methods like shooting, drowning, and burying
victims alive.
In addition to affecting contemporary mass killing by increasing the
destructiveness of the tools used by the killers, technology has also
decisively affected the mass killing process by imposing physical and
emotional distance between killers and their victims. Not only can killers
annihilate great numbers of people in short periods of time, but they can
do this often without even seeing their victims. As Allen notes, "The increasing tendency is to wage war at a distance.... Modem scientific
war thus becomes depersonalized."89 For example, during World War
I, the crews of heavy artillery pieces fired across no man's land into the
area of enemy trenches rather than at individually sighted enemy soldiers. During World War II, many of the bombing raids were obscured
by cloud cover or by smoke rising from fires started by earlier strikes.
In the Holocaust, the heavy psychological toll on the Einsatzgruppen
killers engaging in the face-to-face mass shooting of men, women, and
children was greatly reduced when the killing methodology shifted to the
large gas chambers into which technicians would pour gas crystals
through openings on the roof, without having to watch the victims die.90
An important effect of technologically imposed distance between killers and victims is an increased tendency to dehumanize the victim.91
"In general," notes sociologist Lewis Coser, "the perception of the
humanness of the 'other' decreases with the increase in distance between
perceiver and perceived. "92 Such dehumanization further erodes any
moral restraints that might intrude upon the effective performance of
function by the killer. A case in point is provided by the strategic
bombing campaigns of World War Il. Kennett observes:
The escalation of the air war was made easier by the fact that those who
directed the bombing offensives and those who carried them out remained
curiously insulated and detached from the consequences of their work. Photographs taken at thirty thousand feet gave no clue to the human effects of a
raid, nor did other sources. In this vacuum, imagination and extrapolation
could picture the population of an enemy town deprived of its homes but not
of life and limb.... Anodyne, antiseptic phrases such as "dual target" and
"area attack" further served to mask the fact that human lives were being
destroyed.93
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Despite apparent differences between genocide and total war as forms
of state-sanctioned mass killing, this preliminary comparison has disclosed several significant similarities and parallels.
Both genocide and total war are undertaken by the nation-state as
national security measures. Democracies as well as totalitarian governments have perpetrated genocides and engaged in total wars. Indeed,
participation in a total war tends to narrow the gap between the two
forms of government by centralizing authority and encouraging governmental propaganda and secrecy.
Ideological elements such as dehumanization of the targets of violence
are common to both genocide and total war, as is the conviction that the
vitality of one's own group or nation can be preserved only by willingness to destroy masses of people in a different group or nation. The invocation of a threat to national security, and governmental authorization
for measures that would ordinarily be considered atrocious, facilitate the
suppression of moral and empathic restraints among citizens who participate directly in the mass killing, as well as those who tacitly support it as
"good citizens."
In the modem era, both genocide and total war tend to be bureaucratically organized. This form of social organization results in a diminished sense of personal responsibility for those who are directly or
indirectly involved in the mass killing project. It also routinizes the performance of specialized tasks that are removed from the reality of the end
results, but which collectively and cumulatively contribute to those
results.
Technology plays an extremely important role in both forms of mass
killing in at least two ways. First, it makes the task of killing large numbers of people easier and more efficient, and second, it eases any potential mental burden on the killers by interposing physical distance between
them and their victims. This distancing reinforces the effects of dehumanizing ideology noted above.
The result of all three facilitating factors is to create a momentum that
tends to increase levels of destructiveness until the goal has been reached
or an outside force prevents continuation of the policy.
This comparative analysis has been admittedly preliminary and brief.
The roles of such facilitating factors as ideology, bureaucracy, and technology need to be explored in greater detail, and other differences and
similarities need to be identified and analyzed.
On the basis of this initial effort, however, it does appear that the line
between genocide and total war has become very blurred in many cases.
Warfare in the twentieth century has become increasingly genocidal, and

118

Eric Markusen

several genocides-with the German genocide against the Jews as the
exemplary case--resemble military campaigns and utilize military forces
in the killing process. 94
The lessons of this study for the problem of the nuclear threat are very
ominous. The same facilitating factors that expedite genocide and total
war also characterize the preparations for nuclear war. The build-up of
nuclear arsenals and the willingness to use them are justified on the
grounds of national security. Elaborate ideological rationalizations are
used to convince citizens of the need for more and better nuclear weapons. In both the United States and the Soviet Union, government
propaganda and secrecy surround the making of nuclear policy and the
plans for nuclear combat. Those who are closest to the policies and the
weapons see them as being absolutely essential for the preservation of
their nations, even to the point of being willing to risk destruction of
those nations. The leaders and citizens of each "side" are vilified and
dehumanized by official rhetoric and propaganda on the other side. The
Soviets are demonized as "Godless monsters" dwelling in an "evil empire," while citizens of the United States are caricatured as "evil imperialists" and "heartless capitalists."
The preparations for nuclear war take place in vast bureaucracies in
which many thousands of patriotic individuals make their livings by
performing compartmentalized tasks that contribute to the readiness to
engage in nuclear holocaust. The destructive capacity of nuclear weapons technology is beyond the comprehension of most, if not all,
potential victims of nuclear war, which decreases their ability to recognize and confront the risk that such technology poses. The weapons
themselves will be launched by young men and women buried in underground missile silos, submerged beneath the ocean in submarines, or
flying high above the ground in airplanes. Most of those who will be
responsible for actually using the weapons do not even know their
precise destination.
These and many other features of the nuclear threat make it very difficult for human beings to comprehend and confront it. Yet, if they fail to
even try, then factors that contribute to the growing likelihood will be
allowed to grow stronger, and the efforts of the minority of the people
who have dedicated themselves to trying to prevent the holocaust will be
in vain. The problem of state-sanctioned mass killing-in the past,
present, and future-must be elevated to the highest level of our priorities as citizens, scholars, and parents. We must confront the ugly issue
of mass killing in order to avoid becoming victims ourselves.
Although the following words of Bruno Bettelheim were originally
addressed to the question of why the Jews became ensnared in the
unimaginable madness of the Holocaust, they have much to say to us in
an era of genocide, total war, and the preparations for nuclear holocaust:
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When a world goes to pieces and inhumanity reigns supreme, man cannot go
on living his private life as he was wont to do, and would like to do; he
cannot-as the loving head of a family, keep the family living together peacefully, undisturbed by the surrounding world; nor can he continue to take pride
in his profession or possessions, when either will deprive him of his humanity, if not also of his life. In such times, one must radically reevaluate all that
one has done, believed in, and stood for in order to know how to act. In
short, one has to take a stand on the new reality-a firm stand, not one of
retirement into an even more private world.95
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7
SOCIAL MADNESS
Ronald Aronson

I

In The Dialectics ofDisaster: A Preface to Hope I have analyzed the
"Final Solution to the Jewish Problem" as an act of societal madness.1
We ordinarily use this term "madness" quite freely in conversation, but
then abandon it upon moving into serious discourse and study-perhaps
in trying to be more precise, objective, or scientific, perhaps to avoid a
contentious descriptive term. I would argue, however, that sophisticated
thought has ignored an important spontaneous insight. Used carefully
and self-consciously, the term "madness" illuminates much of the century's genocidal history, including above all the Nazi project to exterminate Europe's Jews.
Mad: untutored and casual reflection contains an insight to be preserved and deepened, not suppressed, by systematic and scientific study.
Nazi policies toward the Jews were mad, as were Stalin's attacks upon
Russian society, as was the American near-destruction of Vietnam. And
in the dynamic structures of these and other quite different madnesses we
can find guides for understanding and perhaps combatting the nuclear
madness menacing all of us.
Yet to describe social policies as mad immediately exposes one to a
raft of doubts: about indulging in rhetorical excess, about being imprecise, about confusing the social with the individual, injecting normative
conceptions that have no place in social analysis. For example, even if
we grant that individuals may be described as mad-and this language is
contestable as being value-charged, unscientific, and obsolescent-how
can psychological terms appropriate to individual mental functioning be
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applied to collective behavior? After all, don't societies function according to different processes than do individuals?
This and similar objections are reinforced by the functionalist premise
that generally guides studies of social life. It is no great leap from assuming, quite appropriately, that all social policy is intentional, to seeing
that intentionality as rational-thus gilding rulers' acts with the rationality of those studying them. If it had afu.nction and purpose, the "Final
Solution" was done "in order to ... ": to unite Germany, say, or to
divert it. It had a particular function, then, a logic. The executioners
were guided by or manipulated according to this logic. But such formulations tend to cast genocide as another human project among the
universe of projects-whose rationality is either assumed or lies beyond
the specific study in question-rather than as a policy whose logic is
fundamentally rooted in illogic. Yes, it was just another human act, but
it was also an insane one. Yes, understanding it demands that we use
customary explanatory categories, but it also stretches them to their limit
The Nazi policy and practice of extermination was-in spite of its
overwhelming technical rationality, in spite of the palpable reality of the
extermination-camp universe-as supremely irrational as can be
imagined. Yet its madness, if felt and intuited, is difficult to locate, more
difficult to argue. Was it in the decision to exterminate, in the machinery
itself, in the mental functioning of those who ordered it or those who
carried out their orders, in the society that made it possible? Although
the debate continues, it is at least plausible for us to see an organizer of
the "Final Solution," Adolf Eichmann, as did Hannah Arendt, as banal
and mediocre rather than as pathologically mad. 2 And it is at least possible to argue, as did Richard Rubenstein, that the key to the Holocaust
is not a crazed intentionality but a rather indifferent and impersonal
process of twentieth-century technological rationality.3
Certainly I agree that "madness" is a methodologically troubling term
-a culturally bound concept whose use for socio-historical processes is
so problematic and controversial that it would be preferable to avoid it
altogether. But discarding the term will not dispel what it would convey.
How else can we preserve what is essential to it-the systematically and
radically deranged character of the "Final Solution"? How do justice to
the intuition that at its core it was insane, beginning to end?
Yet aren't these subjective responses? Rubenstein has argued that we
should bracket our emotional responses as interfering with our objective
understanding of this event.4 Is not our sense of its madness similarly
subjective and distortive? Won't dwelling on it slant our discussion in a
hopelessly colored personal direction? Shouldn't we limit ourselves to
presenting and understanding the facts without adding any such personal
evaluation to them?
On the contrary, if the Holocaust commands our attention it is because
we cannot separate data-the numbers of dead, for example-from our
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definition of their meaning. The event's impact and significance is indeed subjectively based: the sheer scale of the catastrophe cannot be
disentangled from our sense of its grotesque character. The "Final Solution" was an end in itself. There is no value-free way of characterizing
the Holocaust-its very definition as the worst catastrophe imaginable
short of nuclear war is rooted in our respect for life, our sense of what
humans should be and how they should and should not treat each other.
Objectivity, insofar as history and society are concerned, is an intersubjective product constituted by those who share this same space, the earth.
It is assumed, perhaps elaborated, as our sense of the collective conditions for survival, let alone well-being. In its utter gratuitousness, the
Nazi extermination program so violates even the most minimal of these
norms-proper behavior in wartime-that we cannot help but perceive it
by using such terms as "unspeakable," "evil," "barbaric," "horrifying,"
or "demonic."
We perceive it this way: our lenses are inescapably emotionalsubjective and objective, and give us the event already laden with
meaning. We perceive it this way: it is this way. In the human world
"subjective" reactions are indeed objective: they claim to illuminate not
our feelings about the Holocaust but its very structure and character.
Conversely, as a human project it has a structure and character only
within the human world whose norms it so systematically outraged. Our
objective-subjective reactions claim to mark it off from other historical
events and tell us how and why it is unique. In this sense such terms do
not call for being bracketed out at the start, but rather for being
retained-clarified and understood, in order to better guide us to the
event itself.
II

But what does it mean to call social policy and collective behavior
"mad"? How can the intuition be preserved and rendered usable for
research and analysis?
Let us be clear what we do when we call an act "mad." First, our
assertion may be of various strengths, and our emphasis may vary
accordingly. We may simply mean that it is severely and systematically
abnormal-that it departs considerably from our sense of the normal.
"Normal," of course, is a subjective-objective notion which, strictly
speaking, conveys our judgment of the range of proper human behavior
-the norm we apply. But even if we try to restrict this judgment to
behavior, it is hard to escape an accompanying reference to the psychological state underlying the behavior. In other words, in addition to
considering a "mad" act as extremely abnormal, we imply that its source
is in a mind that is somehow deranged. A mad action, we may suggest,
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proceeds from a disordered psyche. Indeed, if we call an act "insane"
we complete this shift and our emphasis falls more heavily on the mental
state of the actor. Between the milder emphasis on an action's abnormality and the stronger focus on its subjective source, I propose to explore "madness" in the middle sense, as suggested by "deranged"-as
judgment of an act which opens toward, but does not immediately insist
on focusing on, its subjective source.
Second, we must insist on the normative claim implied at each stage
so far. When we speak of individuals as mad/deranged, we may have in
mind three possible areas: systematic derangement of perception, systematic derangement of intention, or systematic derangement of affect.
The individual may claim to see things that are not there or not see things
that are there, may seek to do things that are inconceivable, or may show
feelings or responses that are seriously and systematically inappropriate.
In each type of madness, a standard is implied against which the act is
measured: what is really there to be perceived, what is really possible to
do, what is normal for human beings to feel. Obviously we cannot restrict ourselves to common-sense judgments of reality for our standardrevolutionaries, inventors, and poets constantly break beyond and redefine what are assumed to be the limits of reality and are frequently
falsely thought to be mad. This does not deny that there are standards,
however; just that a given society's definition of what is real-as in the
case of Nazi Germany-must in turn be judged against more solid
standards.
What is their source? Daily life is underpinned by a shared sense of
the real world, its structures and limits. Science uses but sees beyond
this, remains guided by its own, and corresponding, shared sense of
reality, which is continuously and collectively refined and redefined just
as is that of common sense. Even a revolutionary social philosophy,
Marxism, which projects social transformation-a radically different
reality which, if glimpsed, has not yet been achieved-bases its claim to
truth on its scientific character. In other words, it is no more than
utopian speculation if its projections are not based on actual, observable
tendencies and possibilities of this society.
Even if it is now regarded as intersubjectively based rather than independent and external to us, a structured real world is central to all our
experience. The rebellious-or revolutionary--rejection of the commonsense version of these structures is not mad, nor are the transcending
visions of great poets, artists, and scientists. Their visions have seen
through to deeper layers of the reality and have allowed future generations access to them. To be sure, sometimes we cannot tell for sure
whether we are witnessing a transcendence of common sense or a mad
break with reality-a vision of a madman. But then no normative concept is without its gray areas. Despite these, judgments of abnormality/
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derangement still rest on a shared and demonstrable sense of objective
reality, its spheres including intention and feeling as well as perception.

III
The three categories of individual madness demand closer examination to see which are useful for societal analysis. First, what does it
mean to see what is not really there? The Nazis saw the Jews as the
source of Germany's problems: they perceived them as sub- and superhumans, as a danger, a pollutant, a parasite, an evil.5 I do not mean
"see" and "perceive" literally in terms of the physiological/optical fact of
perception, but inferentially, as in the case of a belief. When someone
sees the devil we assume not a perceptual but a mental malfunctioning:
madness is not color-blindness but a mental disorder in which we believe
our world of experience to form a causal pattern which is radically false.
Patently absurd connections or processes of causation are invented,
beings are created for which there is no basis in reality. These specific
people, the Jews, were endowed by large numbers of Germans with
certain menacing qualities and were linked mentally to their actually experienced problems.
To see this as madness is to concede that at its core were not the
manipulators and the manipulated, but rather, more disturbingly, people
who believed the inanities they spoke. Like the madman who sees the
devil, those who thought the Jews were racially defiling them were sincere. They believed in their fantasies.
To see what is not there is also to not see what is there. If one looks
at nuclear weapons and does not see danger but instead security we may
speak of a similar double, and similarly radical, misperception. Again,
the term "perception" is used loosely: the derangement lies in the mental,
not the optical, process.
Why not simply speak of an error? Why is it not enough simply to
label as mistaken the man who sees the devil or the Nazi who sees the
Jew as the devil? After all, we are first of all talking about a mistake.
The problem is that to call misperception a mistake locates it within the
realm of reason and evidence we presume in all discourse and indeed
perception. Within that realm a mistake may be corrected, for example,
by demonstrating it to be false. But to call it madness underscores on the
one hand its depth and seriousness, on the other its psychological roots
and quality of being beyond reason and demonstration. If we regard a
belief as mad we see it as being both willful and beyond reach.
This is a remarkable combination of opposites: a mad belief is
beyond control, unreachable by any customary process of evidence or
reasoning, yet it is willful. It proceeds with determination and from a
definite intention.
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Madness of the first sort, then, suggests a willful turning away from
both normal perception and inference and its standards of evidence and
truth, and a turning away which proclaims-and acts on-the inexistence of what is real and the existence of what is not. Of course, no
individual or social movement turns completely from reality. Hitler not
only showed normal perceptual capacities when he ate and drank, but in
rising to power he demonstrated a brilliant grasp of the political situation
down to the smallest detail of timing. If he was deranged it was only in
certain specific areas. The same is true for those judged and treated as
clinically insane: however far from normal reality they may be in specific areas, they know where and how to eat, how to walk, what it
means to sleep. Total derangement, if possible, would deprive the
would-be pathological killer of the very capacity to kill: every reality
would be scrambled. Derangement is always selective and limited,
leaving intact most of the vast web of one's other ties to reality as well as
abilities to function within it.
Which is why we must see madness as lying along a continuum
which stretches from the impossible extreme of seeing and acknowledging reality completely to the other impossible extreme of breaking with it
totally. If the second is inconceivable for the reasons just given,
Sigmund Freud has made clear why the first is also conceivable: civilized life demands repression and neurosis. If sane people stand somewhere along the continuum, the insane stand further along, having
broken with more ofreality. It is, however, a quantitative change which
becomes qualitative. To speak of "madness" implies that reality is being
denied more fully and in an area that is decisive for functioning. One
could scarcely imagine functioning without denying some aspects of
reality-this is the meaning of repression and neurosis as Freud articulated them. Repression is necessary to civilized life as such-for example, generating the sublimations that yield culture as well as protecting
humanity from the impulses that would threaten it. Neurosis, differentiated from madness only by degree, afflicts every member of Western
society in some way(s) which at some time(s) may become disruptive.
Madness is more pronounced, more disruptive, more systematic.
If the phenomenon of denial characterizes all neurosis and suggests
the (relatively) easy reversability that treatment or time can bring, a
stronger term is needed to describe the willful, radical, systematic departure from reality we mean by "madness": a rupture with reality. This
formulation captures all of the meanings I have been exploring: the fact
that madness involves a relationship with reality; the normative character
of the description; the seriousness of the derangement; its willful character; and the difficulty of return.
A second meaning of "madness" emphasizes the derangement not of
perception but of intention. Of course, the two are linked: belief is an
act whose derangement proceeds from an intention to rupture with reality
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and so believe. Moreover, madness has consequences-and is thus
talked about and studied--only when it becomes yet more active and
produces practical results. Nevertheless, "madness" has still a further
implication, within the practical sphere, of an act that is undertaken
contrary to evident possibility and in spite of that evidence. To attempt
unaided flight from a tall building is so patently pursuing the impossible
and courting death as to be mad. Of course, as with the earlier qualifications of misperception, acts that seek to "do the impossible" are regarded as mad when they are sustained, serious, and far-reaching. If
this madness indeed contains strong elements of misperception, the emphasis falls on the misperception of causal relations between act A and
intended result B. "If I leap I will fly." The absence of any conducting
path between A and B is rejected, replaced instead with magical belief.
B can be accomplished by doing A, in the face of all contrary evidence
and experience. Reality is defied.
The intention is mad not insofar as it is felt or desired, but insofar as it
is willed against reality. I focus on this as a distinct kind of madness
because the intention dominates so wholly as to be pursued in spite of its
patent impossibility. My desire to fly goes against reality, but instead of
submitting to that reality I attack and disregard it by jumping from the
window. If I disregard it with reference to the laws of physics, I attack
it with regard to my own body. In this sense the realities in and through
which the action takes place are violated in decisive ways-my body in
particular-in hope of achieving B. Madness: an extreme and systematic violation of reality in the intention of achieving an impossible
result.
And yet common sense tells us that many things are impossible which
are later accomplished. Was flight impossible in 1900? Black-white
equality in the American South in 1950? I select a technical and a sociopolitical example, both of which were susceptible to change over time.
Yesterday's impossibility becomes tomorrow's common sense: space
travel, for example, or women's equality with men. This implies that
special caution is necessary when talking about madness. Moreover,
systematic analysis of social structures and tendencies may reveal certain
possibilities which are roundly denied by established ideologies: social
movements sometimes suddenly and momentously extend the field of
possibilities, as when Russian workers created the Soviets in 1905.6
Thus the intention for social change-even for revolutionary change
-cannot be a priori characterized as mad any more than can the impulse
to invent what has not yet been invented. Defenders of the status quo
may see a given project as mad because of interests which understandably limit their sense of what is possible. Here it is important to
note not that "madness" is and can be falsely applied-true of any normative term-but that it is used, and with a precise but incorrectly applied meaning: to attempt what is plainly contrary to possibility.
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A third meaning of "madness" needs to be considered: systematic and
radical estrangement from oneself. Psychopathic mass murderers are
often regarded as mad not only because they kill but also because they do
so without normal affect. "Cold-blooded murder": the assumption is of
an appropriate complex of motivations and feelings which this killer
utterly lacks. We see him as having thus ruptured with his own moral
sensibilities and human fellow-feeling. He does not feel or react as one
is supposed to, meaning in turn that he is not only abnormal but quite
probably radically separated from himself. Acts of extreme cruelty
which spread beyond specific acts of self-defense or revenge can be
easily seen to express this divorce between the person's actions and
underlying feelings.
Rather than exploring the various problematic aspects of this meaning
of "madness," it will be useful to note that, like the others, it rests on
demonstrable standards of reality and normality and makes no sense
without them. .Like the others, it may be arguable, but those who employ it as a normative concept would willingly shoulder this burden of
argument.

IV
I have so far been discussing "madness" as we usually use it-to
describe individuals. In what ways, and with what qualifications, can it
be applied to the social world? Certainly if we focus on a given ruler we
can assess his mental state and describe his acts using the definitions just
developed: Hitler's "Final Solution" was mad. To the extent that an individual decides policy, we might conclude that any and all analysis of
individual behavior can be used. Was Hitler's perception deranged? His
intention, or his affect? How are these reflected in Nazi policy?
But if we make no distinction between individual and social we would
ignore the specifically societal character and determinants of the acts of
even the most powerful dictator. Hitler matters not because he was an
individual but as the one who managed to become absolute ruler of that
specific society. He became absolute dictator in the most intimate relation with those specific social and historical conditions-his character
expressing and focusing that situation, right down to and including his
insanity. Moreover, his individual qualities themselves were produced
in and through a specific history of a specific social class in a specific
society. Above all, they became reflected in policy only as Hitler took
power: insofar as he led the movement that became the dominant political force in Germany.
The point is that every step and layer of the madness that became the
"Final Solution," even the most individual, was social. This suggests
that the above meanings of "madness" cannot simply be grafted from
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individual to social process without prior reflection on their suitability.
Hitler may have been mad in all the senses described above: our question turns on the madness of the social policy and collective behavior he
directed.
This difference between the individual and the societal becomes clear
as soon as we ask how political behavior can be mad in the third sense
used above, as systematic and radical estrangement from self: derangement of affect. What is the "self' of a society from which it would
become estranged in acting madly? Certainly it might be possible to
describe a "sane society" or a "sick society" in terms of specific internal
relations and standards of health. But such an exercise would require a
totally new definition of categories rather than a translation of the individual into the social. Such a redefinition would mark the considerable
difference, pace Plato, between character structure and social structure.7
Political behavior is not individual behavior writ large-the body
politic is a rather different animal than the individual human being. The
affective character that is inextricable from relations between individuals,
for example, has a wholly different place, if any, in collective relations
these individuals direct or participate in.
John F. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev confronted each other in the
Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 not as individuals but as leaders of nations. That the difference was decisive can be gathered from a reading of
Robert Kennedy's memoir on the near-catastrophe.8 It was apolitical
conflict which, however it may have used or been reinforced by individual feelings, was conducted in political terms, according to a political
logic, for political ends. Kennedy and Khrushchev acted not as private
individuals might-concerned above all, for example, about their children-but as rulers of nations-concerned about power. For example,
the political consequences of being seen to be backing down were central
in Kennedy's calculations because of his self-conscious role as president
of the country that saw itself as the most powerful in the world. As
such, an abstraction as remarkably distant from the fate of the world's
people-or of his own children-as "national interest" largely controlled
Kennedy's behavior in the conflict. However we interpret this psychologically, we must clearly put its peculiar political character at the center
of our interpretation.
Thus the example suggests that the third area of our definition of individual madness, estrangement from self, offers serious resistance to
being applied to political behavior. But the other two meanings can be
more readily applied. When its rulers organize a society against false
enemies, when they believe and propagate the view that the society is
being mortally threatened although it is not, when they organize to combat the threat-then we may speak of madness as surely as when an
individual does the same. For systematic misperception is involved.
But how can we say that the society perceives or misperceives? Es-
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pecially when a society is fragmented into warring classes or groups?
Here the shift from individual to societal "madness" may complicate our
efforts but not cancel them. In speaking of a ruler we may say, simply,
that he sees what is not there and does not see what is there. Rulers'
perceptions of themselves and their situation may be so deranged as to
merit the term "madness."
In certain situations, however, this deranged perception is not theirs
alone, but rather becomes collective madness. I would cite as an example, insofar as it has been believed, the Communist "threat" to the United
States, or Soviet society's organization against Leon Trotsky's "threat"
to the Bolshevik Revolution, or (taking a less controversial example) the
Jewish "threat" to Germany. In each case-however different from each
other-the character and extent of a societal derangement was so extreme
as to at least arguably warrant the description of "madness." What
makes it a matter of a specifically societal derangement is not only the
obvious fact that it was shared by vast numbers of people, but that this
sharing, beyond being an imposition by a powerful ruler or dominant
class, had deep social roots. The "Final Solution" became policy as a
response to what vast numbers crazily regarded as a real threat to their
society. To be sure, along the road to Auschwitz there had to be
manipulators and manipulated-those who, for reasons of power, consciously used paranoid anti-Semitism without sharing it, as well as those
who acted according to it because they saw no alternative. But the
manipulations of and obedience to authority were not the secret of the
Nazi madness but only its inevitable corollary. Bullying and manipulation, submission and obedience may have a place in any social movement, but they never explain it.9
But isn't everything we have been saying served adequately by the
term "ideology"? Nazism was an ideology-a class-centered vision of
social reality which was offered, and accepted, beyond the German
lower middle class because it made sense of the experience of vast numbers of people and gave them a program of action. As such it had to
distort aspects of reality, just as it had to render aspects of it adequately.
Nazism, anti-Communism, Stalinism-in speaking of madness am I not
really describing ideologies which in these key respects are similar to all
other ideologies?
Where I quarrel with such analysis is in emphasizing that some
ideologies must be seen as mad. A central question, in spite of all relativism, is how far ideology corresponds to reality. At what point do we
call it deranged? Granted, all ideologies distort in service of specific
social classes; granted, also, that Marxism set itself up as the scientific
critique of ideology but in power has become just another ideology. The
original Marxist distinction between a more or less distorted and a more
or less accurate vision of social reality is decisive. The psychological
spectrum, stretching from (impossible) complete sanity to (impossible)
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complete madness, requires only slight alteration to become as relevant
to the discussion of societies as of individuals. The rulers of any society
may impose a more or less distorted vision of reality on all other social
groups and classes, but at a certain point along the continuum ideological
distortion can become so severe as to fundamentally lose touch with
reality. The image of the Jew in Nazi ideology is an example. Quantity
becomes quality: the degree of willful yet believed obfuscation is so
great as to merit description as "madness." Even in class societies, then,
ones governed by grotesque lies and absurdities, a point may be reached
when the ruling vision crosses a line, the line of madness.
To explain Auschwitz means looking at those who believed that the
Jews were menacing German society, and humanity, and were a threat
that could only be eliminated by extermination. A "misperception" on
this scale, as I have said, stems from an intention: the various stresses
and traumas of their experience were shaped by the Nazis and their
supporters into a deranged vision which placed the evil Jew at its center
and called for action. The Nazis who so believed ruptured with the
reality before them to create instead a fantasy-universe which "explained"
their problems and directed them toward a "solution." That it was evil,
that it was barbaric and ultimately self-destructive, did not deter (and perhaps attracted) those who chose it. It motivated and united them, gave
them moments of victory and indeed mastery, successfully propelling
them far from their original pain and stress. Since they were able to reshape the world around them according to their mad vision, we might
say that their madness "worked"-the mental rupture led to an actual
physical rupture in which the menacing subhuman parasites were progressively deprived of human rights and human treatment, and then were
exterminated.

v
I have differentiated derangement of perception from that of intention,
but the "Final Solution" certainly crosses the line. In perceiving, then
treating, people as people-who-are-not-human, the Nazis clearly acted
contrary to reality. Yet they succeeded whenever they exterminated a
Jew, insofar as they did remake reality according to their mad fantasy.
Nevertheless, testimony of survivors indicates that they failed, utterly.
Not only did many of these people retain their sense of humanity while
in the camps, as was demonstrated in acts of solidarity, compassion,
cunning, and outright resistance, most dramatically in the successful destruction of Treblinka. But afterwards, even those who felt themselves
nearly reduced to subhumans by the Nazis but survived returned: to
reconstitute their sense of humanity, to testify, to remember, to remind
us. Those who later demonstrated-or whose children demonstrated-
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against wars they saw as inhumane testified to a resilience of human
fellow-feeling and moral sense which will forever mock the Nazis' effort
to redefine their reality as human beings. Indeed, the only way the Nazis
were successful in remaking reality according to fantasy was by committing genocide.
I originally spoke of the madness of intention in relation to an individual trying to do the impossible. We are dealing with action, the category
where analyses of individuals have the easiest societal application. As
with the individual, so with social policy: trying to do what cannot be
done is mad. I have emphasized that it must be clearly differentiated
from trying to do what common sense says is impossible, for common
sense always sets its boundaries in keeping with the prevailing social
structures and their accompanying universe of discourse. But the criterion remains valid nevertheless: it is not madness to seek to transform
society in keeping with its possibilities and tendencies, according to its
demonstrable capacities. It was not madness to attempt to enslave
another people when the differences of power and of culture were so
great as to render this possible. It is madness to seek to realize a vision
which has no basis in fact, actual tendencies, human relations, or human
capacity.
And so we may judge the Nazi vision: the Reich sought to subjugate
other "Aryans," to destroy the national identity of "non-Aryans" like
Slavs or others judged "inferior," and to exterminate the "subhumans."
Even if extermination could be carried out-and it was the most successful of all the Nazi policies-the rest of the vision could not. Indeed,
even without the Normandy invasion, the Soviet Union alone eventually
would have destroyed Nazi Germany.
It is not mad to attempt a brutal or benevolent social policy whose
success is unlikely, nor to attempt an action in order to test its possibility. The madness, rather, lies in going against reality, willfully and
obdurately, when it is quite clear that success is impossible. Great
destruction is a likely corollary in such cases, because those bent on
changing what is unchangeable easily seek to coerce it if they have the
means. In The Dialectics of Disaster I have explored the dynamic
whereby impotence, in power, can lead to genocide. Societal mass murder, in our century, has been rooted in ruptures with reality in which the
project of transformation can only be achieved through violence. Human
reality may be recalcitrant, even to those with political and military
power, but human beings can be forced: threatened, beaten into submission, destroyed if they refuse. Violence is indeed the only way of reshaping what resists. Thus was "socialism" created by Stalin; thus was
an "independent non-Communist South Vietnam" pursued by the United
States after its unattainability became clear in late 1964. In each case
reality was madly assaulted by those with power to do so, violently
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made over to resemble the guiding vision. In each case a grotesque
mutant was created, and at frightful human cost.

VI
I have tried to develop a working notion of "madness" as a rupture
with reality and to indicate how it might be useful for understanding
catastrophic events like the Holocaust. A number of unresolved questions remain, above all regarding the kinds of societal processes that can
produce mad societal behavior. If a society is not an individual writ
large, how does it become deranged to the point of producing the kinds
of acts we have indicated? And how is this derangement different from
the "normal" social conflicts and class struggles that make up so much of
history?
In The Dialectics of Disaster I have explored the dynamics of uneven
historical development within and between societies in search of an
answer. For now, however, a more immediate question involves staying on the terrain of the concept and its application: how to employ the
meanings of "madness" described above to clarify current political behavior? It may be possible to reflect fruitfully on the past, but can the
understanding help us to clarify the far more volatile and difficult world
in which we ourselves are immersed? Above all, I have in mind the
impending nuclear holocaust. How are we to regard the casual intuition
that the current process of nuclear escalation is mad?
Certainly the notion of radical misperception can be our starting point.
Do the nuclear planners, we may ask, not see what is there and see what
is not there? The question may be posed from two directions--one
regarding their perception of the Soviet Union, its behavior and its intentions; the other concerning how they perceive danger and security vis-avis the spread of nuclear weapons. The point is not to fall into labeling a
given policy "mad" just because it is unpalatable, but to use the notion
rigorously as a significant evaluation. It is possible that social policies
are mad; it is possible that this policy is mad. The task is to evaluate the
policy of nuclear escalation to determine whether it is indeed a rupture
with reality of the sort we have been describing.
Second, we may ask whether it displays a madness of intention:
trying obdurately to achieve what is demonstrably impossible, assaulting
reality in doing so. Here our terrain would be the supposed quest for
security involved in increasing and diversifying nuclear arsenals: "peace
through strength." Does this in fact only increase the general insecurity?
Is this not self-evident to all but those who insist on building more
weapons? Again, the point is not whether the policy is mistaken, but
rather whether it systematically flouts what is possible and falsely redefines reality in doing so. To destroy a village "in order to save it," as
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was done during the Tet offensive in 1968 (and indeed describes much
of American conduct during the war in Vietnam), is more than a violation
of sense. It is a madness of intention, trying to do the impossible and
then resorting to destruction.
We cannot yet talk about the nuclear planners actually destroying the
world in order to achieve its security, because they have not done so yet.
Still, we must not be mystified by the peculiar character of nuclear
destruction: it is all prepared, waiting to happen, the missiles ready to be
launched. If a mistake sets off the holocaust it will not only, or even
primarily, be the fault of the mistaken machinery or persons, but of the
entire process which lies waiting at this very moment. If the world's
destruction depends on a computer error, we are justified in exploring
whether the human process leading to this state of affairs was mad. In
other words, then (and only then, alas, after the fact) will the intuition
about the systematic rupture with reality be proven incontrovertibly true.
The question now is, how do we regard the system that endangers us?
How do we analyze this derangement of intention now, before the
catastrophe? In short, the intention to achieve security by expanding
nuclear arsenals can and must be evaluated today, before the holocaust.
Finally, I have left aside the question of estrangement of self as
offering too many difficulties for societal analysis. Trying to assess the
possible madness of nuclear war would force us to reconsider this. It
may well be that the structure and governing logic of states are drastically
different than the structure and governing logic of individuals, and that
this makes it extremely difficult to diagnose a political rupture with
normal human fellow-feeling. After all, states have quite "normally"
engaged in wars, and virtually all have habituated their young men to
fight and die and their people to support their killing. But adequately
describing nuclear policy brings a new perspective to such questions.
Ultimately, the purpose of a society is to further the well-being of its
people. I say "ultimately" understanding that most societies have been
marked by class and other social struggies-because they have also been
characterized by class and other social consensus. When the consensus
has totally broken down-and the rulers decide to survive by permanently suppressing a major part of the population-the society is ripe for
revolution. Most often a state apparatus has contradictory functions-it
serves all of its people in some fashion even while guaranteeing the
exploitation of some by others. The point is that even slaves must be fed
and kept alive at a human level adequate to their functioning. The slaveowners who declare all-out war on their slaves are destroying their own
conditions of survival. Mad? Our earlier reservations about the psychological origins of the concept no longer apply because we are dealing
with a self-rupture which is far more basic. They would be made in a
structural sense similar to the estrangement from self discussed earlier.
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Similar, yet more profoundly so: actions which attack one's own survival itself are the most radical rupture with one's own reality.
Of course, to return to the individual level, suicide is not necessarily
mad, even if it is the most extreme possible rupture with self. Great pain
or suffering or a loss of all purpose can lead one to choose death over
life, just as death in struggle may rationally be preferable to a life of
subjection. The Warsaw Ghetto uprising, although suicidal, asserted for
all time the dignity of the fighters and their refusal to die passively. It
was a sane act. Their suicidal struggle was self-consciously seen as a
testimony: it implied a world that would continue beyond this battle and
even the Nazis, and it spoke to that world.
Are those who declare "better dead than Red" threatening the same
courageous battle to the death? Not at all. First, nuclear policymakers
are choosing not only their own death, but that of tens of millions of
others. Certainly the Warsaw Ghetto fighters brought German retribution down upon the entire ghetto, but this happened in the process of the
Nazi attack on the resistance. The primary targets of nuclear war are
civilian population centers themselves, because they are population centers. Thus he who would save Americans from an alleged Communist
victory would "save them" by having them killed. Moreover, the threat
itself is an absurdity. The belief in the Communist or Soviet threat is one
of those madnesses of perception which has operated, and continues to
be revived, against all evidence, by those whose perception is systematically deranged. But above all, the nuclear planners are mad because
nuclear war would destroy the world as we know it. Even assuming for
a moment that their cause were real, the war they plan on its behalf
would leave no one alive to struggle for a better social system than the
one they would combat.
Are there no conditions under which it would make sense to risk
destroying all human life for an end superior to life itself? Or is it mad to
risk destroying all of life? We can find our direction in answering this
by asking how we would respond if the Soviet Union were indeed Nazi
Germany and threatened the rest of the world with nuclear weapons
unless it surrendered. This is the deranged perception of some anticommunists, notably the Committee on the Present Danger; let us suppose it were true. Even then, it would be mad to deprive tens of millions
of people who had made no such decision, as well as virtually all of
humankind, present and future, of the chance of struggling against and
overthrowing such a monster. Yes, surrender under such conditions
would not only be the best course, it would be the only sane course.
Even the mass suicide at menaced Masada left Jewish communities intact
elsewhere: otherwise no one would recall it today. It would then have
had no meaning at all. Destroying the outside world as well as those
locked in a struggle, however righteous, against an evil system would
render their own struggle absurd. A continuing existence is a presuppo-
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sition of every struggle, just as the continuing existence of an outside
world is a presupposition of every individual suicide.
In short, omnicide-the destruction of everything-is mad in a way
that individual or group suicide is not. It is mad without regard to its
reason, mad because it attacks the basis of all life, all value, all meaning.
To risk this-virtually unimaginable-total death is totally different than
risking death amidst an abiding world. Today, "better dead than Red"
points us toward the ultimate rupture with reality, the nuclear planners'
flirtation with destroying the human adventure as such. Or rather, we
must say that they have already decided to do so-under such and such
determinate conditions.
I have willy-nilly begun characterizing nuclearism while still in the
process of asking whether our categories could be useful in describing it.
The reason lies in the nature of omnicide itself-it is unlike any evil
humans have yet encountered in that it promises destruction without
appeal, the world at an end. It alone threatens the premise of continuing
human existence implied by other, more partial disasters, indeed, by
suicide itself. Madness, in all forms, suggests a partial but significant
and systematic rupture with reality. How, then, to characterize the
preparation for total and ultimate rupture, the destruction of reality per
se? We can understand the relevance of the category as we have done
only by briefly exploring the situation itself.
The rigorous use of "madness" is deeply disturbing, of course, which
is perhaps one reason why it has been so conspicuously avoided in a
century so rife with madness. The functionalist bias of most systematic
thought assumes that there is a reason for every societal act, a more or
less rational intention behind political action. It offends the intellect to
suggest that there is no reason behind a major policy--or that indeed its
reason is profoundly and systematically irrational. "Madness" is even
more unsettling in suggesting that we may be living admist a profound
and destructive irrationality, one which lies beyond the traditionally
understood irrationalities of history-those of mad individual leaders,
for example, or of irrational class societies in a state of crisis. Moreover,
our conventional political sense is deeply troubled by ascriptions of such
madness: what political countermeasures will move the crazy leaders of
mad societies? To describe a major social policy as "mad" and to suggest that it is rooted in fundamental societal dynamics is to rule out the
hope of simple reforms improving the situation, of leaders seeing the
light.
Above all, as if these implications were not disturbing enough, much
of this essay, and the study where these reflections began, points to our
society, today, in the United States and the West. If it can be seriously
discussed whether the Vietnam War was mad, whether nuclear escalation
is mad, then all of the above problems may apply to us, our social
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structures, our daily life. Not that they do not or have not applied elsewhere-in the Soviet Union, for example, or in the genocidal transformation of Kampuchea-but we who study and think and act here have
responsibility for understanding the situation we would influence. Did
most Germans between 1933 and 1945 see the sickness of their society,
or were some of them too deeply immersed to even question it, others
deluded by false hopes? What assumptions did they share with those
who ruled them, and with the genocidal policies they themselves carried
out? Can the same question be asked, today, by ourselves, of ourselves? Can we afford to wait until the blinding flash to acknowledge
that the nuclear planners are mad?
Such are some of the challenges of pursuing, rather than abandoning,
a term like "mad" to describe events such as the "Final Solution."
Daunting to the intellect, certainly, and to the will as well. But too much
is at stake to ignore the challenge.
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8
WAS THE HOLOCAUST UNIQUE?:
A PECULIAR QUESTION?
Alan Rosenberg

The question of the "uniqueness" of the Holocaust has itself become a
unique question. However, when we approach the Holocaust we are at
once confronted with the following dilemma: if the Holocaust is the
truly unique and unprecedented historical event that it is often held to be,
then it must exceed the possibility of human comprehension, for it lies
beyond the reach of our customary historical and sociological means of
inquiry and understanding. But if it is not a historically unique event, if
it is simply one more incident in the long history of man's inhumanity to
man, there is no special point in trying to understand it, no unique lesson
to be leamed.1 Of all the enigmas, paradoxes, and dilemmas facing
Holocaust scholarship,2 the "uniqueness question" is surely the most
vexing and divisive, the one question most likely to evoke partisan
debate and to generate emotional heat in discussion.3
In my own efforts at analysis of the issues underlying the "uniqueness question" I have been struck by the very oddity of the question
itself, for it is strange that there should be argument about it at all. What
strikes me as peculiar about it is the fact that the legitimacy of the
question as such is so taken for granted, that it is so readily assumed that
the uniqueness of the Holocaust is not merely a fit subject for analysis
but is a problem of the very first rank in importance. The anomaly here
is just that the "uniqueness question" itself is taken to be crucially relevant to an understanding of the Holocaust although it is relevant to
few-if any-other landmark events of history. One finds little discussion, for example, of the "uniqueness" of the Protestant Reformation or
the Industrial Revolution. The atomic destruction of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki-surely qualified as "unique" and "unprecedented" in terms of
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their implications for the future of mankind-is simply not the subject of
debate concerning its "uniqueness" involving controversy and serious
divisions of opinion. While scholars often draw comparisons and mark
the contrasts of the American and French revolutions, little time is spent
in analysis or discussion of the "uniqueness question" with respect to
either. If the "uniqueness" of such events as these, events that have
radically altered our world, is not in question, why is it that the "uniqueness question" has assumed such prominence in the context of Holocaust
studies? Why is the question itself so hotly contested? Why do some
authorities on the history of the Holocaust go so far as to claim that the
stance that one takes with respect to the "uniqueness question" determines the way in which one relates the Holocaust to the rest of human
history, influencing every dimension of one's interpretation and evaluation of the event itself?
According to Saul Friedlander, for example, before we can begin
analyzing any number of the central issues surrounding the Holocaust
we must first deal with "a preliminary issue of crucial importance for
every aspect of the Holocaust: are we dealing with a phenomenon comparable with some other historical event or are we facing something
unique not only within any traditional and historical context, but even
within Nazism itself?"4 George Kren and Leon Rappoport call the
"uniqueness question" very important, for, "depending upon how it is
answered, the general orientation of interpretive analysis will obviously
vary a great deal. "5 And again, insistence upon its historical uniqueness
may, according to Yehuda Bauer, render the Holocaust irrelevant except
as a specifically Jewish tragedy. Here is the thrust of Bauer's argument:
If what happens to the Jews is unique, then by definition it doesn't concern
us, beyond our pity and commiseration for the victims. If the Holocaust is

not a universal problem, then why should
Philadelphia, New York or Timbuktu teach it?
is no uniqueness, not even of a unique event.
can happen again: not quite in the same way,
form.6

a public school system in
Well, the answer is that there
Anything that happens once,
perhaps, but in an equivalent

In what follows I shall be addressing the problems and issues that are

raised by texts like these, texts cited here simply as evidence that-for
Holocaust studies-the "uniqueness question" is at once paramount and
problematic.
It is clear, moreover, that the "uniqueness question" has become a
matter of concern to the Jewish and Christian lay community as well as
to the professional scholars in the field. One need only think of the public debate over the issues of the inclusion of the Holocaust in the social
studies curriculum of the New York City school system or the U.S.
Holocaust Memorial Council to see how sensitive the issue has become,
especially within the Jewish community itself.7 We may ask if this spe-
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cial sensitivity is not itself an impediment to more widespread dialogue,
thus hampering the very cause of understanding which Jews support.
For, as Professor Ismar Schorsch states, the Jews' "obsession" concerning the uniqueness claim "impedes genuine dialogue, because it introduces an extraneous, contentious issue that alienates potential allies from
among other victims of organized human depravity. Similarly, our fixation on uniqueness has prevented us from reaching out by universalizing
the lessons of the Holocaust. "8
Considerations such as these clearly imply that, if we are to widen
and deepen our understanding of the Holocaust, we must deal with the
claim of "uniqueness" by developing a strategy that will free us from the
conceptual muddles that presently cloud the issue. We must be clear as
to the meaning of the claim itself if we are to escape the mystification that
frequently has surrounded it.9 We appear to have three principal options: (1) We can dismiss the whole question of "uniqueness," as
Schorsch suggests that we should, simply on the grounds that it adds
nothing of value to our understanding of the Holocaust. (2) We can
attempt to account for why it is that the "uniqueness" claim has become
integral to the discussion of the meaning of the Holocaust while it has
been treated as merely peripheral to the analysis of other historical events
of major consequence. (3) We can concentrate our analysis upon how
the "uniqueness question" helps as well as hinders us in our quest to
elucidate the meaning and significance of the Holocaust
Though I am sympathetic with those who confine their strategy to the
first option, I shall reject it as unrealistic. For, while it is true-as
Schorsch points out-that the claim to uniqueness sometimes does pose
a difficulty for those who would gain a better understanding of the
Holocaust by comparing it with other cases of mass human destruction,
it does not seem to me that we can duck the "uniqueness question" by
simply disregarding it. The "uniqueness question" is much too central to
the Holocaust to be ignored. Since, as I shall go on to show, an adequate strategy for dealing with the "uniqueness question" will include
-rather than preclude-grounds for developing comparative historical
analysis and evaluation, the second option is of decisive import, for it is
always helpful to understand what lies behind any particular perspective
on an event, and especially so when the range of perspectives on the
event is so much a part of the event itself and gives rise to so much
controversy. Although I shall be exercising the third option, since it
builds upon the second-depending as it does upon clarification of the
meaning of the claim of "uniqueness" with respect to the Holocaust-so
it will be necessary for me to say something about this issue, though a
full account of the matter lies beyond the scope of this chapter. In the
end I shall try to show why "unpacking" the "uniqueness question" is
the strategy that is most fruitful in understanding the Holocaust itself.
However, although I shall be adopting this third option, let me first
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sketch some of the factors that have tended to make the "uniqueness
question" itself a part of the problem in understanding the Holocaust.
Before we can see how it can be treated as part of the "solution," so to
speak, we must see why it has become "part of the problem."
It seems to be beyond question that the peculiar role that the "uniqueness question" has come to play in relation to the historical accounts and
understanding of the Holocaust is largely due to the insistence of the
Jewish community that the Holocaust must be viewed as unique.10 It
was a segment of the Jewish community, in fact, that devised and
accepted the very label "Holocaust" in order to express the uniqueness of
the event, 11 literally defining it as such by the name that they gave it.12
The process by means of which a series of historical incidents becomes
known as an "event" is well known, for it is only by gathering into
meaningful clusters the apparently separate and unrelated facts of historical happenings that we are able to form coherent concepts of what has
happened in the past. The naming of such a cluster is but one step in the
process of self-understanding, and so it is easy to see why a segment of
the Jewish community has come to view the naming of the Holocaust as
an attempt to capture and preserve the uniqueness of meaning which is
implicit in the facts so named. As those facts became known in the aftermath of World War II they immediately gave rise to a numbing horror in
which the human mind seemed to be incapable of dealing with them, of
grasping them in the normal fashion that we deal with the factual
materials of history. The awful depth and scope of these "incidents," of
these particular historical facts, were of such horrible dimensions as to
seem completely incomprehensible. It is from this response that the
claim to the "uniqueness" of the Holocaust is generated.13 And it is in
the context of this response that the search for those characteristics and
traits that mark the Holocaust as unique must be understood. For it is
precisely this search, and the various proposals which have issued from
it, that is responsible for making the "uniqueness question" a part of the
event which the "Holocaust" names: it has become part of the problem
of the understanding and comprehension of what happened. The peculiar question of "uniqueness" may not have been an inevitable component
of the problem, but it is clearly, at this point, an inescapable one.
Quite aside from the origins of the "uniqueness question" and its integration into the total problematic of the Holocaust, there are at least three
other substantive problems concerning the characterization of the Holocaust as "unique." They can be readily stated, though not so readily
solved. We must, first of all, be clear about what we mean when we
claim an event to be unique. Secondly, we must be clear as to what
element or elements of the event make it unique. And, lastly, we must at
least try to be clear about the implications of the decision to classify the
Holocaust as unique and try to understand how that decision may affect
our interpretation of the event itself.
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Existing Holocaust scholarship, surprisingly, is of little help in determining criteria for what constitutes "uniqueness" with respect to a historical event, whether it be the Holocaust or any other. And, should we
consult ordinary language, we are helped even less. The American
College Dictionary gives three possible definitions of "unique": (1) "of
which there is but one"; (2) "having no like or equal"; and (3) "rare and
unusual." In such terms, every event can be called unique, for no event
of history is ever literally duplicated or "happens" twice, or is exactly
"like" any other event, or its "equal." Moreover, it would seem to
trivialize the importance of an event such as the Holocaust to call it
simply "rare" or "unusual." In order to avoid such trivialization we must
look at the actual use of the claim itself, we must analyze the intentions
of those who have insisted upon the "uniqueness" of the Holocaust, and
we must try to grasp the point of the claim. In this way, it seems to me,
we can make sense of the question. For it is clear that what the claim of
"uniqueness" is intended to do is to set apart from other historical events
just that singular event that has the potential of transforming a culture, or
altering the course of history, in some profound and decisive way. If the
Industrial Revolution, for example, is said to be a "unique event" in the
history of the West, it is because it is viewed in this transformational
light; it changed our Western culture, altered its values, and so can be
viewed as a cause of a major "turning point in history."14 Such a way of
defining the "uniqueness" claim corresponds closely to the definition
offered by Emil Fackenheim, for his "epoch making event"15 is just
what is meant by terming an event as actually-or potentially"transformational" of the status quo ante, as radically altering the course
of history .16 Given such a definition we can see how it is possible to
claim that the Holocaust, as well as other events, such as the atomic
bombing of Japan, can be classified as "unique."
And yet we must be cautious about such claims. I have used the
words "see how it is possible to claim" since it must be emphasized that
no historical event comes with its meaning already attached. As Walter
Wurzburger has said:
Historic events possess only the kind of meaning which historians assign to
them. Since there is no objective meaning inherent in any historic event that
awaits discovery, meaning is not given but is created. The meaning of any
particular event is not a function of its objective properties but hinges upon the
choices of categories selected by a given subject for its interpretation. Hence,
history teaches only the lessons that people choose to learn. 7
For my own part, even Wurzburger's statement puts the matter too
weakly and accounts for only a small portion of the process whereby
meaning accrues to a historical event. For it is not merely the ascription
of meaning by "historians" that counts, but the construction of meaning
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by the culture that matters. It is by means of those processes that we
have come to understand, after Peter Berger and Thomas Luclcmann, as
the "social construction of reality," that the past can become meaningfuI.18 It is not the ascriptions of historians that make certain events
rather than others "transformational" events or "turning points" in history. It is only through the actions of the individual members of a culture and the consequences of those actions-both intentional and unintentional-that any event becomes transformational of meanings and
values. Only through those practices which Anthony Giddens has called
acts of "structuration" can events of transformational potential become
actual transformations of culture.19 And yet, while these are undoubted
features of the historical process of change and the acquisition of meaning, we find interpreters of the Holocaust seriously divided over the preliminary question of uniqueness-a question that must surely be
resolved if the event itself is to be transformational.
In the first instance, there are those who view the whole issue of
uniqueness as unimportant, for there is, as we have seen, a trivial sense
in which all historical events are unique.20 They see the Holocaust as
unique only to the extent that every historical event is necessarily different from every other historical event; since "history never repeats
itself'--contrary to what has sometimes been popularly believed-it
follows that the "uniqueness" of the Holocaust is affirmed. But such an
affirmation is clearly a "trivialization" of the "uniqueness question."
There is yet a second group that falls within the camp of the "trivialists." They are quite willing to see the Holocaust as an event of major
importance, but they nevertheless agree that the claim of uniqueness
cannot be sustained in any non-trivial form. They argue that too much
has been made of what have been called the "exceptional" features of the
Holocaust. Without denying the existence of these features, this group
concentrates on showing that these features are just what might have
been expected to follow from the events leading up to the Holocaust as
such. In their view the Holocaust may simply be regarded as just one
more incident-albeit a flagrant one-of man's inhumanity to man, one
more horrible atrocity in a century filled with them. They cite such
precedents as the destruction of the Armenians by the Turks21 and
pogroms in Poland and Russia, even reaching back to the genocidal
near-extermination of the American Indians for parallel cases. Some of
these critics grant that whatever uniqueness the Holocaust may possess
can only be seen within the context of Jewish history.22 But some
Jewish intellectuals, Jacob Neusner23 and Arnold Eisen24 for example,
go so far as to hold that even within the context of Jewish history the
Holocaust cannot be viewed as unique. They contend that the Holocaust
should be understood as one event in a succession of events, one link in
a long chain of events aimed at the elimination of the Jews as a people
commencing with the destruction of the Second Temple in 70 C.E.
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In sharp contrast, those that I have called "absolutists" are certain that
no other event in history even remotely resembles the Holocaust or
furnishes a precedent for understanding it. Its singularity is such that it
exceeds the power of language to express; its meaning is such that it
belongs to "another planet." It is incomprehensible, completely outside
the normal dimensions of our terrestrial history, beyond all historical
explanation and appraisal. It is, they say, not merely unique; it is, to use
the Eckhardts' phrase, "uniquely unique. "25
Menachem Rosensaft sums up this view succinctly: "Holocaust
stands alone in time as an aberration within history."26 And Elie Wiesel
writes that "the universe of concentration camps, by its design, lies
outside if not beyond history. Its vocabulary belongs to it alone."27 In
Bauer's striking characterization, the Holocaust is viewed by these
writers as an "upside down miracle."28 These absolutists see the Holocaust as unique simply because it happened, and concerning their view
nothing needs to be added.
Those reluctant to accept either the trivialist or the absolutist position
may be termed "relativists." Other turning points in history, other great
crises, they suggest, contain elements comparable to and related to the
Holocaust. Accordingly, they view it as "relatively unique," for there
will always be distinct features of the Holocaust that set it apart and
which remain of more importance than its similarities and resemblances
to other events. Approached from this angle the Holocaust is neither
"extra-historical," in the sense claimed by the absolutists, nor yet just
another atrocity, as the trivialists maintain. It is central to the relativist
thesis that the Holocaust must be viewed contextually. This means that it
is possible to view the Holocaust as unprecedented in many respects,
that it is an event of critical and transformational importance in the
history of our world, and yet it is still an event that must be addressed as
a part of that history. It can and should be compared to other genocidal
incidents, described and analyzed in language free from the "mystification" which only blocks our understanding, and made as accessible to
explanation as possible. It should not be assumed, on a priori grounds
of its absolute "uniqueness," that what caused the Holocaust is forever
beyond the reach of the tools of historical analysis, or that the consequences cannot be explored by means of social theory. For, if we fail in
our efforts at historical comprehension, and if our social theories are
inadequate to the task of explaining such events, we are almost sure to
experience similar catastrophes in the future. Indeed, if our conceptual
tools and analytical methods are baffled by the Holocaust, we must devise new concepts and new methods.
It would be misleading to claim that all those scholars that I have
categorized as relativists-possibly the term "contextualists" would be
more appropriate-speak with a single voice concerning the "uniqueness
question." Steven Katz29 and Saul Friedlander,30 for instance, take an
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"intentionalist" approach. They hold the view that it is the "intention" of
the Nazis with respect to the total elimination of Jewry that marks the
Holocaust as unique among comparable pogroms and genocides.
Others, such as Richard Rubenstein31 and Henry Friedlander,32 take a
more "methodological" point of view. They see the uniqueness of the
Holocaust more in terms of the distinctive bureaucratic and technological
methods of destruction employed. These very sharply defined differences of focus on what accounts for the uniqueness of the Holocaust are
responsible for serious divergences of interpretation of the event itself.
For it is clear that both the intentionalists and the methodologists employ
their respective views of the "uniqueness question" as interpretive frameworks for understanding the Holocaust itself. The preliminary question
of uniqueness helps to determine, by the way in which it is solved, the
conceptual apparatus for exploring the other problems of the Holocaust
Some idea of how decisively this preliminary step figures in the eventual perspective upon the character of the event itself can be gained from
comparing the following texts. In "Whose Holocaust?" Yehuda Bauer
takes the intentionalist approach:
The uniqueness of the Holocaust does not ... lie in numbers. It does not
lie in the method of mass murder.... What makes it unique is the existence of two elements: planned total annihilation of a national or ethnic group,
and the quasi-religious, apocalyptic ideology that motivated the murder. 3
By contrast, here is Robert E. Willis representing the approach from the
methodology standpoint:
For whatever similarities are present between Auschwitz and other
cases--and there are many-the former is distinguished by being the first
instance of a situation in which the full bureaucratic and technical apparatus of
the state was mobilized for the primary purpose of extermination.3
With these very different approaches to the Holocaust locked into the
different interpretive grids through which the event itself is to be viewed
and interpreted, from the preliminary stage on, it is small wonder that the
eventual interpretations that are reached should themselves be widely
variant.
What concerns me here is not that we should accept any one approach
to the "uniqueness question" as true-and the others as false-but that
we should try to discover which of these approaches yields the most coherent and intelligible results, which framework elucidates the problems
of understanding the Holocaust most clearly and is the most promising
for understanding its historical and moral significance. It is not a simple
matter to decide, and the fact that there are subtle differences within each
of the two basic types of approach does not make the task any easier.
Some methodologists, for example, make it clear that they fully recog-
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nize the important role which the intentionalists ascribe to the "uniqueness" of the Nazis' emphasis on "total extermination," while insisting
that the special bureaucratic and technological means employed in that
destruction are the more decisively unique feature of the event.35 Both
forms of relativist interpretation have great appeal owing to their common stress upon understanding the Holocaust in contextual terms, and
the great illumination that results from such analysis of the "uniqueness
question" leads to a preference for both over either the trivialist or absolutist stands. And yet between them, I lean most to the methodologist
explanation as providing the framework that most clearly helps in comprehending both the uniqueness of the event and the event itself. For it
is the emphasis upon method in the apparent "madness" of the event that
helps us most to grasp the significance of the event for our own lives and
for the world we live in. After all, we do live in a depersonalized bureaucratic world, a world in which almost every facet of public and
private life is subject to the mindless influence of bureaucratic methods.
But it is not merely that the methodologists appear to shed more light
upon the relevance of the Holocaust to our own situation that leads to my
rejection of the intentionalist approach. For there are internal problems
with the intentionalist position itself, problems of internal coherence, as
well as problems with the facts and assumptions upon which it is predicated. In order to show the dimensions of some of these difficulties, I
have chosen to analyze them in the context of Yehuda Bauer's position,
for he is clearly the strongest exponent of the intentionalist view and the
most popular of its recent defenders. It is not my purpose to refute
Bauer-for both "proof' and "refutation" are hardly apposite when we
are dealing with frames of reference such as these-but I do intend to
show how Bauer's insistence that it is the intention of the Nazi state--the
policy of total annihilation of the Jews-that determines the uniqueness
of the Holocaust can be more of a hindrance than a help in dealing with
the meaning of the Holocaust
Bauer's argument is most forcefully presented in his important book,
The Holocaust in Historical Perspective, in which he devotes his second
chapter to an analysis of the various implications of the "uniqueness
question." Titled "Against Mystification: The Holocaust Phenomenon,"
this chapter puts the central dilemma of uniqueness this way:
If what happened to the Jews was unique, then it took place outside of his-

tory, it becomes a mysterious event, an upside down miracle, so to speak, an
event of religious significance in the sense that it is not man-made as that term
is normally understood. On the other hand, if it is not unique at all, then what
are the parallels and precedents?36
Bauer wants to escape the dilemma by developing a conception of the
Holocaust that will account for its uniqueness by placing it within the
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context of history. He argues that the historical uniqueness of the
Holocaust does not consist in the fact that it involves the practice of
genocide, for he acknowledges that there are precedents and parallels
where genocidal practices have been politically instituted. He does,
however, find that there is something unique and unprecedented in certain special features of the genocidal policies and practices of the Holocaust. These features, he claims, show that what happened to the Jews
is different from what befell other victims of mass murder, both within
the Nazi "universe of death" and outside it. For it is clear that Bauer
wants to give full weight to the fact that mass murder as practiced by the
Nazis-as well as by others-has not been confined to attempts specifically aimed at the elimination of the Jews as a people. But he also
wants to claim that there is something quite different about the Nazi
policy with respect to the Jews. Bauer argues that only the Jews were
the victims of a deliberate policy of total extinction.
He acknowledges that some two and a half million Soviet prisoners of
war were killed by Nazi practices and policy, by ill-treatment in the
prison camps, malnutrition, and starvation. He points out that "tens of
thousands of Poles were brutally murdered as resistants, real or
imagined."37 But he goes on to argue that the policies which sponsored
these atrocities, while "genocidal" in character, were not aimed at the
total extinction of either the Poles or the Soviets. Bauer cites Raphael
Lemkin, coiner of the term "genocide," in order to support his contention
that "clearly, what was happening to quite a number of people in Nazi
Europe was genocide. "38 But he goes on to distinguish such general
Nazi practices from the intentions embodied in the Holocaust:
The difference between that and the Holocaust lies in the difference between
forcible, even murderous, denationalization, and wholesale total murder of
every one of the members of a community. Contrary to legend there never
was a Nazi policy to apply measures used against the Jews to other national
communities.39
In short, Bauer's contention is that the only group that the Nazis intended to totally annihilate was the Jews. Accordingly, he concludes,
the term "Holocaust" should only be used with reference to the extermination of the Jews so that its uniqueness does not become blurred and
the Holocaust confused with other mass murders committed by the
Nazis, murders to which the term "genocide" also applies.
It is this last contention that weakens Bauer's argument by introducing into it an element of conceptual confusion and incoherence.
When Raphael Lemkin first introduced the term "genocide" he intended
that it should be used to denote only those instances of mass murder
directed at the total extermination of a people, and not merely intended to
bring about their "denationalization." Lemkin states:
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Denationalization was the word used in the past to describe the destruction of
a national pattern. The author believes, however, that this word is inadequate
because: (1) it does not connote the destruction of the biological structure; (2)
in connoting the destruction of one national pattern, it does not connote the
imposition of the national pattern of the oppressor; and (3) denationalization is
used by some authors to mean only deprivation of citizenship.40
Bauer does not appear to recognize that Lemkin himself was fully
satisfied that the Nazi policy of genocidal destruction was aimed at total
annihilation, whether directed at the Jews or at the Czechs or the Poles.
Lemkin specifically stated that "genocide is directed against the national
group as an entity, and the actions involved are directed against individuals, not in their individual capacity, but as members of a national
group."41 Genocide is instituted, Lemkin argued, as "a coordinated plan
of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of
the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves. "42
The incoherence of Bauer's use of the term "genocide" as applicable
to the policies aimed at less than total annihilation is made even more
perplexing when it is recalled that, in an earlier work, he employed the
term-as Lemkin did-to denote the intended total destruction of a
people. There he stated: "The Holocaust was a crime of genocide-that
is, an attempt to exterminate all members of a particular national or racial
group simply because they were members of that group. "43 It is clear
that in this statement the "Holocaust" and "genocide" are not seen as
denoting two different types of event. One can, of course, argue, as
Bauer does, that the Holocaust was a unique event, distinguishable from
other events of Nazi mass murder. One might even be able to argue that
the Nazi intention was different in kind, with respect to the Jews, from
what it was with respect to other national groups. But one cannot, as
Bauer has done, cite Lemkin as sponsoring authority for such arguments. For it is undeniable that Lemkin views what happened to the
Gentile populations that fell victim to Nazi genocide as more, rather than
less, like what happened to the Jews. Lemkin sees the Nazi intent in all
such cases as the same, i.e., total destruction.
On the factual side, Bauer's argument is similarly weak. He argues,
for example, that the Nazis' intention with respect to the Gypsies and
other groups was very different from that toward the Jews. Although
debate over this matter cannot be entered into here, there is substantial
evidence to indicate that the Nazis did indeed intend the total elimination
of the Gypsy population. As Bauer himself had earlier acknowledged:
"History records other actions which qualify as genocide by the strictest
definition. Hitler himself sought to annihilate the Gypsies as well as the
Jews."44
Assuming that my criticism has cast doubt upon the adequacy of
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Bauer's thesis as to the "uniqueness question" and shows that there are
serious difficulties to be overcome in the intentionalist position, we now
have to ask about the alternative methodological view. Is it, perhaps, a
more adequate perspective in terms of which to approach the "uniqueness question," and from which to proceed to the substantive interpretation and understanding of the Holocaust itself? Can it be said, for
example, that the Holocaust is a unique form of genocide-using that
term, indeed, as Lemkin originally defined and used it? As we have
seen, Lemkin treated genocide as the intentional attempt to destroy a
group in its ethnic and biological totality. With that definition in mind
are there discernable features of the Holocaust that distinguish it from
other such genocidal events?
I believe that these questions can be answered affirmatively.
Although I cannot deal with the evidence here in detail,45 I can suggest at
least/our kinds of evidence that can be offered as showing how and why
the Holocaust should be understood as a unique genocidal event, genuinely unprecedented in the annals of our world and its history. First,
there is evidence of uniqueness in the simple fact of the size and scope of
the destruction, in the enormity of the numbers alone, which are of an
entirely new order of magnitude when compared with other genocides.
Second, there is the far more complex fact of the means employed in the
Holocaust, for no other genocidal event has so deeply involved the entire
structure of the legal and administrative machinery of a government in its
implementation. There are simply no similar instances of a legally constituted government adopting anything like the extensive bureaucratic and
technological apparatus that was created to carry out the genocidal intention of the Holocaust. Third, the Holocaust is unique in the varied
physical and psychological qualities used to reduce the intended victims
to their barest physical qualities as "objects" in order that they might be
more efficiently processed in the mechanical production line of the death
camps. And, finally, the Holocaust is unique in the vast and determined
attempt by the Nazis to transform the victims into the image that the
Nazis had of them. The scope of this massive effort at creating an
"image" of the intended victims of genocide is such that it vastly exceeds
similar efforts; its scale is literally unprecedented.
It will be evident, then, that I am among those who believe that it is
the various processes, techniques, and methods of destruction characteristic of the Holocaust that justify the ascription of "uniqueness" to it.
And it is because of these same features of the Holocaust, features that
help us to understand not merely why the Holocaust is unique but also
features that help us to understand how it was possible that such an event
could occur in our history and in the context of our age, that I reject the
absolutist view. That view, I believe, tends to render the Holocaust
incomprehensible by putting the event outside of our history, by treating
it as outside the context of our age, our language, and our capacity for
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analysis and understanding.46 This rejection of the Holocaust as something that could occur in our time, and which could clearly occur again
for much the same political and sociological reasons, seems to me simply
unacceptable. It virtually amounts to the denial that it did occur, a denial
that seems to me almost an invitation for it to happen again. For if we
are to avoid such an event in the future we must surely attempt to grasp
its meaning in political and sociological terms. If the Holocaust seems
somehow to be beyond the grasp of our usual categories of political and
sociological analysis, to be beyond the reach of our normal concepts of
historical interpretation and explanation, the lesson is not that we should
give up the attempt at analysis and explanation. The lesson is that we
must develop more adequate categories and concepts.
Finally, it is for this last reason that I reject all forms of trivialism with
respect to the "uniqueness question." By drawing attention away from
just those novel features of the Holocaust process that are unprecedented, by trivializing them, the trivialists divert our attention from the
very features of the Holocaust that we ought to be trying to understand
and explain, features that we must be able to cope with if we are to avoid
such events in the future. By taking the view that the Holocaust is just
one more atrocity, we are unlikely to see its deep and unique significance
as an event with potential transformational consequences for our culture
and our age. We are unlikely to see the possible implications of the Nazi
abuse of science and technology, the application of bureaucratic techniques, principles of managerial efficiency and "cost-benefit" analysis,
and all such unique features of the Holocaust process for our own situation, our own lives. For there are analogies to be drawn between our
own situation and that of the victims of the Holocaust, analogies that
depend upon understanding as clearly as possible how such things as
science and technology, bureaucracy and managerial "efficiency" were
employed in the destruction of the Jews and how they might well be
employed for our own destruction somewhere down the road. Moreover, as I have emphasized, we cannot accept the simple situation of the
Jews and the special "intention" of the Nazis with respect to their total
extinction. Not only does this emphasis on the particularity of the Jewish situation tend to obscure relevant analogies with the predicaments of
other groups-possibly even with our own situation as hostages to the
threat of nuclear war-but it also obscures the more universal implications for the future of all mankind that the Holocaust raises. For, as
even Bauer himself once asked, if the Holocaust has no universal lesson
for all men, why should anyone study it?47 In the end it is those who
emphasize the uniqueness of the methods, processes, and techniques of
the Holocaust that best enable us to draw the analogies and explicate the
event itself. In the end it is possible that by understanding those
methods, techniques, and processes by means of which an oppressed
population can be destroyed we can avoid such destruction in the future.
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If we can succeed in this purpose, the Holocaust will truly have been a
transformational event.
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9
THE HOLOCAUST AND
HISTORICAL EXPLANATION
Robert G.L. Waite

I

Those who reflect on the nature of the Holocaust will confront the
question of its uniqueness. Was the Holocaust the culmination of over
2,000 years of active anti-Semitism and persecution, or was it unique,
forming a radical break from the past?
Both sides of this ancient historical debate, continuity versus change,
are important. Certainly there is much continuity with the past. Indeed,
the Holocaust was made possible, in large part, because German history
had shown a continuum of virulent anti-Semitism. It is of course true
that anti-Semitism existed in every country of the Western and Slavic
worlds. But in no country in the world did so many influential leaders
over so long a time champion so vicious a hatred of the Jewish people.
Martin Luther, for example, preached hatred and persecution of the
Jews 400 years before Hitler. As early as 1543 Luther demanded that
Jewish synagogues and schools be set afire, that their silver and gold be
taken from them, their houses and prayer books seized and destroyed,
that brimstone and pitch should be thrown upon them, and that they be
driven away "like mad dogs"l-a program which Adolf Hitler would put
into practice on a national scale beginning with the infamous Reichskristallnac ht of November 9-10, 1938, a date which, by a quirk of
chronology, fell on Luther's birthday.
For centuries Catholic bishops and priests joined Lutheran pastors in
thundering against an imaginary "Jewish menace." Indeed, the antiSemitic record of both Christian confessions is one of the most appalling
chapters in the entire history of religion. Published statements made by
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saints of the Catholic Church were later used as texts for scurrilous antiSemitic broadsides. Saint Gregory of Nyssa (d. 396) described Jews as
"slayers of the Lord, murderers of the prophets, haters of God, advocates of the devil, a brood of vipers." St. Ambrose, Augustine's
teacher, said that Jewish synagogues should be burned to the ground and
boasted that he personally had set fire to one. St. John Chrysostom (d.
406) called Jews "lustful, rapacious, greedy, perfidious bandits." He
preached that "it is the duty of Christians to hate the Jews" and concluded that the Jews are "fit for slaughter."2 Saint Thomas Aquinas, the
most influential theologian in the history of the Catholic Church, argued
that it was morally justifiable for Jews to serve Christians as slaves because, as the slayers of God, they were bound to "perpetual servitude. "3
The Church practiced what its Fathers preached. Official Church
councils set forth decrees which clearly foreshadowed Hitler's infamous
Racial Laws. The Synod of Elvira of 306, for example, forbad intermarriage and sexual relations between Christians and Jews. The Synod
of Claremont (535) decreed that Jews could not hold public office. The
Third Synod of Orleans of 538 made it illegal for Jews to walk in public
streets during Passion Week. The Fourth Lateran Council of 1215
decreed that Jews must mark their clothing with a special badge. The
Council of Oxford (1222) forbad the construction of new synagogues.
The Council of Basel of 1434 prohibited Jews from obtaining academic
degrees. 4
One day in April 1933 when Catholic bishops protested to Hitler that
his government was mistreating Jews, Hitler replied that he was "only
putting into effect what Christianity had preached and practiced for 2000
years. "5 He had a point.
The historian Uriel Tal is therefore probably justified in concluding
that the Christian church bears heavy responsibility for the virulent antiSemitism of the Third Reich. 6 German Christians agree. In January
1980, the Synod of the German Evangelical Church of the Rhineland,
the most populous of the twenty-seven regional units of the EKD,
passed overwhelmingly the official declaration, Zur Erneurung des
Verhaltnisses von Christen und Juden (For the Renewal of Relations
between Christians and Jews). The first sentence of this historic declaration reads: "Stricken, we confess the co-responsibility and guilt of German Christendom for the Holocaust. "7
Religious anti-Semitism, it bears repeating, had shown great continuity in Germany. But it was only in the Second Reich-Imperial Germany after 1871-that religious persecution gave way to a racial antiSemitism which explicitly anticipated the Third Reich.
When Adolf Hitler was still a babe in his doting mother's arms,
Germany's most influential thinkers were inciting racial anti-Semitism
with slogans which Hitler would later take over as his own. In the
1890s, for example, the prodigious scholar Paul de Lagarde (whom
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Thomas Mann hailed as "one of the giants of our people")8 coined
portentous metaphors: "Jews are decayed parasites ... usurious vermin" and warned that "with bacilli one does not negotiate: one exterminates them as quickly as possible."9 The long list of racial anti-Semites
includes Germany's most popular historian, Heinrich von Treitschke, a
best-selling novelist, Gustav Freytag, and probably the most influential
Jew-baiter of them all, Richard Wagner.IO
Hitler exploited this legacy of hatred. But while showing continuity
with the past, Nazi anti-Semitism was different from its predecessors.
Here was not merely prejudice, persecution, and invective. Here, for the
first time, was a calculated program of mass murder set forth by the legal
government of Germany-a government unique in all history.
This was no mere "authoritarian state" of which we have so many and
varied examples in world history. This was a government conceived in
oppression and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created unequal. This was social and moral cannibalism. This was the very "negation of God erected into a system of government."
This government promised that Jews would be traduced, persecuted,
vilified, destroyed. Such was the promise and such was the practice.
The horror of Hitler was this: he was no hypocrite; he meant what he
said; he practiced what he preached; he kept his promises. Indeed, as
Elie Wiesel has noted with bitter irony, "Hitler is the only one who kept
his promises to the Jewish people."11
Hitler's policy of genocide was not designed to remove subversives
who were a threat to the German state. Quite to the contrary, German
Jews through the centuries had proven their devotion to the Fatherland
by supporting its government and fighting gallantly in its wars. Their
loyalty was shown even after Hitler came to power in 1933. One
example: the Reichsbundjadischer Frontsoldaten (National Association
of Jewish War Veterans) hailed the advent of Hitler in 1933 and publicly
promised support of his government.12 (They soon changed their
minds.)
Nor were the Nazi executions designed to punish criminals and malefactors. The Jews were killed not because they had done anything but
merely because they existed-because they had been born. Jews were
criminals by definition. In occupied Russia, for example, the Nazi conquerors decreed death for the following crimes: ( 1) sabotage, theft, espionage, and (2) also for "Judenverdacht"-those suspected of being

Jewish. 13

The Nazi Holocaust was also different in the extent of the cooperation
it received from the German social infrastructure. The Holocaust enjoyed the support or the benevolent neutrality of Christian churches, the
civil service, the judiciary, educators, and thousands of the railroad officials who handled the complex logistics of transporting millions of
people to their death. Army generals-the evidence is now incontro-
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vertible-also knew of the mass murders and gave their approval.14
Thus this genocide succeeded because its perpetrators could count on the
cooperation or acquiescence of German state officials, of religious, civic,
and military leaders, and of the German public at large. Recent studies
have shown that the German people really did know about the genocide
and reacted with "a mixture of private sympathy and public passivity." 15
A German historian of public attitudes toward Jews during the Third
Reich has concluded that there was "scarcely another country whose
population accepted the carrying away of its Jewish fellow citizens with
so little opposition. "16
There is another reason why the Holocaust could take place: the victims cooperated with their executioners; they collaborated in their own
destruction. I find this to be one of the most disturbing and least understood problems of the Holocaust. But here we must sound a clear note
of warning about the use of the words "cooperative" and "collaboration."
If they suggest a voluntary desire to be helpful, the words are badly
misused. As Lucy Dawidowicz has emphasized in her valuable studies,
there was no voluntary Jewish cooperation; there were no Jewish collaborators in the sense of the word made infamous by Quisling and
Laval. Not one Jew wanted to cooperate with the Nazis. No Jew
wanted Hitler's "New Order" in Europe.17 The Judenriite (the Jewish
Councils approved by the Nazis and elected by the Jews themselves)
cooperated with the SS by selecting Jews for transport to their deaths,
but they did so only under the most extreme duress. When the Nazis
threatened more drastic enlargement of the death quotas they were
obliged to fill, the councils had little choice but to obey. Constantly they
confronted soul-destroying decisions: choose for extinction either the
young or the old. The Judenriite -it must be repeated-had virtually no
choice. They tried desperately to do the very best they could under impossible circumstances. They were coerced into compliance. That much
needs to be said and remembered. And yet the hard conclusion reached
by eminent Jewish authorities on the Holocaust must be squarely faced
and carefully pondered: however compelling the reasons, however extreme the duress, the fact is that Jews actually did become tragic
accomplices in their own extinction. Raul Hilberg, Hannah Arendt, and
Isaiah Trunk have demonstrated beyond dispute that leaders of the
Jewish communities in Berlin, as in Amsterdam, Antwerp, and Warsaw,
cooperated with the Nazis and smoothed the way to deportation and
death. It is true that there were notable exceptions among the Jewish
Councils, but the predominant pattern is clear. Most of the Judenriite
implemented SS directives, published benign Nazi cover stories, denied
warnings given by the Jewish underground, selected those who were to
die, arranged their transportation, and collected money to pay their transportation to the death camps-thereby helping the Nazis achieve their
goal of making the Final Solution "self-financing." The Councils gen-
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erally opposed sabotage and active resistance and ordered compliance
with Nazi directives.18 Most Jews followed the orders of their leaders,
and many displayed what Hilberg has called "anticipatory compliance":
in pathetically futile efforts to pacify the Nazis, they sedulously collected
and turned in their jewels and gold and arrived well ahead of time at the
designated staging areas, having paid their railway fare in advance.
"They attempted to tame the Germans," Hilberg writes, "as one would
attempt to tame a wild beast. They avoided 'provocation' and complied
instantly with decrees and orders."19
The Nazis were surprised and pleased by the passivity and cooperation they received from their victims. It made their job much easier.
Adolf Eichmann, the SS official chiefly in charge of the mass murders,
testified during his trial in Jerusalem that the Jewish Councils were so
effective in implementing SS orders that German personnel could be
released for other service.20 Hannah Arendt concludes bitterly that without Jewish help, the murder of millions of Jews would not have been
possible: "To a Jew, this role of the Jewish leaders in the destruction of
their own people is ... the darkest chapter of the whole dark
story."21
An even darker role was played by the Jewish Police of the ghettos,
an agency which the Nazis created with Satanic cunning to implement
their orders and to shatter and demoralize the Jewish community by
setting it against itself. After the war, Jewish "Courts of Honor"
established that the Jewish Police actively participated in the destruction
of their fellow Jews. They ferreted them out of their hiding places,
arrested them in the middle of the night, beat them up in the streets, and
filled their own pockets with bribes from their victims. A Jew who was
to pay with his life for their vicious treachery angrily recorded in his
diary: "Every Warsaw Jew, every woman and child, can cite thousands
of cases of the inhuman cruelty and violence of the Jewish Police.
Those cases will never be forgotten by the survivors, and they must and
shall be paid for. "22
Later we must consider some of the explanations which Jewish
writers have given for the extent of Jewish cooperation with their
executioners. But first something else must be said. For it is true, as
Reuben Ainsztein has shown in his massive book on Jewish resistance
to the Nazis, that many, many heroic Jews fought back at hopeless odds.
Their gallant resistance was most tragically demonstrated in the uprisings
against their oppressors in the Warsaw ghetto during the spring of 1943
-was it not the only urban uprising against the Nazis in Europe?-and
in the death camp of Sobibor in October 1943.23
And yet it must be recorded that the overwhelming majority of the
Jews of Europe, by the hundreds and hundreds of thousands, did indeed
go, as furious Jewish activists charged at the time, "like sheep to the
slaughter." Shortly before he and his family were killed, one of the
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heroes of the Warsaw ghetto noted "the passivity of the Jewish masses"
and asked some anguished questions: "Why are they all so quiet? Why
does the father die, and the mother, and each of the children without a
single protest? ... Why did everything come so easy to the enemy?
... This will be an eternal mystery-this passivity of the Jewish
populace even toward their own police. "24
These questions of Emmanuel Ringelblum and the mystery he could
not solve will continue to haunt historians of the Holocaust.
The Holocaust differed from other genocides in other ways as well.
For the first time in history, a cultivated and articulate people, confronted
by unimaginable suffering and death, left records of immense value to
survivors who seek to understand what happened. Philip Friedman has
called the details of these harrowing experiences "test tubes ... in a
vast psycho-sociological laboratory such as had never been set up
before. "25 These records do indeed provide insight into the ways in
which the human psyche reacts to stress. They also cast new light into
the human soul, probing not only the depth of wickedness and evil, but
also--in the memoirs of Anna Frank, Emmanuel Ringelblum, Viktor
Frankl, Chaim Kaplan,26 and thousands of others-the light that human
courage, faith, and goodness can shed in the darkest pits of hell.
In short, these precious records display the human capacity both for
evil and for good. There is a political as well as a moral and a psychological lesson here, for the duality of human wickedness and human
goodness proclaims the dangers of dictatorship and the saving promise
of democracy. The political lesson of this human duality was best stated
in Reinhold Niebuhr's memorable aphorism:
Man's capacity for good makes democracy possible;
Man's inclination to evil makes democracy essential.
The Nazi genocide was also unique in its senselessness. Yehuda
Bauer has well asked, where else in history has a government of a
civilized nation set out to kill everyone whose grandfather was of a
particular religion or ethnic group? "For the first time in history a
sentence of death had been pronounced on anyone guilty of having been
born. "27 And where have mass murders been so injurious to the
perpetrator's own self-interest? In 1943, 1944, 1945, beleaguered Germany desperately needed railway transport and skilled labor supply. Yet
Hitler allocated billions of work hours and massive amounts of transportation to one purpose: the killing of a nonexistent "menace." For the
Jews were not then and had never been a threat to the German Reich.
The whole thing was quite literally senseless.
But was this genocide really unique? Was there no historical precedent or parallel? Historians will recall other mass murders, other
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slaughters of the innocent. One thinks of Herod and Genghis Khan, or
of Stalin's murder of some 15 million kulaks, minority groups, and
Russian prisoners of war.28 We recall the massacres perpetrated by Idi
Amin Dada of Uganda29 and the calculated starvation in Cambodia,
where over 50 percent of the entire population was killed between 1975
and 1980.30
Two parallels to the Holocaust of the Jews seem particularly close. In
1915 Turkish authorities ordered the annihilation of the entire Armenian
people. The proportion of Armenians killed was about the same as that
destroyed in Hitler's Holocaust of the Jews: two out of every three
people died.31 The Nazi genocide of the Gypsies also shows close
parallels to the murder of the Jews. Gypsies too were killed for no other
reason than the alleged threat of "racial pollution" of German blood. As
with the Jews (and unlike the Poles) all Gypsies were to be executed.
They too (unlike other Nazi victims) were gassed at Auschwitz.32
So what can be concluded on this issue of continuity versus change?
Many eminent Jewish authorities insist that this Holocaust was uniqueit alone deserves a capital letter. Alvin Rosenfeld has called it an event
without analogy, "something new in the world, without likeness or
kind. "33 Yehuda Bauer has said that any comparison with other genocides is misleading and inaccurate.34
An American sociologist, John Murray Cuddihy, has noticed something revealing about the very intensity of Jewish insistence that it is only
their genocide which is worthy of the name "Holocaust." He finds that
this affirmation of uniqueness and denial of universality is a modem reworking of the ancient "Chosen People" concept: "Chosenness is
found ... even in such horrible context as the Holocaust in the attempt to define victimization in such a way as to exclude all other groups
besides Jews. "35
Elie Wiesel illustrates Cuddihy's point. When historians refer to
other holocausts, such as the massacre of the Armenians or the Gypsies,
Wiesel is disturbed because such parallels question the special status of
the Jewish victims. He is sorely afraid, he says, that "they are stealing
the Holocaust from us ... [which] we need to regain our sense of
sacredness. "36
There are obviously differences of opinion on this question, but I
would say that despite close parallels, the uniqueness of the Jewish
Holocaust is striking. It was unique in Hitler's avowed purpose of
killing all members of a religious, cultural, ethnic community-a calculated effort to annihilate one of the most creative people on earth. 37 This
genocide was unique in the endorsement of leading social institutions
and agencies; unique in the senselessness of the whole program; unique
in the help the victims gave to their murderers; unique in the consequence
it has had on both Jewish and Christian thought.
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II
Let us turn to a second group of questions that highlight the problem.
How adequate are the explanations and theories that attempt to account
for the Holocaust? What approaches seem most fruitful? What new
approaches are needed?
First, how adequate are the explanations? The answer to this is
simple: there is no adequate explanation of the Holocaust. This event
will continue to stagger the mind and trouble the soul of anyone who
investigates it
Yet several approaches are particularly helpful in leading us to a
deeper understanding-though we shall never know the full and final
truth about it, just as we shall never know the final truth about any
historical problem that is worth its intellectual salt.
In our search for understanding, insights can be gained from sociological and psychological studies. Helen Fein,38 for example, following
closely the monumental work of Raul Hilberg, has examined the social
setting for the Holocaust and found answers to such questions as: What
made the social environment congenial to genocide? She provides careful comparative statistics from different countries to show that the extent
of cooperation with the SS depended upon a number of factors, but the
most important of these was the amount of anti-Semitism that existed
historically in each country (thus the importance of the first question
about continuity). Fein shows, for example, that there is a direct relationship, a positive correlation, between the amount of anti-Semitism
-and the support it received from church, army, and the civil serviceand the number of Jews killed. Where anti-Semitism was extensive, as
in Germany, Rumania, Hungary, and Poland, genocide was extensive.
Where anti-Semitism was not strong historically, and where popular
sentiment and civic and religious leadership did not support it, as in
Denmark and Bulgaria, killing was minimal. Bulgarians and Danes refused to carry out SS orders and helped thousands of Jews to escape
death.
Thus the congeniality of the social environment helped determine the
extent of the Holocaust. So too did the degree of effective political
power. Where political power is overwhelming-as in Stalin's Russia,
Amin's Uganda, or Hitler's Germany-where opposition is silenced and
bureaucracy is obedient, mass murder can become routine.
Fein's comparative approach, which encompasses sociological and
quantitative analysis, is a valuable aid to a fuller understanding. So too
are the contributions made by psychologists and psychoanalysts. 39 We
particularly need their help because the very irrationality of the Holocaust
makes traditional political and historical explanations distressingly
inadequate.

The Holocaust and Historical Explanation

171

Psychologists can tell us a great deal about the personalities of the
perpetrators. What kinds of people, yes, what kinds of human beings,
were the Nazis? For it is important, though admittedly distasteful, to
remember that the Nazis were human. To dismiss them as "monsters" or
"freaks" or "demons" is too easy and far too dangerous. We shall learn
little about this historic event until we recognize that the Holocaust was a
deeply human phenomenon.
In all people there is a propensity for murderous aggression. Even
the unspeakable events of the Holocaust are not "bestial" in the literal
sense of the word. To call the Nazis beasts is to defame beasts. Animals in the jungle do not kill except for food or self-defense. Such
events as the Holocaust, Heinz Kohut has written, are "decidedly
human, an intricate part of the human condition. "40 That is a disturbing
and unpalatable thought, but it is a basic fact of psychological life.
Hannah Arendt reached the same conclusion. In her brilliant study of
Eichmann in Jerusalem she observed that Eichmann was no monster-if
he had been, the entire case against him would have collapsed immediately. "The trouble with Eichmann was precisely that so many were
like him and that the many were neither perverted nor sadistic, that they
were and still are terribly and terrifyingly normal. ... This normality
was much more terrifying than all the atrocities put together."41 Elie
Wiesel found the same things to be true about Franz Stangl, commandant
of the Sobibor and Treblinka death camps: "It is not the murderer in
Stangl that terrifies us-it is the human being."42 We need to know
more about the mechanisms which permit normal people to commit such
awful crimes, and psychologists can help provide some answers.
Psychologists have also helped by demonstrating what the "antiSemitic personality" is like.43 Germany has no monopoly on such
twisted human beings. Hitler, Heinrich Himmler, Eichmann, and the
rest were very much like American anti-Semites: they too reveal infantile
personalities incapable of development; they too swing radically between
swaggering confidence and abject despair. Like American anti-Semites,
the Nazis exalted the strong and despised the weak. They too projected
their personal problems onto others, namely, the Jews. They too tended
to be sado-masochists with inclinations to perversion.
Psychologists can help us understand the anti-Semitic person. So too
can philosophers. Jean-Paul Sartre, quite without realizing it, has painted a discerning picture of Adolf Hitler and his vicious but frighteningly
human colleagues:
We are now in a position to understand the anti-Semite. He is a man who is
afraid. Not of the Jews, to be sure, but of himself.... He is a coward
who does not want to admit his cowardice to himself; a murderer who
represses and censures his tendency to murder without being able to hold it
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back.... The existence of the Jew merely permits the anti-Semite to stifle
his anxieties .... The anti-Semite is a man who wishes to be pitiless stone,
a furious torrent, a devastating thunderbolt-anything except a man.44
Biographers, aided by psychology, can reach a deeper understanding
of the individual perpetrators of the Holocaust. One recalls Peter
Loewenberg's penetrating study of Himmler,45 Richard Hunt's pioneering work on Joseph Goebbels, 46 Gidda Sereny's sensitive insights into
Franz Stangl,47 as well as Hannah Arendt's study of Eichmann.
Certainly we need to know a great deal more about the personality of
the one person who was finally responsible for the Holocaust: Adolf
Hitler.48 We need to understand the psychodynamics of the process by
which his personal hatred of the Jews was rationalized and projected into
public policy. We need to see how the personal prejudice of one
demented person was transmuted into a horrendous historic force.
Psychologists have also widened our horizons and deepened our
knowledge of how it is possible for average people to follow orders
which debase and destroy their fellow human beings. Here, two studies
by two American social psychologists offer insights-only partial
insights, it is true, but nevertheless revealing glimpses of an answer-to
that simple but terribly complex question: How could decent people
commit such evil crimes? How could they possibly do it? Stanley
Milgram at Yale and his colleagues in several other American universities
have reached deeply disturbing conclusions about the propensity of ordinary people-in this case hundreds of American citizens-to follow brutal orders commanding them to turn on electric currents which appeared
to inflict suffering on fellow citizens. Professor Milgram concludes:
Subjects will obey the experimenter no matter how vehement the pleading of
the person being shocked, no matter how painful the shocks seem to be and
no matter how much the victim pleads to be let out. This was seen time and
again in studies and has been observed in several universities where the experiment was repeated. It is the extreme willingness of adults to go to almost
any lengths on the command of an authority that constitutes the chief finding
of the study and the fact most urgently demanding explanation.
This is perhaps the most fundamental lesson of our study: ordinary people
simply doing their jobs and without any particular hostility on their part can
become agents in a terrible destructive process.49
If this is true of average American citizens, how much more it is true
of German Nazis whose attitude and inclinations were powerfully reinforced by an environment which not only permitted the destruction of
their fellow men, but demanded it.
Philip Zimbardo of Stanford University has demonstrated that college
students carefully selected for their normality can become perverted by
the pathology of power. These students illustrate Stendhal's assertion
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that "power is the greatest of all pleasures." In his experiment, Zimbardo simulated a prison situation and had students act out the roles of
prison guard and prisoner. The experiment showed how much American students delighted in that greatest of all pleasures and used it to humiliate and hurt their fellow students. It also showed that the victims of
this power-also normal college students-became depressed and disoriented, and meekly followed the commands of their persecutors.
Zimbardo's experiment, which was planned to last two weeks, was
aborted after six days because in those few days Professor Zimbardo
was alarmed by a frightening metamorphosis he witnessed in the students. Those who were serving as guards grew increasingly abusive
and sadistically cruel to the "prisoners"; the students who were prisoners
became so depressed that they were on the verge of psychological
disintegration and suicide. Zimbardo concluded that
in the contest between forces of good men and evil situation, the situation
triumphed. Individuals carefully selected for their nonnality, sanity, and
homogeneous personality traits were, in a matter of days, acting in ways that
out of this context would be judged abnonnal, insane, neurotic, psychopathic
and sadistic.SO
If that can happen to average American college students in six days, it is
small wonder that Germans who had been carefully conditioned to Nazi
ideology could become brutal instruments of Hitler's "wicked will," or
that humiliated, frightened, starving, and disoriented Jews who felt the
utter futility of resistance should yield to brute force and passively obey
commands.
Psychoanalysts such as Bruno Bettelheim have further increased our
understanding of the difficult question-and to Jews a very sensitive
question-of why the Jewish people cooperated in their own destruction. Bettelheim believes that the aggressive-destructive drive so obvious in the SS was also present in their Jewish victims. Feeling helpless and abandoned, they were unable to direct aggressive impulses
outward against their hated oppressors. They therefore made both an
excuse and a virtue out of futility and used it as a psychological defense
against self-accusations of cowardice. Thus they continually exaggerated their own utter helplessness and the total omnipotence of the enemy,
and then turned aggressive-destructive drives inward against themselves,
thereby cooperating in their own destruction. Bettelheim concludes that
Jews were already suicidal before they walked toward the death
chambers. 51
Such analysis, not surprisingly, has brought a storm of protest and
denial from Jewish writers. But it is ironic that these writers who
denounce the conclusions reached by Bettelheim, Arendt, and Hilberg,
and who vehemently deny that the Jews died with meek resignation,
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nevertheless in their own books offer explanations of why the Jewish
people were compelled to do just that. They give a number of reasons,
all of which have considerable merit.
First, they argue that Jewish tradition did not encourage active resistance to persecution. They point out that for centuries Jews had been
conditioned to obey, to suffer, and to survive. As Lucy Dawidowicz has
written, "[their] religious tradition elevated powerlessness into a positive
Jewish value. It fostered submissiveness."52 Jews believed that their
vaunted capacity to submit and yet to endure would carry them through
even this persecution, as it had so often in their past. They made a
catastrophic mistake. As Richard Rubenstein has noted, "The Jewish
reaction to the Nazis was one of the most disastrous misreadings of the
character of an opponent by any community in all of human history." 53
Jews did not understand that Hitler did not plan merely to humiliate
them; he planned to kill them. This sensible, legally minded, and cultivated people simply could not believe that the German government really
meant to murder them all. That just did not make sense. In this the Jews
were quite correct. It did not make sense. But it happened.
Second, Jewish writers argue that to this tradition of "suffer and
survive" was added the psychological defense of denying. Jews denied
that they were to be transported to death camps. Such horror stories
could not be true. Gladly they accepted the Nazi fiction that they were
merely being "resettled" in the East. Their psychological need to believe
that fantasy led them to cooperate and obey SS orders because to do so
was a way of denying what they dreaded might be true. Notice how
psychological denial is reflected in their euphemisms. Jews did not talk
of killing centers, of gas ovens or death camps; they referred to them as
"bakeries"; a person who had given up all hope was a "Moslem"; a depot
holding the belongings of recently gassed victims was called
"Canada."54
Third, as Helen Fein has noted, there was a general beliefparticularly among Western Jews-that the Nazis were "punishing" only
Eastern Jews, not the rest. Many German Jews, for example, said that
Polish Jews must have done something terribly wrong to merit their
fate.5 5
Fourth, Yisrael Gutman believes that thousands of devout Jews went
quietly to their death with prayer shawls gathered about them in the faith
that they were participating in a Kiddush Hashem-a sanctification rite in
which they bore witness to their devotion to God. They agreed with a
revered rabbi who said, "The quintessence of martyrdom is dying for
one's Jewishness. "56 And psychologically it was easier to believe that
they were dying as martyrs to their faith in God than it was to entertain
the awful thought that their God had forsaken them.
Fifth, to many Jews, death in Hitler's gas chambers was atonement
for individual or collective sin. Devout Jews found it more bearable to
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believe that it must be they themselves-and not the God of Abraham
and Sarah, Isaac and Jacob--who had broken the sacred covenant which
Jehovah had made with his Chosen People.
Sixth, historically, Jews tended to trust their spiritual leaders. As we
have noted, official Judenrate urged Jews to obey orders for shipment to
the East and not to resist. As Dawidowicz has written, they fearedwith ample justification-that any act of resistance would only increase
the wrath of the SS.57
Finally, and this is the point that needs most emphasis, we must
recognize that European Jews, like the kulaks of Russia or Idi Amin's
victims in Uganda, yielded to a force majeure. The Jews, isolated,
intimidated, and confronted by the institutionalized terror of a modem
police state, had no other effective choice. They were overwhelmed by
sheer power.
It seems to me that all these explanations-including Bettelheim'sdeserve an examination that is as careful, as courageous, and as dispassionate as this emotion-laden issue will allow.
The Holocaust clearly required perpetrators; and we need to understand the psychodynamics which drove them. Here, by and large, were
frighteningly normal people who were given great power and trained to
exploit universal human frailties for horrendous purposes. The Holocaust also required victims, and they too can teach us much about the
human condition-how even under the most brutal tyranny, people can
retain their humanity and refuse to be broken. But the Holocaust also
shows how the cowed and frightened and disoriented can succumb to
brutal power and cooperate in their own psychic and physical destruction. The Holocaust is indeed a terrifying but profoundly revealing
laboratory of human behavior.
Which is to say that the Holocaust was a human event-an event of
shattering and unspeakable inhumanity, but one perpetrated by humans
upon humans. It was an event unique in history and yet within the
human experience.

III
Historians, as well as psychologists and sociologists, can also contribute to our understanding of the Holocaust because of their long
experience with a third issue: the role of the commanding personality.
We see in the Holocaust yet another example of the ancient historical
interplay of man and circumstance. But it is doubtful if ever in the past
there has been so close a relationship, so fateful an interconnection, as
there was between this peculiarly compelling man and these peculiarly
receptive circumstances.
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First consider the man, Adolf Hitler, the originator and mover of the
Holocaust, the one person without whom this event could not have been
possible.58 He was both a consummately cunning political opportunist
and a pathological fanatic. And both aspects determined his program for
the Jews. As an astute political operator he recognized the appeal of antiSemitism to Germans of the 1920s and 1930s. This "Terrible Simplifier" offered a simple explanation for all difficulties: Jews were responsible for the defeat and humiliation of 1918, for the economic disasters
of 1923 and 1930-1933, for all the political and moral problems of the
time. It was not "our" fault: the Jew was to blame. There have been
other racists, other political anti-Semites before Hitler. Three things
made Hitler special: the depth and intensity of his hatred for the Jews;
the extent of his effective political power; the opportunity given to him
by a compliant and cooperative society.
Hatred of the Jews and the desire to murder them was a lifelong
obsession of Hitler, the organizing principle of his life. One can feel the
venom of his hatred in an early conversation, now recorded in the
archives of the Institut fiir Zeitgeschichte, Munich.
As soon as I have power [he said in 1922] I shall have gallows erected, for
example in Munich in the Marienplatz. Jews will be hanged one after another
and they will stay hanging until they stink ... then the next group will
follow ... until the last Jew in Munich is extenninated. Exactly the same
procedure will be followed in other cities until Gennany is cleansed of the last
Jew.59
This personal obsession became his political program. His promise was
kept. Both his last and his first political statements confirmed his obsession with a nonexistent "Jewish Menace." His last political statement,
delivered on April 30, 1945, was dictated just before taking a lethal dose
of cyanide: "Above all I enjoin the leaders of the Reich to scrupulous
observance of the Racial Laws defending against the universal poisoner
of mankind, international Jewry." In his first public speech, of which
we have one faded shorthand report dated August 7 or 8, 1920,
Salzburg, Hitler had sounded the same ominous note:
Don't be misled into thinking that you can fight diseases without killing the
carrier! ... Don't think you can fight racial tuberculosis without ridding
the nation of the carrier of racial tuberculosis! This Jewish contamination will
not subside, this poisoning of the nation will not end until the carrier himself,
the Jew, has been banished from our midst.60
That promise was also kept.
The extent of Hitler's anti-Jewish phobia is manifest. The psychological reasons for it are complex and cannot concern us here. 6 1 Let us
simply reiterate that the Holocaust was not possible without Hitler. It
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was also not possible without a supportive society. For, once again in
history, man and circumstances worked together to produce the event.
German society exhibited attitudes and values recognizable in any
country. What made German circumstances peculiar was the intensification and distortion of those attitudes and values through the force of
unusual historic pressures and the manipulative skills of the man, Adolf
Hitler. We should consider some of these attitudes and notice the way
Hitler used them to his advantage. His program required anti-Semitic
racism, and German history, as noted, obliged him with a particularly
virulent variety. He manipulated it with diabolical cunning. Anti-Semitism not only provided a simple explanation for all Germany's recent
disasters, it allowed Hitler to fulfill his contradictory claims that he was,
at the same time, a conservative and a revolutionary; that he would
preserve traditional society and transform it through a New Order; that he
was the champion of both capitalism and socialism. "The Jew" enabled
him to have it both ways and to win both capitalist and proletariat to his
banner. He convinced capitalists that he was the enemy only of "Jewish
finance capitalism"; he persuaded socialists that his program of National
Socialism fought only "Jewish Marxist Socialism." He also applied antiSemitism in another way. His success as mass leader was due in part to
his psychological insight that man is both evil and good, beset by two
conflicting tendencies: an impulse for aggression, destruction, hatred;
and a capacity for creation, cooperation, sacrifice, and service. Hitler
appealed to both impulses. His regime institutionalized brutality and
aggression, channeling them against the Jews. But we do not understand his appeal, particularly to the youth of Germany, unless we understand that he also inspired them with faith and hope-a shining hope for
the future, faith in him as their Messiah. Through the magic of his
charisma and the cunning of his propaganda he convinced millions that
barbarism was heroic, brutality was strength, and nihilism was an
exalted ideology. And the lofty goals of Germany strong and triumphant
could be achieved only when the country was cleansed and purified by
removing the Jews who defiled the Fatherland.
Hitler manipulated German anti-Semitism to his own advantage. He
also gained mightily from another national tradition: obedience to the
state. Surely the German people have no monopoly on obedience and
capacity to obey inhuman orders, as Milgram's chilling experiments have
shown. Yet in Germany, since Luther and the Prussian kings and the
Imperial Army, obedience to Obrigkeit (authority) was raised to the
highest virtue of citizenship. At Nuremberg, as at a score of Nazi trials
since, the phrase Befehl ist Befehl! (an order is an order) was recited as a
litany.
Hitler's Holocaust was helped along by yet another circumstance:
general indifference to the suffering, humiliation, and murder of the
Jews. Here again a common human phenomenon was intensified in
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Germany. People in most societies are indifferent to the existence of
social evil in their midst. Edmund Burke's justifiably famous warning
about evil prospering because of the indifferent silence of good men and
women is, unfortunately, true of most good people. Certainly the
silence of many good and influential people-people like Pope Pius XII,
Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, Felix Frankfurter, and Rabbi
Stephen Wise62-helped Hitler carry out the Holocaust. Silence was
international. But the indifference of the elite of German society was
particularly pronounced and peculiarly helpful to Hitler, as Rainer Baum
and Dieter Hartmann have graphically shown. 63
Hitler was also aided by the psychological phenomenon of defensive
denial. People have a remarkable capacity to deny what they prefer not
to believe. Turks deny that an Armenian massacre took place in 1915;
Englishmen denied the existence of concentration camps in the Transvaal; Americans denied the Christmas bombing of Hanoi; Israelis denied
all responsibility for massacres of Palestinians. But denial was pandemic during the Holocaust. And Jews joined the chorus of those who
insisted that the genocide was not actually taking place. Since they could
not believe they were being transported East to their deaths, they denied
it, and their denial expedited their extinction. To a large degree, as was
noted, Jews accepted their own victimization. But attitudes of resignation and cooperation with one's oppressor are emphatically not an
exclusively Jewish trait. As Barrington Moore has demonstrated, human
beings in vastly different social, religious, and political settings all
display a remarkable tendency to accept maltreatment and make a virtue
out of humiliation. Such is true of Christian ascetics and saints, the
Untouchables of India, Chinese coolies, and German steel workers in
the Ruhr in the 1890s. Acceptance is a social norm, Moore has observed; resistance is an acquired taste.64 But here again, during the
Third Reich there were specific psychological, social, and political
reasons why the Jews put up so little resistance and helped Hitler to
direct a human condition to inhuman purposes.
We seek to understand the Holocaust, to explain it, and to establish
the truth about what happened. We shall never explain it adequately,
never find the final truth. But there is no cause for despair. We can find
comfort in the words of a wise old rabbi:
Who says the Truth was meant to be revealed?
It has to be sought, that's all.
I have suggested that we begin our search by considering the interplay
of a peculiar man with peculiarly fortuitous circumstances; that we seek
enlightenment from such disciplines as sociology, psychology, and
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history; and that we recognize this event both as a part of a historical
continuum and as a phenomenon with distinctive features of its own.
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DISCRIMINATION,
PERSECUTION, THEFT, AND
MURDER UNDER COLOR OF LAW:
THE TOTALITARIAN
CORRUPTION OF THE GERMAN
LEGAL SYSTEM, 1933-1945
Gunter W. Remmling

The German dictatorship did not materialize quite as suddenly as
Pallas Athena, who sprang fully armed from the forehead of Zeus. The
Third Reich, something the German resistance fighter Ernst Niekisch
called the "realm of the lower demons, "1 had numerous links with the
past.

SOCIAL ORIGINS OF THE GERMAN DICTATORSHIP
The anti-Semitic rabble-rousers of imperial Vienna kindled Adolf
Hitler's murderous hatred of the Jews. "Then I came to Vienna," he
wrote in his political autobiography Mein Kampf, as he set out to explain
the origin of his anti-Semitism.2 The chief designer of the National
Socialist death machine was never in the mood for hiding his megalomania: "So I believe today that I am acting in the spirit of the Almighty
Creator," Hitler raved. "By struggling against the Jew I am fighting for
the Lord's work. "3 When the Austrian moved across the northern border he joined the strident chorus of German anti-Semites.
World War I and its aftermath influenced the political drift toward
authoritarian regimes in Germany. When Hitler entered the political
scene in Weimar Germany, he promised to restore the power of the
military and garnered support among the warlords.4 When the excorporal promised to "tear up" the Treaty of Versailles, he won over
many nationalistic and conservative voters.5 When Hitler echoed the
"Dolchstoss" legend he appealed to chauvinists and militarists who

186

Gunter W. Remmling

peddled the fantasy that radical Social Democrats, pacifists, and Jews in
Berlin had plunged a dagger into the back of the victorious army. 6
The National Socialist German Workers Party (NSDAP) received
financial support from German industrialists and bankers who were convinced that Hitler could destroy the trade unions and the Communists. 7
In the crucial election of July 31, 1932, the inhabitants of upper-class
and upper-middle-class residential districts of large cities cast a disproportionately high Nazi vote.8 Available statistics show that the social
"elite" was overrepresented in the party leadership and membership.9
The Nazi party, however, was not the movement of a single class.
All strata of German society contributed to the growth of the Nazi vote
and the buildup of the NSDAP. The National Socialist program offered
something to some Germans in every segment of society-with the
exception of the German Jews.10

FREE CORPS ACTIVITIES AND VEHMIC TRIALS
Apart from the wider connections between the Nazi phenomenon and
the German past,11 there are two developments which directly influenced
the course of events leading to the totalitarian corruption of the legal
system.
The first development began in World War I, when German Army
commanders built up Storm Troops (Sturmbataillone). These highly
trained "princes of the trenches" had a special mission. They were to
tear apart the unity of the enemy's defenses and open the way for the
regular infantry attack.12 According to G. S. Graber, the storm battalions of World War I were the forerunners of the SS or Schutzstaffel
(Protective Squad). They anticipated the Nazi SS as regards recruitment
and the relationship between the men and their leader. The storm battalions also left their imprint on the SS in other ways: in the creation of an
elitist self-image and in the practice of a "blind savagery which was taken
over from the heightened conditions of war into peacetime bourgeois
life."13
Unwilling to lay down their weapons after the war, many members of
storm battalions enthusiastically supported the formation of the Free
Corps (Freikorps). These paramilitary volunteer units brutally went to
war against the German Communists and against the Poles, Latvians,
and Russians on the country's eastern borders. Freikorps soldiers used
the German salute (Heil!), the brown shirt, and the swastika.14 When
the government disbanded the volunteer units in 1921, thousands of
Freikorps fighters joined the SA and the SS.15
The second development which is especially important for the corruption of the law began after World War I with a series of illegal Vehmic trials-imitations of secret medieval blood trials or Vehmegerichte.1 6
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In 1920, ex-Freikorps leader Hermann Ehrhardt founded a secret society
in Munich: Organisation Consul. This organization of right-wing conspirators held Vehmic trials of postwar political leaders and others who
were condemned to death as traitors.
On August 26, 1921, two members of Organisation Consul killed
Matthias Erzberger, Catholic Center politician and chief signer of the
armistice. Another famous victim of the Vehmic trials was the Jewish
industrialist and German foreign minister Walther Rathenau; members of
Organisation Consul murdered him on June 24, 1922.17 In 1922 and
1923, Major Buchrucker's nationalistic Schwarze Reichswehr or Black
Army conducted Vehmic trials of so-called traitors which resulted in
numerous brutal murders.18
Ehrhardt's and Buchrucker's roles were not limited to the sphere of
Vehmic murder (Fememord). Both men were involved in attempts to
overthrow governments which the German people had elected.19
The German judicial system treated the right-wing extremists who had
participated in Vehmic murders and political insurrections with great
leniency. The legal liquidations of political insurrections such as the
Kapp, Kiistrin, and Hitler putsch created a pattern that became typical for
the treatment of right-wing offenders: law breakers were allowed to flee
the country or go into hiding; highly placed offenders were never
brought before a court; cases against defendants were dropped; convicted
criminals received light sentences; prisoners only served a fraction of
their time.20 After the Beer Hall putsch, Hitler was sentenced to serve
five years at Festung Landsberg; he was paroled after a few months. In
the preface to Mein Kampf, he described his comfortable stay at Landsberg prison as a chance to relax and start work on his autobiography.21
While the courts treated right-wing extremists very leniently, they
handed out severe--often unjustified-sentences to left-wing Germans. 22 The operation of this double standard revealed the fatal flaw of
the entire judicial system: tacit approval of Fascist and anti-Semitic
terrorism. Over the years most jurists proved to be disloyal to the
Weimar Republic. 23 The same lack of loyalty characterized the behavior
of many civil servants, administrators, and military officers who had
sworn to uphold the republic.24

BATTLE LAW AND SECRET POLICE TERROR
The National Socialists knew that they could count on the cooperation
of most established jurists and civil servants when they set out to create
law in their own image. The totalitarian corruption of the German legal
system began as soon as the NSDAP came to power on Januar; 30,
1933. The Vehmic courts provided a murky background as Nazi jurists
began to demolish the existing legal system. The National Socialists
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called their new law Kampfrecht, or battle law.
"Heil, Comrade jurists!" wrote Hans Frank, the Fuhrer of the
German Law Front (Deutsche Rechtsfront), ushering in the year of the
bloody Rohm Purge, "you are gathering around the flag of Adolf
Hitler ... you have committed your entire being ... to the battle
against the enemies of our State and Community. "25
In 1935, Frank told a meeting (Gautagung) of the National Socialist
Jurists League: "There is only one source of law ... the sovereign
National Socialist people, and there is only one center of will for Reich
and people and the Movement, and that is the Fuhrer. "26
In this roundabout way German jurists were ordered to accept blindly
the will of Hitler as the only legitimizing principle. Now one man's
pathological hatred and thirst for revenge came to determine what was
considered justice in Germany. The National Socialists transformed the
German legal profession into an army of soldiers taking its orders from
Hitler, the supreme commander. On January 30, 1934, Roland Preisler
wrote: "So we also have our task. We, the soldiers of law.... We
must create a law, a German, a National Socialist law ... Therefore
criminal law must be combat law.... like the weapon's tip which in
battle is pointed at the enemy ... it must view the lawbreaking will of
the ... antisocial and antinational ... individual as the object of
... destruction. "27
Nazi battle law changed all parts of Germany's legal system; the
transformation was most lethal in the area of criminal law. The National
Socialists invented a plethora of nebulous new crimes such as "insulting
the people," "affront to the folk tradition," "economic treason," and
"assaults upon the racial continuance of the German people."28 The
National Socialists also escalated the severity of punishment--death
penalties became as common as fines for littering.
With unprecedented ruthlessness and brutality, the dictator and his
henchmen used all the levers of power to transform Germany into the
monstrous thing Hitler liked to call the "total state." Battle law served
the purposes of the new rulers well-but they wanted more. Therefore
the Nazis accepted SS-Gruppenfuhrer Reinhard Heydrich's idea to institutionalize protective custody (Schutzhaft): a dreadful penal twilight
zone supervised by the SS Main Security Office (Sicherheits-Hauptamt).
Now official pseudo-law was linked with the naked terror of secret
police activity. Graber has described the sequence of events. Under the
guise of Schutzhaft any local Gestapo official could suddenly arrest
anybody he viewed as an "enemy of the state." The victims of protective
custody were never brought to trial: without ever finding out what
crimes they were charged with they languished in police prisons until
they were herded into cattle cars and transported to concentration
camps.29
Among the first victims of protective custody were the leaders and
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members of Germany's workers' mass movements and so-called pacifists. On March 9, 1933, the Nazi Minister of the Interior, Wilhelm
Frick, proclaimed gleefully that Communists and Social Democrats were
being sent to concentration camps.30 On March 20, 1933, ReichsfuhrerSS Heinrich Himmler announced the opening of Dachau concentration
camp during a news conference in Munich. 31
The destruction of the workers' movement entailed the arrest, torture,
and murder of proletarian leaders and activist workers, the theft of all
properties and funds belonging to trade unions, workers' organizations,
the German Communist Party (KPD), and the Social Democratic Party
(SPD), and the prohibition of all working-class activities. On March 31,
1933, the National Socialist government decreed that "crimes against
public safety" were punishable with death by hanging. The last blow fell
on June 22, 1933, when the Nazis used Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution to outlaw the SPD. With the "voluntary" dissolution of the
Catholic Center Party on July 5, 1933, all political parties-with the
exception of the NSDAP-ceased to exist.32
The Nazi leaders used battle law and secret police terror to destroy
their opponents, to cow the people, and to accelerate the establishment of
a totalitarian social system. Nazi totalitarianism was a reign of terror
benefiting only a few: Hitler, the National Socialist leadership, highranking military officers, large landowners, the big capitalists, and the
top civil servants.33 The rest of humanity paid an exorbitant price for the
twelve-year rule of the Nazi mass murderers. When World War II
ended, 50 million people had been killed, 30 million were crippled, and
half of Europe lay in ruins. 34
THE ASSAULT ON GERMAN JEWRY
When the destruction of the workers' movement and the demolition of
the democratic political structure were in their final phase, the Nazis intensified their official assault on the German Jews. On March 28, 1933,
the leadership of the NSDAP organized the nationwide Judenboykott,
centered around the long-standing Nazi slogans "Don't buy from the
Jews" and "The Jews are our misfortune." The boycott took place on
April 11, 1933. This anti-Jewish action unleashed members of the SA
and SS who terrorized Jewish retail merchants, physicians, professors,
lawyers, and their clients. Uniformed Nazis also prevented Jews from
entering universities, libraries, and law courts.35 During the boycott
many Jewish merchants and professionals were taken into "protective
custody" and sent to concentration camps.36
The continued oppression and persecution of the German Jews deepened the corruption of the legal system. During the period 1933-1939,
the National Socialists created a huge body of anti-Jewish law-their
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Judengesetzgebung, which they published in its entirety in 1939.37 As
Joseph Walk and his co-workers have shown in their recent collection of
anti-Jewish laws, decrees, ordinances, secret orders, etc., the legal
transformations took place during the entire Nazi period, continuing until
the last year of World War II.38 The fate of the roughly 565,000
German Jews39--eventually shared by the other victims of the Holocaust throughout Nazi-ruled and Nazi-occupied Europe-indicates that
modern large-scale genocide must be prepared for. And among the
prerequisites of genocide, the corruption of the law occupies a prominent
place.

THE FIRST PHASE OF ANTI-JEWISH LEGISLATION
The first phase of the Nazi anti-Jewish legislation began on January
30, 1933, with the National Socialist seizure of power, and ended on
September 15, 1935, with the enactment of the "Nuremberg Laws."40
The anti-Jewish measures belong to a body of laws made possible by
actions of the Reichstag which met for one day on March 23, 1933. The
Nazi-dominated legislative body suspended all constitutional provisions
protecting the political and civil equality of all German citizens. On the
same day, the Reichstag transferred its legislative powers to the cabinet,
thereby giving the Hitler government unquestioned authority to issue any
kind of dictatorial edict. The enabling law (Ermiichtigungsgesetz),
which empowered the government to enact laws deviating from the constitution, provided the legal smoke screen for this drift into totalitarianism. By a vote of 441 the Reichstag adopted the law-a creation of the
NSDAP and the Deutschnationale Volkspartei. Only the Social Democrats cast their 94 votes against the enabling law. The KPD had already
been forced to leave theReichstag on March 8, 1933.41
The drift into extraconstitutionality which began in the final phase of
the Weimar Republic had been speeded up by the Reich President's
Emergency Decree on the Protection of People and State of February 28,
1933. The provisions of Paul von Hindenburg's decree included the
revocation of the citizens' basic constitutional rights. 42 With the subsequent enabling law of March 24, 1933, the extraconstitutional power
passed into the hands of Hitler.43
During the first phase of the anti-Jewish drive, German government
authorities enacted numerous laws and issued many decrees, regulations,
ordinances, directions, and explanations. In keeping with the Party
Program of the NSDAp44 this "legal" onslaught was designed to publicly humiliate Jews, baptized Jews, non-Jews of Jewish descent, nonJewish spouses of Jews, and persons of "doubtful Aryan descent." 45
The term "Aryan" formerly designated groups oflanguages. The Nazis
arbitrarily used the term in their crackpot racial theory claiming that "non-
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Aryans" were inferior to "Aryans." Nazi agitation and legislation was
programmed to brand all "non-Aryans" as pariahs.
The National Socialists combined the public humiliation of the Jews
with their campaign of discrimination and persecution. On April 7,
1933, shortly after the boycott of Jewish business, Reich Chancellor
Hitler, Reich Minister of the Interior Wilhelm Frick, and Reich Minister
of Finances Count Schwerin von Krosigk promulgated the Law for the
Restoration of the Professional Civil Service. Paragraph three of the
law, the so-called Aryan paragraph, began with the statement, "Civil servants who are not of Aryan descent are to be retired; honorary officials
are to be dismissed from office. "46 Many Germans of Jewish descent
were deprived of their jobs by a stroke of the dictator's pen.
On April 11, 1933, the Minister of the Interior and the Minister of
Finances promulgated the First Decree to the Law for the Restoration of
the Professional Civil Service. The second paragraph of this decree extended the expulsion to civil servants with only one Jewish grandparent.
The decree also appointed an "expert on racial research" (Sachverstandiger fur Rasseforschung) in the Ministry of the Interior to whom
persons of "doubtful Aryan descent" had to apply for an opinion. Paragraph one of the decree ordered the dismissal of all civil servants with
Communist affiliations of any kind-an afterthought in view of the
earlier mass arrests of German Communists and Socialists.47
The Second Decree to the Law for the Restoration of the Professional
Civil Service of May 4, 1933, annulled all service contracts of "nonAryan" clerks and workers in civil service organizations such as health
insurance and social work. 48
On May 6, 1933, the Third Decree to the Law caused the dismissal of
"non-Aryan" judges, notaries, public school teachers, and salaried and
unsalaried university teachers.49
The National Socialists deployed the "Aryan paragraph" as a major
"legal" weapon in their offensive against the economic underpinnings of
the Jewish community: a tidal wave of discriminatory legislation followed the attack on Jewish civil servants.
When the Nazis enacted the Law on Patent Lawyers on September
28, 1933, they completed a series of laws which excluded Jews from all
forms of legal practice and all positions in the judiciary.so
The beneficiaries of this campaign quickly responded with a public
display of their servile obedience to the Nazi rulers. On October 1,
1933, the judges of the Reich donned their blood-red robes and assembled in front of the law court in Leipzig. There the judges and other
jurists swore an oath of loyalty to Nazi battle law.51
The arbitrary and inhuman expulsions of Jews from the civil service,
education, and law were coordinated with other ousters to bring about
the blighting effect upon Jewry which the Nazis had been planning from
the start.
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Other laws which the Nazis enacted to surround their illegitimate campaign of Jewish annihilation with the mantle of legality removed and excluded Jews from tax assessment and tax consultancy. The anti-Semitic
legislation destroyed the likelihood of Jewish physicians, dentists, and
dental technicians working with social health plans which covered almost
the entire population. Other laws removed and excluded Jews from
journalism, literature, the film industry, the theatre, broadcasting, music,
the plastic arts, the ownership of hereditary rural homesteads, public
orders and contracts, the stock exchange, the produce exchange, and
executive positions in trade unions.S2
On July 14, 1933, the cabinet passed the Law Regarding the Seizure
of Anti-folkish and Subversive Assets, which was aimed at Marxist organizations. However, the Nazis also used this law to steal Jewish
property; later they promulgated specific anti-Semitic laws designed to
rob Jews of their possessions.S3
The Nazis used boycotts, forced sales, and terror to oust Jews from
commerce and trade. The Law Concerning the Ordering of National
Labor of January 20, 1934, intensified the process of excluding Jews
from executive positions in the German economy.54
During the Party Day rally of September 1935 (Parteitag der Freiheit),
Hitler ordered officials of the Ministry of the Interior to Nuremberg,
where they had to draft legislation which became known as the
"Nuremberg laws." On September 15, 1935, the Nuremberg law on
citizenship (Reichsburgergesetz) officially transformed Jews into
second-class citizens. Unlike "Aryans," Jews were not allowed to attain
the new status of "citizen of the Reich" (Reichsburger) and consequently
lost all political rights.SS The blood protection law (Blutschutzgesetz) of
September 15, 1935, prohibited marriages and extramarital relations
between Jews and "citizens of German or kindred blood." Jews were
not allowed to employ "Aryan" females below the age of forty-five in
their households, and they could not display the German flags.56

THE ROAD TO GENOCIDE
The second phase of anti-Jewish legislation began on September 15,
1935, with the Nuremberg laws and ended on November 9, 1938, with
the start of the officially prompted pogrom which the Nazis dubbed the
night of crystal (Kristallnacht).
During this period the Nazis intensified the anti-Jewish drive by using
the weapon of prohibition of profession (Berufsverbot). The ousters
devastated additional occupational groups such as construction engineers, cattle dealers, auctioneers, arms dealers, realtors, nurses, etc.S7
The Nazis continued to expropriate Jewish companies and enacted
oppressive measures which excluded Jews from doctoral examinations;
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imprisoned Jewish violators of racial laws and returning emigrants in
concentration camps; prohibited changes of Jewish names; enforced the
registration of Jewish businesses, assets, and persons; and ordered Jews
to carry special identity cards and to use the middle names Sarah or
Israel.
After the annexation of Austria, the Nazis disenfranchised the Austrian Jews on March 16, 1938. On October 5, 1938, the German government seized all Jewish passports. The Minister of the Interior also
limited the issuance of new passports, which had to be marked with the
letter J. On October 26, 1938, Himmler ordered the deportation of all
Polish Jews. Two days later the Gestapo arrested these Jews and
transported them to the border, where SS officials brutally forced them
into an unhospitable Poland.58
The third phase of anti-Jewish legislation extends from the pogrom
night of November 9-10, 1938, to the start of World War II on September l, 1939. During the November pogrom Hitler unleashed hordes
of sadistic SA and SS hooligans who murdered Jews, burned down their
synagogues, demolished their stores and apartments, and carried out
mass arrests. 59
A wave of legislation followed the pogrom which accelerated the
isolation and impoverishment of the Jews. On November 11, 1938,
Jews had to surrender all weapons in their possession to the police. On
November 12, 1938, Hermann Goring signed three decrees in his
capacity as plenipotentiary for the (economic) Four-Year Plan. The first
decree and subsequent legislation levied a punitive payment in the
amount of 1 billion marks upon all Jews. The second decree excluded
Jews from cooperatives and forbade them to engage in business, artisanry, or management. The third decree forced Jews to pay for the enormous damages which Nazi hoodlums had inflicted upon Jewish property
during the November pogrom and to surrender all insurance claims to the
Third Reich. 60
The discriminatory legislation of the third phase sharpened the isolation and confinement of the Jews. On November 12, 1938, the president of the Reich Chamber of Culture, Joseph Goebbels, issued an order
barring Jews from theatres, movie houses, concerts, exhibitions, etc.
Subsequent legislation forbade Jewish children to attend public schools,
subjected Jews to curfews, limited their freedom of movement, invalidated their driver's licenses and automobile registrations, expelled them
from non-Jewish apartments and houses, and forced them to move into
buildings occupied solely by Jews.61 On July 4, 1939, the Minister of
the Interior, Wilhelm Frick, established the SS-controlled Reich Association of Jews in Germany and decreed that all Jews inside Nazi territory had to belong to the association. 62
The fourth phase of anti-Jewish legislation and activity extends from
the start of World War II to the destruction of the Jews in Nazi-domi-
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nated Europe and covers the period September 1, 1939 to May 8, 1945.
The legislation of this phase aimed at the complete impoverishment
and isolation of the Jews and their physical destruction. On September
12, 1939, Heydrich issued an edict which limited the access of Jews to
food stores and subjected their apartments to police searches. 63 Other
measures forbade Jews to do the following: leave their apartments after
eight in the evening; own radios; buy clothes; have telephones; use
public transportation without restrictions; move without permission;
write checks; own typewriters, bicycles, cameras, binoculars, etc.; use
public telephones; keep pets; subscribe to newspapers and magazines;
receive an education; purchase meat, meat products, eggs, milk, and
books; send letters abroad. 64 These measures and others of similar
nature dissolved the everyday world of Jews.
Behind this nightmarish scene smoldered the Polish horizon; there the
SS was herding Jews into city ghettos. By December 1939, Poles and
Jews were pouring into Nazi-dominated Poland, where the SS was carrying out executions of hundreds of thousands. 65
On March 4, 1941, the Nazis subjected German Jews to forced labor;
on September l, 1941, they ordered them to wear a yellow Star of
David; on October 23, 1941, they forbade them to emigrate; on November 4, 1941, the transportation (Abschiebung) of Jews to Nazi-occupied
Eastern Europe went into high gear and the Minister of Finances,
Schwerin von Krosigk, organized the seizure of the deportees' assets.66
On July 31, 1941, Goring, as head of the Four-Year Plan, charged
the chief of the Security Police and the Security Service (SD), SS-Gruppenfuhrer Heydrich, with the preparation of the Final Solution of the socalled Jewish question.67 On January 20, 1942, Heydrich summoned
top officials of all ministries and offices involved in anti-Jewish activities
to a villa in Wannsee, a swank Berlin suburb. Under SS direction the
assembled civil servants developed a plan for the Final Solution.
Authorized by Hitler and supported by the Nazi leadership, the Wannsee
planners developed a detailed schedule for the destruction of Europe's 11
million Jews. 68
After the Wannsee Conference Nazi legislation and policy operated in
support of genocide. The consequences were horrendous and bestial:
Jews became the slave workers of German corporations, which profited
enormously from their misery; Jews were systematically worked to death
by the SS; Jews were murdered in the torture chambers and gas chambers of the concentration camps.
The Nazi program of large-scale genocide, resulting in the death of 6
million Jews and millions of Poles, Russians, and other non-Jews,
conjured up a final wave of legislation. On April 25, 1943, the Minister
of the Interior cynically decreed that Jews and Gypsies-who were
continually being destroyed in Nazi death factories-could not become
German citizens.69 On June 9 and 10, 1943, the Nazis dissolved the
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Reich Association of Jews in Germany and seized the assets of the
organization.70 On July 1, 1943, Jews officially lost all legal protection
and were subjected to the power of the police and Gestapo. In the event
of death, Jewish assets were seized by the Reich.71
And so the Nazi death machine rattled on. The horrifying operation
of the machine of mass extermination was supervised by brutal SS
hordes and accompanied by the dry pronouncements of miserable
bureaucrats. These debased representatives of a perverted legal and administrative system continued their lethal labor to the last moments of the
Hitler regime-down to that Runderlass of the Minister for Economics,
Walther Funk. The minister's circular of February 16, 1945, ordered
the destruction of all files containing references to anti-Jewish activities
in order to prevent the capture of these documents. 72
The Nazi technicians of hell tried to shroud the scenes of mechanized
mass murder with an impenetrable veil of secrecy. Against concealment,
ignorance, and indifference a united humanity must set the watchword of
the Italian anti-Fascists: Non dimenticare! Don't forget!
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THE ULTIMATE REPRESSION:
THE GENOCIDE OF THE
ARMENIANS, 1915-1917
Gerard J. Libaridian

INTRODUCTION
Exterminations of families, tribes, and ethnic or religious groups have
been known to occur since the dawn of history. The particular heinousness of mass death, however, has brought the gradual recognition of
such acts as crimes against humanity. Planned and systematic genocides
have even acquired a wider scope, while technology has increased their
efficiency. Given the technological advances in military and biological
hardware, the degrees to which many groups depend on governmental
policies for their survival, the abrupt changes which traditional societies
undergo when facing the challenge of modernization, and the increase in
tensions between nations due to the diminishing resources available for
distribution, one can expect governments to have recourse to radical
solutions such as genocide to solve real or imaginary problems. Genocide thus may become merely another manifestation of what differentiates a state from other institutions: its monopoly of the right to kill
enemies of society and to ask its citizens to kill enemies of the state or to
be killed doing it.
A corollary to the above hypothesis is that certain groups that seek
change in a system, particularly a traditional one, are more likely to be
victims of genocide. This is especially true when the ideology of the
state characterizes a potential victim as both an enemy of society (of the
internal order) and of the state.1
The genocide of the Armenian people during World War I is the
earliest case of a documented modern day extermination of a nation.
Planned and carried out by the Ittihadist (Ittihad ve Terakke Jemiyeti, or
the Committee of Union and Progress) government of the Ottoman
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Empire, this first genocide of the twentieth century may also be a paradigm for a type of "political" genocide likely to become the pattern of
twentieth-century genocides.
The purpose here is to suggest the possibility that twentieth-century
genocides may have become radical means used by governments to
resolve political problems. This chapter will briefly present the facts and
impact of the Armenian genocide, discuss the generally accepted
explanations of the holocaust as the final solution to a thorny national
problem, introduce some newly discovered evidence on the relations
between Armenian and Turkish leaders preceding the genocide, and suggest that the Ittihadist government perceived Armenians not only as an
unwelcome ethnic group but also as a social group which threatened the
traditional authoritarian order of Ottoman society.
The events between 1915 and 1917, the worst years of the genocide,
are quite clear and documented in gruesome detaiI.2 In early 1913, the
Young Turk government was taken over by its militaristic and chauvinistic wing led by Enver, Talaat, and Jemal Pashas.3 This triumvirate led
the country into World War I on the side of Germany. Sometime in
early 1915 that same government developed and put into effect a plan for
the extermination of its Armenian population, variously placed at between 2 and 3 million subjects. Most Armenians lived in the rural and
small-town environment of historic Western Armenia, a part of the Ottoman Empire since the sixteenth century.4
The plan was carried out in phases. In April 1915, the religious, political, educational, and intellectual leadership of the Armenian people,
close to 1,000 individuals, most educated in the Western tradition, were
taken into custody throughout the Empire and killed within a few days.
Then Armenian draftees of the Ottoman army, estimated at 200,000,
were liquidated through mass burials, burnings, executions, and sheer
exhaustion in labor battalions. Finally, the remainder of the population,
now composed largely of elderly people, women, and children, was
given orders for deportation in all parts of the Empire (except the capital
and a few cities with European presences).5 While a few cities and districts resisted the orders, most followed them, with the faint hope that
they might be given a chance to come back. 6
The fate of the deportees was usually death. Caravans of women and
children, ostensibly being led to southern parts of the Empire, became
death marches. Within six months of the deportations half of the deportees were killed, buried alive, or thrown into the sea or the rivers.
Few reached relatively safe cities such as Aleppo. Most survivors ended
up in the deserts of Northern Mesopotamia, where starvation, dehydration, and outright murder awaited them. Subsequent sweeps of cities ensured the elimination of the Armenian people from the western and
largest portion of their historic homeland.
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The extermination was accomplished under the supervision of a secretive organization which functioned as part of the government, the
Teshkilat-i Mahsusa or Special Organization, run by the highest government officials, manned by convicts released from jail, and acting under
the immediate supervision of select members of the Ittihad Party. 7 The
release of the vilest, unbridled animal passions served well the government's purpose of ensuring extermination in the most humiliating, dehumanizing fashion. The torture of thousands of women and children
became a source of satisfaction for hundreds who sought and found official sanction from government officials as well as Muslim clergymen,
since the murder of Armenians was characterized, like the war against
the Entente, as a jihad or holy war. Human imagination labored to devise new ways of mutilating, burning, and killing. The suicide of hundreds of women and children attests to the particular brutality of the
methods used.
The carnage took place in full view of the military and diplomatic representatives of governments allied with the Ottoman state, such as Germany, and neutral ones, such as the United States (until 1917). In addition, Western missionaries, journalists, travellers, and even sympathetic
officers of the Ottoman army described the death marches and atrocities
in daily letters and accounts. Reports of the extermination and its
methods forwarded to Washington, Berlin, and other capitals by eyewitnesses confirm the stories told by thousands of survivors in subsequent memoirs and oral history interviews.8
The methods used to bring about the extermination of the Armenians
are very significant, since they attest to the participation of an important
segment of the general population. The acquiescence of Turkish, Kurdish, and, to a limited extent, Arab civilians was made easier by the
promise of loot, of appropriation of children and women, and of an
afterlife in heaven. A governmental decree making it illegal to assist
refugees or orphans might ultimately have been responsible, however,
for the absence of wholesale assistance from Turks to their former neighbors and friends. The penalty for such assistance was death by hanging
in front of one's own house and the burning of that house.9 This did not
stop some, nonetheless, from resisting orders. A number of Turkish
governors and sub-governors were removed from office for their unwillingness to follow orders. Many Turks and Kurds, especially in the
Dersim region, risked their lives to save straggling Armenians, and
Arabs throughout the Empire's southern provinces accepted and helped
the survivors. 10
It is not clear whether it was the absence of technologically viable
means to exterminate swiftly or the desire to keep the appearance of "deportations" that led the government to achieve extermination through
such methods. The Ottoman government had a record of massacres,
some against Armenians. Of these, the 1894-1896 and 1909 are the best
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known.11 But this was the first time such a wholesale operation was
conducted, ending in the uprooting of a whole nation.
The impact of the genocide was devastating. Of the 2 to 3 million
Western Armenians, 1.5 million perished during the holocaust. Up to
150,000 of those who had accepted Islam or had been kept, stolen, or
protected by Turks and Kurds survived in Western Armenia without,
however, any possibility of preserving a sense of religious or national
identity. Close to 400,000 survived by fleeing to Russian Armenia and
the Caucasus (where many more died as a consequence of disease and
starvation) or Iran; perhaps 400,000 survived by reaching the southern
or Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire.12
In addition to the death of some 50 to 70 percent of Armenians living
under Ottoman Turkish rule, Armenians lost the right to live as a community in the lands of their ancestors; they lost their personal property
and belongings. They left behind the schools, churches, community
centers, ancient fortresses, and medieval cathedrals, witnesses to a long
history. Survivors were forced to begin a new life truncated, deprived
of a link with their past, subject to upheavals in the new lands where
they suddenly found themselves as foreigners. The remnants of the
largely peasant and rural population were now a wretched group of
squatters on the outskirts of cities poorly equipped to handle an increase
in population.
The genocide constituted a radical break with the past for Western
Armenians. The normal transmission of ethical and cultural values was
cut off. The traditional ways of explaining tragedies could not accommodate the final solution. Orphans grew to remember and tell the stories
of childhood years; they did not know what to think of their Turkish
neighbors and found it difficult to imagine that they had once lived
together in relative peace.

ENEMIES BY DEFINITION
The victims of twentieth century premeditated genocide-the Jews, the
Gypsies, the Armenians-were murdered in order to fulfill the state's design
for a new order.... War was used in both cases (an opportunity anticipated and planned for by Germany but simply seized by Turkey after World
War I began) to transform the nation to correspond to the ruling elite's formula by eliminating groups conceived of as alien, enemies by definition.13
So argues Helen Fein in Accounting for Genocide. This provides a
basic and adequate explanation for the dynamics of the Armenian genocide. Whatever political, sociological, and other explanations one may
end up accepting as part of the causal process, only such an encompassing, exclusive characteristic of the human mind can account for the
radical nature of the "solution," for the act of genocide. It is when man
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plays God and wants to recreate the world in his own image-however
perverted man or the image--that the other can be reduced to a nuisance,
to an enemy that by definition must be destroyed regardless of his or her
actions and policies.
Explanations of the Armenian genocide have generally agreed with
Fein's conclusion. The "formula" which historians have ascribed to the
Ittihadist elite may vary; some stress a Pan-Islamist vision at work,
others a Pan-Turanian one. Most have focused on the rise of an exclusive Turkish nationalism underlying or in the service of Pan-Turanian
and/or Pan-Islamic dreams.14 This nationalism was tied to Anatolia, the
"birthplace" of Turkism, a last bastion after the loss of European Turkey.
In some cases, as if to moderate the burden of the crime, some have
argued that the genocide was the violent manifestation of an otherwise
predictable and historically natural clash of two nationalisms in conflict,
Armenian against Turkish; this explanation allows for the equation of the
motivations of the two groups, with a difference only in the means used
by each to achieve their goal.15
Evolving Turkish nationalism was, in fact, the major factor which
determined the course of Ottoman history during the first two decades of
this century. Whatever subjective satisfaction Pan-Islamic and PanTuranian dreams gave to its adherents, whether under Sultan Abdul
Hamid II or the Young Turks who replaced him, these ideologies remained vehicles by which energies outside Turkish nationalism could be
harnessed to its service. The Young Turk-Ittihadist elite cared not under
what ideology it continued its domination. Religion worked for a while,
in some places. It was particularly potent in moving the ignorant
masses, in ensuring the support of the mollahs (priests) and the softas
(students of religion) for the Holy War. The idea of unification of Turkish groups across Asia had some success as well; but Pan-Turanism too
remained an abstraction for most of the people it was supposed to
inspire.
By the time the Ittihadist triumvirate decided to sign an alliance with
Germany, its members had determined that whatever ideology emerged,
and regardless of who won the war, drastic measures were needed if the
Turkish elite were to continue to rule over the remains of the Empire.
Long before the war, the Ittihadists were already pursuing a policy of
Turkification which went beyond Pan-Islamism.16 Arabs and Albanians
were to speak Turkish; it was not sufficient that they were largely
Muslim. The problem with the Ittihadists was that they had not as yet
given up on the idea of an empire, which required an ideology and a
basis of legitimation wider than Turkish nationalism or dynastic
allegiance.
Conditions were ripe for genocide to occur during a period of transition from the concept of an empire based on dynastic allegiance to that of
a nation-state. Pan-Turanian and Pan-Islamic ideologies were stages that
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helped the Ottomans accept the break from a tradition of conquest. One
of the vehicles for the building of Turkish nationalism was the identification of "enemies" of the yet to be born nation; a second vehicle was
its resistance to the loss of territory and dignity to Western imperialism.
The self-definition in relation to the Armenian enemy was convenient,
since Armenians were neither Turks nor Muslims; and the long history
of the Armenian Question as an integral part of the Eastern Question
made identification with outside enemies, in this case France, Great
Britain, and Russia, easy.17
The Ottoman government had used wholesale massacres before
against "enemies" of the state. Wartime conditions provided justification
for extraordinary measures. Western governments, traditionally the only
ones interested in and capable of intervention, were already at war, on
the wrong side, as far as the Ottoman Empire was concerned. Germany,
the Ottoman Empire's major ally, was capable of making a difference but
opted not to.18 Armenians, based on their history of past victimization,
could easily be perceived as enemies of society or the state, given the
paranoia of Ittihadist leaders.19
It is possible to paraphrase Helen Fein, then, and reconstruct a Turkish "design for a new order." This would be based, on the one hand, on
the assertion of sovereignty vis-a-vis the West by reversing the series of
losses of territories; on the other hand, this design would insist on the
establishment of "order" within the country, an order which was
threatened by elements for whom the symbols of Turkism, Islamism, or
Turanism could not mean much and who were seeking an alternate
framework for identification with the state. In addition, these elements,
i.e., Armenians, could be charged with collusion with the traditional
enemy, Russia. 20
The basic explanation provided by Fein, however, does not preclude
the further elaboration of the vision of the criminal state in its specific
and more complex historical context. Many scholars have contributed to
the understanding of genocide and to the identification of factors leading
to genocide. Leo Kuper and Irving L. Horowitz have developed new
perspectives on genocide as a political weapon in the twentieth century
and argued for its study as a new category in social research. 2I Vahakn
Dadrian, a sociologist pioneering in studies on the Armenian genocide,
has concentrated on the victimization theory and has pointed out sociological factors involved in the process of dehumanization leading to
genocide resulting from the search for power.22
The Kurdish historian Siyamend Othman, in his doctoral dissertation
and a subsequent article, attempted to explain the reasons why Kurds
played such a prominent role in the deportations· and massacres. His
argument is that for Kurds within a feudal structure the tribe provided
group identity and therefore allegiance was to the chief, who was manipulated by the Ottoman government. Othman also points out that the
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common Kurd may have been harboring some resentment toward Armenians, who tended to be the usurers and capitalists in the marketplace. 23
In a recent paper Ronald Suny attempted an analysis of the sociological makeup of both Turks and Armenians and suggested that the
existence of an Armenian upper class in control of many critical sectors
of the economy might in fact have accentuated antagonisms.24
Of major importance is the analysis provided by Robert Melson.
Melson has recently argued that one must go beyond victimization theories that generally point to victims of genocide as scapegoats or as provocateurs. He found instead that groups that have social mobility and
adaptability to modernization, and thus tend to disturb the traditional
orders, may tend to become victims in times of crisis. Melson has called
for a somewhat more complex model within which the paranoia of the
victimizer is as important in understanding-and foreseeing-genocide
as the "success" of the victim.25
These recent points of view can be seen as suggestive and important
efforts that provide specificity to the case of the Armenian genocide and
help shed light on the "formula" operative in the minds of the Turkish
leaders that made possible the dehumanization and, eventually, the extermination of Armenians.

A Populist Agenda and the Alienation of the State
To the extent that the Ittihad decision to exterminate Armenians in the
Ottoman Empire can be explained by the history of relations between the
two, the period from 1908 to 1914 is obviously the most important.
Armenian political parties, the revolutionary Hunchakians and
Dashnaktsutiune, had opposed the Sultan's government until 1908, as
had the various Turkish groups known as the Young Turks, of which
the Ittihad ve Terakke was the most important. When the Young Turks
took over the government in 1908 and restored the Constitution that had
been promulgated in 1876 and prorogued in 1878, Armenian
revolutionaries ended their armed struggle and pledged allegiance to the
new regime and kept their pledge until the beginning of the genocide.
Thus, the first point to be made regarding the pre-genocide period is
that Armenian political parties functioned as legitimate Ottoman
institutions, whose goals and bylaws were recognized by the Ottoman
government. While they differed in their assessment of the chances for
successful reforms under the Ittihad government, there was and there
could have been nothing in their programs or actions which could have
been considered illegitimate or detrimental to the Constitution.
The second important fact with regard to these relations is that, along
with a change in the ruling elite of the Ottoman Empire, the 1908 Constitution also produced a change in the representation of the Armenians. To
negotiate Armenian demands for reform the Ottoman Turkish govern-
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ment had to deal with Armenian leaders of the revolutionary and guerrilla
movement The new spokesmen for the Armenians had won the right to
represent Armenians by waging an armed struggle on behalf of economic
and political rights; their religion had been Enlightenment. These new
leaders supplanted the largely conservative clergymen of the Patriarchate
who were bound by the dictates of the millet system which defined
Armenians as a religious community and denied them an essentially
political character.
A third important characteristic of the pre-genocide Armeno-Turkish
relations is that they evolved between 1908 and 1914. The major factor
which determined this change was the gradual elimination of the liberal
program which some Young Turks had advocated prior to and immediately after the 1908 takeover. As a whole, the Young Turks had linked
the imperative of preserving the territorial integrity of the Empire with the
need to introduce general reforms. This willingness to recognize the importance of domestic social, economic, and political policies affecting the
larger population had satisfied Armenians in their struggle to improve
their situation, particularly the lot of the peasant and rural populations.
Generally speaking, the Ittihad government discarded its liberal democratic ideals; it moved toward despotism and began relying, as its predecessor had done, on the reactionary classes, repressive measures, and
symbols to secure its position in power.
Based on documents being studied for the first time, it is possible to
argue that the critical period when the fundamental change occurred was
between 1909 and 1911.26 By 1909, the excitement of the first days
was over. Elections for the first Parliament were completed. The Ittihad
Party had run on a platform with the Armenian Revolutionary Federation
(ARF) or Dashnaktsutiune, and won. Furthermore, following the massacre of Adana, the government promised to take concrete steps to
introduce long promised reforms, consolidate the constitutional regime,
and resolve domestic issues which caused hardship to Armenians.
An agreement signed between the Ittihad and the Turkish Section of
the Western Bureau (highest executive body) of the Dashnaktsutiune
seemed a secure path toward the realization of reforms throughout the
Empire. In 1911 the Sixth World Congress of the Dashnaktsutiune
reached the conclusion that the party could no longer hope that the Ittihad
would realize the reforms and consequently it could no longer remain in
an alliance with the Ittihad.27
According to the agreement, the two parties were to develop a joint
committee, above and beyond formal contacts and parliamentary negotiations. This committee would be composed of high-level officials whose
task it was to find ways to strengthen the Constitution, educate the public
on political issues and against the reaction, educate the Turkish masses
on anti-Armenian prejudices, and increase political rights for all. In
addition to the main committee in Constantinople, regional and district
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joint committees were also to be organized. The agreement was reached
at a meeting between representatives of the Turkish Section of the ARP
Bureau and the Central Committee of the Ittihad held in Salonika in
August 1909, four months after the massacres of Adana. These negotiations may have been the price paid by the Ittihad in return for the
willingness of the Dashnak:tsutiune to ascribe the massacres to the reaction, when in fact at least local Ittihad members were implicated.
The institutionalization of contacts at all levels appeared a good way to
avoid future misunderstandings, to decrease tensions, and to open the
way to important reforms. However, from the beginning, the Dashnaktsutiune had difficulties in ensuring the functioning of the committee.
The first and most important committee, to be established in the capital,
did not get its Turkish appointees until early 1910. In addition, the
Ittihad avoided regular meetings from March to June 1910, and none of
the important issues, foreign or domestic, was placed on the agenda by
the Ittihad.
The Dashnak:tsutiune had its own agenda, which constituted basically
its minimum and practical program. The party demanded:
1. The end of feudal structures, laws, and practices in Anatolia.
2. A change in the government's policy of total indifference toward social and economic development and the concomitant crises affecting
all segments of society; economic development was necessary to
provide opportunities for the improvement in the standard of living.
3. The solution of the most critical issue, the agrarian crisis, which
resulted both from inherent inequities and the feudal system as well
as from the conscious policies of officials to expel Annenians from
their fanns, expropriate their lands, and give them to muhajirs or
Muslim immigrants. The latter, often coming from the fonnerly
Ottoman Balkan districts, were systematically directed into Annenian districts for resettlement, which would then take place at the
expense of Annenian fanners.
4. The end of regressive, extralegal, and illegal taxes, which particularly affected Christians, but generally had a negative impact on
all subjects.
5. The end of insecurity of life, honor, and property, particularly for
Annenians whose communal existence was threatened by continuing
pillaging, lawlessness, and renewed overt aggression and discrimination.28
These issues, and especially the agrarian crisis and the tax laws, were
pointed to as threatening the economic foundation of the Armenian community. 29
The Dashnak:tsutiune placed these and other, more specific, items on
the agenda on many occasions. None of the issues, however, received
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satisfactory solutions. A second trip was needed to Salonika to determine why there was no action. In March 1911 two party plenipotentiaries went to meet again with the Ittihad Central Committee. The result
was renewed promises for reform, once a new study was completed by
two Ittihad leaders who were sent on a tour of the provinces. The Ittihad
leaders seem to have agreed with the Dashnaktsutiune representatives
that the problem was not between Armenians and Turks or Kurds but
between the poor and the rich, and that Turkish and Kurdish peasants
often suffered as much as Armenians. Despite the agreement in principle
and the promise to seriously confront the problem, the tour by the two
dignitaries produced no changes in government policies. Reporting from
Van, a member of the Dashnaktsutiune's local Central Committee echoed
the observation of many Armenians when he wrote: "[The two representatives] are here now and, frankly, we cannot understand what they
are doing. They have shied away from all contacts with the popular
masses and the rural folk; they are constantly surrounded by the local
notables and government officials. "30
Following two years of intense efforts and accommodation to an Ittihad agenda which seemed to be lacking focus, the Dashnaktsutiune came
to the conclusion that it no longer could expect basic changes to come
from the Ittihad. A Memorandum accompanying the Report to the Congress listed a number of reasons for the inability of the Ittihad to respond:
1. Feudalism was still not such an abhorrence to the Ittihad; at any rate,
its leaders did not wish to alienate the Kurdish chieftains and local
landlords, whose support they ultimately considered more important, and safer-since they demanded nothing in return-than that of
the Annenians.
2. The Ittihad allowed reactionary elements, such as great landowners
and mollahs, to become members of the local Ittihad clubs, changing
the liberal character of the organization; it was gradually taken over
by those forces which constituted the backbone of the previous
regime and which had opposed constitutional change and parliamentary government
3. The fear ascribed by Ittihad leaders to Kurds but in fact shared by
some Turks that should Annenians have an equal chance in the system they would overwhelm others by their numbers and achievements.
4. The Ittihad did not wish to see the Dashnaktsutiune or any other
Annenian party strengthened.
5. The Dashnaktsutiune's unqualified support of the Ittihad allowed
them to take that support for granted; the Ittihad did not need to
return any favors for the support.
6. The Ittihad did not wish to see an element in Asia Minor
strengthened which might be favored by the Russians, particularly
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when the more important friend, Germany, had other plans for Asia
Minor.
7. The disagreement between two Dashnaktsutiune members of the
Ottoman Parliament on the best methods to develop the proposed
railroad in Eastern Anatolia.
8. Instability in the cabinet and its inability to make decisions.
In addition to the absence of reforms and the Ittihad's disregard for its
own pledges, the authors of the Memorandum listed the following governmental actions to support their conclusions:
1. The Ittihad government had stopped prosecuting Kurdish chieftains
accused of crimes against Armenians; one prominent criminal,
Huseyin Pasha, had in fact been invited back into the country with a
pardon.
2. The Ittihad had favored the Bagdad railway line which, in the view
of the Dashnaktsutiune, would only enrich foreign capitalists; the
party had recommended instead the Anatolian railway, which would
help the economic development of this poor region.
3. No concrete steps were taken to return to Armenian peasants and
farmers their lands, their principal means of livelihood. Such a distribution would hardly have affected the Kurdish or Turkish
peasant, but it would have hurt the large landowners and muhajirs.
The Dashnaktsutiune's proposal to achieve such a return through administrative decisions was frustrated by the Ittihad's recommendation that the regular courts be used for that purpose; pleas that the
courts had not yet been reformed since the revolution and that
peasants did not even have money to go to court or to bribe the
corrupt officials were hardly heeded.
4. Where joint committees had been formed, the CUP representatives
had on occasion made unreasonable and suspicious demands, such
as assimilation of the Dashnaktsutiune into the Ittihad ve Terakke or
turning over the lists of party members to the Committee of Union
and Progress.31

The Sixth World Congress of the Dashnaktsutiune determined that the
party could no longer be in alliance with the Ittihad, and that it would
continue its efforts as a party in friendly opposition in Parliament.
Thus, during the period of intense relations following the revolution,
when the two groups were able to know each other and act on this
knowledge, Armenian leaders discussed security of life, land reform,
economic development, and political equality, rather than autonomy or
independence. Their disagreements and ultimate break were over bread
and butter issues rather than over boundaries. Simon Zavarian, one of
the founders of the party and a member of the Buro's Turkish Section,
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argued in 1912 that of all the elements in the Ottoman Empire,
Armenians had been the most supportive of the Constitution:
This sympathy was not the consequence of [the Annenians'] high morals,
[their] pro-Turkish inclination, or [their] political maturity. Rather, it is a
question of geo-political realities and the current situation. Dispersed all over
Asia Minor and mixed with Turks and other nationalities over the centuries,
Annenians could not seek their future in a territorial autonomy, to lead an
even more isolated political life. Annenians have tried to create [favorable]
conditions for all Ottomans by supporting refonn for the Ottoman state, [and
to change] for the better the status of Annenians and Annenia.32
He observed, however, that Ottoman subjects had very little to show for
the four years they had lived under a Constitution: "End of the internal
identification cards, a few students to Europe, and some road projects .
. . . But what do peasants and craftsmen have to show? ... One
also cannot hope much from the new Parliament, since most new deputies have titles such as beys, zades, pashas and mu/ties. "33 The alienation of the Armenians from the state was most dramatically illustrated in
the final defense statement of the Hunchakian Paramaz in 1915, who
after having been accused of plotting against the government, was
hanged along with twenty other Hunchakian leaders. "I am not a separatist," said Paramaz. "It is this state which is separating itself from me,
unable to come to terms with the ideas which inspire me. "34
It seems, then, that long before the beginning of World War I the
Ittihad, as well as the Armenian parties, had concluded that the Young
Turk revolution had failed. Jemal Pasha, one of the triumvirate, argued
in his memoirs that the Ittihad failed to take root.35 In 1912 Zavarian
had been more explicit in his explanation of the failure of the Ittihad:
Instead of waging a struggle, of establishing a popular militia, of creating a
democratic party, a party with [political] principles, [the Ittihadists] went the
way of their predecessors: they chose "the easy path." They kissed and allied
with all the dignitaries and created a "union" of coreligionists.36
Armenian political parties wavered between clear signs that the liberal era
had ended and the hope that they were mistaken. Meeting in Constanza
in September 1913 for its Seventh World Conference, the Hunchakian
Party had perceived the dangers inherent in Ittihad mentality. A new
party policy was based, among other arguments, on
the fact that the fundamental principles [of the lttihad] call for the preservation
of a Turkish bureaucracy and that they do not allow for the emergence of a
new state, and that it is the [lttihad's] obvious goal not only to assimilate but
also to eliminate, and if need be, extenninate, constituent nationalities. 37
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The Hunchakians concluded that Armenians should at least be ready for
self-defense. Nonetheless, they, along with others, were determined to
pursue the search for peaceful solutions. The Dashnaktsutiune continued
to advocate reform, whatever the source. In 1914 the Dashnaktsutiune
was still insisting on the need for reforms advocated in a June 1912 editorial published in the party organ, Droshak. That editorial had listed six
critical issues, in addition to land reform:
1. Better administration throughout the Empire;
2. Decrease in taxes on the poor and implementation of progressive
taxation;
3. Abolition of all feudal taxes;
4. Balanced budget by decreasing the number of officials and building
up an economic infrastructure;
5. End to acts and policies which create fear of Turkification and
Islamization of minorities;
6. Safeguarding of freedoms.38
After 1912, Armenians welcomed the renewed Western, and especially Russian, interest in pressuring the Ottoman government for reforms in the Armenian provinces of the Empire, reforms which would be
realized under the supervision of European governors.39 This, however, did not change the fundamental relationship between the leaderships of the Ittihad government and Armenians and the political program
each represented for the other.

LIMITATIONS OF THE NATIONALIST PERSPECTIVE
While the issues raised by Armenians were in the area of social and
economic development and political equality, general interpretation of the
genocide which followed this period remains mired in the limited and
limiting perspective of Turkish and Armenian nationalisms.
The nationalist perspective creates many obstacles to an understanding
of the full and real picture of Armeno-Turkish relations and mutual perceptions during the period preceding the genocide. It is true that the nature of the crime and its inhumanity are such that it is difficult to imagine
that the Armenians and Turks were able to have a relationship other than
that of victim and victimizer; it seems that it was always in the nature of
the relations of these two peoples to massacre and to be massacred; that it
was in the spirit of the times for both peoples to develop traditions of
modern nationalism; that these two nationalisms were bound to clash as
they did; and that it was natural for the Turks to be the killers and for the
Armenians to be the victims. Moreover, the current domination of the
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theme of genocide in Armenian life, the bitterness and resentment in the
absence of international recognition, and the increasing intensity of the
Turkish denial of the genocide strengthen the misleading impression that
all events preceding the genocide led to the genocide, and all events
succeeding the genocide have been caused by it.
Turkish historiography has had particular difficulties with the Young
Turk period, which remains little studied. While critical of the Ittihad ve
Terakki on many grounds, Turkish historians have followed the policy
of recent Turkish governments in either denying the genocide or justifying "deportations" during which "unfortunate" deaths occurred.40
More so than is the case with Armenian writers, Turkish historians have
denied Armenians any role in Ottoman politics except to assign them
dreams of "independence," of which pre-genocide Armenians had to be
disabused. Charges of separatism have become convenient vehicles to
avoid discussion of the real problems then facing Ottoman society and
the failure of the Young Turk government to solve them by means other
than war and genocide.
The absence of Armenian life in Western Armenia (now Eastern
Turkey), the success of the genocide, and the depoliticized existence of a
contemporary Armenian community denied its memory in Istanbul make
it easier for some Turkish historians to characterize Armenians and their
aspirations as they do the Balkan peoples: once happy Ottoman subjects
who were carried away by romantic nationalism. Turkish historians treat
Armenians as an important political factor only in the context of a separatist threat that had to be dealt with.41
In other words, students of the period have difficulty imagining that
Armenians were an integral part of Ottoman society for many centuries.
This integrality was based on more than the physical occupation of lands
under Ottoman dominion. It involved parallel developments in folk cultures, integration through a single economy, and mutual adjustments of
social mores and values between Armenian and Turkish as well as Kurdish societies.42 Thus Armenians constituted an integral part of the political life of the Ottoman Empire, whether defined as a millet or as an ethnic
group with parliamentary representation under the Young Turks.43
Yet terms such as nationalism and independence have re-created a
reality which places Armenians outside Ottoman history, just as the
genocide placed Armenians outside Ottoman society; and analysis revolving around conflicts over irreducible categories such as race and religion tum history into a field where, instead of human beings interacting,
abstract concepts do battle. It is as if hordes of individuals think and act
as prescribed by ideologies of nationalism, religion, or race. Terminology then comes to reconfirm the view imposed by the genocide that,
ultimately, one need not account for real Armenians leading real lives
whose disappearance from their homes and from history must be accounted for; one is comforted by the thought that Armenians can be
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reduced to a corollary of a concept. The politician dehumanizes a nation
in order to get rid of it; the historian does so to explain it away.
Genocide becomes its own explanation; ultimately, it becomes its own
justification.
The Young Turks, including the Ittihad ve Terakke, evolved in opposition to the despotic, reactionary, and corrupt rule of Sultan Abdul
Hamid II as well as in reaction to his ineptness in protecting the territorial
integrity of the Ottoman Empire against separatist tendencies and Western imperialistic encroachments. The latter were often justified in the
name of persecuted minorities in the Empire. Therefore there evolved a
linkage between domestic reforms, particularly those that might affect
non-Muslims and non-Turks, and the defense of the territorial integrity
of the Empire.
While all Young Turks agreed that the Sultan must go and that the
prorogued Constitution of 1876 must be reestablished, it was obvious
from the start that not everyone agreed on the best possible solution to
the problem of territorial disintegration. One group, led by Prince Sabaheddine, promoted the idea of a multinational empire, with not only
equal rights to the non-dominant groups, such as Armenians, but also a
decentralized government which recognized a degree of regional autonomy to these groups.44 Ahmed Riza, on the other hand, whose views
became the more dominant after the revolution, believed in an Ottomanism which minimized differences, in a centralized state which, while
recognizing the equality of all under the law, would promote the evolution of a homogeneous, corporate body politic. According to one historian:
[Ahmed Riza] used the word "Ottoman" freely in connection with individual
inhabitants of the Empire, Muslim and Christian, as did Sabaheddine, but in
Riza's vocabulary the word did not connote so much an individual with
supra-national citizenship as a person who, if he was not already a Turk, must
be hammered into a reasonable likeness to one.45

In 1908 the Young Turks took over the government and restored the
1876 Constitution. An era of brotherhood and renovation was thought
to have begun; there was popular support for the move, and all problems
were expected to be resolved soon with a new parliament.46 Parliamentary elections were held twice during this period, in 1909 and 1912.
These parliaments included representatives of various religious and
ethnic groups, including Armenians, although there seems to have been
constant haggling over the number of deputies each group was allotted,
the Turks always retaining a comfortable majority.
But the Ittihad government, already weak in its commitment to
democratization, was frustrated in its attempts to implement significant
reforms. Between 1908 and 1914 the Ottoman Empire had to fight two
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wars against Balkan states during which it lost the remainder of its
European holdings; the Ottomans also lost Libya to Italy. Thus, their
revolution had not guaranteed the territorial integrity of the Empire. The
Young Turks were particularly irritated by France and England, the two
bastions of liberalism and the principal external sources pressuring for
internal reform, who stood by while more and more Ottoman lands were
taken away. The Ittihad ve Terakke was also naive in its belief that a
parliament in and by itself constituted reform and could change a society.
Impatient about criticism and unwilling to undertake reforms which they
thought would weaken the authority of the state, the Ittihad ve Terakke
itself moved toward despotism, just as Abdul Hamid II had done over
three decades earlier. The Ittihad leadership gradually eliminated not
only opposition parties but also elements within the Ittihad who still
linked the salvation of Ottoman society to domestic reforms and a
vigorous constitutional life.47 The coup d'etat in 1913 led by Enver,
Talaat, and Jemal Pashas came as the logical conclusion of the evolution
of the Ittihad toward a dictatorship. The three continued to believe that
they embodied all the wisdom necessary to lead the Empire toward
salvation; and the salvation of the Empire was couched in terms of
molding the character and thoughts of the citizens of the Empire in the
image of some ideal Ottoman.
From the promise of reform and equality and political rejuvenation
springing from the dedication to the ideal of a state which provided
equality under the law, the Ittihadids had moved to the position of a
corporate state within which not only non-Turks would be designated
"enemies" by definition, but also all liberals who insisted on a different
vision than the one articulated by the Ittihad, however vague and shifting
that may have been. Liberalism, which sought to reject the use of ethnic,
religious, or national identity as the basis for legitimation of power, was
seen as a weakness, as the lot of the forces of particularism and dissent,
as a source of chaos and further disintegration, unworthy of the various
visions of greatness that were motivating the Ittihad-the "true"
successor of the once powerful sultans.48
The Ittihad distaste for liberalism is critical for the understanding of
their policies before and during the war. In the Ottoman Empire liberalism and ethnic issues had been intertwined since the nineteenth century. Western pressures for reform always focused on the status of
Christians. The Turkish and Kurdish masses in the Empire had been
denied a systematic exposure to the need for reform from their own
revolutionaries.49 They consequently viewed the Ottoman Constitution
as a privilege only for Christians.SO Moreover, the Turkish people felt a
false sense of power through identification with the ruling dynasty and
ruling elite. Ramsaur, who tends to see all minorities as budding
nationalists, nonetheless recognizes that
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the Moslem minorities, such as those Albanians who professed Islam, were
beginning to feel the sweep of nationalism as well, but they were somewhat
weakened in their aspirations by the fact that they enjoyed better treatment
than did the Christian minorities and because they had a religious bond with
the dynasty that the latter did not possess.51
Naturally, non-Turks found it easier to understand and appreciate reforms. Being more affected by the corrupt and decrepit taxation and
legal systems than others, Armenians had long developed a tradition of
political thought of their own in reaction to Ottoman misgovernment,
Turkish superiority, and despotic rule.
Nonetheless, these non-Turkish parties constitute as much a part of
Ottoman history as those founded by Turks. The Armenian focus of
their parties, for example, is a reflection of the religious/ethnic structure
created by the Ottoman government, not a natural result of Armenian
nationalism. 52
By 1914 the idea of liberal reforms had been eliminated from the
agenda of the Ittihad. By 1914 as well, Armenians were the only
significant non-Muslim people left in the Empire, the only non-Turkish
political element in Anatolia capable of measuring the actions of the
government beyond the rhetoric of Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islamism-a
rhetoric which certainly could not inspire Armenians. Armenians were
also the only segment of the electorate still supporting the parliamentary
system and the Constitution. While the promise of Russian-sponsored
reforms may have diminished the need to see political reform for the
majority in the Armenian vilayets (administrative divisions) of the Empire, Armenians in central Anatolia, Cilicia, and the western provinces
had no other hope.

A CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENT
Armenian liberalism was the legacy of the revolutionary movement
which developed following the failure of the signatories of the Congress
of Berlin in 1878 to deliver on their promise of reforms for Ottoman
Armenia. Armenians developed a liberation movement which, while
having as an inspiration the Balkan movements, grew in reaction to
Ottoman policies and Armenian realities and needs. Armenian groups
were motivated much more by the socioeconomic disintegration of their
society than by dreams of a renewed Armenian dynasty. 53 Even the
Hunchakian Party, the first revolutionary party and the only one to
advocate independence when founded in 1887, did so because it argued
that since there were no positive results to be seen decades after the
promise of internal reforms and almost a decade after the Congress of
Berlin, Armenians could no longer hope to see reforms general enough
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to bring a change in their status.54 The Dashnaktsutiune, founded in
1890, which in 1892 advocated a degree of autonomy and the opportunity to create "political and economic freedom," made clear that their
purpose was not the replacement of a Turkish sultan with an Armenian
one.55 It was not surprising, therefore, that neither the Church nor the
wealthy classes in Armenian society supported the revolutionaries; both
remained very much part of the millet mentality fostered by the Ottoman
government and, ultimately, were manipulated by it
The liberation movement among Armenians, which turned into an
armed struggle in the 1890s, acquired depth and an inter-ethnic scope in
the 1900s. This included prodding Young and liberal Turkish groups
into action against despotism and cooperation among the anti-sultan
forces. One of the issues raised by the Armenian political parties during
these early years was the need for Turkish liberalism to acquire a popular
basis by addressing social and economic issues and by being ready to
engage in an armed struggle to achieve the goal of a democratic and
parliamentary regime. They also urged Turks to provide for a popular
defense mechanism against any possible reaction following a revolution.
In other words, the Young Turks were urged to make a revolution rather
than a coup d'etat. These positions were articulated clearly over a decade
of relations between Armenian revolutionaries and Turkish liberals in
Europe and in the Ottoman Empire.56 The last time the Dashnaktsutiune
had insisted on the need for an Ottoman revolution was in 1907, during
the second congress of Ottoman opposition forces, which had been
convened on its initiative. Armenians did not have much faith in revolutions from above.
Although in 1908 it was the Ottoman army and not the people that
toppled the Sultan, the move was radical enough to invite the support of
many segments of Ottoman society, and particularly Armenians for
whom liberalism and reform had become political solutions as well as
ideological tenets. The Young Turk revolution of 1908 produced important changes in the Armenian political scene. The oldest of the political
parties, the quasi-Marxist and revolutionary Hunchakians, met in 1909
for their Sixth General Convention and decided to discard the party's
demand for political independence for Armenia and voted to realize their
ultimate goal, socialism, within the Ottoman context. Nonetheless, the
Hunchakians registered their distrust of Ittihadist nationalism and absence of commitment to reforms.57 The Dashnaktsutiune put into place a
mechanism for realizing the federal structure it had envisioned in its
Fourth World Congress in 1907, in collaboration with the Young
Turks.58 Finally, the Armenian bourgeoisie and well-to-do, who had
never felt comfortable with the armed struggle and socialistic rhetoric of
the two existing parties, created a third party, the Ramgavar-Sahmanatragan or Democratic-Constitutional Party, which rejected violence
and adopted capitalism as the proper form of economic development for
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the Ottoman Empire and the appropriate way to solve Armenian socioeconomic problems.59
All three parties worked within the bounds of the Constitution to
achieve gains and to realize their goals. The coalition of the Dashnaktsutiune and the Ittihad produced parliamentary victories for both. The
Hunchakians formed an alliance with the Ittilaf Party of Prince Sabaheddine. More important, all three Armenian political parties shared a
vision of the society which they wanted to see evolve in the Ottoman
Empire. This vision was based primarily on the need to address the
problems facing a disintegrating Armenian rural society and a frustrated
middle class. Equality, reform, and progress were slogans which
everyone used and no one found to be against the interests of the state in
1908.60 They were inspired by what educated Armenians considered the
universal values of the Enlightenment. Armenians believed in progress
and in change at the expense of the traditional because, to paraphrase
what has been said of German Jews, these attitudes facilitated emancipation from the political and social disabilities that had oppressed them
for centuries; the Enlightenment gave them optimism, faith in themselves
and in humanity. It was this general belief that led the Armenians, but
especially the Hunchakians and Dashnaktsutiune, not only to participate
vigorously in the first Russian revolutionary movement in 1905 but also
to play a role in the Persian Constitutional movement before World War
I. This role was critical enough for one of the leaders of the Dashnaktsutiune, Yeprem, who had led his guerrilla fighters into many
battles, to end up with the responsibility for the security of Tehran until
his death in 1912.61
Among the Turks, enlightenment and progress were adopted by
Prince Sabaheddine and the Liberal Party. However, they were small in
number and lacked a popular base. Even the nascent Turkish bourgeoisie supported the Ittihad policies of economic nationalism and placed
their hopes on a strong central government which might find it easier to
make room for the growth of Turkish capital, as opposed to the traditional Ottoman capital that had been accumulated in trade by Armenians,
Greeks, and Jews. The masses were more easily swayed by the rhetoric
of glory, whether of the imperial or religious variety. When faced with
the Western challenge, the Turkish reformers, whose liberalism was "ill
digested," were more likely to be impressed by the technological and
military advances-advances which, when borrowed, could have resolved the Ottoman problem as seen by Turks: military weakness
against European powers and humiliation at the hands of former subjects. 62 Some also internalized Social Darwinism, which made it possible for them to rationalize their insistence on the primacy of Turks in
the Empire, their internal imperialism. 63
Even in 1908, therefore, there were two visions of society at work,
both in opposition to the Sultan, both favoring the Constitution, both
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based on the dual principles of internal reforms and territorial integrity of
the Empire. It was the first time since the articulation of Armenian
political demands that so much common ground existed and that there
was an opportunity for the solution of both problems. Yet for those in
the Ittihad who had believed in some degree of equality and justice, the
promise of reforms may have been the price to be paid in return for
territorial integrity, and possibly aggrandizement. With the continued
loss of territories in the Balkans and the threatened loss of the Arab
provinces, the Ittihad lost even its weak interest in limited reforms and
sought its aggrandizement elsewhere.
Armenian political parties, meanwhile, had been willing to make all
the necessary adjustments to strengthen the Constitution: it was a welcome alternative to an otherwise difficult position. Armenians, particularly the Hunchak:ians and Dashnaktsutiune, made serious compromises
on the degree of socioeconomic reform needed in order to provide the
best possible support to the liberal elements in Turkish politics. And
while among the Young Turks they had always associated with Sabaheddine, the Dashnaktsutiune agreed to run joint election campaigns with
the Ittihad, which, as the party in power, the Dashnaktsutiune thought
needed the largest dose of liberal presence.
The Armenian parties made it clear, however, that their commitment
to the Ottoman fatherland, their willingness to defend its territorial
integrity and the search for Armenian reforms in the context of the
empire-wide changes, were contingent upon one condition: the Ottoman
Empire had to be a "democratic and parliamentary state." 64 This feeling
was shared by the larger Armenian population as well. A letter to the
editor of the Droshak stated it clearly:
For citizens states are not goals. They are means to develop, to progress, to
become strong. If a means to reach a goal is inappropriate, inadequate or
weak, it becomes necessary to exchange it for a better and more appropriate
form .... The issue is not separation or inclusion in the Ottoman state,
since these are fundamentally related to the larger purpose---our welfare. We,
Turks, Armenians, Greeks, Bulgars, Kurds and other citizens like to remain
and live and even, yes, sacrifice and be sacrificed, in a state where our
welfare is [considered]. We shall shed our blood only for the flag which
knows how to keep our heads up. Flags which are miserable, shameful,
often defeated, subject to derision and mockery do not deserve our blood.65
The Hunchakians in 1913 reaffirmed their intention not to seek a separate
homeland; but they also made it clear that they did not intend to accept a
regime where any group dominated the others.66 In October 1913 all
Armenian parties functioning in the Ottoman Empire signed a joint statement which, in addition to promising an end to internal conflicts, also
reasserted their dedication to the Ottoman Parliament and Constitution. 67
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In other words, for Armenians allegiance was to basic forms of political association or organization rather than to a dynasty, a nationalism, a
religion, or a race. They were ready to support a political system which
allowed for the equitable and just solution to ethnic and religious as well
as social and economic problems. 68 This was a form of social contract
which was reminiscent of what Sabaheddine had come to learn and respect from contemporary readings. 69 With their concern for social,
economic, and agrarian reforms and a democratic system of government,
Armenians were thus part of the Ottoman political spectrum. But they
occupied the left wing of the spectrum.
Two other issues were problematic for the Ittihad government. First,
Armenian parties had strong popular bases due both to their long
struggle and sacrifices and to their populist platforms. Secondly, given
the socialistic nature of their programs, they had also made serious
efforts, beginning in 1900, but especially after 1908, to spread the liberal
creed among Turks, and even Kurds in Anatolia. 70 While they had had
very limited success, there always was a danger that Armenian revolutionary parties with socialistic tendencies could create politically viable
coalitions of peasants and rural craftsmen, supported by a liberal bourgeoisie.

WAR AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE STATE
It was no accident that the Ottoman Empire entered World War I and
did so on the side of Germany. A crisis situation, martial law, and war
conditions in general would change the rules of politics and the need for
accountability for failures, while creating the possibility of territorial
expansion. Siding with Germany was in character with an elite in power
increasingly hostile toward any element which reminded them of their
promises and failures. Fighting the war on the side of Germany could
free the Ittihad from its commitment to reform just as the Russo-Turkish
war of 1877-1878 had freed Abdul Hamid II from the pledge he made in
1876 to create a constitutional government.71 A war which was to be
fought against France and England, the liberal states of Europe, allowed
the linkage between external threats and internal reform to be articulated
in the measures taken against Armenians, now seen as the main threat,
the enemy of the Ittihad "vision"; the Turkish elite considered Armenians
ideological allies of the French and British or as a population sympathizing with the traditional enemy, Russia, which in 1912 had resumed
its role as the sponsor of Armenian reforms. The war provided an
opportunity for the Ittihad to create a coherent world: an opportunity to
prove Turkish military prowess by fighting on the side of a strongly
militaristic non-liberal empire such as Germany, and against the bastions
of liberalism, France and England.
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But the war also made it possible to eliminate the particularities and
dissent in the political arena by eliminating Armenians, who could never
be part of the new vision since they were not Turks or Muslims, and
who, by their political consciousness, were bound to become a permanent source of dissent and discontent, a particularity in a society which
was expected to find solace in the Pan-Turanian, Pan-Islamic creeds or
in Turkish nationalism rather than in the search for equality, justice, and
a dignified human existence. Jemal Pasha, one of the Ittihad triumvirate
and Minister of the Navy, conceded a fundamental relationship between
the decision to enter the war, domestic policy, and the Armenian
"problem":
Of course, it was our hope to free ourselves through the World War from all
conventions, which meant so many attacks on our independence.... Just
as it was our chief aim to annul the capitulations and the Lebanon Statute, so
in the matter of Armenian reforms we desired to release ourselves from the
agreement which Russian pressure had imposed upon us. 72
Jemal certainly did not imply that reforms were not needed, since in
these memoirs he confesses having promised Armenians reforms as
soon as the war was over, if Armenians functioned as a fifth column in
Russian Armenia against Russia.73 In a strange but intriguingly vague
style, Jemal stated that "it was an active domestic and foreign policy" that
drove the Ittihad to war. The most important domestic problem was the
question of the minorities, Jemal asserted, and, among the minorities,
the Armenians were the most critical. 74 Subsequent justifications of the
deportations and massacres clarify the meaning of "active" policy. It
seems to have been nothing less than the domestic equivalent of war on
enemy states.
The desire to proceed with state building unfettered by any external or
internal accounting was, according to Jemal, one of the reasons for the
Ittihad's decision to enter the war. Of course, as soon as the war started,
the two European governors who had just arrived in the country to
supervise reforms in Armenian provinces were sent back. But the war
allowed the Ittihad to do more. The purpose of the deportations and
massacres, wrote the German missionary and eyewitness Johannes
Lepsius, "seems to be to drive the idea of reforms out of the Armenians'
minds once and for all."75 Perhaps this will explain why the murder of
the intellectuals took on such a gruesome character. It is said by
eyewitnesses that on more than one occasion their skulls were crushed
with stones and the brains were thrown to the ground with an invitation
to the victim to dare to "think again."
When the news of the deportations and massacres reached Europe,
many Turks dissociated themselves from the policies of the Ittihad.
Attempting to do so publicly, Mehmet Sherif Pasha, the son of the first
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Grand Vizier of the constitutional regime in 1908, described the
Armenians as industrious and peaceful people. Attempting to explain the
carnage taking place in his homeland, Mehmet Sherif added that "the
Armenians' agitation against despotisms in Turkey and Persia [is a
quality] one suspects has not endeared them to the autocratic 'reformers'
of the Young Turk regime. "76

GENOCIDE: A RADICAL FORM OF POLITICAL
REPRESSION?
The relationship between genocide and domestic change is a theme
which precedes the Young Turks in Ottoman history. Evaluating the
meaning of the Constitution first introduced by Midhat Pasha under the
young Sultan Abdul Hamid II in 1876, Harry Luke wrote that, "[Midhat
Pasha] was sufficiently shrewd and realistic a statesman to know that
only by drastic internal reform, self administered, could the rapidly
dissolving Empire stave off the coup de grace which Russia was impatient to administer. "77 Soon after he felt secure, the Sultan exiled
Midhat Pasha and replaced the Constitution with an administration
repressive enough to invite a revolution from his most resilient subjects,
the Turks. In the introduction to an unsigned study published in 1913,
"Turkey: The Situation of Armenians in Turkey Introduced with Documents, 1908-1912," a commentator discussed the repression of the
massacres of 1894-1896 in the following way:
The top officials of the old regime were convinced that repression is essential
to despotism and refonns are deadly weapons. Seeing the determination of
Armenians to obtain reforms and to make their Turkish compatriots
companions in their aspirations, they preferred to massacre the Armenians as
the ones responsible for the situation, instead of undertaking general refonns
which could have brought the end of despotism and their rule. 8
Given this strong sense of the relationship between repression and
wholesale massacre felt by Armenian leaders and nurtured by events, it
is not surprising that both major parties as well as conservative leaders
could see by 1913 that the Young Turks might be moving in the same
direction as the Sultan. "Turkey is promising reforms for European
consumption," argued a Droshak editorial in June 1913, "but is actually
aiming at the destruction of the Armenian element in Anatolia." Only the
method would be different from the Hamidian massacres, argued the
editorialist. 79 The Hunchakians thought that the scope would be
different too. so
They were both correct, although it seems that none wanted to believe
that the worst actually could happen. The parties did caution the Armenians not to give any reason for provocations. During the initial stages
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of the roundups of leaders, the drafting of young men into the army, the
inspections for caches of arms, and other preliminaries to the actual deportations and massacres, Armenians tended to accede to demands,
avoided any actions which might have been construed as opposing the
state, and hoped that the whole episode would ultimately be forgotten
and that the community would survive with minimum damage. Local
measures such as the murder of a few hundred intellectuals or a few
thousand enlistees were nothing compared to what had been predicted.
In most communities where any self-defense was possible the realization
that the small incidents were part of the larger event came too late to be of
any use. Where communities acted early, such as in Van, Shabin
Garahisar, Musa Dagh, and Urfa, the self-defense became part of the
justification for the genocide while the genocide was progressing.81
To complete the preliminary stages of the genocide, the emasculation
of the nation without risking much resistance, the planners of the
genocide had, in fact, counted on the infinite belief of Armenian leaders
in the possibility of political solutions to their problems. Armenians
were, after all, students of the Enlightenment and devotees of political
discourse once discourse had been made possible by the elevation of the
"revolutionary" Young Turks to power. To believe that their colleagues
from the days of exile in Europe and from the Ottoman Parliament could
in fact use the methods of the Sultan and improve on them was to
undermine the basic motivation for their adoption of the best that the
West had to offer: belief not only in progress by man but also progress
in man, in his perfectibility, in his ability to reason and to do what is
reasonable.
When the Young Turks determined to exterminate the Armenians,
they were not just ridding themselves of another ethnic group; they were
also eliminating the social basis for a substantial change in the regime.
They were not guaranteeing just a turkified Turkey, but also a Turkey
which was closer to the model of the Empire in its heyday: virile and run
by elites who were inspired by ideas beyond the reach of common men
and women, particularly those of a lower race and religion, by ideas
beyond the reach of discourse, abstracted from reality and, ultimately,
from humanity.
The genocide of the Armenian people may be a paradigm for twentieth-century "political" genocides, where the elite's vision was predicated upon the political and sociological dimensions of the society they
wanted to rule over. The return to a traditional order where hierarchies
are in place and unchallenged may be one such vision. Recent genocides, especially the Indonesian, the Cambodian, and the Ibo, have been
more brazenly political in nature, confirming the worst fears that
knowledge of evil does not necessarily result in abhorrence of evil; that
human reasoning can always find ways to characterize evil as being
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something else and to conclude that some societies must be destroyed or
must destroy parts of themselves to be saved.
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12
RELATIONS OF GENOCIDE:
LAND AND LIVES IN THE
COLONIZATION OF AUSTRALIA
Tony Barta

I think of land as the history of my nation. It tells of how we came into
being and what system we must live. My great ancestors who lived in
the times of history planned everything that we practise now. The law
of history says that we must not take land, fight over land, steal land,
give land and so on. My land is mine only because I came in spirit
from that land, and so did my ancestors of the same land ....
My land is my foundation. I stand, live and perform as long as I
have something firm and hard to stand on. Without land ... we will
be the lowest people in the world, because you have broken down our
backbone, took away my arts, history and foundation. You have left
me with nothing. Only a black feller who doesn't care about anything
in the world. My people don't want to be like you!l
-Galarrwuy Yunupingu
The basic fact of Australian history is the conquest of the country by
one people and the dispossession, with ruthless destructiveness, of
another. The recorded effects of this encounter are as clear as they are
terrible. Of the black people who inhabited the continent as "Aborigines," "from the beginning," and who had developed complex languages, cultures, and social organizations in more than 50,000 years of
tribal life, only small minorities survived the first generations of contact
with the white invaders. Driven from their lands, deprived of traditional
food supplies, decimated by introduced diseases, many thousands died
of causes the Europeans would list as "natural." Thousands moreperhaps 20,000-were killed in the raids and reprisals of frontier war, in
massacres, in countless individual acts of violence. 2 Wherever Euro-
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peans were determined to settle, Aborigines were fated to die. Not only
in Tasmania but in all the rapidly occupied south and east of Australia the
processes of colonization and economic expansion involved the virtual
wiping out of the Aboriginal population. Australia-not alone among
the nations of the colonized world-is a nation founded on genocide.
This is not a view which many white Australians share. The majority
have in any case little consciousness of the violence in their past and
resent the increasingly outspoken Aboriginal references to it. They
would prefer to celebrate their bicentennial in 1988 free of black counterdemonstrations and untroubled by the mounting Aboriginal claims for
restoration of land. Among the historians who have shaped the Australian consciousness of the past only very few, very recently, have
emphasized the destruction of the Aborigines as a central fact. If they
have not spoken of genocide-the word appears very rarely3-it is for
reasons of definition which have made the concept inadequate in a case
crying out for its use. What we need, I shall argue, is a conception of
genocide which embraces relations of destruction and removes from the
word the emphasis on policy and intention which brought it into being.
That genocide must be seen as a policy, for which individuals could
be held responsible and called to account, was the main argument behind
Raphael Lemkin's conception. The new word was meant "to signify a
coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential
foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating
the groups themselves. "4 This emphasis on intention and scope, on purposeful annihilation, has given the word its terrible leading edge. It has
succeeded in devaluing all other concepts of less planned destruction,
even if the effects are the same. To be really terrible, an ordeal inflicted
on a people now has to be "genocidal." These essays, too, are written
under that shadow.
"The deliberate destruction of a race or nation"; "acts committed with
intent to destroy in whole or in part a national, ethnical, racial or
religious group as such": all subsequent definitions of genocide have
pressed home the emphasis on planning and purpose.5 Yet we know
that the destruction of many peoples, genocidal outcomes, have been the
result of complex and only obscurely discerned causes, and in that respect genocide should properly lose its uniqueness-the uniqueness of
having intentionality as its defining characteristic. It should not be possible after more than a century of Marxism and other varieties of historiography intent on teasing out dialectics of change behind apparently
singular events to accept the construing of policy as a substitute for explorations of its contexts. This is the issue Karl Marx addressed early
on, when he attempted to establish the sets of relationships structuring
historical reality as the proper object of historical enquiry, rather than
only the intentions and actions of individuals.
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In the investigation of political conditions one is too easily tempted to overlook the objective nature of the relationships and to explain everything from
the will of the persons acting. There are relationships, however, which
detennine the actions of private persons as well as those of individual authorities, and which are as independent as the movements in breathing. Taking
this objective standpoint from the outset, one will not presuppose an exclusively good or bad will on either side. Rather, one will observe relationships
in which only persons appear to act at first 6

Marx did not have genocide-or Australia-in mind; nor was he yet
thinking primarily in terms of economic relationships. Discussion of
capitalism, of imperialism, of colonialism has of course embraced the
kinds of violence associated with the clash of cultures and the imposition
of an alien economic, social, and political order. It is in this way that
Leo Kuper (somewhat reluctantly, it seems to me) acknowledges a contribution of Marxism to our understanding of genocide. He quotes Eric
Wolf on the extermination of hunting and gathering peoples in the name
of civilization, whose representatives then inherit the land: "The progress of civilization across the face of the earth is also a process of
primary accumulation, of robbery in the name of reason." And while
Jean-Paul Sartre is seen as too readily equating colonization with genocide, Kuper recognizes in Sartre's reference to Americans "living out
... a relationship of genocide" with the Vietnamese as a way around
some of the more legalistic approaches to the problem of intent.7
It is this kind of "living out a relationship of genocide," one structured
into the very nature of the encounter, which I wish to explore in the case
of Australia. I will not, I hope, beg the question of how relationships
might be expressive of intentions; I expect to construe intentions from
action (and inaction) and from words as well. But I will assume of actions that they imply relationships, and entail consequences, which
people do not always envisage clearly. Genocide, strictly, cannot be a
crime of unintended consequences; we expect it to be acknowledged in
consciousness. In real historical relationships, however, unintended
consequences are legion, and it is from the consequences, as well as the
often muddled consciousness, that we have to deduce the real nature of
the relationship.
In Australia very few people are conscious of having any relationship
at all with Aborigines. My thesis is that all white people in Australia do
have such a relationship; that in the key relation, the appropriation of the
land, it is fundamental to the history of the society in which they live;
and that implicitly rather than explicitly, in ways which were inevitable
rather than intentional, it is a relationship of genocide.
Such a relationship is systemic, fundamental to the type of society
rather than to the type of state, and has historical ramifications extending
far beyond any political regime. Irving Horowitz (misleadingly, in my
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view) calls Germany "a genocidal society" because during one terrible
period of political aberration the "state bureaucratic apparatus" was used
for "a structural and systematic destruction of innocent people."8 My
conception of a genocidal society-as distinct from a genocidal state-is
one in which the whole bureaucratic apparatus might officially be
directed to protect innocent people but in which a whole race is nevertheless subject to remorseless pressures of destruction inherent in the
very nature of the society. It is in this sense that I would call Australia,
during the whole 200 years of its existence, a genocidal society.
Nothing could have been further from the minds of its founders.
Captain James Cook had taken possession of eastern Australia as "terra
nullius," land not effectively belonging to anyone, so that there was
never any negotiation with the Aboriginal inhabitants. 9 In this certainly
were the seeds of the subsequent genocide: because the Aborigines had
never mixed their labor with the soil to make it productive they had no
right to it and would be cleared from it by those who did. However,
when Captain Arthur Phillip arrived with the first fleet at Botany Bay in
1788 his instructions were unequivocal: he was "by every possible
means to open an intercourse with the natives," to "conciliate their affections," and to enjoin everyone to "live in amity and kindness with them."
He must punish all who should "wantonly destroy them, or give them
any unnecessary interruption in the exercise of their several occupations. "10 The problem, of course, right from the beginning, would be in
defining "wanton destruction" and "unnecessary interruption." Colonizing activity in itself-founding a settlement, planting crops, pasturing
animals-could not be considered under either heading. To "wantonly
destroy" the Aborigines was something very different from taking land
they appeared to make no use of, and the distinction became more important in the maintenance-and modification--0f colonial attitudes as
the area of settlement expanded and Aboriginal resistance increased.
The impulse to expansion was economic. In 1812 it was demonstrated that Australian wool could sell profitably to the Yorkshire mills.
Having displaced the peasant farmers from the British countryside by
enclosures and larger-scale farming (a process of social dislocation not
unrelated to the rise in urban crime and the pressure to transport convicts
to Australia), the agrarian revolution in Britain now helped finance an
expanding textile industry which it could not supply with raw materials
from home production. In 1822 the British government dropped the duty
on wool from its own colony on the other side of the world to one-sixth
of that on German wool. A new wave of free settlers, often only with
sufficient capital for a small starting flock, knew that enterprise and
determination-with much of the frontier hardship borne by convict or
ex-convict stock-keepers-might bring rich rewards. Sheep may seem
unlikely instruments of genocide, but together with the cattle that
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trampled edible plants and fouled the water holes, they were the innocent
embodiment of historical pressures which wrought massive and irremediable destruction. The tide of strange animals loosed on the Aborigines'
carefully tended grazing lands displaced the Aborigines' game and the
Aborigines themselves. If the kangaroo, so curious to the eyes of white
men, represented the ecologically delicate economy of the hunter-gatherers, the sheep, equally odd in the eyes of the blacks, were suitable representatives of the incomprehensible concepts of individual ownership
and private property. The imported animals and the appropriated land
were soon shown-like Byron's stocking-frame-to have a higher value
than human life. The most drastic demonstration was in Tasmania.
In 1817 the European population of Van Diemen's Land stood at
2,000, the Aboriginal population at about the same. By 1830 the Europeans' numbers had increased to 23,500, some 6,000 of whom were
free settlers with capital to invest in the pastoral industry. They had been
granted almost half a million hectares, which they stocked with 1 million
sheep-more than in the whole of New South Wales.11 Nobody
seriously considered the effect of this on the few Aborigines encountered; the settlers were more worried about escaped convict bushrangers.
But the Aborigines were shortly to make their attitude plain, and in the
necessity of fighting a virtual war to protect the settlers Australia was to
at least brush with that more classical mode of genocide, the direct
sanctioning of violence by the state.
The imperial administrator called on to test the viability of humane
principles on the frontier was Colonel George Arthur. He arrived in
Hobart as Lieutenant Governor of Van Diemen's Land in 1824 with a
reputation for having stood up to the slave owners of British Honduras
in defense of an indigenous people, the Mosquito Indians. One of his
first duties, indicative of the way things were to develop, was to approve
the trial and execution of the first two black resistance leaders-one of
them called Mosquito. He also issued a proclamation, in accordance
with Colonial Office instructions, placing the Aborigines under the protection of British law and warning the stock-keepers that if they continued to "wantonly destroy" the Aborigines they would be prosecuted.
Neither during his tenure of office, which saw the rapid escalation of
frontier violence, nor in the subsequent history of the colony was any
European charged, let alone committed for trial, for assaulting or killing
an Aboriginal.
Arthur was no doubt sincere in his desire to protect the Aborigines.
But attacks on settlers continued, and in November 1826, only two and a
half years after his arrival, he gave the settlers the right to drive off any
Aborigines they suspected of meaning them harm, and if their own force
was insufficient they could call on assistance from the nearest detachment of troops. There followed three years of warfare during which
Arthur could find no alternative to the policy being urged on him by the
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settlers; the Aborigines would have to go. As the clamor increased for
their forcible removal to some kind of reserve-or else for a free hand to
the settlers-he confessed, "I cannot divest myself of the consideration
that all aggression originated with the white inhabitants," but it is not
clear that he ever saw this aggression as being synonymous with the
very act of settlement. Settlement, after all, was Arthur's business;
whatever Colonial Office principles of fair treatment might be, they did
not include the re-embarkation of the colonists and the restoration of the
land to savages who had never known how to make it productive. If the
blacks would not allow white expansion to proceed uncontested (and
thirty white deaths in 1827 showed that they would not) their exclusion
from the settled areas was the only option. Under pressure from the
local press-the Hobart Town Courier recalled the removal of the
Indians to the other side of the Mississippi forty years earlier-the final
solution came to be envisaged as removal of all Aborigines from the
main island of Tasmania.
Arthur was only reluctantly pushed into declaring martial law, into
sponsoring the Black Line, a drive across the entire island which despite
ridicule hastened success in clearing the settled areas of Aborigines, and
into the removal of the remainder to special camps on outlying islands.
He was persuaded that the Aborigines were ready to go for their own
good, that removal was necessary for their protection, that once removed
from their traditional lands they would more readily accept the blessings
of white civilization--Christianity and the work ethic-as the only
means to survival. He knew that they might "pine away"; he also knew
that their end would be more violent if they were left among the settlers.
The despair and disease which finished off the last full-blood Aborigines
was not ameliorated by Arthur's hope that their passing be attended by
"every act of kindness." Nor was this decline confined to the southernmost colony, with the smallest black population. In fundamental respects the pattern was repeated in the rest of Australia: pastoral invasion,
resistance, violent victory of the white men, mysterious disappearance of
the blacks.
When a House of Commons Select Committee in 1837 attempted to
understand what was happening to the Aborigines it quoted the Bishop
of Sydney:
They do not so much retire as decay; wherever Europeans meet with them
they appear to wear out, and gradually to decay: they diminish in numbers;
they appear actually to vanish from the face of the earth. I am led to apprehend that within a very limited period, a few years, those who are most in
contact with Europeans will be utterly extinct-I will not say exterminated
-but they will be extinct.12
The bishop had observed well. By 1850 whole tribes from the region
of Sydney had disappeared. The story was the same at Newcastle,
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further north. In the Port Phillip area, after the settlement of Melbourne
in 1835, the numbers dropped from more than 10,000 to less than 2,000
in eighteen years-a decline of over 80 percent. Around Geelong, a
center of pastoral expansion, the decline was from 279 to 36. In the new
colony of South Australia, the number of Aborigines in the region of
Adelaide fell from 650 to 180 in the fifteen years after 1841. Relatively
few of these deaths-perhaps a fifth of them-were the result of direct
violence. The countless undocumented atrocities and the known killings
on the advancing frontier of settlement do not account for the vast
proportions of the disaster. By far the greatest number-possibly twothirds-were killed by the previously unknown illnesses against which
Aborigines had no resistance (chiefly smallpox) but also by alcohol and
malnutrition. Aborigines had a low resistance to alcohol and tobacco and
the respiratory complaints which were exacerbated by the European
conventions of clothing (often worn when wet) and housing (now fixed,
but without adequate sanitation). Malnutrition, in the almost instantaneous adaptation to a high carbohydrate European diet-flour and
sugar were irresistible innovations-played a part in the dramatically
lowered birthrate, as did venereal disease.13 A greater part, too easily
underestimated, was played by demoralization and despair. If the Europeans only half understood the inability of the Aborigines to withstand
civilization and too readily saw them as a race doomed to extinction,
Aborigines themselves had reason to be fatalistic. With many of their
women bearing mixed-race children to white men, the black birthrate
dramatically in decline, their social structure destroyed, and their traditional culture impossible to maintain, many Aborigines could hardly envisage a future in such a cataclysmic world. They knew the white men's
ways, and they knew that the kind of statements now treated as empty
rhetoric by many historians expressed the white man's view of the real
relationship between the races, the genuinely historic terms of the
encounter.
We cannot shut our eyes to the inevitable destiny of the Aborigines-the
incontrovertible fact that the propagation of the race has ceased-and the consequence, that the present generation of Aborigines is the last that will have
existence.... we have already expressed an opinion, which under the expectation of receiving obloquy of pseudo-philanthropists, we unhesitatingly
repeat, that the perpetuation of the race of Aborigines is not to be desired.
That they are an inferior race of human beings it is in vain to deny; (the
probable extinction of the race from natural causes is a proof of this); and it is
no more desirable that any inferior race should be perpetuated, than that the
transmission of an hereditary disease, such as scrofula or insanity, should be
encouraged. In the case of the Aborigines, the process of their extinction is
the result, in a great degree, of natural causes; and even if not beyond cure, is
scarcely to be regretted .... This may be considered a harsh, cruel view of
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the question, but it is founded upon clear conviction, and is not unkindly
meant. 14
The immediate context of this statement, an expression of editorial
opinion by The Geelong Advertiser in 1846, was a discussion-intended
to be realistically supportive-of missionary efforts to help the Aborigines. The larger context was Geelong's new status, within a decade
of its foundation, as one of the busiest wool ports in the world, the
center of pastoral expansion into that area of potential wealth called by its
white discoverer "Australia Felix." In these vast grasslands individuals
with sufficient capital and pioneering spirit could take up "runs" as
"squatters" on Crown Land.15 If not every squatter had to kill for the
land which would now be his, he knew that the necessity to protect his
flocks and stockmen from Aborigines might arise and that if the
Aborigines did not threaten him it was because some of them had already
been killed-"taught a lesson"-by other settlers. The Geelong Advertiser, which since the previous year had added "and Squatters' Advocate" to its masthead, was vocal in retailing the "depredations" and
"outrages" of the blacks and in demanding military protection from a too
philanthropic government. So the reality of land seizure by whites, and
clearing or at least "pacification" of blacks, was the context of all
government policy in Victoria, too, as it had been in Tasmania.
The strategies adopted by a harassed, undermanned administration
were to be the same elsewhere, until every yard of the continent had been
appropriated. "Protectors" would be appointed to round up the Aborigines and "civilize" them, while saving them from the settlers. Those
who resisted this path to social and cultural destruction risked more
immediate annihilation at the hands of a new and deadly force of black
troopers formed in response to settler demands. Expert at tracking down
and "dispersing" Aborigines accused of crimes against people or property, the Native Mounted Police were an effective instrument for securing the displacement of one people by another in most of Australia.
Nowhere was the displacement achieved without official and unofficial
killing. Everywhere the killing-whether officially sanctioned or notwas understood as necessary to the establishment of the new economic
and social order.
The connection between appropriation and violence was lost on no
one. From the first expansion of the zone of settlement around Sydney
there had been official encouragement for the settlers to form vigilante
groups, and in 1824, to protect the flocks and herds spilling out onto the
plains beyond the mountains, martial law was declared for five months.
No casualty figures were ever reported, but in that time the Aboriginal
problem was generally considered solved: there was no more trouble in
the Bathurst area. Later the missionary L. E. Threlkeld gave an account
of what had been told to him. It is thick with the language of genocide.
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One of the largest holders of Sheep in the Colony, maintained at a public
meeting at Bathurst, that the best thing that could be done, would be to shoot
all the Blacks and manure the ground with their carcases, which was all the
good they were fit for! It was recommended likewise that the Women and
Children should especially be shot as the most certain method of getting rid of
the race. Shortly after this declaration, martial law was proclaimed, and sad
was the havoc made upon the tribes at Bathurst A large number were driven
into a swamp, and mounted police rode round and round and shot them off
indiscriminately until they were all destroyed! When one of the police enquired of the Officer if a return should be made of the killed, wounded there
were none, all were destroyed, Men, Women and Children! the reply
was;-that there was no necessity for a return. But forty-five heads were
collected and boiled down for the sake of the skulls! My informant, a
Magistrate, saw the skulls packed for exportation in a case at Bathurst ready
for shipment to accompany the commanding Officer on his voyage shortly
afterwards taken to England.16
Such massacres took place on every colonial frontier: in Australia the
terrible story of shootings, decapitations, and poisonings continued into
the twentieth century.17 There was open discussion of atrocities in the
press, many of them involving troopers supposedly upholding the law,
and many more incidents than were ever reported lived on in Aboriginal
memory. One of the best documented, because the Attorney General of
New South Wales was determined to show that the law (unlike the land)
could not be taken into private hands, was the Myall Creek Massacre of
1838. Some thirty peaceful and friendly Aborigines on Myall Creek
station were kidnapped by twelve white stockmen and the entire group,
men, women, and children, slaughtered. Although the bodies were
burned beyond recognition, seven of the killers were tried and-at the
second attempt--convicted. Amidst enormous public outrage at this
victimization of men who had acted no differently (it was asserted) from
government agents in the same area some weeks before, and despite a
defense lobby organized by the squatters, they were hanged. Their jailer
reported that right to the end all of the men maintained "that as it was
done solely in defence of their masters' property ... they were not
aware that in destroying the aboriginals they were violating the law, or
that it could take cognizance of their having done so, as it had (according
to their belief) been so frequently done in the colony before. "18
It is true that the colonial government, prodded by the disquiet expressed in the House of Commons, now attempted to assert its authority
over the settlers and to make its protection of the Queen's black subjects
more effective. But the government knew it was dealing with a larger
historical encounter whose effects it could at best mitigate. It knew that
its own position represented a fundamental denial of Aboriginal claims
"whether as sovereigns or proprietors of the soil," and the settlers knew
it, too. When they demanded that "energetic and effectual steps" be
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taken against the Aborigines because they were "convinced that such a
course will eventually prove to be the most humane and merciful," they
knew there was after all no dispute about the necessity to protect "the
laudable and enterprising pursuit of a pastoral life in the interior" or their
status as "pioneers of civilisation." 19 The government was able to proceed with the appointment of protectors because it was understood that
their mission would be a civilizing one-rounding up Aborigines and
showing them the benefits of Christianity. They would not interfereand would in fact stop the Aborigines from interfering-with the
"laudable and enterprising" incorporation of the continent into the
capitalist economy.
The settlers won on the ground, and it is their history, pioneers of
civilization in a harsh continent, inevitably displacing the stone age
tribes, which remains the conventional view. Very few Australians are
aware of the ruthlessness of the process; sympathy for Aboriginal fringedwellers, out of sight and out of mind, is low. Claims for land rights are
often met with derision. References to the subsequent history of attitudes to the Aborigines-" smoothing the pillow of a dying race," removing children from parents, forcing assimilation of half-castes, insisting
that the majority culture of white Australians must be embraced by
Aborigines if they are to survive (this has remained the basis of policy in
most areas up to the present)-are assumed to be either excusable
("that's the way they thought in those days") or, in common-sense way,
inevitable. Certainly nobody now, despite occasional remarks later
passed off as jokes, thinks in terms of extermination. So the idea that
the consistent, indeed mounting pressure toward incorporation in the
now even more internationalized Australian economy is in some way
related to genocide is incomprehensible. In fact, all the subsequent
pressure on the Aborigines as a people is a direct result of their losing the
unequal war for possession of the land. It is possible that a people less
weakened by disease might have resisted more successfully; it is not
possible to imagine a settler class less determined to break that resistance. The killing on the frontier, then, had to be of a kind that would
destroy the ability of Aborigines to survive as independent peoples, with
their own social organization, ethnic separateness, and cultural value
system in conflict with the world view and economic interest of the
invaders. This was clearly understood at the time, by both sides. The
Europeans knew that if they could not establish their right to secure
property-possession of the land-they had no future; the Aborigines
knew that when they lost the fight for the land, all was lost. The fatalism
of the black people's "fading away" from those areas where the white
man's civilization so quickly triumphed was not very mysterious. In the
ten years to 1849 only twenty births were recorded amongst all the seven
tribes around Melbourne. But without the land to which their whole
being belonged, without the sacred sites and ceremonies which ex-
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pressed the meaning and purpose of Aboriginal life, how could a future
life be envisioned? Derrimut, of the Yarra people, said to a European in
the 1840s:
You see ... all this mine, all along here Derrimut's once; no matter now,
me soon tumble down.... Why me have lubra? Why me have piccaninny? You have all this place, no good have children, no good have lubra,
me tumble down and die very soon now.
And Billibellary, an elder of the same group, apparently explaining the
increase in the traditional practice of infanticide:
The Black lubras say now no good children, Blackfellow say no country now
for them, very good we kill and no more come up Pickaninny. 20
To veil the realities of this conflict behind the cloudy rhetoric of "the
fatal impact" is to deny historical responsibility by refusing historical
analysis. "We Australians," a Melbourne sociologist recently assured
newspaper readers, "have inherited the wreckage of one of the many
cultural tragedies that litter human history. When a strong and a weak
culture meet, the latter invariably dies." It was not a matter of anyone
being at fault in the past, so we should not overreact in the presentnotably by "rushing in dripping with guilt to give away huge sections of
the country" which might (through mining) be of benefit to all Australians.21 I am aware that the large-scale "relations of genocide" I propose can imply a similar "no one is to blame" approach. The difference,
I hope, is in an insistence that relations imply connections within systems, and that the whole system needs to be critically explored.
What Marx said in 1843 referred to the economic and societal pressures on the Moselle wine growers, but it is equally apt to the situation
of Australian wool growers at the same time. It was not "an exclusively
good or bad will on either side" which caused the destruction of the
Aborigines but "the objective nature of the relationships" between
(white) capitalist wool producers and (black) hunter-gatherers. Local encounters were always between individuals, and individual attitudes could
make an immediate difference between life and death. The quality of
personal relationships varied according to the whole range of individual
character and circumstance, but the larger encounter and the inescapable
relationship was between totally incompatible forms of economy and
society.
At the center of this relationship-both in consciousness and in
actuality-was the land. Both peoples, the Aboriginal inhabitants and
the invaders, needed the land. Because of the uses for which each
people needed the land, and because of the cultural gulf in understandings about the land, coexistence was impossible. The black people
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belonged to the land, their being was part of it and it was part of them.
Collectively and individually, it was their life. To the white people it
was land to be brought into production; that production was at the center
of their culture and the basis of their social order. Collectively, taking
over the land was the driving force of the colonists; individually, they
saw the land as potential and then actual property. Once appropriated by
one man it belonged to him alone-even if normally owned by the state
power which had claimed it all. Very few of the invaders had a sense of
alienating the land from the Aborigines; how extreme a form of alienation
it was they understood even less. The men who put their capital into
land knew they had a relationship, through wage labor, with the men
who helped them make the land productive, even if they would not have
recognized any alienation of labor into capital through that relationship.
With the Aborigines there were generally no relations of production,
only relations-again by means of capital-through the land. So the key
relation between white and black was one of total alienation: that was the
condition of the triumph.of a taken for granted economic, social, and
political order in an "alien" land
It will still be objected that taking over a continent and destroying its
inhabitants are two very different things. And-as I have been at pains
to agree-the determination to do one did not imply the intention to do
the other. Only a minority "had to" kill, as they saw it, in defense of
their property, or in defense of their own lives-lives on the line because
of commitment to property. But the violence accompanying the appropriation of the land was of a scale and ruthlessness-largely uncurbed by
official intervention-which could leave no doubt in black or white
minds as to the fate of those who resisted the "inevitable" course of
events, and it can be no coincidence that it was accompanied, among
those with no thought of murder in their minds, by much talk of the
"inevitable" dying out of the black race. I do not think it is too simplistic
to see in this dominant opinion the most comfortable ideological
reflection of a relationship which could not be recognized in good
conscience for what it was-a relationship of genocide.
In some larger human reckoning, it has been pointed out, the economic development of Australia benefited more people than it harmed.
By the end of the nineteenth century, "three million Australians and
millions of people in other lands were being fed by a continent which in
its tribal heyday had supported only a fraction of that number." The new
sheep industry in Australia provided work in English mills and warmth
to millions in Europe and North America. 22 And it was the blanket, a
typical and beneficent product of the new capitalist world economy,
which provided the symbol both of the production relations and the relations of dispossession which came together in the appropriation of the
land. Made productive according to the original justification for its
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seizure, the land was never acknowledged in principle or practice as having been taken from previous owners. Therefore no payment or compensation was ever offered. But for many years the acknowledgment
that a black fringe-dweller was a full-blood Aborigine, deserving at least
of government charity, was the issue of a new blanket, completing its
journey from the wool of the seized grasslands, through the mill of the
industrial economy, to the survivors of the dispossessed.
We were hunted from our ground, shot, poisoned, and had our daughters,
sisters and wives taken from us .... What a number were poisoned at
Kilcoy .... They stole our ground where we used to get food, and when
we got hungry and took a bit of flour or killed a bullock to eat, they shot us or
poisoned us. All they give us now for our land is a blanket once a year. 23
Times change, commodities at the center of the economy change,
ways of negotiation change. Aborigines in the far north of Australia,
where the climate and landscape were less congenial to European settlement, met the white onslaught later and with greater numbers. Some
who still remember the massacres-the last shooting by a police party
took place in 1928-finally, in the 1970s, acquired rights to significant
areas of reserve land. But the pressure at the frontier of the yet more
transnational economy has not let up. Bauxite, industrial diamonds,
uranium-a substance whose genocidal potential for the first time
threatens the white peoples of the world as well-have joined pastoral
products as necessary commodities which black peoples, in the name of
the greater good, should not stand in the way of. Some would have the
Aborigines stand finn against uranium mining. The Aborigines know
the uranium will be mined when there is a market for it and that their
choices in the future are not separable from what has happened in the
past. They know that the relations of power between black and white
may still be modified, but that their fundamental weighting will not be
changed.24 In that sense the relations of genocide are alive, and every
negotiation will continue to be witnessed by the Aboriginal dead.
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MIDDLEMAN MINORITIES AND
GENOCIDE
Walter P. Zenner

Africans have rioted against Asians in South Africa and Kenya. The
Asians were expelled from Uganda. Chinese have been persecuted
throughout Southeast Asia and expelled from Vietnam. Japanese Americans in the United States were interned in 1942. Armenians by the
hundreds of thousands and Jews by the millions were slaughtered in this
century. All of these events have given rise to the connection between
middleman minorities and the victims of genocide.I "Middleman" or
"trading" minorities are ethnic groups which are disproportionately
represented in occupations related to commerce, especially in the small
business sector. As minorities, they are not part of the ruling elite,
although many may become quite affluent. It is this lack of power which
makes them vulnerable to violence. The connection is certainly present
in the last two cases, although the other cases, while reporting interethnic conflict and violence, do not refer to genocide per se.
Genocide is defined legally in terms of the intentional physical
annihilation of all or part of a group of people on racial, religious, or
ethnic lines. This definition approximates what Helen Fein, following
Vahakn Dadrian, has called "optimal genocide" and the manner in which
Yehuda Bauer has distinguished the Nazi Holocaust against the Jews
from most other "genocides."2 Genocide is a species of the more general category of "massacre," which involves "the intentional killing by
political actors of a significant number of relatively defenseless people."
Genocide, however, differs from ordinary massacres, because of its
scope and aims. In the case of genocide, the aim is to transform a social
field by removing a whole group of actors, not merely to terrorize the
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group's survivors. It also differs from another favored form of population elimination, namely, expulsion or enforced emigration.3
Genocide by this definition has been directed at a wide variety of
peoples. Probably the largest number of ethnic groups in recent times
subject to genocide, although usually involving small numbers of individuals, have been peoples subsisting by hunting, gathering, and shifting horticulture (see Chapter 12). Other groups have also been subjected
to genocide and various other forms of liquidation, such as the kulaks
(or so-called wealthy peasants) in the Soviet Union under Stalin, or the
Communists of Indonesia after the attempted coup of 1965, or the Muslims of Hamah (Syria) in 1982. None of these events points to a connection between middleman minorities and genocide. Still, the fact that
two large-scale genocides were committed against groups generally
identified as middleman minorities means that the link cannot be ignored
Indeed, the international convention against genocide was formulated in
the wake of the Nazi campaign against the Jews, which can be seen as
the prototype for the concept of genocide itself.
In this essay, those theories which have examined the middleman
minority phenomenon will be examined in terms of what they say about
the victimization of these ethnic groups in general and with regard to
genocide in particular. This will be followed by a brief comparison of
middleman minorities which have or have not been subjected to various
forms of persecution.

MIDDLEMANISHNESS AS A PRECONDITION FOR
VICTIMIZATION4
Middleman minority theories in modern social science began with
theories which strove to explain the special position of the Jew in
medieval and modem Europe. Several of these theories, particularly
those of Werner Sombart and Max Weber, debated the role of the Jew in
the creation of modem capitalist economies, not in understanding the
reasons for hostility toward the Jew. Indirectly, both sociologists suggest that Jewish culture is responsible for hostility against Jews. Sombart was generally hostile to the bourgeois-capitalist form of enterprise,
for which the Jews as well as other ethnic groups were responsible.
Weber saw traditional Jewish forms of capitalism as being quite different
from the rational capitalism that arose out of Puritanism. Unlike the
Puritans, according to Weber, the Jews practiced a double standard of
economic ethics, treating out-group members differently from members
of their own group and not viewing work and business as a sacred vocation. While Sombart and Weber differed in their views on the roles of
Judaism and Puritanism and in their politics, neither dealt with the victimization of the Jews per se.5
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Wilhelm Roscher, Georg Simmel, and Ferdinand Toennies saw the
Jewish problem in terms of intergroup relations. Roscher, the earliest of
these three, analyzed the Jewish role in the medieval economic European
economy, although he compared Jews with other groups as well.
Roscher, based on then available historical data, found that the Jews
controlled commerce in the early Middle Ages, only to be displaced by
Christian merchants in the latter part of that period. In the early period
the Jews were dominant, because they, as strangers, introduced monetary commerce into a feudal economy. They occupied a niche in the
society as traders. As the society grew, Christians aspired to the position which Jews occupied, and through use of their power they displaced
the Jews.
Simmel and Toennies considered the role of the trader as an intermediary between different groups of people, as one who is simultaneously within a society and outside it, as one who is distant even when
physically nearby. The marginality of the intermediary makes him more
objective, thus serving his success as a trader (and in other roles), but
causing ambivalence on the part of others. They suggest a dialectical
relationship between the intermediary who may or may not be a member
of an out-group and members of a particular community.
An important part of the "stranger-intermediary" involves credit. In
borrowing, the debtor reveals much of himself to the borrower. One
may prefer to borrow from a stranger, who has little power over other
aspects of one's life, but the high cost of such credit also breeds resentment. The ambivalence toward credit from a "stranger," even a
familiar alien, lies at the heart of commercial arrangements involving
minority middlemen and their majority clients. 6 Even though the role of
intermediary may be a necessary one, it may produce deep-seated
hostility.
The elements of "middlemanishness" stressed by these five authors
continue to be the ones which form the basis for middleman minority
theory. The term "middleman minority" comes from Howard P. Becker,
but the theories, which increasingly have been concerned with Asian
immigrants and others rather than with Jews, have continued to make
use of ideas formulated in an earlier time. The minority's ethnic specialization, in the first instance, is created by a status gap. The societies need
people to do certain jobs in commerce and crafts; this is especially true of
feudal and colonial societies, but such gaps may appear in modern
industrial societies as well. The minority which occupies this niche is
generally of foreign origin or otherwise distinguished from the rest of the
population. Its success in occupying this niche is enhanced by its ethnic
solidarity and by certain attributes such as frugality and a double standard of economic ethics. Hostility toward the minority is the result of the
tensions between the minority as successful traders and entrepreneurs
against majority group members who are their clients, employees, and

256

Walter P. Zenner

competitors. As more and more majority group members compete with
the minority, hostility against the minority increases. The minority is
also a convenient scapegoat, because of its frequent association with the
ruling classes, who were their initial patrons.7
Edna Bonacich's revision of middleman minority theory by applying
it to immigrant groups in contemporary capitalist societies has renewed
interest and debate. She has connected the middleman minorities to other
ethnic groups by showing the similarities between the split-labor market
and the situation of immigrant small businessmen. Both pertain to sectors of the economy which are shunned by natives because of the paltry
rewards for hard labor, but, at the same time, both the immigrant laborer
and the alien small businessman are seen as unfair competitors. While
pointing to empty niches in the economy which minority middlemen fill,
she did not see the necessity of positing a status gap in these societies. 8
From the debates of Weber and Sombart on, those explaining the
connection between ethnicity and commerce have often disagreed with
each other quite sharply. Rather than thinking of a single theory of middleman minorities, it is more appropriate to see middleman minority
theory as a subset of hypotheses and propositions which deal with the
meeting of economics and ethnicity.
One issue in the discussion of middleman minorities and victimization
is determining situations in which these minorities escape persecution.
Among the factors which appear to cause such reactions are competition
with the out-group (or groups), visibility as strangers, and visibility as a
separate ethnic group.
The first of these involves objective features of the economic scene.
In the ideal model of the Indian caste system, there is a caste division of
labor into which foreign groups could be incorporated. Each group contributes to the whole, and the society is permeated by an ideology recognizing the role of each without challenge. Indeed, we find that the
Parsis, a fairly typical middleman minority in western India, and the
Jews of India, who served in various occupational roles, did not suffer
from persecution.9 In the ideal status gap setting, such as in early
medieval Germany or even in eastern Poland during the inter-World War
period, the situation is similar. Again, various authorities suggest that
persecution of Jews in pre-Crusades Germany, pre-World War II
Volhynia, and the Belorussian areas was not as severe as in other times
and places.to
Another objective feature is that minority members are more likely to
be seen as non-threatening in an open society with a growing economy.
Then they may be seen as individuals, not group members, and their
contributions are welcome. The openness to innovation may be limited
to certain sectors or regions of a country or may encompass the whole
society. Thus, in frontier areas minority members will be welcomed
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more than in old areas, while they may find opportunities in either abandoned sectors of the economy, such as urban slums, or in new lines,
such as the film industry in the early 1900s. Thus, such niches will be
filled by disproportionate numbers of minority members. 11 Contrariwise, a shrinking economic base with growing impoverishment is likely
to result in anti-minority sentiment. This is especially true if the minority
is growing and if its share of the societal wealth is growing. Perception
of such growth, even if only apparent, may be sufficient to cause a rise
in xenophobia.12
The perception of the minority by the majority is important when
theorists speak about such variables as visibility and ethnic solidarity.
Bonacich, who isolated ethnic solidarity as a factor in both the success of
the minority and in their persecution, has also pointed to the fact that
such minority communities are frequently rent by intense factionalism
and other rivalries.13 If there is much solidarity, it is most frequently
found at an interpersonal familial level or in friendships formed in the
community of origin. Yet, to outsiders, the minority is often seen as
more united than it is: the famous psychological principle that all outgroupers look alike.
The effects of discrimination and persecution are twofold. On the one
hand, they may induce group members to seek assimilation into the
majority, especially its elite. On the other, they may react defensively
and thus such action may reinforce group solidarity. These two reactions may come simultaneously, affecting different segments of a single
minority. Thus we find that European Jewry during the late nineteenth
century spawned assimilationists, Christian converts, and universalistic
revolutionaries on the one hand, and Zionists and fervent Orthodox Jews
on the other.
While most middleman minority theories see ethnic solidarity as reinforcing the xenophobia of the majority, assimilatory trends may have a
similar effect. Minority members attempting to assimilate compete even
more directly with majority members for places in universities, the army,
the civil service, and other niches in the society. Since the majority tends
to perceive all members of the minority as being part of a unified whole,
it is easy to see how they may come to see all members of the minority,
whether assimilationist, radical, conservative, or religious, as playing
different roles in a single conspiracy against the majority.14
The proportion of the minority to the majority may play a role in the
way it is perceived by the majority. Stanislav Andreski has argued that if
the minority is 10 percent or more of the population, it has reached a
critical point of conspicuousness.15 The only exception he claims to a
high proportion leading to such molestation is in New York City, where
the position of the Jews has made it possible to fend off persecution. He
sees the importance of numbers in that it leads to points of friction be-
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tween majority and minority members. On the other hand, he does not
claim that smaller numbers inevitably lead to freedom from discrimination.
Numbers and proportions, however, are tricky indeed. Germany in
1933 gave rise to the movement which caused the Holocaust par
excellence. The proportion of Jews was less than one percent of the total
population. Yet the total "war against the Jews" was initiated and organized by a German, not a Polish, government Again, perception is important The proportion of Jews in prominent social positions and in the
major German-speaking cities, including Vienna, was higher than in the
country as a whole. There also were Jews throughout the country,
including many in rural areas. This made the Jew in early twentiethcentury Germany loom larger than percentages would suggest
An important part of a perception is whether one is seen as a "native"
or as a "stranger." (Alternatively, a minority member may wish to be
seen as an individual on one's own account, rather than as a representative of a collectivity.) Entrepreneurs in early nineteenth-century
Britain might be primarily Scots or Dissenters, like Quakers-Le.,
members of distinctive groups within the society, but natives. The businessmen of Casablanca include Berbers from the Sous region and Arabs
from the city of Fes, both groups of Moroccan Muslims, albeit
distinctive ones. In addition, there are Jews, who are Moroccans but not
Muslims, and Frenchmen who are neither.16 Thus there are degrees of
"nativity" and "strangerhood."
Urbanization and other forms of internal migration may upset the
feelings of neighborliness which may have come to mark relations in
rural areas. In the older cities or in the countryside, an equilibrium based
on complementarity and toleration may have been established. With
massive urbanization, however, all out-groupers may be seen as hostile
strangers, and competitiveness and envy of successful minority members
may be the new order of the day. Large-scale international migrations
would amplify such a perception. The mass emigration of Jews from
Russia and the Polish provinces of the Austro-Hungarian Empire during
the late nineteenth century upset relations between the small Jewish
populations of Western Europe and the United States and their Gentile
neighbors. The large-scale emigration of Chinese to Southeast Asia in
the late nineteenth century had similar effects for the more acculturated
Chinese in those countries.
Visibility of the minority is heightened by its own characteristics,
such as concentration in certain occupations, a special religion or
religious practices, racial signs, and speaking a separate language. This
occurs most obviously when the minority consists of recent immigrants,
but in multilingual or multi-religious areas, members of several ethnic
groups may have shared a single region for generations, such as in much
of Eastern Europe and the Middle East.

Middleman Minorities and Genocide

259

For these elements of estrangement to result in conflict, other elements must be added. Political mobilization which may utilize the minority as a target is an important one. In such a case, the members of the
minority are seen as representatives of a group. Usually such a political
mobilization is connected with an ideology. Two elements combine in
anti-middleman ideology. One is to view commerce, especially that
engaged in by stranger-middlemen, as evil and as violating the rights of
natives. In its extreme form, moneymaking is seen as diabolical. 17 The
second is to view the minority middlemen as foreign agents who are enemies of the nation, whether this is the Bolsheviks, the Pope, or the
Japanese Empire. Both serve to dehumanize the minority middlemen;
when combined they form a potent weapon to use against them, and this
helps exacerbate the normal frictions between businessmen, their competitors, and their clients.
While those opposed to particular minorities follow strategies to
convince the majority and the ruling classes of the minorities' estrangement, the minorities follow various strategies with an opposite intention.
They may seek to lower their profile and to be less conspicuous. Thus
they may refrain from open political activity as an ethnic group and may
give up their language, religion, and the like. They may strive to convince their fellows that while they maintain a separate identity, they are
full members of the nation. Thus they may stress their participation in
the struggle for independence by the nation-state. They may try to
change the ethnic group's occupational structure and otherwise reform
themselves so as to answer their critics. Finally, they may stress a
political ideology that gives them full rights of citizenship as individuals.
In post-World War II North America, several ethnic groups once labeled
middleman minorities have made considerable progress along these
lines, including the Jews and the Japanese.18
Middleman minority status thus seems to cause victimization when the
friction derived from trade relationships is compounded by ethnocentrism and by ideologies which dehumanize all alien-traders. Even if the
minority, however, is in some ways victimized, the types of victimization range from mild discrimination to optimal genocide. Middleman
minorities have a special vulnerability to attack because their social
position is one with some wealth but with little authority or power. Even
if most members of the minority are extremely poor, there are usually
some who are affluent and excite envy. The minority is usually dependent on the ruling class, which sacrifices the minority as a scapegoat.
The minority is generally unarmed. Because of its business connections,
it must be essentially sedentary.19
Some of these qualities may under some circumstances be a strength.
The weak, unarmed nature of the minority may make it possible for the
majority to tolerate the minority. Such was indeed the position of the
Jews under Islam, where for centuries they were outside the power

260

Walter P. Zenner

struggle. Jewish officials might serve as scapegoats, and mobs might
attack Jews as a whole when they fell, but they were also to be tolerated
if they showed proper deference for the majority. The occasional attacks
can be seen as a ritual to restore the proper deference. 20
Middleman minorities as groups may have some protection through
their dispersion, in that one place may be a refuge when another is
perilous, although if the net used against them is wide enough this is of
little avail. Since such minorities are often recent immigrants, their
former homeland may offer protection and/or refuge. This, however,
has often proven hazardous, especially if the homeland is the enemy of
their present place of residence and makes the sense of threat seen by
their hosts realistic, as in the cases of the Jews of Syria after 1948 and
the Japanese Americans during World War IL

PROBLEMS IN THE COMPARISON OF GENOCIDES
Certain problems of comparison can be found throughout the social
sciences. First, no two situations, events, or other units of analysis are
identical. When taken to the extreme, realization of this fact would make
any comparison impossible, but it should be kept in mind. Two, studying more than one case often necessitates spending less time and effort
on each case than if one were devoting all of one's attention to a single
instance. While several examples will bring out crucial features which
need to be compared, the presentation of each case becomes more superficial as the number of cases increases. Where a great many cases are
used, as in cross-cultural or cross-national correlational studies, complex
patterns must be reduced to relatively simple abstractions. Three, the
definition of the units of analysis is always a difficult task. Four, studies
on particular cases are often quite different in quality.
These problems are acute in the study of genocides. Uniqueness has,
of course, been argued with regard to the Jewish Holocaust of 19411945, although in the process both Bauer and Dawidowicz have
compared these events to others. Bauer comes close to admitting that the
Holocaust does have some resemblance to the Armenian genocide during
World War 1.21 The second problem is one endemic to comparison and
not particular to this area. Problems of unit definition are, however,
important. Social scientists are accustomed to dealing with nation-states
as units; yet problems spill over national frontiers. This is especially true
in times of armed conflict. The Jewish Holocaust and attendant genocides of other groups during World War II took place at a time when
Germany rapidly spread its control over most of the European continent
and then retreated. Thus the nation-state approach has had to be
modified considerably.22 The Armenian genocide was contained within
the Ottoman Empire. On the other hand, in the East African cases of
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Asian expulsions possible demonstration effects of the Kenyan partial
expulsion on Uganda must be taken into account. In addition, the reaction of receiving countries, particularly Great Britain, depended on
internal factors. This was also relevant with regard to other expulsions,
as we shall see, such as the role of Malaysia and Indonesia at the time of
the 1978-1979 refugee crisis involving ethnic Chinese. In defining the
unit of analysis, attention must be paid to temporal dimensions as well as
spatial ones. In considering European Jewry, does one begin the Holocaust in 1933 with the rise of the Nazis to power or in 1939 with the
invasion of Poland? Does one consider the 1894 massacres under Abdul
Hamid II as forerunners of the 1916 genocide or as pa.rt of it? When one
concentrates on the preconditions, this question is less crucial than in
dealing with other aspects of the genocidal events, but the question is
still relevant. Scale also plays a role in our consideration since some
ethnic groups discussed here are much smaller than others.
A problem faced by comparativists is that of the differing bodies of
literature on each group or crisis. There is an immense and growing
literature on the Holocaust and a smaller but substantial body of material
on the Armenian massacres and genocide. Those dealing with Asians in
East Africa and Chinese from Vietnam are much smaller, especially since
these are events which occurred much closer to the present. The former
two literatures are dominated by participants and historians, while the
latter two are dominated by social scientists. The richness of the work
on European Jewry, anti-Semitism, and the Holocaust is overwhelming,
compared with the much thinner data available on the other communities.
In this essay, I will compare a number of middleman minorities,
beginning with those who were not subjected to extreme harassment.
They will be compared to those persecuted and expelled, as well as to
those subjected to "optimal genocide." The comparison made here is
suggestive and not definitive; the units used are not strictly comparable.
For our cases of non-persecution or only minor harassment, the Parsis
of western India and the Jews of Morocco will be used. In dealing with
expulsions, recent cases from Africa and Asia are cited. One such example, that of the Chinese in Vietnam, is considered in greater detail. This
particular instance was quite recent and, at the same time, suggested
many parallels to one phase of Nazi persecution which preceded genocide proper, namely, the refugee crisis of 1938-1939. It is important that
we understand what differentiates such forms of population elimination
from the full-scale Holocaust
There is some agreement that total or near-total murder of peoples
occurred in only two cases of persecution of middleman minorities-that
of the Jews by the Nazis and that of the Armenians by the Young Turk
regime. The material on these two cases is better formulated than that on
the others. Dadrian and Robert Melson, in particular, have analyzed the
events which led up to the deportations and liquidation of Armenians in

262

Walter P. Zenner

1915 in social scientific terms, which makes comparison easier.23 The
work done on the Nazi "war against the Jews" is huge; various authorities, such as Bauer, Dawidowicz, and Fein, have addressed themselves
to a number of issues of interpretation in which they have summarized
the literature available. Rather than summarizing the history of the
Armenian and Jewish holocausts again, I will refer to these events, assuming some knowledge on the part of the reader. In all cases, descriptions will be brief, and those interested are referred to the sources listed
in the notes. 24
All of the minorities in question are concentrated occupationally in
commercial and related occupations. While the ramifications of this vary
from place to place, this is not gone into here. Among the points to be
compared are the following:
a. recency of foreign origin;
b. visibility of the group;
c. degree to which the minority is separated from the majority on cultural, racial, religious, and linguistic lines (nativity and strangerhood);
d. degree of impoverishment of the society at large at the time of
conflict;
e. the minority's proportion of the population at large;
f. the minority's perceived share of the national wealth (separate occupational role);
g. extent of complementarity and/or competition with the majority;
h. the absence of common foes and the relationship of the internal ethnic conflict to external relations of the nation.
These points of comparison suggest that the occupational specialization of the minority is but one aspect influencing its ultimate fate. 25

EXAMPLES OF MIDDLEMAN MINORITIES
Just as middleman minorities are not the only victims of genocide, so
they are not inevitably the subjects of persecution. One example is that
of the Parsis of western India, who were neither persecuted in premodem times nor in the twentieth century when India was the scene of
much inter-religious and inter-ethnic conflict. Previously, the Indian
Parsi and Jewish cases were explained in terms of the complementarity
implicit in the traditional caste system, but this does not explain why no
persecution (apart from two minor instances of riots) took place when
other conflicts and massacres engulfed India. Here structural explanations have some cogency. The Parsis are neither Hindu nor Muslim;
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rather, they belong to the ancient Persian religion of Zoroastrianism.
They have been in western India for a thousand years and they speak
Gujerati, the local language. While the Parsis were clearly demarcated as
an ethno-religious group which was concentrated in certain sectors of the
economy and were more prosperous than the general populace in an
impoverished nation, they were a small and declining group. In 1971,
there were approximately 91,000 Parsis in India, approximately 70
percent living in Bombay. This was fewer than in 1941, in a country
where the population was over 400 million and growing. Even within
Bombay their proportion of the population was declining and their once
great local political power had vanished. Until very recently Bombay
had prided itself on its inter-religious harmony, and the Parsis benefited
from that as well. Although the Parsi community as a whole had favored
a conservative pro-British course, enough Parsis, including Indira
Gandhi's husband, had been proponents of independence to give them a
place in the national constellation. Many of the Parsis who feared the
consequences of independence emigrated quietly, thus contributing to the
community's decline. Intermarriage was increasing. Despite their coolness to Indian nationalism, the Parsis were not identified with either
China or Pakistan, the main enemies of the Indian Republic since
independence.26
Another case where no major persecution took place in a potentially
threatening situation is that of the Jews in Morocco. Again we have the
instance of a middleman minority which (although containing numerous
poor people) is more prosperous in the aggregate than the majority in a
Third World nation. Like the Parsis and the Jews of Europe, the Moroccan Jews had lived in the country for many centuries; they were not
recent immigrants. They spoke the local Arabic dialects. Later, many
adopted French as a domestic language. As in India, the Moroccan Jews
occupied specific economic niches in a traditional pre-industrial economy, although there also was some competition in commerce between
Jews and Muslims. Jewish occupations ranged from craftsmen and rural
peddlers to international traders.
The Jews were clearly subordinated to the Muslims in traditional
Islamic fashion. While this resembles the hierarchy of the Indian caste
system, there is a difference. The Jewish and Christian religions are
viewed as past and potential rivals of Islam. The Jews could also convert to Islam. Moroccan history contains instances of pogroms against
Jews, especially when Jewish officials were deprived of office, and
scholars dealing with North Africa dispute the degree to which JewishMuslim relations were marked by subordination and persecution or by
peaceful symbiosis, based on patron-client relations.27 There is little
dispute, however, that these relations were never marked by such massive upheavals as the Rhineland massacres during the Crusades, the
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medieval expulsions from England, France, Portugal, and Spain, or the
Cossack depredations of the seventeenth century.
Like the Parsis in British India, the Jews in both Spanish and French
Morocco welcomed the protection offered by European colonialists.
They were perceived as being collaborators. At the same time, they were
subjected to French anti-Semitism, but when this came to a head during
World War II under the Vichy regime, the Moroccan Sultan, Mohammed
V, protected them as his subjects. The postwar period was marked by
the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Moroccan struggle for independence.
While some Moroccan Jews identified with Moroccan nationalism,
others stood aside, preferring the continuation of French rule or emigration to Israel, France, or Canada. Although far to the west of the
Levant, Morocco is a member of the Arab League and contributed troops
to various countries fighting Israel in 1967 and 1973. The potential for
large-scale violence and/or government sponsored restriction and harassment has been present, but it has not occurred.28 Indeed, in April 1984,
Morocco was the scene of a public meeting between Moroccan and nonMoroccan Jews and the King of Morocco in Rabat. The Jewish leaders
included members of the Israeli Parliament. This was an unprecedented
event, especially since Morocco is a member in good standing of the
Arab League.
Several structural features may explain why Morocco has not been the
scene of such persecution. One is that the patron-client relationships
which were marked by dyadic contracts between an individual Jew and
his family on the one hand, and a powerful Muslim and his family on the
other, characterized intergroup relations in many parts of the country.
The patron would consider an attack on his Jewish client as an attack on
himself. While such patronage was primarily found in rural areas, it
could be extended to urban areas, and the present king and his father
have considered the Jews as their clients.29 This serves as a deterrent to
persecution, although such patronage has not been unknown elsewhere
in countries where pogroms have occurred.
The rapid and unimpeded emigration of Jews since 1950 has made the
Jews less vulnerable. Anticipating trouble, the Jewish community has
declined from over 200,000 to less than 20,000 today. This is a much
more rapid decline in numbers than that of the Parsis. While it has increased the perception of the Jews as a foreign and unassimilable minority, it also makes them less and less of a threat and a scapegoat.30 Few
Jews are prominent in politics.
In post-independence Africa, Southeast Asian and various middleman
minorities have been affected by legal discrimination and expulsions,
involving either the whole community or particular segments of it. The
groups involved have generally been of recent immigrant origin and, for
the most part, bearers of foreign nationality. Victims of persecution have
included civil servants and labor migrants as well as those involved in
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commerce. In West and East Africa, for instance, victims of forced
repatriation have included both Africans from neighboring countries and
Asians.31 Many of the migrants entered these countries during the colonial period to serve in the newly expanding economy, crossing what
were basically provincial boundaries between colonies of the same metropolitan power. There were some exceptions to this, such as the
Chinese and Lebanese. Many Indians from British India migrated into
French-controlled areas. While the expulsions of this variety which have
drawn the greatest world attention have been those of Asians from
Kenya and Uganda and of Chinese from Vietnam, equally large expulsions have occurred involving labor migrants from neighboring countries. For instance, Idi Amin's actions against the Indians and Pakistanis
in Uganda in 1971 were preceded by the expulsion of the Kenyan migrant workers, especially members of the Luo ethnic group, by his
predecessor, Milton Obote.32 This earlier event was less publicized outside of Africa because the expellees were repatriated to a neighboring
country, requiring little action on the part of European countries. The
Asians, however, attracted greater world attention because many had
claims as British subjects; but Britain was reluctant to accept non-white
commonwealth subjects as immigrants. On the other hand, India and
Pakistan, the lands of origin of these expellees, felt that those who
claimed British nationality were the responsibility of Britain, which at the
time of Ugandan independence had promised them protection. 33 While
there have been massacres, pogroms, and other genocidal actions in
Africa since independence, they have generally not been directed primarily against middleman minorities. One possible exception is that of
the massacres directed at the Ibo in northern Nigeria in 1966, which led
to the attempted secession of Biafra and a hard-fought civil war. These
massacres, however, had been preceded by a military coup in which Ibo
officers had overthrown a government dominated by northerners and in
which northern officials had been assassinated. Subsequently the Ibodominated junta was violently overthrown and pogroms were conducted
against Ibo outside of their region in Nigeria. Dadrian (1975) sees the
anti-Ibo pogroms as retributive genocide.34
The separateness of the groups considered here varies. As recent immigrants to the various countries where they live, they are generally
separated by culture and social structure. In some cases, they are racially
similar, as in the case of Nigerians in Ghana or Thais in Malaysia. The
degree of linguistic separation also varies, as does willingness to intermarry with the local populace. Most separated from the local populace
were probably the Indians and Pakistanis in East Africa. In addition to
their linguistic and racial distinctiveness, most South Asian groups also
maintained rigid caste and sectarian boundaries and did not even intermarry with other Asians. This was more true for Hindus than for
Muslims.
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Some of the instances of expulsion from African and Asian nations
have evoked images which remind many in the West of events related to
the Holocaust. The massacres in northern Nigeria were very effectively
used by proponents of Biafran independence. The homelessness of
Asian refugees from East Africa and the "boat people" from Indochina
reminded many of the refugee ships of the World War II era which went
from port to port with unwanted people, sometimes sinking under the
weight of their overcrowded passengers in a hostile sea. It is clear,
however, that these middleman minorities have not suffered the "optimal
genocide" which constituted the holocausts of the Armenians and the
Jews. One instance of this variety will be examined in some detail
before considering the similarities and differences between that case (as
representative of such expulsions) and that of the holocausts.

THE CHINESE OF VIETNAM AND THE SOUTHEAST
ASIAN CONTEXT
The vast majority of Chinese immigrants in the world, especially prior
to the revolution, came from the southeastern provinces of China. Prior
to the nineteenth century, junk trade between China and Southeast Asia
was carried on through these provinces. The vast labor migrations to
both Southeast Asia and the Americas were primarily from this region
during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. While most of the migrants were farmers by origin, commerce and moneymaking were familiar to countryfolk there, and commerce carried greater prestige in the
southeast than in other parts of China.
The initial migration as part of a traditional trade diaspora, and later
migrations of single men unaccompanied by families, produced a situation in which Chinese men frequently formed liaisons with or married
local women. In many places, their offspring assimilated into the local
population, although in some places, such as Java, they formed a distinctive part of the local Chinese community. Through such intermarriages and unions Chinese communities had kinship links with the nonChinese population. However, a large immigration of Chinese families
during the twentieth century changed this and led to greater isolation of
the Chinese from the local population. Coupled with rising Chinese and
local nationalisms and fears of the "Yellow Peril," conflict between the
Chinese and host populations increased. The immigration into Vietnam
and other parts of French Indochina followed this pattern. In fact, the
high point of Chinese immigration was reached during the civil unrest
and the Sino-Japanese war of the 1930s.
Chinese participation in the economies of the various Southeast Asian
countries followed two patterns. One was labor migration. During the
nineteenth century and the early twentieth century, Europeans recruited
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many Chinese to work in mines and on plantations throughout Southeast
Asia, as well as in other areas of the world. Such laborers were indentured or otherwise indebted to their employers. The vast majority were
single males, often leaving spouses and children behind in China. The
second pattern was for Chinese migrants to open enterprises of their
own, ranging from small mining operations and truck farms to large rice
mills and rubber-trading corporations. While many laborers returned
home, others went into business for themselves or worked for Chinese
employers.
The situation of the Chinese in Vietnam was fairly typical of such
populations throughout Southeast Asia, with some special conditions
stemming from Vietnam's proximity to China itself. The history of
Sino-Vietnamese relations prior to the French conquest in the nineteenth
century was marked by trade, tribute, and occasional warfare. Although
not expansionary in the Western sense, Chinese civilization did
incorporate areas south of its original heartland, some of which are seen
by modern Vietnamese as part of their own homeland. In premodern
times, Vietnam was seen by the Middle Kingdom as a tributary state,
even when it was independent. Struggles for independence from Chinese domination are part of Vietnamese history; at the same time, Vietnam absorbed important cultural complexes from China. This history
has ramifications for contemporary Sino-Vietnamese relations.
During the early Ching or Manchu period (seventeenth-eighteenth
centuries), Chinese fleeing from Manchu rule were settled in Cochin
China (what is now the southern part of Vietnam, including Saigon/Ho
Chi Minh City). The Vietnamese rulers of the time encouraged such
immigration. Under French rule (1859-1954), Chinese immigration
increased. By the end of the French administration, the majority of
ethnic Chinese in Vietnam were either immigrants themselves or the
descendants of recent immigrants, many of the earlier migrants having
been assimilated. In 1978, there were approximately 1.5 million
Chinese in Vietnam, only 300,000 of whom lived north of the 17th
Parallel, which divided the two Vietnamese states from 1954 until 1975.
The Chinese were approximately 10 percent of South Vietnam's
population and under 5 percent of Vietnam's population as a whole.35
The Chinese practiced a wide range of occupations, although they
were, to a large extent, involved in trade. In northern Vietnam (especially Tonkin), there were Chinese factory workers, fishermen, and
miners. Prior to independence, certain avenues to economic mobility
were reserved by the French for themselves, including mining, forestry,
and large plantations. Most Chinese business firms were small in terms
of their capital and simple in their organization. The most important industry in which the Chinese were predominant was rice-milling, crucial
in a rice-exporting country. At one time, this industry appears to have
been monopolized by the Chinese. In 1958, 60 percent of the rice-mills
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in the Saigon area were still owned by Chinese. The Chinese also invested in spinning and weaving shops, generally small in size. Chinese
also owned groceries, medicine shops, rice shops, second-hand goods
stalls, export and import firms, inland and maritime transportation,
banks, and insurance companies. Some Chinese, especially those originally from the island of Hainan, specialized in the cultivation of specific
crops, such as pepper. In general, the Chinese in South Vietnam in
particular played central roles in the commercial economy.36
As with other minorities, the political status of the Chinese throughout
Southeast Asia and in Vietnam was problematical. This status was further complicated by the continuing struggle for international recognition
and for the sympathies and loyalties of overseas Chinese by the rival
governments of Peking and Taipei during most of the post-1949 period.
The Peking government in particular varied between policies encouraging overseas Chinese to assimilate and measures to recruit these people
for its cause and for their protection. On the one hand, the Peking government would tell overseas Chinese to be good citizens in their host
countries. On the other hand, overseas Chinese students would be encouraged to study in the homeland. When governments persecuted their
Chinese residents, Peking sometimes sent a ship to repatriate overseas
Chinese from that country. 37
The nationality of the Chinese in Indochina was complicated by
various arrangements which the French had established for the control of
Chinese populations in their colonies. During the colonial period, the
French administration ruled the Chinese indirectly through "chiefs"
whom they appointed to maintain law and order. The chiefs ruled the
Chinese "congregations," which thus helped segregate the Chinese from
other Indochinese. This system was abolished by both the Communists
in the north and by the Diem regime in the south. The Chinese in Indochina remained Chinese nationals but were granted rights combining
those given to the natives and those granted to French nationals. They
were technically under the protection of the Chinese government. The
status of Chinese in Vietnam was thus comparable to that of Europeans
who had been granted extra-territoriality in various Asian and African
countries, although as nationals of a weak power the ability of China to
help them effectively was limited.38
After the partition of Vietnam the situation became more complicated,
since there were two Vietnams, each of which had diplomatic ties with a
different Chinese government. In the north, there was a partial maintenance of the status quo ante but with encouragement for the Chinese in
Vietnam to become naturalized. In 1961, the People's Republic of China
recognized North Vietnamese jurisdiction over its Chinese residents and
ceased issuing Chinese passports to such residents of Vietnam. In South
Vietnam, the Diem government followed a policy of forced naturalization
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by which many Chinese residents became citizens in order to remain in
business there. Their importance for the economy of the region remained intact. After the fall of Saigon, the Vietnamese government
viewed the Diem measures as valid, but the Chinese government contended that they were invalid as the products of an illegitimate government. 39
The dispute over the citizenship of the South Vietnamese Chinese was
entangled with other issues. There were some unresolved territorial
disputes and trouble over Cambodia, in which China sided with the Pol
Pot regime.40 In addition, Hanoi's decision to nationalize the South
Vietnamese economy and to integrate South Vietnam with North Vietnam
impinged on the Chinese large and small businessmen of the Saigon
area. By May 1978, Hanoi had decided to clamp down on the Chinese
businessmen of South Vietnam, and China reacted by announcing an
intention to send two ships to Vietnam to evacuate Chinese residents. As
relations between Hanoi and Peking worsened, negotiations over this
and other issues broke down. By the summer of 1978, ethnic Chinese
residents of both former North and South Vietnam were encouraged to
leave, and refugees began flowing over the Sino-Vietnamese border and
into the seas off Vietnam.
While this precipitated the refugee crisis of 1978-1979, the exodus
was initially illegal. Extortion and departure taxes were demanded from
potential refugees. Often Chinese businessmen acquired a boat and fares
were paid in cash and gold, half of which would go to the government
and for bribes to officials. In this way, it was similar to the departure of
ethnic Vietnamese, who were the majority of "boat people" during the
other refugee waves out of Vietnam since 1975. By July 1979, nearly
300,000 ethnic Chinese had fled from Vietnam.
What made this refugee crisis comparable to the pre-World War II
crises was the attitudes engendered in other nations, especially those of
Southeast Asia and the West. The People's Republic of China (PRC)
and Taiwan did accept refugees who arrived by land or sea. In the case
of the PRC, however, refugees in some cases had to undergo re-education, much like that which they were trying to avoid in the New
Economic Zones of Vietnam. This was less of a problem for proletarian
refugees from northern Vietnam than for those from Saigon.41
Vicissitudes of travel by sea in an open boat were many. The ships
and boats were often barely seaworthy. The passengers faced storms,
but also pirates. Many of the pirates were Thai fishermen who found
that robbing refugees was a lucrative occupation. At the height of the
refugee crisis, many ships avoided sealanes where there were refugees.
If landfall was achieved, there was no certainty that one would be allowed to land. Even the predominantly Chinese "city-states" of Singapore and Hong Kong were reluctant to accept refugees. Other neighbor-
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ing countries, particularly Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines,
were unwilling to accept ethnic Chinese refugees because each had its
own "Chinese" problem.
In Indonesia and in the Philippines, the Chinese constitute a small
percentage of the population (in both cases less than 5 percent). In these
countries, conflict between local "native" populations and the Chinese,
who are seen as controlling certain sectors of the economy, has been
acute for the past century. In both, dual nationality of the Chinese has
been an issue, with alternate policies of exclusion or forcible assimilation
of Chinese having been followed. In both, one also finds high degrees
of assimilation by certain segments of the Chinese population. "Mestizos" of partial Chinese ancestry have played an important role in Philippine life; Jose Rizal, the father of Philippine nationalism, was such a
mestizo. In Indonesia, many people of mixed Chinese and Indonesian
ancestry speak the local language. However unwilling they were to accept Chinese refugees, these countries played a less prominent role
during this crisis than did Malaysia.42
The government of Malaysia was quite vocal during this period. In
the summer of 1978 it threatened to tow refugee boats back into the sea if
they reached land in its territorial waters, and at times it backed up its
threat The Chinese constitute 35 percent of Malaysia's total population.
Thus an ethnic Chinese wave of settlers would threaten a delicate ethnic
balance. Malaysia had quietly resettled Muslim refugees from Indochina
in 1970. The balance between Chinese and Muslim Malays can, in fact,
be seen as crucial to the formation of the present Malaysian federation.
Singapore was expected to be part of this federation, but was excluded,
in part because it would have made a Chinese majority in the federation
possible. The Chinese had come to Malaysia as laborers to work in the
mines and the plantations, and many have continued to do so. The range
of Chinese occupations is broader in western Malaysia than in other
Southeast Asian countries. While the Chinese in Malaysia cannot be
seen exclusively as a middleman minority, they are prominent in commerce, and Singapore, with a Chinese majority, is the financial center of
the region. In general, the politically dominant Malays have felt that they
were weak economically relative to the Chinese and that the latter would
take over their country. The present Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohammed, expressed this fear in a controversial book published in
1970.43
The dramatic events of 1978 and 1979 filtered to the West with
reports that the South China Sea was full of refugees who were being
cynically allowed to leave Vietnam after paying extortionate taxes and
bribes; robbed, raped, and killed by pirates; and refused permission to
land by various governments, especially that of Malaysia. This aroused
memories of the late 1930s and early 1940s, and a wave of sympathy
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swept over certain Western countries. An international conference was
called. Pressure was put on Vietnam to control the flow of refugees and
on Malaysia to allow them to stay until other arrangements could be
made. Certain countries, especially France and the United States, accepted substantial numbers of these refugees. This relieved the transit
camps in various Southeast Asian countries, though large numbers continue to live in such camps and continue to leave the Communist nations
of Indochina through a variety of means. It is my impression that the
"boat people" of 1978 and 1979 were viewed by most Americans in a
manner similar to previous and subsequent groups of Southeast Asian
emigres and not as ethnic Chinese. While all of the Indochinese refugees
in the United States have encountered anti-alien racist prejudices and
opposition, no specifically anti-Sinic current differentiated the 19781979 wave from the others.
The Sino-Vietnamese case shares many features with other such instances, although it resulted in a rather brutal expulsion rather than an
optimal genocide. In Vietnam proper, especially southern Vietnam, the
minority was visible and conspicuous. Poverty was general and aggravated by many decades of war, both domestic and foreign. The minority
was apparently more prosperous than the majority, and the occupation of
the south by the north increased poverty. While the minority was
probably not increasing relative to the majority, it did control more
wealth than did the majority Vietnamese population. The minority's economic role was resented, and the Chinese were blamed for economic
problems in South Vietnam as early as 1957. This was also the case
under the Hanoi occupation.44 Clients and competitors, as well as the
officials of a nationalistic and socialistic government, all resented the role
of the Chinese. After 1975, the Chinese in Vietnam were no longer
related to a fraternal socialist government on the one side or to an anticommunist ally (Taiwan) on the other, but to the enemies of Vietnam,
i.e., the Chinese to the north and the Americans. They did have wealth
to plunder, through taxation and extortion.
So far, the preconditions for expulsion and genocide coincide. Why,
then, did the Vietnamese government carry out the former program rather
than the latter? There may be several reasons. One, the Vietnamese
government at this time was justifying its invasion of Cambodia on the
basis of the brutality of the Pol Pot government. While governments are
not particularly consistent in this regard, some form of legitimation plays
a role in political actions. Two, at least some of the Chinese were accepted by China proper. Three, the Vietnamese were themselves vulnerable to attack by China and the United States, although neither was in a
strong military position in 1978-1979. Still, some retaliation was possible. Four, the creation of a refugee crisis by expelling or encouraging
emigration is useful in embarrassing one's neighbors and foes. This
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crisis did do this, although not as effectively as the Mariel refugee flow
from Cuba in 1980. Five, the Vietnamese were not ideologically prepared for an optimal genocide. 45

COMPARISONS WITH HOLOCAUSTS
Looking at a number of examples is instructive. The two holocausts
of middleman minorities were committed on groups who were longstanding residents in the regions where they were murdered, not relatively recent immigrants. In this way, the Jews of Germany and Eastern
Europe and the Armenians of Anatolia, the main bodies of victims,
resembled the Parsis and the Moroccan Jews more than they did the
Indians in East Africa or even the Chinese in Vietnam.
In Europe, however, the Holocaust had been preceded by a period of
great migrations and urbanization. The Jews, in particular, were part of
these migrations, especially after the pogroms and May Laws in Russia
in the early 1880s. While the anti-Semitic movement in Germany began
well before that period and anti-Semitic ideas were commonly held at an
earlier time, large numbers of East European Jewish immigrants in
Germany and throughout Western Europe and North America certainly
reinforced the view that Jews were essentially an alien people. The
growing numbers of foreign Jews similarly lent credence to fears of
Jewish domination.
The recentness of migration is also relevant to the degree to which the
minority is visible as a separate group, although both the Jews in Eastern
Europe and the Armenians in Anatolia remained loyal to a separate
language for a long period of time. Such language loyalty, however,
was breaking down in Eastern Europe during the interwar period, and
many Armenians spoke either Turkish or a mixture of Turkish and Armenian. Genetic markers are also blurred with durable co-territoriality,
since sexual relations between members of the various groups take place,
whether in the form of marriage or of illicit seduction, rape, and
concubinage. While linguistic, genetic, or sumptuary markers may persist as ideals or as stereotypes, their breakdown may give anxiety about
assimilation and/or infiltration on the part of both groups in contact.
The fact of being old-timers in the region should also mean that a
minority is viewed as "native." At the very least, one would expect them
to reinvest resources in the country of their residence rather than sending
them abroad. Yet in most of the cases discussed here, such an expectation was upset for both old and recent residents. The major exception was probably pre-1914 Germany. One cause of such foreign
investment was the general impoverishment of the country. In most
cases, this was strengthened by moves of discrimination coupled with
fears of escalating persecution. To a lesser extent this was found among
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the Parsis of India, but it is certainly true of the other cases.
While it is hard to describe economic trends simply, most of the
countries under consideration have had economic difficulties during the
period preceding persecution (or expected harassment). Population
growth in many developing areas, depression, and inflation all contributed to a sense of impoverishment in the countries under consideration. The other part of the economic picture is the relationship of different classes with the minority, which had characteristics of a class in
itself. In India and Morocco, there were a variety of mercantile groups
competing with reasonable success. In Vietnam, East Africa, and
Poland, the minority was perceived as having some kind of monopoly
on trade and was particularly resented. In the Ottoman Empire, the
Armenians were one of several non-Muslim minorities who were perceived as controlling commercial enterprise; the degree to which Muslim
Turks desired to compete is not indicated in the literature. Germany, of
course, has been studied and dissected, and yet the results are inconclusive. It should also be pointed out that those who were most integrated into the society, whether in Poland or Germany, often competed
most directly with members of the majority ethnic group. It was the
German-speaking or Polish-speaking Jew who sought to enter the
university, become a professional or civil servant, or pursue success as
an artist. When positions of this kind are limited, competition is often
intense. While anti-Semitism was central to the Nazi ideology, it is still
unclear whether anti-Semitism itself was part of the core of its appeal to
those who became Nazis or voted for the Nazi party. Andreski, when
offering his economic interpretation of anti-Semitism, explicitly argued
that anti-Semitism in Germany was weaker than in Poland and Hungary,
roughly corresponding to the relatively small percentage of the population which was Jewish. Lately even the thesis that it was the lower
middle class that was most in competition with Jews and in the forefront
of German Fascism has been called into question. Istvan Deak agrees
with Andreski's argument that anti-Semitism was secondary to other
factors in drawing Germans to the Nazi movement and in leading them to
comply with the systematic genocide which followed 46 Still, the Nazis
incorporated the stereotype of the Jew as an alien middleman into their
propaganda.
Where does this leave middleman minority theory in its relationship to
genocide and ethnic conflict in general? As indicated early on, middleman minority theory is primarily applicable to the preconditions for
inter-ethnic conflict and genocide as a manifestation of such conflict.
Like most sets of theory, it provides us with questions to ask. Unquestionably, economic conflict between competing merchants, workers
and employers, and buyers and sellers takes on an ethnic dimension
when those on one side tend to be members of a different ethnic group
from those on the other side. There is a wide range of options for the
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end results of majority-middleman minority relations, including substantial assimilation, occupational integration, or the development of
complementarity, all with minimal conflict, as well as the conflicts resulting in voluntary emigration, harassment, expulsion, and genocide.
There is thus no necessary connection between middleman minority
status and victimization.47 In a period which has seen the mass murder
of Indians in Brazil, Paraguay, and Guatemala; Communists in Indonesia; large segments of the total population in East Timor and Cambodia; landowners and others in China; the ruling Afro-Shirazis in
Zanzibar; the dominant Tutsis in Rwanda; Hutu in Burundi; and
dissident members of ruling groups in the Soviet Union, it is difficult to
say that any group is not subject to genocide. Still, the vulnerability of
middleman minorities is related to their economic position and has been
demonstrated dramatically in this century. In all cases of victimization,
other factors were present, but the images of minority middlemen as
economic parasites and collaborators with alien enemies of the nation
were intertwined and served to justify their liquidation from the body
social.
As noted earlier, middleman minority theory's historical roots are
shared with the ideologies used to justify anti-minority actions. The
denigration of trade and moneylending and the ideal of a national
economy controlled by members of the national community, excluding
strangers, were important in the foundation of the social sciences as well
as in the formulation of both socialist and nationalist ideology. Jacob
Katz48 in his study of modem anti-Semitism concluded that many of the
observations of anti-Semites on the Jewish position in Europe were
empirically based, but the conclusions which they drew were colored by
extremely negative attitudes toward the Judaic heritage and the Jews
themselves. This observation can be extended to attitudes toward
middleman minorities elsewhere and to social scientists studying these
groups. As social scientists and scholars, we must pursue the economic
reasons for inter-ethnic conflict, even though our writings may be used
to justify oppression and persecution. With this awareness, however,
we might paraphrase Avtalyon: Beware scholars of your words, for evil
may follow from your speech.49
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AFTERWORD: GENOCIDE AND
CIVILIZATION
Richard L. Rubenstein

Although there have been thousands of books written about the destruction of the European Jews, few have been devoted to the more
general problem of genocide per se. Indeed, a number of contributors to
this volume have commented on the avoidance of the subject by political
and social researchers. Kurt Jonassohn and Frank Chalk observe that
until recently scholars participated in a process of pervasive, selfimposed denial concerning the importance of genocide in history. In
their introductory essay, editors Isidor Wallimann and Michael Dobkowski note the relative silence of social scientists on the subject. They
argue that social scientists have, e.g., been far more interested in poverty
than in the "nature of social conflicts and their possible escalation into
war and destruction." At the 1983 convention of the American Political
Science Association, a session on genocide, which featured papers by a
number of leading authorities, drew an audience of no more than ten. It
is this writer's thesis that the relative silence on the subject of genocide
stems from the unwillingness of both scholars and their audiences to
confront the fact that, far from being a relapse into barbarism, genocide
is an intrinsic expression of civilization as we know it. Put differently,
the genocidal destructiveness of our era is an expression of some of its
"most significant political, moral, religious and demographic tendencies."1 If indeed genocide expresses some, though obviously not all,
of the dominant trends in contemporary civilization, it would hardly be
surprising that few researchers would want to spend much time on the
night side of the world we have made for ourselves.
In the present volume the connection between civilization and genocide is raised most directly by Tony Barta's chapter, "Relations of Geno-
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cide: Land and Lives in the Colonization of Australia." A professor at
an Australian university, Barta asserts that the basic fact of his nation's
history has been the conquest of the country by one people and the dispossession "with ruthless destructiveness" of another people, the Aborigines, those who were there aborigine, "from the beginning." Barta argues that, although it was by no means the initial intention of the British
government to destroy the Aborigines, Australia is nevertheless a "nation
founded on genocide." According to Barta, genocide was the inevitable,
though unintended, consequence of the European colonization of the
Australian continent. Barta's thesis puts him somewhat at odds with
those scholars, such as Walter P. Zenner, who hold that genocide is "the
intentional physical annihilation of all or part of a group of people on
racial, religious or ethnic lines." According to Barta, in order to comprehend genocide we need a conception of the phenomenon that embraces
relations of destruction and removes from the term the emphasis on
policy and intention with which it is normally associated. Barta argues
that the history of his own country amply demonstrates that genocidal
outcomes can come into being without deliberate state planning. Moreover, he fully appreciates the degree to which the destruction of Australia's Aboriginal population was not the consequence of the actions of
isolated men acting out their aggressions on a lawless frontier far from
metropolitan centers of civilization but was in fact the outcome of economic, social, political, and religious transformations in the mother
country, the first European nation fully to enter the economically
rationalized world of the modern era.
If we wish to comprehend the roots of genocide in the modem world,
the beginnings of the modernization process in Great Britain may
provide an excellent starting point.2 The beginnings of English modernization are to be found in the acts of enclosure which transformed the
subsistence economy of premodern English agricultural into the money
economy of our era. In the process, the customary rights to land usage
of the economically unproductive English peasant class were abrogated
and that class was largely transformed into a congeries of individuals
whose survival was entirely dependent upon their ability to find wage
labor. Absent gainful employment, the dispossessed peasants could
only turn to a harsh and punitively administered system of poor relief,
vagabondage, or outright crime. A crucial social by-product of England's economic rationalization was the creation of a large class of people
who were superfluous to England's new economic system.
A class of more or less permanently superfluous people is a potential
source of acute social instability. Having no hope of receiving society's
normal rewards, it has little incentive, save fear of punitive retaliation, to
abide by society's customary behavioral restraints. Even if such a group
is tied to the rest of the population by common ethnicity and religion, it is
likely to be perceived and to perceive itself as having been cast outside of
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society's universe of moral obligation. Implied in a universe of moral
obligation is the expectation that, consistent with their social location, its
actors will, under normal circumstances, subordinate their individual
inclinations to the good of the whole. A measure of self-sacrificing altruism rather than self-regarding egoism will normally characterize the
behavior of members of such a universe toward each other. At a minimum, members will not normally regard other members as potential
sources of injury or even personal destruction. To the extent that trust is
possible between human beings, the actors within a shared universe of
moral obligation will normally trust each other, an attitude they will find
impossible to extend to strangers. Such attitudes have less to do with the
moral virtuosity of individuals than with the way social relations are
structured. The enclosure laws had the effect of expelling England's
displaced peasants from the only universe of obligation they had ever
known, that of the manor and the parish. This was clearly understood
by English decisionmakers as early as the enactment of the Elizabethan
Poor Laws, which were as much police measures aimed at controlling
England's first redundant population as they were philanthropic efforts
to supply that population's irreducible needs for survival.
In the case of the modernization of England, the arable land taken
from the displaced peasants was devoted to sheep raising, a cash crop,
and economically rational large-scale farming. Out of the vast social
dislocation engendered by the process, England was able to finance its
first large-scale modem industry, textiles. However, the transformation
of arable land to pasture seriously diminished England's ability to produce its own food supply. Moreover, by the beginning of the nineteenth
century, that country was no longer able to produce all of the raw
materials necessary for its burgeoning industry.
Australia was an ideal land for sheep raising. It was also a convenient
outlet for the relatively humane elimination of a significant portion of
England's redundant population. As Barta points out, the convict population exported by England to Australia was not unrelated to the dispossession of England's peasantry by the acts of enclosure. In addition,
England contained large numbers of undercapitalized small holders and
artisans who were faced with the prospect of downward economic
mobility in an increasingly capital-intensive home economy. Many of the
more enterprising small holders took their meagre assets to Australia in
the knowledge that an ever-increasing demand for both sheep's wool and
sheep's flesh in the mother country presented the undercapitalized free
colonizers, who were willing to work and capable of prudent management, with opportunities for prosperity which could not be duplicated at
home. Australia was thus an important safety valve for those segments
of England's population made redundant by the progressive rationalization of its economy and society.
As we know, Australia was not an unsettled country. Its Aboriginal
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people had developed a viable human ecology which was altogether
incomprehensible to the settlers, as indeed the ways of the settlers were
incomprehensible to them. Moreover, sheep raising and the settlers'
rationalized agrarian economy was incompatible with Aborigine land
use. Since both sides were absolutely dependent upon the land, albeit in
radically different ways, loss of the land necessarily entailed the
complete destruction of the defeated way of life. As Barta writes, coexistence was impossible.
The issue was decided by the superior power and technology of the
settlers. Since their survival was at stake, the Aborigines had no choice
but to resist. The predictable response of the settlers was to root out the
menace to their way of life. There were a number of bloody massacres.
There were also government-sponsored attempts to diminish settler violence, but even without direct violence the Aborigines were destined to
perish. Having lost their way of life and having been deprived of a
meaningful future, most of the Aborigines who were not killed by the
whites "faded away." Barta writes that between 1839 and 1849 there
were only twenty births recorded among the seven Aboriginal tribes
around Melbourne. He concludes that, whatever the official British
intent, the encounter between the white settlers and the blacks was one of
living out a relationship of genocide, a relationship that was structured
into the very nature of the encounter. Barta distinguishes between a
genocidal society and a genocidal state. National Socialist Germany was
a genocidal state. Its genocidal project was deliberate and intended.
Australia was a genocidal society. It had no conscious genocidal project.
Nevertheless, its very existence had genocidal consequences for the
original population. According to Barta, the basic pattern of the colonization of Australia was everywhere the same. It consisted of white pastoral invasion, black resistance, violent victory of the whites, and finally
the mysterious disappearance of the blacks.
Although Barta confines his description to Australia, it is clear that the
process he describes was repeated in other European colonial settlements. In his biography of Oliver Cromwell, the English historian
Christopher Hill comments:
A great many civilized Englishmen of the propertied class in the seventeenth
century spoke of Irishmen in tones not far removed from those which the
Nazis used about the Slavs, or white South Africans use about the original
inhabitants of their country. In each case the contempt rationalized a desire to
exploit3
What Hill could have added was that Cromwell was fully prepared to
exterminate those Irish Catholics who resisted exploitation and to turn
their lands over to Protestant colonizers. The towns of Drogheda and
Wexford refused to surrender to Cromwell. They were sacked and those
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inhabitants unable to flee were massacred. In the case of Wexford, after
all the inhabitants had been killed, Cromwell reported that the town was
available for colonization by English settlers. An English clergyman
commended the place for settlement: "It is a fine spot for some godly
congregation where house and land wait for inhabitants and occupiers."4
Even in the seventeenth century, it was clear to England's leaders that the
more Ireland was cleared of its original Catholic inhabitants the more
available it would be for Protestant English settlement.
The extremes to which England was prepared to go to empty Ireland
of its original inhabitants became clear during the famine years of 18461848. It is estimated that within that period the population of Ireland
was reduced by about 2 million out of an estimated 1845 population of 9
million. Approximately 1 million perished in the famine. About the
same number were compelled to emigrate in order to survive.5 Elsewhere, this writer has attempted to show that the relief given by the
English government to the Irish, who were, technically speaking, British
subjects at the time, was deliberately kept at levels guaranteed to produce
the demographic result which came to pass. Moreover, the demographic
outcome was welcomed by leading members of England's society and
government The deaths by famine and the removal by emigration were
lauded as achieving for Ireland what the enclosures had done for England, namely, clearing the land of uneconomic subsistence producers and
making it available for rationalized agricultural enterprise. 6 The candor
of an 1853 editorial in The Economist on the benefits of Irish and
Scottish emigration is instructive:
It is consequent on the breaking down of the system of society founded on
small holdings and potato cultivation.... The departure of the redundant

part of the population of Ireland and Scotland is an indispensable preliminary
to every kind of improvement.1

Unfortunately, the "departure" welcomed by The Economist entailed
mass death by famine and disease for a very significant proportion of
Ireland's peasant class. In the eyes of the British decision-making class
of the period, Catholic Ireland was an inferior civilization. 8 A class that
was indifferent to the fate of its own peasants was hardly likely to be
concerned with that of the Irish.
The basic colonizing pattern described by Barta, namely, white settlement, native resistance, violent settler victory, and, finally, the disappearance of most if not all of the natives, was played out in North and
South America as weU.9 If Australian society was built upon a genocidal
relationship with that of the indigenous cultures, so too was American
society. There was a time not so long ago when it was taken for granted
that "the only good Indian was a dead Indian."
The connecting link between genocidal settler societies of the eight-
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eenth and nineteenth centuries and twentieth-century genocide can be discerned in Adolf Hitler's Lebensraum program. As a young man, Hitler
saw the settlement of the New World and the concomitant elimination of
North America's Indian population by white European settlers as a
model to be followed by Germany on the European continent. As John
Roth points out in his chapter, Hitler was keenly aware of Germany's
population problems. He was determined that there would be no surplus
German population even if a significant portion of Germany's Slavic
neighbors were exterminated to provide "living space" for German
settlers adjacent to the homeland. Put differently, Hitler proposed to
repeat in Europe, albeit with infinitely intensified viciousness, the exploitative colonialism practiced by other Europeans overseas. In Hitler's
eyes the Slavs were destined to become Europe's Indians. They were to
be displaced, uprooted, enslaved, and, if necessary, annihilated to make
way for Germany's surplus population. Unlike the earlier colonizers,
Hitler had no illusions concerning the genocidal nature of such an undertaking. He had the historical precedents of earlier European efforts at
colonization and imperial domination. He regarded the defeat of native
cultures by white settlers and colonists as evidence for his version of
Social Darwinism, the belief that history is the theater in which the races
enact their life and death struggle for survival and the superior races
destroy their racial inferiors. As is well known, this same Social Darwinism became an important component in the legitimating ideology for
the Holocaust. In Hitler's eyes, the Jews were the most contemptible of
all of the inferior races destined by fate and German strength for
destruction.
As noted above, there was a fundamental difference between the
behavior of the older European colonizing powers and Hitler's in that his
policies were intentional and deliberately formulated. If the destruction
of the Aboriginal cultures of Australia was an unintended consequence of
state policy, the destruction and eventual extermination of Germany's
neighbors was fully intended by Hitler and National Socialist Germany.
Nevertheless, that difference should not obscure the fact that (a) both
colonizing policies were intended to solve the same fundamental problem, namely, the relatively humane, non-genocidal elimination by the
mother country of a redundant or potentially redundant sector of its domestic population, and that (b) both could be successfully implemented
only by the merciless elimination of the indigenous population of the
colonized lands. Moreover, the very success of the earlier projects
invited their repetition by political leaders, such as Hitler, who believed
their nation to be faced with the problem that had led to the original
colonization. Such leaders could no longer pretend ignorance of the consequences of their policies. One of the differences between Hitler and
his predecessors was his lack of hypocrisy and illusion concerning the
extent to which his project entailed mass murder. Nevertheless, it is
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clear from the history of the English in Ireland and Australia as well as
that of Europeans in the New World that the destruction of the indigenous population never constituted a reason for calling colonization to a
halt There is thus a historical continuum between the unintended genocides of the period of Europe's demographic projection beyond its
original territorial limits and that of the period of Europe's deliberate
auto-cannibalization.
If the above argument has merit, it will be possible to define genocide
as the most radical means of implementing a state or communally
sponsored program of population elimination. It should be noted that (a)
the issue of intention is not raised in this definition, and that (b) genocide
is grasped conceptually within the wider context of programs of population elimination. This definition allows for a comprehension of the
larger historical conditions under which a population is likely to be identified as redundant and targeted for one or another form of elimination.
This definition also helps to structure the connections between population redundancy, emigration, expulsion, colonization, modernization,
and genocide.
According to Walter P. Zenner, the aim of genocide is to transform a
social field by removing a whole group of political actors. Without necessarily disagreeing with Zenner, Roger Smith argues that the fundamental issue in genocide is Who belongs, who is to have a voice in
society? It is this writer's conviction that, unless the identity of society
and the political order is assumed, a highly questionable assumption, the
real issue is Who is to have a voice in the political order?
The issue of a voice in the political order is in turn related to the universe of moral obligation. In ancient Greece, members of the polis belonged to a common universe of obligation. This was especially evident
in war. Only those who shared common origins, belonged by inherited
right to the same community, and saw themselves as partaking of a common fate could be trusted in a life-and-death struggle. Neither the slave
nor the stranger could be so trusted. Hence, they were regarded as
outside of the shared universe of obligation.
A very grave problem arises when, for any reason, a community
regards itself as having within its midst a sub-community or a group of
strangers who cannot be trusted. The problem is especially urgent in
time of war. The perception of disloyalty may be mistaken, as in the
case of the Armenians in Turkey during World War I and Japanese
Americans during World War II. The fundamental reason for the mass
incarceration of the Japanese Americans was the belief of most Americans that the majority of Japanese Americans were loyal to the Emperor
rather than to their adopted country. Similarly, Rabbi Meir Kahane's
extremist agitation to expel all Arabs from contemporary Israel ultimately
rests upon the conviction that Israelis can only trust each other and that
as long as the state contains potentially hostile elements, the safety of the
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community remains precarious. This author is convinced that, were
Kahane's policies ever implemented, the consequences would be disastrous. Nevertheless, even those Israelis who find Kahane's "solution"
abhorrent do not advocate opening the ranks of the Israeli armed services
to its Arab population. The problem Kahane proposes to "solve" is the
classic problem of the nature of membership in a community.
Sometimes the question of a voice in the political community takes on
a class rather than an ethnic dimension. When Kampuchea fell to the Pol
Pot regime in 1975, the victors had a very clear idea of the kind of
agrarian Communist society they proposed to establish. Rightly or
wrongly, they regarded Kampuchea's entire urban population as being
objectively hostile to the creation of the new political order. This perception was consistent with the Marxist idea that the bourgeois class is
destined to disappear with the coming of socialism. Not content to let
this process take its course nonviolently, the regime determined upon the
immediate elimination through genocidal measures of all those who were
regarded as either incapable of fitting into the new system or of being
objectively committed to its destruction. to In the aftermath of the Russian Revolution, a very similar logic compelled the departure from the
Soviet Union of millions of "objective enemies" of the new system.
Similarly, the Cuban revolution resulted in the enforced emigration of
over a million Cubans who could not fit into Fidel Castro's system,
primarily to the United States.
A related development is currently taking place in South Africa.
Because of the overwhelming number of blacks and their indispensability to the functioning of the economic order, it is impossible for the
Afrikaners to eliminate them. Indeed, save for some ultra-rightist
groups, there is no evidence of any Afrikaner interest in so doing.
Nevertheless, the Afrikaners have answered the question "Who shall
have a voice in the political community?" by excluding non-whites. Of
crucial importance is the consistent refusal of the Afrikaners to admit the
blacks to any meaningful kind of suffrage. Apartheid and the denial of
electoral rights are attempts to define membership in the political community without resort to outright mass murder. Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that all of the policies cited above-segregation,
concentration camp incarceration, expulsion, and genocide-are attempts
to cope with a common problem.
Gunter Remmling's discussion of the progressive steps taken by the
Third Reich to deny legal rights to the Jews is especially helpful in
acquiring an overview of the process by which Jews were stripped of
membership in the German political community until finally even the
right to life itself was denied them. The question "Who is to have a
voice in the political community?" was absolutely decisive for National
Socialism. The political emancipation of the Jews in Europe in the late
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries bestowed upon the Jews a voice in
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the political communities in which they were domiciled. With the dour
wisdom of historical hindsight, the extermination of the Jews can be
seen as an unintended consequence of their emancipation. Emancipation
made membership of the Jews in Europe's political communities a
political issue for the first time. Emancipation was opposed by all who
believed such membership should be restricted to Christians. An
important reason why so little was done to assist the Jews during World
War II, both in Germany and in the occupied countries, was the almost
universal European acceptance of the National Socialist objective of
excluding the Jews from membership in the political communities in
which they were domiciled. This certainly was true of the mainstream
Protestant and Catholic churches, which everywhere saw the denial of
political rights to the Jews as a beneficial step toward the creation of a
Europe that was culturally, intellectually, socially, and politically
Christian. The fundamental difference between Hitler and the churches
was that Hitler had no illusions concerning the measures necessary to
carry out such a program. The churches never faced frankly the question
of implementation. Nevertheless, one must ask whether the silence of
the overwhelming majority of Europe's church leaders during World
War II concerning the Holocaust may have been at least partly due to the
fact that church leaders fully understood that extermination was the only
viable means of eliminating the Jews. Having no direct responsibility
for carrying out the process of elimination, they preferred to wash their
hands of the question of implementation. In any event, it is now clear
that the insistent calls for the elimination of the Jews from membership in
the body politic of the European nations was in fact a demand for their
extermination.
The question of uniqueness looms large in the discussions of the
place of the Holocaust in the larger subject of genocide. Surprisingly,
none of the writers discusses one aspect of the Holocaust which was
absolutely unique. In no other instance of genocide in the twentieth
century was the fate of the victims so profoundly linked to the religiomythic inheritance of the perpetrators. In Christianity, the Jews are not
simply one of the many peoples of the world. They are the people in
whose midst God himself reigned to be incarnated. According to the
classic Christian account, instead of being the first to recognize this
supreme act of divine graciousness, the Jews both rejected God-in-theflesh and were responsible for the violent and vicious way in which he
was removed from the human scene. The Jews are depicted as the Godbearing and the God-murdering people par excellence. No other religion
is as hideously defamed in the classic literature of a rival tradition as is
Judaism by Christianity. Moreover, starting with the fall of Jerusalem in
70 C.E., Christianity has taken the disasters of the Jewish people to be a
principal historical confirmation of its own truth. These have been interpreted in the classic sources to be God's punishment of a sinful Israel for
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having rejected Christ. The practical consequences of (a) the ascription
of a demonic identity to Jews and (b) the interpretation of their misfortunes as just chastisements of a righteous Lord was to cast them out of
any common universe of moral obligation with the Christians among
whom they were domiciled. In times of acute social stress, it had the
practical effect of decriminalizing any assault visited upon them, as Hitler
and the leading National Socialists fully understood. The implementation of the Holocaust was greatly facilitated by the deicidal and demonic
interpretation of the Jewish people in the Christian religious imagination.
If the Holocaust was to some extent a unique event, its religio-mythic
dimension constituted a significant component of that uniqueness.
In addition to the religious aspect of the Holocaust, there was a highly
significant economic element. The European Jews were a middleman
minority. The question of the proneness of middleman minorities to
genocidal assault is raised by Walter P. Zenner. Zenner points out that
the Armenians were also a middleman minority targeted for extermination. He also points out that a third middleman minority, the Hoa or
ethnic Chinese of Vietnam, were the object of a large-scale, statesponsored program of population elimination.11 Zenner ends his examination of middleman minority theory with the conclusion that there is no
necessary connection between middleman minority status and genocide.
Nevertheless, he concedes that such a status can be a precondition for
genocide if other factors are present. According to Zenner, middleman
minority theory has yet to face the question of why "economically integrated non-wage labor groups" are more likely to be victimized, while
wage laborers, the marginalized, and the poor are not usually targets. In
actuality, middleman minorities are permitted domicile in a community in
order to do work that, for some reason, is not being done by the indigenous population. Their presence as strangers is tolerated because
they constitute an economically or vocationally complementary population. They are most likely to be targeted for elimination when their roles
can be filled either by the state or by members of the indigenous population. When this development talces place, the minority members become
competitors of members of the majority. Usually, they compete against
one of the most dangerous and potentially unstable groups within the
larger population, the majority middle class. In the case of indigenous
wage workers, the marginalized, or the poor, the same bitter rivalry with
a dangerous class does not arise. When political leaders perceive vocationally redundant members of the majority to be a source of social or
political instability, they have encouraged emigration, as was the case in
Western and Central Europe during much of the nineteenth century.
Nevertheless, there is usually some residual sense that, even when they
become redundant, the marginalized or the poor remain to some extent
part of the community's shared universe of moral obligation. This is not
the case with middleman minorities, especially when they are outside of
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the majority religious consensus. They are often tolerated only as long
as they are needed. Moreover, in premodern societies it was not socially
or economically functional for middleman minorities to share a common
religion with the majority. The impersonal, objective attitudes necessary
for successful commerce were less likely to develop between people who
considered themselves to be kin with the same gods. Commerce rested
on an in-group, out-group double standard. It was only with the rise of
Protestantism that the personalized ethics of tribal brotherhood gave way
to universal otherhood and a universal money economy could come into
being.12
Elsewhere, this writer has attempted to show that the situation of
Europe's Jews became progressively more hopeless as the economies of
Western and Eastern Europe were modernized.13 For example, as the
agriculture of Eastern Europe was rationalized, large numbers of Polish
and Russian peasants were dispossessed of their holdings and forced to
seek scarce wage labor in the villages and cities. Desperate for any kind
of work under conditions of massive unemployment and underemployment, members of the former peasant class began to compete with the
Jews for wage labor and those middle-class slots which had previously
been predominantly Jewish. In seeking to displace the Jews, the dispossessed peasants and their urbanized offspring had the support of the
Tsarist government, which, after 1881, made the Jews the targets of one
of the most highly successful state-sponsored programs of population
elimination in all of history. From 1881to1917, the fundamental objective of the Tsarist government vis-a-vis the Jews differed little from that
of the National Socialist regime in Germany. Both sought the elimination of the Jews as a demographic presence in the areas under their
control. Most American Jews are alive today because the two regimes
did not share a common method of implementation.
In addition to serving as a method of radically redefining and restructuring society, genocide has since ancient times been the most unremitting kind of warfare. According to Kurt Jonassohn and Frank Chalk,
genocide began in ancient times when warring peoples realized that their
victories were only temporary. Elimination of a potential future threat
became a powerful reason for wars of genocide. Undoubtedly, the
human cost to the perpetrator played an important role in determining
when a war was carried to such an extreme. After total defeat, the cost
to the victor of eliminating a future threat was minimal. Since the enemy
was outside of the victor's universe of moral obligation, defeat removed
the only practical impediment to genocide. As long as an enemy retained
the power to injure, a would-be perpetrator had to weigh the relative
costs of a precarious peace against those involved in genocide. If neither
side had the power to achieve a decisive victory, there was no possibility
of a "final solution." In the case of the Holocaust, the Jews were
perceived as a defenseless enemy with no significant capacity to retaliate.
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The problems involved in their extermination were reduced to the bureaucratic management, transport, and elimination of the target population. A principal Jewish motive for the establishment of the state of
Israel was to escalate the cost of killing at least those Jews who are
Israeli citizens. There is little doubt that the cost now includes nuclear
retaliation.
Irving Louis Horowitz points out that genocide very frequently follows military defeat. An important element in the decision of the Young
Turk regime to initiate the program of extermination against its Armenian
Christian minority was Turkey's defeat by Bulgaria in 1912. Similarly,
Germany's defeat in World War I created the conditions in which a
radically anti-Semitic, revolutionary, revisionist National Socialist movement could come to dominate German politics. As a consequence of
defeat, the fringe became the center.
Horowitz also argues that the most massive destruction of Jews
during World War II began in earnest in 1942 after Stalingrad. When
German defeat appeared inevitable, extermination of the Jews became a
paramount goal. In a similar vein, Barbara Harff suggests that a lost war
sometimes leads to genocide against defenseless minorities regarded as
enemies. While Harff stresses the element of battered national pride, a
related element may be that military defeat intensifies the urgency with
which the question of membership in the community is posed. As noted
above, a fundamental issue in genocide is the question of who can be
trusted in a life-and-death struggle. All minorities suffer some discrimination and experience some degree of resentment and incomplete identification with the majority, a situation which is as obvious to the majority
as to the minority. In normal times, such tensions can be held in check.
In the aftermath of catastrophic military defeat, they can get out of hand.
Aggressive energies can achieve cheap victories over a defenseless
minority. The reality of defeat itself can be denied and responsibility for
the misfortunes of war ascribed to the minority's hidden "stab in the
back." The accusation of secret treachery can legitimate genocide against
the minority. If such a group is perceived as bringing about national
catastrophe, while appearing to be loyal, it can become a matter of the
greatest public urgency to eliminate them from the body politic.
Almost from the moment Germany lost World War I, the Jews were
accused of bringing about its defeat through treachery, an accusation that
appeared ludicrous in view of the extremely high proportion of German
Jews who had served as front-line soldiers and who had made the ultimate sacrifice for what they regarded as their Fatherland. Elsewhere,
this writer has argued that the tradition of Judas betraying Jesus with a
token of love, a kiss, provided an enormously powerful religio-mythic
identification of the Jew with betrayal to German Christians.14 Since the
identification of the Jew with Judas takes place in earliest childhood and
is constantly reinforced by religious tradition, it is more deeply rooted
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and less subject to rational criticism than beliefs acquired at a later stage
in the life cycle. When Hitler and the German right ascribed Germany's
defeat to the Jews, they had working for them this immensely powerful
pre-theoretical archetype. Here too, we discern a unique religio-mythic
element of enormous power that sets the Holocaust apart from other
instances of genocide in our times.
Given the presence of religio-mythic elements in the Holocaust, it is
not surprising that many scholars have argued that the Holocaust was
irrational in its objective if not in its method. Barbara Harff has argued
that though the Holocaust may have been a "rational choice of the
Nazis," the utility of its implementation was thoroughly irrational.
Robert G .L. Waite, a historian of preeminent rank, concludes that there
is no adequate explanation for the Holocaust. By contrast, Roger Smith
argues that genocide is a "rational instrument to achieve an end." In
order to understand the force of Smith's argument, it is important not to
confuse that which is humane with instrumental rationality. The experience of our era should leave no doubt concerning the enormous potential
for inhumanity present in autonomous practical reason.
Ronald Aronson argues that the Holocaust systematically outraged the
norms of the "normal world." He insists that the Holocaust was a
product of madness, which he defines as a systematic derangement of
perception, a seeing what is not there. The National Socialists saw the
Jews as the source of Germany's problems and their riddance as a major
element in the solution. Aronson argues that when rulers organize a
society against false enemies and propagate the view that society is being
mortally threatened by them when it is not, we may speak of madness as
much as when an individual behaves in the same manner.
Aronson's arguments summarize the thesis he presents with greater
force and detail in his book, The Dialectics of Disaster.IS It is not surprising that Aronson and Roger Smith do not agree on the rationality of
genocide. Smith sees genocide as a violent means of determining who is
to have a voice in a community. Aronson stresses the patently false
character of the defamation of the intended victim and of the analysis of
society as mortally endangered by his presence. However, Aronson
does not deal with the underlying reason why the question of "who shall
have a voice in the community" is raised in the first place. A community
is more than a congeries of individuals living in close proximity. As
noted above, it is a group whose members may have to sacrifice their
lives in a life-and-death struggle with external enemies in a crisis. When
the group regards itself as secure, it can afford to take a relatively benign
view of the presence of a limited number of strangers in its midst. However, in times of acute national stress, such as war, economic dislocation, or military defeat, the group is likely to view strangers with suspicion and hostility. In an extreme situation, it may decide upon the total
elimination of strangers.
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Aronson insists that the Nazi attempt wholly to eliminate the Jews as a
demographic presence first in Germany and then in all of Europe was
insane because the Jews in no way constituted the threat the National
Socialists alleged them to be. The issue of the truth of National Socialist
defamations is, however, irrelevant to the crucial fact that the overwhelming majority of Germans regarded even the most assimilated Jews
as aliens whose elimination would be a positive benefit. The Germans
were not duped by mendacious Nazi propaganda. They wanted the
volkisch homogeneity Hitler promised them. When it was all over,
some of them regretted the methods employed but not the fact that
Europe was largely free of Jews.
If Aronson were right, it would be irrational to want an ethnically or
religiously homogeneous community consisting of those with whom one
shares a sense of kinship and trust.. In reality, there is nothing irrational
about the desire for such a community. One wonders whether Aronson
considers the colonization of the Americas and Australia, which was
largely achieved through genocide, to be instances of madness. It is not
the irrationality of such communities that is the problem, but the extreme
cruelty and inhumanity which all too frequently attend their creation.
Neither Hitler's ends nor his methods were irrational. They were obscenely cruel and graphically demonstrate what citizens of one of the
world's most advanced civilizations were willing to do to other human
beings for the sake of national homogeneity.
Finally, there is the issue of genocide and national sovereignty.
Roger Smith observes that the United Nations never detected a single
instance of genocide by a member nation. Kurt Jonassohn and Frank
Chalk argue that the sovereignty of the perpetrator is the practical problem in cases of deportation and extermination because the nation-state is
both the most dangerous violator and the ultimate guardian of human
rights. Elsewhere, this writer has argued that National Socialist
Germany probably committed no crime at Auschwitz.16 It was under no
circumstances this author's intention to mitigate the inhumanity and the
obscenity of what the Germans did, but to point to one of the most urgent moral dilemmas involved in the notion of political sovereignty in
our era. Crime is a violation of behavioral norms defined by political
authority. Homicide, for example, is only a crime when the victim is
protected by the state's laws. Even in National Socialist Germany, there
were actually a very small number of SS officers who were punished for
the unauthorized murder of Jews during World War II. The state determined when homicide was an offense against its law and when it constituted the implementation of those same laws.
If it be argued that the National Socialist state was by its very nature a
criminal state because it violated God's laws or the laws of nature, one
must ask what practical difference such violations made to the perpe-
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trators. As long as the leaders of National Socialist Germany were free
to exercise sovereignty, no superordinate system of norms constituted
any kind of restraint on their behavior. As is well known, neither the
German churches nor the Vatican ever asserted that the genocidal program of the National Socialist state was a violation of God's law,
although the program was well known. In reality, there are no human
rights there are only political rights. That is why the question "Who is to
have a voice in the political community?" is the fundamental human
question. Membership in a political community is no absolute guarantee
of safety. Nevertheless, to the extent that men and women have any
rights whatsoever, it is as members of a political community with the
power to guarantee those rights. This was clearly evident in the fate of
the Armenians in Turkey during World War I and the Jews of Europe
during World War II. Genocide is the ultimate expression of absolute
rightlessness.
While highlighting the extreme moral limitations of contemporary
civilization, genocide is nevertheless an intrinsic expression of that
civilization. Genocide is most likely to occur when men and women
refuse to extend the benefits and protection of their societies to strangers
whom they cannot or will not trust. Obviously, that perception is highly
subjective and may very well be in error. Nevertheless, one of the privileges of power is the ability to define social reality. The objective facts
are of far less practical consequence than the subjective perceptions of
the majority.
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